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                                    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                    FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION
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DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS, DOCKET NUMBER vs.

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL - VOLUME 1 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE AMY TOTENBERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT SENIOR JUDGE JANUARY 9, 2024

MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY OF PROCEEDINGS AND COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY:

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(...CONT'D....)
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    PROCEEEDINGS
    (Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia; January 9, 2024.)
    THE COURT: Morning, Counsel.
    We're here for trial in Curling, et al. v. Secretary
Raffensperger, et al. This is 17-CV-2989.
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Counsel, would you introduce yourselves and those with you. Thank you.

MR. CROSS: Good morning, Your Honor. David Cross with Morrison Foerster on behalf of the Curling plaintiffs.

MS. KAISER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Mary Kaiser of Morrison Foerster on behalf of the Curling plaintiffs.

MR. FISHER: Good morning, Your Honor. Ramsey Fisher, Morrison Foerster, on behalf of the Curling plaintiffs.

MR. KNAPP: Good morning. Halsey Knapp, Krevolin \& Horst, on behalf of Curling plaintiffs.

MR. SPARKS: Good morning, Your Honor. Adam Sparks, Krevolin \& Horst, on behalf of Curling plaintiffs.

MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, Robert McGuire, Robert
McGuire Law Firm for the Coalition plaintiffs.
MR. BROWN: Bruce Brown for the Coalition plaintiffs.
MR. ICHTER: Cary Ichter for the Coalition
plaintiffs.
MR. OLES: David Oles for Ricardo Davis.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. TYSON: Good morning, Bryan Tyson for the
defendants.
MR. RUSSO: Good morning, Your Honor. Vincent Russo
for the defendants.
MR. BELINFANTE: Good morning, Judge. Josh
Belinfante, Robbins Firm, for the defendants.
MR. BEDARD: Good morning, Your Honor. Ed Bedard for
the defendants.
MR. PICO-PRATS: Good morning, Your Honor, Javier
Pico-Prats for the defendants.
MR. WEIGEL: Good morning, Your Honor. Dan Weigel on behalf of the defendants.

MR. JACOUTOT: Good morning, Your Honor. Bryan
Jacoutot for the State defendants.
MS. HERNANDEZ: Good morning, Your Honor, Danielle
Hernandez for the State defendants.
MS. LaROSS: Good morning, Your Honor. Diane LaRoss
for the State defendants.
MR. BOYLE: Good morning, Your Honor. Donald Boyle
for the State defendants.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Good morning, Your Honor.
Matthaeus Martino-Weinhardt on behalf of Curling plaintiffs.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Good morning, Your Honor.
Christian Andreu-von Euw on behalf of the Curling plaintiffs.
MR. CAMPBELL: Good morning, Your Honor. Ben
Campbell on behalf of the Curling plaintiffs.

MR. SCHEINMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Aaron
Scheinman, Morrison Foerster, for the Curling plaintiffs.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Counsel, to the extent that we've got folks who are at the tables, because $I$ doubt that anyone who is out there is going to be participating actually in examination right now, just have one of your team just draw me a little map of each of where you are all sitting.

I mean, I obviously know everyone here. But names can fly out of the brain once focused on other things. So if one of you -- each of you could just do that, that would be great.

My understanding, from our conversation yesterday, was that counsel want to do an opening statement. And the plaintiffs are doing a consolidated one, the Curling and Coalition plaintiffs, of approximately an hour.

And additionally, recent counsel for Mr. Davis, who has recently appeared in this case in the last month, asked to also give an opening statement not to exceed ten minutes.

And the State said that you didn't think you were going to go beyond an hour and thought it was going to be less.

MR. TYSON: Correct.
THE COURT: So we'll proceed on that basis.
And, Mr. Cross, are you giving the statement or is
somebody else?

MR. CROSS: I'm going to start. Ms. Kaiser is going to go. I'm going to get up briefly on some different topics and then Mr. McGuire will go.

THE COURT: All right. Well, you're the master of your time then.

OPENING STATEMENT

MR. CROSS: The cornerstone of any democracy is a citizen's exercise of their right to vote. Voting is a citizen's voice in their government.

Importantly, Your Honor, these are not my words. These are the words of the Georgia State Election Board recognizing and emphasizing how important voting is to the functioning of our democracy and importantly emphasizing the individual, singular citizen's right to vote where each individual citizen casts their own unique voice when they cast their ballot. And that is how they participate in the Government and ultimately in democracy.

And here in Georgia, in particular, it is not just voting by any means. What is really important is voting in person.
(Playing of the videotape.)
MR. CROSS: So what we will prove today, Your Honor, and throughout this trial, is that there is standing for our clients, first and foremost, to protect their individual right to vote and particularly their individual right to vote in
person because of how important it is to them and to other voters in Georgia as the Secretary's office has emphasized.

And Secretary Raffensperger himself has emphasized how important it is to have an election process that is transparent, that's accurate, that is objectively fair, and, particularly important, that Georgians subjectively trust.

So Secretary Raffensperger himself recognizes and promised in a stump speech, as he writes in his book, Your Honor, a voting system the Georgians not only can have objective trust but subjectively can trust the election outcomes and that their right to vote is protected.

Unfortunately, despite the promise made here, that doesn't exist in the state of Georgia. And we will show, through the expert testimony of Dr. Alex Halderman and others, that numerous, very serious vulnerabilities exist with this system that have been validated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in particular by CISA, which has responsibility for election security.

And how has the State responded to that? The same way they are going to respond in this trial.
(Playing of the videotape.)
MR. CROSS: Anyone who has the access that Dr. Halderman got can do anything they want with the voting system. That is Secretary Raffensperger's own admission. Goes so far as to say, Duh. Duh. Of course, you could do that if
you got into the system. But he says that is not real world. In the real world, no one could get access to the voting system.
(Playing of the videotape.)
MR. CROSS: What we will show in this trial is the only person who doesn't live in the real world when it comes to voting security is the Secretary of State because that was the real world.

Day after day after day numerous individuals walking in to a county election office with unmitigated access to the voting system, not simply in the way Dr. Halderman had in a conference room detached from the voting system, but in its operational environment.

And as Secretary Raffensperger says, anyone who has that access, duh, they can do whatever they want.

And how has the State responded and how will they continue to respond, no doubt in this case, to what is happening in the real world, to our experts, to CISA?

They say we're election deniers. They go so far as to say that our Ph.D. experts, Dr. Alex Halderman, Dr. Andrew Appel, Dr. Philip Stark, the leading election security experts, experts on audits, are no different than a pillow salesman that has been peddling fraud for years. And if you don't like the comparison, well, tough noogies.

And what we will show is how dangerous this reaction
is because it misleads the public. And what it says to the public and to those would be actors who will come back as we saw in Coffee County, come on in, because we won't take it seriously when you do it. We won't hold you accountable. And we won't protect the system.

And their own expert disagrees with these smears Dr. Juan Gilbert will testify in this case. Their election expert that they retained for this case, will say that if he wanted to assess the security vulnerabilities of a voting system, the top of his list, Dr. Alex Halderman, Dr. Andrew Appel, two experts for us. These are not election deniers. They are among the most credible, respected experts in the country. We will show you the State has absolutely no response to their findings.

Before I hand it off, Your Honor, just briefly, Secretary Raffensperger acknowledges that the ultimate fact check in his book, this is what he says, is the United States is in the court. He says, if you want to know the truth, watch what happens in court.

Well, Secretary Raffensperger won't be here to tell you anything, to answer a single question, and that is a choice. He is choosing not to be here.

With that, I'll hand it off to Ms. Kaiser.
OPENING STATEMENT
MS. KAISER: Good morning, Your Honor. I'll spend a
few minutes introducing you to the key players you will hear from and about during the trial, starting with the Curling plaintiffs.

First we have Jeffrey Schoenberg. Mr. Schoenberg's family moved to Georgia when he was four years old. After attending college at Princeton and law school at UNC, he had a variety of legal jobs before effectively retiring to care for his parents back in Dunwoody, Georgia.

And, Your Honor, Mr. Schoenberg may, unfortunately, not be able to attend the full trial in person as he wishes because of these primary caregiving responsibilities for his elderly parents.

Mr. Schoenberg will demonstrate to the Court as a voter how the BMD system works at the polls and the reasons why he is concerned about its reliability.

Next we have Donna Price. Ms. Price's family has lived in Georgia since the 1700s, and one of her ancestors was involved in drafting Georgia's Constitution.

Ms. Price will tell you that this family legacy and her love of history has informed her belief that voting is critical to protecting our country's democracy, and she registered to vote as soon as she could when she was a high school senior about to turn 18.

Ms. Price worked at Emory University for 30 years, including in the IT department where she helped build websites
for several departments at the school.
Ms. Price will testify about her experience voting on
a BMD and how doing so prevented her from casting a verified ballot. She will also explain that to her voting absentee is no substitute for in-person voting because it is far more complicated, arduous, and confusing than voting in person.

And on two occasions, the State's failure to mail her an absentee ballot left her disenfranchised.

Next we have Donna Curling. Donna Curling was born here in Georgia. She spent some time in North Carolina and lived in California after she got married but moved back here in 1987 and has lived in Roswell ever since.

Ms. Curling has spent several decades volunteering for election protection and integrity organizations, including Georgians for Verified Voting, which she cofounded with Ms. Price.

She will testify that she prefers to vote in person because the experience of going to the polling place is a very important act of civic engagement for her.

However, since she became more educated about the electronic voting equipment used in Georgia, she has mostly voted absentee, even though it requires jumping through a lot of hoops. And on two occasions the system left her disenfranchised.

Ms. Curling will testify that it is critically
important to her that she have confidence that her vote will be counted as she cast it and that her voice be heard in every election but that -- but that under Georgia's current system she is deprived of that right.

Your Honor, next $I$ will briefly introduce you to individuals at the State Election Board and the Secretary of State's office who you will hear about during the course of the trial.

First we have the State Election Board. Sitting within the elections division of the Secretary of State's office, the $S E B$ is entrusted with safeguarding Georgia's elections. The SEB members will confirm their responsibility to protect the system. And several will agree that they would not support a voting system that could be easily hacked.

And yet, at the time of their depositions, they each admitted that they had not read Dr. Halderman's report and were not aware of his findings, even though it was the State that designated the report attorneys' eyes only and the State's witnesses were always permitted to review it.

Next we have the Secretary of State's office. First Gabriel Sterling. He is the chief operating officer for the Secretary of State's office. Mr. Sterling admitted that while the selection of the Dominion BMD system was Secretary Raffensperger's decision, he was involved in the selection process and aware of alternatives with no QR codes.
Mr. Sterling's testimony will also show that the
State has failed to properly assess the serious security
vulnerabilities associated with the BMD system, instead
electing to trivialize them. He has publicly dismissed
Dr. Halderman's report as a, quote, load of crap, even though
he had not read the report.
David Hamilton was the Secretary of State's part-time
contracted chief information security officer until June 2021.
The Secretary of State's office did not have a full-time cISo.
came out. But as the Court will recall, in September 2022
Dr. Halderman demonstrated to the Court that he was able to
hack the Dominion BMD equipment.

Mr. Hamilton stated that as CISO he would have liked to know about Dr. Halderman's 2020 demonstration but he was not made aware of it.

He also confirmed the State's failure to implement critical security measures, including remediating vulnerabilities identified by cybersecurity vendor Fortalice.

Michael Barnes is the director of the Center for Election Services, a position he held when the CES was housed at Kennesaw State University and that he continued to hold when it moved within the Secretary of State's office.

Mr. Barnes has no formal training in computer science or cybersecurity, and yet he continues to play a major role in
managing the electronic voting system in Georgia.
Like several of his colleagues, he can't recall anyone in his office ever even discussing Dr. Halderman or his findings. He was aware of the Halderman report only from a news article in 2022.

Merritt Beaver was the Secretary of State's chief information officer until the end of 2023 and had responsibility for election cybersecurity and technology. He admitted that the reason the election software is not given to the public is because you are giving them a roadmap to how to basically get in and access the system.

Mr. Beaver also had not read the Halderman report. He said I had never heard of that document, never seen it.

And Mr. Beaver's testimony will also show that the Secretary's office receives regular technical assessments regarding security risks in the election system from Fortalice, but after this Court enjoined the DRE system relying in part on the Fortalice reports and the findings of detailing security failings in that report, he personally directed Fortalice to stop providing written reports and to only deliver their assessments orally.

Chris Harvey is the former elections director for the State. As the first line of coordination between the Secretary of State's office and Georgia's 159 counties, he admitted that counties have varying levels of experience and interests in
election security and that any one of those counties could be a, quote, weak point.

Of course, we now know that to be true because of Coffee County.

Mr. Cross will now talk you through what happened in Coffee County, the breaches that occurred there and how additional witnesses were involved. I'll hand it back to him.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. OPENING STATEMENT

MR. CROSS: As Mr. Harvey acknowledges, any one of the 159 counties could be a weak point. We saw that in the real world in Coffee County, and we'll talk through that in a little bit of detail.

Just briefly, Your Honor, as I mentioned, we will put on Dr. Alex Halderman to testify to his findings, over a half dozen different very serious vulnerabilities validated by CISA, and you will not hear a single cybersecurity expert retained by the State who will refute or even disagree with these findings.

In fact, Dr. Gilbert will testify that he does not disagree with any of the technical findings.

Briefly on QR codes, Your Honor, we will show, and I don't think there is any dispute about this, voters cannot read QR codes. That's how the ballots get tabulated. So a voter in this system, unnecessarily, with an unconstitutional burden,
have no ability to determine whether their vote and what will be tabulated reflects the selections they made. And there is absolutely no reason for this. As you will hear, there is no justification, certainly at a constitutional level, the state will be able to put forward on that.

And again, their own expert, Dr. Michael Shamos, his own testimony, as we will show, was don't use barcodes. He told them this in 2019 and they did it anyways. And they will not have a single expert who will justify that.

Now, their response, as you will hear during the course of this trial, is to say it is okay that the $Q R$ code isn't human readable because there is a human readable portion of a ballot.

We will show you that they can't justify that burden either.

And if you look at the ballot in front of you, Your Honor, you have here an actual ballot from May of 2020 from Fayette County. And what they are saying is a voter needlessly cast a vote on a touch screen. Then they print this out. And then they have to review this before they cast it.

First, they are asking voters to take on a burden that is entirely unnecessary because this is not a required system.

Second, they are taking on a burden that they can't actually exercise, as our study -- as our experts will explain
and as the voters will explain.
And if you look at this ballot, they have to remember every selection they made, they have to read through it in detail in the stress of being in a polling site where people are waiting for them to cast their vote, and they even have to remember what the questions were.

In this ballot, this is an easy one for this voter because they voted yes to every question. But a voter who votes yes to some and no to others, when they print this out, they now have to think back to themselves, what was each of the six questions that was asked of me? Which ones did I answer yes or no to? They have to remember all of that and trust that it is right and trust their memory. It is an entirely unnecessary burden that they cannot justify.

Dr. Gilbert, a man who specializes in the human accessibility of BMDs, he has built his career on it, struggled just to figure out the selections on this ballot from Fayette County that were not Republican candidates. The question we simply asked him, just find for us quickly the selections on this real ballot that do not correspond to Republican candidates.

## (Playing of the videotape.)

MR. CROSS: An expert working with these machines took 20 seconds just to identify selections that didn't have a bar next to them. 20 seconds just to do that. Think about how
long it takes the burden of a voter to read through this and actually look at it closely enough and remember to themselves what was I asked, what were my options, is this what I selected.

They cannot justify that burden.
And, in fact, their own expert, Dr. Ben Adida, who has worked with the State for years, who still works with the State on audits, agrees with our experts. He will admit that the default system, the presumption at his company, VotingWorks, is hand-marked paper ballots plus one BMD in a polling site for those who need it. It is always what he recommends to a county when they ask what they should do.

Their own experts cannot and will not justify the extraordinary burden that they impose on voters. And we will establish that there are other means that will not impose those burdens.

Now let me talk a bit about Coffee County. Your Honor is obviously familiar with a lot of this. These are the key players we will talk through in this case. As you can see on the left, the former election superintendent, Ms. Hampton, Mr. Chaney, former member of the election board, both working in the elections at the time of the breach, which you can see in the pictures here. Some of the snapshots of what we saw earlier.

And again, what we saw earlier was people on the
right coming in day after day over the period of a month. Even at the level of you saw Ms. Hampton cutting the seals on election equipment.

And you can see that four of those people have been indicted. Two of them have already pled guilty on charges related to this conduct.

What we have here is just a snapshot of a very long document from Sullivan Strickler, and we will show that what this is are the downloads and the access times that people access the data, the proprietary software, what Merritt Beaver says is the roadmap to hack the system, accessed this time and time again on the internet with IP addresses that appear all over the world.

This is old. This is years old. This is from the summer of 2021. This data has been available in the wild now for three years. We have no idea who all has access to it.

So we have the three breaches. Just a sample of what was taken. There are many, many photos we will walk the Court through. Mr. Maggio will talk through in particular what happened that day. As you can see, they accessed, copied, and stole data and proprietary software from virtually everything in the office.

You can see on the right, pictures of the Poll Pads that are so hopelessly insecure that you can run Netflix and play video games on them.


This is Agent Blanchard walking in with Misty Hampton to her office, connects directly to the EMS server room. And who walks out? Jeffrey Lenberg. You will not see a single document, not a notation, not a report, nothing from Agent Blanchard or anyone at the Secretary's office raising any flag that when they sent an agent to investigate the security of this office and found someone who is not supposed to be there in the most sensitive aspect of that room, they did nothing. Nothing.

Finally, on May 7, there is a new superintendent, Mr. Barnes. He does the right thing when he comes in. He finds a card from Cyber Ninjas, Doug Logan, sitting at the base of the terminal where Misty Hampton left it. He alerts Chris Harvey on May 7 of 2021, that he is concerned about this.

Chris Harvey, to his credit, does exactly the right thing. He writes back to Mr. Barnes on May 11 and says, We're going to open an investigation.

What is he investigating? Whether anyone has had access to any of your equipment. The election equipment.

Frances Watson forwards that on to Pamela Jones, an investigator, and says exactly that. You need to verify what, if any, contact Cyber Ninjas had with any election equipment. This was an investigation into an unauthorized breach of the system. That is what they explicitly suspected and went to look into.

They even hired a forensic consultant, Jim Persinger, at the time. They say he was hired for this litigation. And he was given, sometime around June 8th, we're told, the EMS server and the ICC, which were finally taken because of the concern about a possible breach. They were so concerned about it they opened an investigation, they hired a forensic consultant to take that.

And then they did nothing. It just dies. It just dies. There is no evidence of any further investigation. We asked them, in the ordinary course of discovery, are you aware of any potential unauthorized access to the system? They refused to answer those requests for months. Fighting over them. Saying they weren't relevant. They were too broad. Technical objections.

And finally, on October 21 of 2021, they swore under oath that they were not aware of any hack to the system. They didn't answer our question to which we said, Well, by hacked do you mean something different from unauthorized access? Because if you do, you need to let us know that. They never told us they meant something different, even though their office had investigated exactly that just months earlier.

Then they go on and they tell the public it never happened.
(Playing of the videotape.).
MR. CROSS: But it did happen.

Finally, in June of 2022 they finally tell this Court, after we have been trying to pursue discovery, and they have been telling us and Your Honor that it hadn't happened, telling the public it didn't happen, they finally say, Okay, we're looking into it. We're investigating it.

On July 5th, Mr. Persinger finally looks at the EMS server that he has, he images it, and he does it in a way that wipes out thousands of important files. Destroys them. Gone. Then a few weeks later, while we are trying to pursue discovery to figure out what happened, we will show you that Mr. Ryan Germany, the former general counsel, put in a declaration to this Court where he swore under oath that prior to March of 2022 the Secretary's office was not on notice of allegations about a potential breach in Coffee County.

That is, at best, highly misleading. They investigated it in the summer of 2021 with an investigation that went nowhere.

And finally, in August, the same day, they call for a GBI investigation.

September 26 we will show, long after, a year and a half after this breach, after they have been telling the public it didn't happen, they finally replace some additional equipment but still not all of it in Coffee County.

And that same day, directly contrary to what Mr. Germany had said, Secretary Raffensperger admits that he
and his office knew about it very early in 2021.
(Playing of the videotape.)
MR. CROSS: So he finally says to the public, very early in 2021, we knew about this. We saw Ryan Blanchard there in the office with Jeffrey Lenberg. We then see they investigated months later.

Now, after he says that, we learn from the press that an aide for Secretary Raffensperger off camera said, No, no, no, he was mistaken, he meant that we learned about it May of 2021.

We don't know when they learned about it because Secretary Raffensperger is choosing not to come and tell anybody about when he learned about it. The choice he is making.

But this is, perhaps, at least more consistent with the documents we saw in the summer of 2021. But what it tells us is that Mr. Germany certainly did not provide accurate information nor has Mr. Sterling.

And again, we will show that when this is the approach by the highest officials who are responsible for securing the system, it makes it dangerous. Because it says to the public, it says to those who would do bad things, come on in. Because we will not tell the public about what happened.

And Secretary Raffensperger himself will not be here to tell anyone anything.

The response it is not real world. It is a load of crap. That is the gist of their defense. They have nothing more to offer.

And where does that leave us, Your Honor? It leaves us with CISA's advisory in the summer of 2022. A year and a half ago CISA said, Dr. Halderman's findings are correct. THE COURT: Just for purposes of the record, will you say what the full -- what CISA is.

MR. CROSS: Yes. Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. So the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. I have it on the screen because I always get that wrong.

The agency within the Department of Homeland
Security, which has responsibility for election security, in the summer of 2021, in June, they confirmed Dr. Halderman's findings and, importantly, you can see here, I'm not going to talk through these now, they recommended a dozen mitigation measures they said needed to be adopted as soon as possible.

And we will show evidence they have not adopted virtually any and maybe none at all, a year and a half later. What they will say to you is, We can't, we won't, we're not going to do it. It is the Secretary's decision and he will not be here. He is choosing not to be here to tell you why he will not protect the system in a way that he has been told to do it.

I'll finish with this. When the Coffee County story began to unfold, due to our efforts, we were the ones that brought that to light. We are no election deniers. We are not the ones who tried to hide it. That was the State.

When it began to unfold, the Secretary, the then chairman of the SEB, said the best way to deal with that is to file a lawsuit and get relief from a judge. Because he says the SEB can't do it. The Secretary won't. Well, that is why we are here, Your Honor, doing what the chairman of the SEB is said how you deal with this issue.

Your Honor is the last resort because no one else is going to do anything. Certainly not them.

Thank you.
MR. McGUIRE: Good morning, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Morning.
OPENING STATEMENT
MR. McGUIRE: My name is Robert McGuire and along with my co-counsel, Mr. Bruce Brown, who is right there, I represent the Coalition for Good Governance or CGG, which is an organizational party, as the plaintiff.

CGG is a nonprofit membership organization that works to preserve and educate people about constitutional rights that are exercised through voting.

I would like to ask Ms. Marilyn Marks to stand up. She is CGG's executive director and board member.

Thank you, Marilyn.
She is here in the courtroom today as the corporate representative of CGG.

In addition to CGG, Mr. Brown and Mr. Ichter, who is next to him, represent three of the CGG's individual members who are also co-plaintiffs. I would like to ask each of them to stand. One of them is not here. Megan Missett is not here. She is a little under the weather but hopefully will be here when she feels better.

The others are Ms. Laura Digges, if I could ask you to stand.

Mr. William Digges III.
CGG and the Digges and Ms. Missett are the group that is now called the Coalition plaintiffs.

So over the next eight days, approximately, both plaintiffs' groups are going to show you evidence of four things that you need to see in order to rule for us.

First, we need to show you that the plaintiffs have standing.

Second, we need to show you that the required use of BMDs burdens the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Third, we need to show you that the State lacks any interest in forcing voters to use BMDs that justifies the burdens that the BMDs cause.

And fourth, relief.

The conduct plaintiffs are challenging here is the State's enforcement of the requirement for all in-person voters to use BMDs when they vote. We need to show you how relief can be granted and why what we are asking for will work.

All the evidence that you hear from us over the next eight days is going to fit into one of those four buckets. I'll just tell you a little bit about what you are going to hear from us on those.

On standing, you're going to hear about organizational standing for Coalition for Good Governance and individual standing for the individual plaintiffs.

The Coalition for Good Governance's officers are going to tell you about how the organization has diverted resources away from projects that CGG would have been working on and into things that respond to and oppose the State's BMD requirements.

The individuals for our side and Megan Missett, Mr. and Mrs. Digges, as well as CGG members Jeanne Dufort and Aileen Nakamura are going to tell you about concrete and particularized harms they have personally experienced and will personally experience all because of the requirement that in-person voters must use BMDs.

You're going to hear that the injuries that these individual plaintiffs and that CGG is suffering are caused by the defendants. Evidence is going to show that the State

Election Board causes these injuries in two ways, by its action and by its inaction.

You'll hear about the inaction in the form of the SEB's refusal to use its authority to do anything to protect voters from the burdens of BMD voting.

And you'll hear about the SEB's action in the form of its use of its legal powers always and only to force the use of BMDs like it did in Athens-Clarke County.

Evidence is going to show that the Secretary of State for his part contributes to causing these injuries also by his own failures to investigate or mitigate security breaches that the BMDs have suffered, like the massive and enduring breach that Mr. Cross spoke about just a moment ago.

You're going to hear evidence on the third prong of standing which is redressability, and we're going to show that these injuries are redressable by an order of the Court.

The evidence that you're going to hear on standing is going to establish that these plaintiffs had a stake in the outcome of the case. They have properly invoked the Court's subject matter jurisdiction under Article III.

And then we'll turn to the merits. And on the merits, you are going to hear first about our side of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which is the burdens on voting. You're going to hear from the fact witnesses I just mentioned as well as from experts like Professor Halderman,

Professor Philip Stark, and Mr. Kevin Skoglund, all of whose testimony is going to show that Georgia's unreliable, vulnerable, insecure, unauditable, and inherently untrustworthy BMDs burden the constitutional rights of voters, including the plaintiffs.

And this testimony is going to weigh in our favor on the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.

On the other side of the Anderson-Burdick test, you're going to hear evidence that shows that the State lacks any real interest in forcing voters to use BMDs. You're going to hear from the mouths of the Secretary's own witnesses, Secretary's own employees. You're going to hear testimony that undermines any assertion that the State's asserted policy preferences require the use of BMDs. They don't.

On the contrary, when it comes to BMDs, what you are going to hear is that the defendants are very selective in terms of what state laws they choose to follow and what state laws they choose to believe they should enforce.

Finally, on relief, you're going to hear evidence that the flaws in Georgia's BMDs cannot be fixed. Professor Stark, who is the expert on auditing, is going to explain that audits don't provide a mitigation as long as we're using BMDs, because BMD ballot printouts are themselves not trustworthy records and so they can't be the foundation of an audit. BMD ballots are just not auditable.

On the other hand, you're going to hear that Georgia's voting system can function perfectly well without BMDs even under existing law using the existing scanners.

Jeanne Dufort and Aileen Nakamura have observed lots of elections in Georgia and they are going to talk to you about elections they have observed that are conducted by municipalities without BMDs.

There are municipalities all over Georgia that conduct large elections entirely without BMDs. You are going to hear about these elections, some of these observations, and you are going to hear that municipalities do use the Dominion precinct scanners to count ballots that are cast by voters in those elections.

You're going to hear that those elections work smoothly. They are fast. Nobody is confused either on the worker side or on the voter side.

So in conclusion, Your Honor, we're asking the Court to make what is a difficult decision. We're asking you to decide to enjoin the State from continuing to require in-person voters to use the current BMDs as the standard method for in-person voting. The decision we're asking you to make is not a difficult one because it is hard to know what is right to do. It is difficult because it is hard to do what is right in this political environment, as the Court is well aware.

In this moment, too many people want to use this case
as a vehicle to dispute or to defend what happened four years ago, in terms of the election. And this case is not about that.

There is a famous saying that generals are always preparing to fight the last war when what they should be thinking about is the next war. 2020 is the last war.

As the Court receives the evidence that the plaintiffs are going to present, we respectfully urge Your Honor to look ahead to 2024 rather than backward at 2020.

A voting system like this one that few people do trust, and that the evidence is going to show nobody should trust, is a disaster waiting to happen in 2024.

Four years ago Secretary Raffensperger fought tooth and nail to defend DREs only to call it a Godsend, famously call it a Godsend, when DREs were gone before the 2020 election.

Now, he is fighting tooth and nail to defend BMDs even as the 2024 elections are bearing down on us. We can all hope that we won't need another Godsend, but we might.

Your Honor has a historic opportunity to truly protect democracy in this country. All of the evidence is going to show that BMDs are a profoundly insecure, unreliable, and untrustworthy voting system component.

At the end of our case, we will ask the Court to bar the State from requiring BMDs to be used as a standard method
for in-person voting. And we respectfully ask you to grant that relief.

For the Coalition plaintiffs, Mr. Brown, Mr. Ichter, and I look forward to presenting our case.

And thank you very much.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Oles, did you want to make a few more remarks? OPENING STATEMENT

MR. OLES: Good morning, Judge. I represent Ricardo Davis.

Ricardo, will you stand up, please.
Ricardo is here today to rectify a dilemma that began in 2002 when the Georgia Secretary of State, then Secretary of State Cox, purchased a statewide paperless direct recording electronic voting system over the objections from the voters, legislators, election officials, and even the Fulton County elections director.

The paperless system produced secretly counted results that were unverifiable to the voter, not auditable by election officials, and not re-count capable for candidates.

Before that system was purchased, the Georgia legislature removed the legal requirement that any voting system have an independent audit trail of each vote cast illustrating that Georgia voters cannot be confident that its legislature will protect their constitutional rights.

Ricardo Davis was aware of the voting system problems back then because he helped install the system for his county. He later cofounded an organization called Voter GA that filed a lawsuit in state court, much like this one, on behalf of Georgia voters. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled against the voters, again illustrating that Georgia voters cannot count on the Georgia judicial system to protect their constitutional rights either.

In August of 2019, this Honorable Court upheld many of the claims back then finding the old DRE system constitutionally deficient. At the same time, the Court responded to excuses from the Secretary's office about a 2017 breach occurring in the Center for Elections Systems then at Kennesaw State.

The Center's server that prepared the files for all elections for all Georgia counties was found to be exposed to anyone in the world to hack.

The election server was wiped days after this lawsuit was filed without mitigating the risk of that potential breach.

This Court rejected the Secretary's excuses finding that given the entire course of events described here the defendants' contention that the servers were simply repurposed and not intentionally destroyed or wiped is flatly not credible.

Again, this illustrates the Georgia voters cannot
rely on the Secretary of State's office to protect their rights either.

We remain in this dilemma because the Secretary purchased another electronic voting system that plaintiffs contend is similarly deficient. The Court already found that this new Dominion system violates Georgia law in its October 11, 2020, order that -- reciting that a Georgia law requires a voting system must print an elector verifiable paper ballot and produce paper ballots which are marked with the elector's choice in a format readable by the elector and going on to conclude that plaintiffs and other voters who wish to vote in person are required to vote on a system that does none of these things.

Despite this clear, plain text and acknowledgment of the Court's findings, the Secretary, Georgia legislators, county election boards ignored both this Court's findings and Georgia law.

So this Honorable Court remains the last resort for Georgia voters seeking to protect their constitutional rights. That it has ample authority to do so is clear. Page 4 of the Court's November 10, '23, order sets the issues for trial by explaining that this Court has the legal authority to identify constitutional deficiencies with the existing voting system.

The record before this Court is awash with various types of security vulnerabilities, deficiencies that severely
impede the constitutional right to vote.
These are not simply speculative as the defendants have claimed and not limited to the BMDs, the ballot-marking devices. Dr. Halderman opines that the Dominion scanners accept duplicate ballots, and he and Dr. Stark and others have confirmed that over 2800 duplicates were counted in the 2020 election.

Dr. Halderman's security analysis explains that malware which can change vote results can be delivered from the State's centrally programmed election server through the county election management servers to programmed county system components like the BMD.

The record shows that a State election preparation server has already been exposed to the internet and has always been vulnerable to a single point of attack. The State server can infect any county election system in any election without detection.

Depositions in this case establish that Dominion personnel wirelessly accessed the Coffee County system on the night of January 5th, 2021, U.S. Senate runoff, adjusting mail-in ballot scanner settings to address a partisan ballot rejection problem without ever touching the equipment.

Such wireless access conflicts with the claims by defendants and the vendor that the system has no remote capability.
Dr. Halderman explains that Dominion failed to pay
sufficient attention to security during design software
engineering and testing, and it would be extremely difficult to
retrofit security into a system that was not intentionally produced with such a process.

The best interest of Georgia voters demand that this Court find the entire Dominion BMD system constitutionally deficient, enjoin the State from using the system and prohibit the State from enforcing any laws requiring use of the system.

But what would prevent the State from buying another constitutionally deficient system that produces secretly counted results? Would plaintiffs then have to go back to court for the third time?

We ask the Court to consider that elections without transparency are also, by nature, constitutionally deficient.

On Page 114 of its November 10, '23, order, this Court said, setting precedent allows for suits based on the argument that State officials' inaction allegedly harms constitutional rights.

The record in this case shows that Georgia's electronic election landscape is littered with inactions and inappropriate actions by the defendants.

For example, in 2017 the defendants allowed the central election preparation server to be wiped days after this lawsuit was filed.

In 2019, the defendants' lack of candor with the Court caused the Court to find the defendants flatly not credible.

When 2020 Coffee County machinery counts added 39 votes with no change in ballots cast and then failed to count votes on 185 more ballots, the Secretary did not help.

In 2021, the Secretary filed an amicus brief attempting to prevent other plaintiffs from looking at ballots that senior poll managers swore were counterfeit.

In 2022, when the Dominion system declared the wrong winners in DeKalb District 2 commission primary, the Secretary refused to allow full race hand counts for any other races to ensure that statewide elections were correct.

Now, in 2023, '24 the Secretary of State refuses to come before this Court.

The record shows that defendants employ wholly inadequate audit procedures relying on secret electronic vote counts and deny access to legally sealed ballots well beyond the two-year legal seal requirement.

This inaction and others have left Georgians with no reasonable means to verify election results or to detect counterfeit ballots that the system cannot accept.

Ricardo Davis believes that these types of inactions are also constitutional deficiencies in the overall election system. Mr. Davis urges the Court to declare these practices
constitutionally deficient along with the complete Dominion ballot-marking device system.

Mr. Davis relies on this Court as the last line of defense to secure our future elections.

Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you. Ready?
Mr. Tyson, are you doing this exclusively, or do you also have a team?

MR. TYSON: You've got just me.
THE COURT: You've got a team. But are any of them other than you speaking today?

MR. TYSON: I'll be the only one speaking, Your Honor.

## OPENING STATEMENT

MR. TYSON: Well, good morning again. Bryan Tyson
for the defendants.
I want to begin in a similar place as Mr. Cross.
This is a case about voting. It is a very important -- nothing is more important than the right to vote. And cases involving the right to vote, as we have talked about, look at the burden on the right to vote and then the State interests that are involved.

And one thing that is unique about this case is it is unlike other cases in the election context. It is not challenging a statute like a deadline for absentee ballots. It
is not challenging a particular election procedure like a citizenship check for voters. It is not an election practice like list maintenance.

Plaintiffs aren't claiming that any policy keeps them from voting. They are not claiming the State failed to train county election officials. What they are claiming is that there is a burden on the right to vote by the inability for them to determine that the vote they cast was accurately counted.

As we'll see, even if the software is ultimately correct, convincing somebody of that fact is almost -- can be impossible. And so in order to have a claim there has to be a burden on the plaintiffs' right to vote that is placed there by the defendants that results in a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting and is not justified by any state interests. That is how the Eleventh Circuit formulates this kind of claim.

And obviously the proper functioning of the election system is critically important. But choosing between the relative cost and benefit of various types of election systems is a decision for the legislature, not for the Court.

And we have heard a lot of arguments already this morning, good policy arguments about debates on the right voting system. But this Court has to look at the constitutionality of the system, not what it would think is the

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ideal system.
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Now, as has been mentioned, Georgia's faced litigation about its method of voting before. Georgia faced litigation in 2001 from voters who said that a hand-marked and chad-based punch card system had a disproportionate effect on voters of color and didn't count their votes. That was the Andrews case.

Mr. Oles mentioned the Favorito v. Handel case that challenged the DREs, the original touch screens.

But we're now at trial in this case. And this is the first time in the nearly seven years this case has been pending the Court is able to fully weigh the admissible evidence under the Federal Rules without some kind of inference where you defer to the plaintiffs.

And you're going to get to hear also, I think for the first time since at least the Dominion equipment was put in place, from the plaintiffs themselves about their claims.

And people having confidence in election outcomes matters immensely in a democracy. But as this Court said in both Georgia Shift and in this case, you can't sit as the guarantor of a perfect election. That is both a practical reality and a reality of the separation of powers in our system.

You have the power, the Court has the power, to enjoin State officials when there is an unconstitutional burden
on the right to vote.
And that is what the plaintiffs are asking for here. You have heard they want an injunction enjoining the Secretary and the SEB from enforcing Georgia law about the use of ballot-marking devices.

And this is a very broad claim. There are jurisdictions all over the country that use BMDs for in-person voters. Los Angeles and San Diego, California. States like South Carolina and Arkansas. Huge portions of Texas.

This is a far-reaching claim the plaintiffs make here. And I think it is important to remember why they are asking you to make this declaration.

We have heard a lot today about vulnerabilities. What we have not heard and what you will not hear during the course of this trial is evidence that a piece of election equipment has been hacked and actually altered votes in an election.

In fact, what we're going to hear is the opposite of that. We're going to hear that not a single vote in Georgia there is evidence that it has been altered by nefarious actors.

So, Your Honor, we're going to hear from Dr. Halderman. He has no evidence of malware on the DREs despite having access to those.

No evidence of malware in the GEMS databases despite having access to those.
No evidence of malware in Dominion BMDs used in an election.

No evidence of malware from when he's looked at the Coffee County equipment.

You are going to hear other experts that relied on Dr. Halderman for his analysis on that point.

But you're not going to hear evidence of malware affecting elections. You are also not going to hear evidence the plaintiffs' votes have been compromised.

Each of the plaintiffs, I'm sure, has policy concerns about why they would prefer to vote using a different method. But ultimately they don't have evidence they were prohibited from voting or had their vote cast incorrectly on a ballot-marking device.

And to the extent there is a claim that they didn't receive an absentee ballot, the law in Georgia, both in the Eleventh Circuit and in statute, is counties process absentee ballots. So a burden on the right to vote from not receiving an absentee ballot could not be traceable to the State.

And we have heard a lot about Coffee County. We're going to hear a lot about that. But even Coffee County doesn't provide the kind of evidence that plaintiffs claim that it does.

First, none of the plaintiffs live in Coffee County. So anything that happened there we would submit is not

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burdening their right to vote.
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Dr. Halderman said that the Dominion software was in the wild in his 2021 report before anyone knew about Coffee County, besides a handful of individuals and Ms. Marks.

That was the claim that there was software in the wild from other states and that was part of the basis for Dr. Halderman's opinions in this case about vulnerability.

So while Coffee County shows that every election system is vulnerable to insider attacks, that is not something unique to a ballot-marking device system. It doesn't change the ultimate equation because, at least according to Dr. Halderman, the software was already out there from other states.

So Coffee County is very serious, and I don't want to downplay that. But it is not serious for the reasons the plaintiffs say it is. It is serious to show the importance of election officials. It is serious to show what wrong beliefs about threats to elections will lead people to do. But ultimately it doesn't change the threats to Georgia elections even under the plaintiffs' approach.

So then what is the plaintiffs' claims? What are they basing their request for a ban on ballot-marking devices on? We're going to hear over and over in this trial, it is vulnerabilities, it is risks, it is possibilities.

What the plaintiffs are asking you to allow them to
do is substitute risks or substitute evidence for risks. To be clear, you're going to hear from -- testimony from the plaintiffs about every component of the election system. You are going to hear that the precinct scanners have vulnerabilities. You are going to hear central count scanners have vulnerabilities. You are going to hear that election management servers have vulnerabilities and that ballot-marking devices have vulnerabilities.

But the only piece of equipment that plaintiffs are asking you to enjoin is the ballot-marking devices for voters who do not have disabilities. So I think it is also important to remember the plaintiffs are not asking for an absolute bar that no Georgia voter can vote on a ballot-marking device.

They still want to keep ballot-marking devices available for voters with disabilities, even if they are barred for everybody else.

So when we look at the entirety of the evidence you're going to hear, what you are going to see is plaintiffs are fine with a system that has vulnerabilities, including continuing to use much of the existing Dominion equipment, because they have to be.

Every voting system, a hand-marked system, a ballot-marking device system, a DRE system, they all have vulnerabilities, even including a hand-marked ballot system where votes are counted by hand.

And on this point, I think it is important to remember on vulnerabilities we agree with the plaintiffs' experts on this point. Because in November of 2020 plaintiffs' experts, I think almost all of them, signed a letter, and they said in that letter, The presence of security weaknesses in election infrastructure does not by itself tell us that any election has actually been compromised. Altering an election outcome involves more than simply the existence of a technical vulnerability.

And that is exactly right. The existence of a technical vulnerability does not tell you if an election outcome has been altered.

And this is a statement signed by Dr. Halderman, signed by Dr. Appel, signed by Mr. Hursti, signed by Mr. Skoglund, signed by Dr. Stark.

Plaintiffs have only evidence of vulnerabilities in this case. And again, they are asking you to substitute risks for evidence when it comes to categorizing the burden on the right to vote.

So let's look next at how this case works as a matter of law. I know the Court is well familiar with our Anderson-Burdick standard. You have to determine what is the burden on the right to vote. After we get past standing, that is the legal question we have to answer.

Is the burden voting on an electronic voting system?

Well, it can't be that because electronic voting systems, as the Court has said, are not inherently unconstitutional any more than lever or chad-based voting. Plaintiffs have the freedom to vote a hand-marked paper by absentee ballot and they can return that to their elections office on election day if they so choose.

Is the burden voting on a system that has vulnerabilities? Well, that can't be the burden because every system has vulnerabilities.

Is it voting on a system that has malware installed and hacked and election results are being altered? Well, maybe. But that is not the evidence that the Court is going to have in this case.

It also can't be a right to have their individual voted counted in a particular way. As the Court has made very clear, the Supreme Court and others, there is no right to vote in a preferred manner.

To put plaintiffs' claims into focus, all analogies are imperfect, but it is almost as if what plaintiffs are saying is they can present evidence saying someone could drive a car into a polling place on election day because there were not sufficient vehicle barriers around that facility.

That is a risk that could disrupt voting, could cause significant problems for voters, could have a massive impact on an election depending on where it took place.
But it is a speculative risk without more. It is a
potential burden on the right to vote. It is not an actual
burden on the right to vote, just like there is a potential
burden on the right to vote from a blizzard on election day or
the storm we had this morning, people trying to get to polling
places.
to the level of a constitutional violation. They are just part
of the usual burden of voting and living in the world that we
live in.

And I know the Court talked about the language from Jacobson regarding the risks of voting related to particular election procedures. But the application of the procedures the Eleventh Circuit was talking about there would have resulted in votes not being counted. The risk was a specific not counting of votes.

What you are going to have evidentiary-wise here is not that votes are not counted, just that there is only a risk. And a risk that cannot be quantified.

Ultimately, Your Honor, there is nothing to show anything here beyond the usual and normal burdens associated with voting. And there is nothing here to show that if the burden ultimately is Coffee County that the defendants proximately caused anything related to that.

But let's say we don't convince you on that point and
you say you think there is a burden on the right to vote.
We have to then consider the State interests and weigh that. As you know, the categorization of the burden matters. A severe burden requires a compeling interest. A lesser burden requires a lesser interest involved. And you never get to the point of weighing State interests until you have categorized the burden.

The evidentiary burden is on the plaintiffs to show that severe burden on the right to vote. And if they do, then we've got a number of State interests to talk about, and you'll hear evidence on these points.

Starting with policy, ballot-marking devices are the system of elections chosen by the legislature, signed by the governor. The political branches chose this system and that matters to this equation.

Ballot-marking devices provide clear voter intent unlike hand-marked paper ballots. They provide a paper trail. They provide disability accessibility and ensure that voters with disabilities are not held in a separate category of voting equipment.

Ballot-marking devices are touch screens. As
Mr. Oles referenced, Georgia voters have been voting on touch screens for over two decades now. There is a familiarity with that process.

Ballot-marking devices help election administrators,
particularly in early voting, to make sure they get the right ballot for that voter when they can show up at any place in a county during early voting.

And we'll talk about a lot more than that during the course of the trial. But ultimately, even if the plaintiffs can show a burden, we would submit they can't overcome the State interests that are involved.

Ultimately, the plaintiffs are very narrowly focused on the single issue of cybersecurity when administering elections requires so many more facets for how those elections have to be administered. Everything from training poll workers, poll workers being able to operate equipment, all the way through the ability to count and audit.

So this also, obviously, assumes we get past jurisdictional issues on standing. I'm not going to rehash those. I know you're well familiar with those.

We will submit that plaintiffs will not be able to show an injury, especially the individual plaintiffs. And we don't believe that the one plaintiff rule is going to work for purposes of post trial given the two separate complaints.

My team and I finished the trial with Judge Jones recently with multiple cases, multiple complaints and ultimately had to make findings of standing as to each of those cases. And we submit that should happen here as well.

But let's assume, take one more step farther, we have
not convinced you on jurisdiction, we haven't convinced you on the burden on the right to vote or State interests. How the Court would write an order or order a remedy I think shows how difficult this kind of claim is.

This Court said correctly several times that it can't order Georgia to use a hand-marked paper ballot system. So the remedy the plaintiffs ultimately want is not part of, kind of, of what you can order.

But then, if the order is ultimately about the mitigation of a risk, how is the Court and what standard is the Court going to apply to determine when a risk is sufficiently mitigated to make a system constitutional again?

So, for example, on some of the specific things that we have talked about, if the order says Georgia can't use the Dominion equipment until such time as it upgrades the software to a newer version, for example, that is ultimately not going to be supported by the evidence at trial.

Dr. Halderman is going to testify he believes there are more vulnerabilities on the Dominion equipment than what he found. And it leaves the Court and the State in a position of not being sure that, well, this one software upgrade solved the constitutional problem. And then what happens if another version of the software comes out or an additional vulnerability is found?

Is every new software version going to lead to a new
lawsuit? And this is where finding that the Constitution speaks to a specific version of software gets into the minutia of elections in a way that doesn't fit well with the role of a federal court.

If the order instead says Georgia has to do more audits, we're going to have more evidentiary problems there. As we have just heard from Mr. McGuire, the plaintiffs believe that it is impossible to audit BMD-marked ballots and that there is no auditing regime that would give confidence in the election results here.

We, obviously, strongly disagree with that. We stand by Georgia's robust auditing system. But is a certain kind of audit constitutionally required? And again, what standard will we use to determine when a sufficient amount of audits is taking place? And how do we determine that an insufficient amount of audits makes a system unconstitutional?

The biggest problem I think, Your Honor, is that if you take the plaintiffs' case to its logical conclusion, the only logical order that this Court could enter is one banning ballot-marking devices completely and requiring hand-marked paper ballots, which is exactly what this Court cannot do.

Let me get last to the public interest. Obviously to find for the plaintiffs on a permanent injunction, since we're only seeking prospective injunctive relief in this case, you have to get to the question of, What is the public interest
that is involved?
As a consequence of giving risk and vulnerabilities the weight of a constitutional violation is that we'll see some people who rightly or wrongly are going to use the idea that elections are not perfect to so distrust based solely on risk.

As we said at the beginning, the Court can't
guarantee a perfect election. We know that. No election is without risks that something is going to go wrong. That is the nature of it. That is why we have election contests in Title 21. It is why we have ways of addressing these types of issues.

But it is not in the public interest to find that risks are sufficient to make an election system unconstitutional because we have seen what happens with that after 2018 and after 2020.

After 2020, Sidney Powell argued to another judge in this district that her claims were, quote, About ensuring the integrity of the vote and the confidence of the people that the will they expressed in their vote is what actually determines the election.

Ms. Powell also said, quote, Allowing voters to cast ballots that are solely counted based on their voting designations and not on an unencrypted humanly unverifiable QR code that can be subject to external manipulation and does not allow proper voter verification and ballot vote auditing cannot
withstand the scrutiny of a federal court and cannot pass muster as a legitimate voting system in the United States of America.

Those are quotes from Ms. Powell on Pages 33 and 38 of the transcript in the Pearson v. Kemp case that was on December 7, 2020, here in the Northern District.

And that is the danger we all face when risks become a substitute for evidence of actual problems with elections.

In contrast to that, after the 2018 governor and lieutenant governor race, there were multiple claims against voting machines by candidates and those on the left who lost those elections. Secretary, county election officials were here in this courtroom and other courtrooms across the state defending those election results.

After the 2020 presidential election in Georgia, again multiple claims about machines from those on the right who lost the election. Meanwhile, the Secretary, county officials were in this courtroom, and other courtrooms across the state defending the 2020 election results often at great personal risk.

And the Secretary is still moving forward with efforts to ensure safe and secure elections in Georgia. Over the past year, the Secretary's office conducted health checks of voting equipment across the State. Other states looked to us as an example for auditing and how risk-limiting audits
should be conducted.
Georgia conducts excellent elections. And the Secretary is committed to protecting Georgia elections and election integrity in this state.

And so, Your Honor, we would submit that on the public interest piece of this, Georgia elections work. Georgia election officials do their work well, regardless of attacks from the right or the left.

Georgia's 2020 and 2022 election results stood the test because we used paper ballots in Georgia and we have an auditable paper trail. When there is a question, we can go back and look at every piece of paper, as we did after 2020.

What plaintiffs are asking of you in these cases is to take that system that performed exactly as it was supposed to in 2020 and in 2022 and dozens of elections and determine it is unconstitutional based solely on the fears of the plaintiffs and their experts that somehow, someday, someone might do something that alters the outcome of an election.

That is not enough to have standing. That is not enough to call into question the integrity of Georgia's voting system. And there is no basis under the Constitution to enjoin Georgia from using its Dominion ballot-marking devices.

So we would submit that at the conclusion of all the evidence the Court should grant a defense verdict in both cases and allow Georgia to continue to use its chosen election

## system.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
All right. Are plaintiffs ready to proceed?
MR. CROSS: Yes. We are, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I need a three-minute restroom break. So
knowing the fact that people are coming in and out of this, we'll say five minutes. It is 10:58. So let's just --

MR. CROSS: One quick thing, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CROSS: There were aspects of Mr. Tyson's opening that I didn't object to because I didn't want to interrupt the opening. I just want to make sure that objections are not waived.

THE COURT: It is opening statement. It's not --
MR. CROSS: I just wanted to be clear.
THE COURT: I don't have a jury here. So, you know, all of this will be weighed with the real evidence. You are all terrific lawyers and make compelling cases in both of your arguments and your co-counsel's arguments. So --

MR. TYSON: And to be clear, Your Honor --
THE COURT: It is an abundance of intellectual riches from all of you designed to try to confuse me at the same time as illuminate all the issues.

MR. CROSS: I'm sure Mr. Tyson is about to say he
would have objected to me too.
MR. TYSON: Exactly.
MR. CROSS: Everything is preserved.
THE COURT: All right. Everything is preserved.
There is nothing in this that would -- you haven't sacrificed, your point, as to any issue. And you-all wanted to make an opening statement to sort of assist me in looking at it from a global perspective. Though I think I have in the past. But I understand that there is great public interest in this and why it is useful to illuminate the issues also for the public at large since the trial is being covered.

MR. CROSS: One quick thing my team reminded me.
An issue Mr. Tyson and I talked about before also concerns sequestration of witnesses. So Your Honor has ordered sequestration of witnesses. I think both sides have requested it, except for experts and either a plaintiff who's named or a representative for like the Coalition or Secretary's office.

One thing we talked about was, since there will be some amount of press on this case, we would like either an order or at least an agreement that witnesses who are sequestered will avoid the press to the extent they can in good faith. They are not going to look for things, they are not going to go try to read things. Because otherwise it defeats the sequestration if folks can just --

THE COURT: Probably Twitter as much as anything
else.
MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, for the defendants, we don't have an objection to that in theory. Our concern is that obviously our clients and some of the witnesses, like Mr. Sterling -- there are elections happening now. He may have to hold a press conference. There may be a need to engage with the media or read media about different things.

I think what we settled on is maybe if we could have the witnesses agree they would not click on a story, not go seeking out news about the case. That may be the best way to approach it.

MR. CROSS: I think that generally works. We would ask again -- the Secretary's office is a big office. Like Mr. Sterling doesn't have to be the one to do a press conference. Right? Witnesses should be in a role of a witness is essentially what we're asking you.

THE COURT: I think that is true, except -- and if we were in a one-week trial, that would be simple. The problem is it is a three-week trial. And elections are in the -- in our future.

So I don't know that I'm prepared to say that the Secretary's key deputy isn't able to make -- give a press conference.

But in any event, I think at this juncture almost all the witnesses are very educated about the case. So -- but if
there is something that is really seminal that you think that somebody might share that would affect testimony, you can -you should talk about it first among each other and we'll address that then.

MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. RUSSO: Your Honor, one more thing, and we talked
to Mr. Cross about this earlier, is back to the identification of witnesses.

THE COURT: Just speak up a little.
MR. RUSSO: Back to the identification of witnesses, and the 6:00 P.M. deadline the night before. We got a list of 11 witnesses at 6:00 P.M. last night not indicating who is actually being called today. We asked for that to be identified. Around 7:45 we did get some list. It included even Dr. Halderman possibly being called today.

One of the individuals who was not on the list, David Hamilton, then emails us this morning to say he was contacted about possibly being called today.

And, look, we're all, of course, running around and trying to get things done. We get it. And we're going to try to get something figured out, maybe a better strategy going forward. But we did want to put this on your radar.

THE COURT: Well, I understand. I don't know all what happened. I'm not sure that it makes sense at the moment
for me to try to unravel that. I would not expect, frankly, if you -- Dr. Halderman to speak with -- to be testifying with that little amount of notice.

So I don't know who else might be -- might be a problem. But have you indicated your first people that you are going to be calling?

MR. CROSS: We did, yes.
They asked us to provide two days of witnesses. So we were trying to do what they asked to accommodate them. We provided two days of witnesses.

As I have acknowledged to them, in fairness, we did not break it out in the email between the two days. Once we got their email, we responded quickly. So I don't think this is an issue, and I think we'll work it out.

THE COURT: I'm sure you will. Yes, they probably need to know, first of all, who though -- as a whole, each of you need to know who -- immediate folks who are likely to be called in the next day and who are the next ones, understanding that if something happens you may move up somebody. But a really big witness I think each of you need to know.

MR. CROSS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, let's take a five-minute break.

If you're planning -- if you are a member of the public and you are planning to continue to stay, I'm not -- you
can come back. Just you are not wedded to your seat. Everyone needs a restroom break at points.

But -- and it still looks like we have maybe a seat or two, or maybe I'm not looking at it properly. Do we have --

All right. So we are fine.
All right. We'll see you in five minutes.
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. Court is in
recess for five minutes.

## (A brief break was taken at 11:04 AM.)

THE COURT: Have a seat.
Who's plaintiffs' first witness? Would you call that person?

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, before the first witness, just a housekeeping note.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: I have spoken with the defense counsel.

And it is about who can attend the hearing. We had Dr. DeMillo on our witness list, and we have taken him off. So he is -- it is okay for him, as our consulting expert, to remain in the courtroom? So Mr. Russo just wanted me to state on the record that he is not on our witness record.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. RUSSO: We are going to release him on our
subpoena. We just wanted it to be on the record.
THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Good.
Well, that is not very nice of your colleagues to put the newest person around here to -- as the first lawyer up for examining a witness.

Well, I'm not saying you're the newest lawyer in
town. I'm just saying that it is -- they are the veterans and then there is -- and then they throw you into the pit. All right.

MR. CROSS: Everybody told me you were tired of seeing me up, Judge.

THE COURT: That's right. Of course.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: At least I'm a fresh face, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Remind me of your name.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Matthaeus Martino-Weinhardt on behalf of the Curling plaintiffs, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
THE PLAINTIFFS' CASE.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: The first witness we would like to call is Mr. Jeffrey Schoenberg.

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please raise your right hand.

## (Witness sworn)

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat.

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If you would loudly and clearly into that mic state
your name and spell your last name for the record.
            THE WITNESS: My name is Jeff Schoenberg,
S-C-H-O-E-N-B-E-R-G.
    Whereupon,
                JEFFREY SCHOENBERG,
        after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
                        DIRECT EXAMINATION
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BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Good morning, Mr. Schoenberg.
A. Morning.
Q. I would like to start with just a few questions about your
background.
Where do you live?
A. I live in Dunwoody, Georgia.
Q. Where were you born?
A. I was born outside of Washington, D.C., Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland.
Q. Why there?
A. My father was an Air Force officer stationed at the Pentagon and that is -- that was the convenient place at the time.
Q. Can you briefly summarize for the Court where you have lived since then?
A. We moved around a couple of times when I was young. My
family -- my last -- my father's last station was Warner Robins Air Force Base, Robins Air Force Base in middle Georgia. We moved there in 1970.

He retired. We moved to Atlanta in 1973. And other than leaving the state for college and law school, $I$ have lived in Georgia ever since.
Q. Where did you go for college?
A. I went to Princeton University.
Q. What degree did you get?
A. I got an $A B$ in politics with a concentration in political theory.
Q. And what did you do after college?
A. I went to law school.
Q. Where did you go to law school?
A. The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Q. Could you briefly summarize your professional background after college --
A. Sure.
Q. -- and law school.
A. Sure.

I practiced law for a few years at a large firm in town here. I resigned from that position to start a business in real estate development. When -- after a few additional years, I got myself a position as an adjunct professor at Oglethorpe University here in town.

I went to work for elected officials both on the campaign side and on staff side. That included federal, legislative, members of the Georgia delegation.

I have been an attorney recruiter for a number of years. And most recently I've effectively retired in order to take care of my aging parents.
Q. Next I would like to ask you some questions about your experience as a voter in Georgia.

Are you registered to vote?
A. I am.
Q. Where?
A. In DeKalb County.
Q. Have you voted in previous elections in Georgia?
A. I have. Many. Yes.
Q. Since you've been eligible to vote, about how many elections?
A. Dozens. As many as -- as many as I could, and I try to vote in absolutely every election.
Q. Do you intend to keep voting in future elections?
A. Yes, I do.

Again, as often as there is an election, $I$ will very
likely vote.
Q. Why do you vote?
A. Because I feel it is my civic responsibility. It is the -- it is the core act of participating in government and
civic life. It strikes me as a very important thing to do and something I really value.
Q. How is voting, to you, an act of participating in civic life and democracy?
A. As a citizen, you bring your experiences and your point of view to the question of how the -- how the government should be run, who should represent your interests in government. You know, specifically questions, ballot initiatives and whatever, that you are being asked what is your opinion, what do you think?

And the clearest, most obvious way to participate in civic life is to answer those questions by voting. I think it is -I have engaged in many different kinds of civic participation. That is the one that seems most direct.
Q. Is it important to you that your vote is counted?
A. Yes. My vote should be counted as cast. My particular point of view should be heard.
Q. Is it important to you that your vote is counted as cast even if in a particular election it wouldn't have changed the outcome?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Why is that?
A. Because it seems to me that regardless of whether I win or lose an election, my voice has to be registered. You know, and I will say, unlike what I have already heard in court today,

I'm not motivated to be here because I don't like the results of a particular election.

I am -- my motivation for being a plaintiff in this case is to protect my right to vote in a meaningful way and to know that when I vote it is counted as cast.
Q. And more to the process of voting, do you prefer the process of voting in person or mailing in an absentee ballot?
A. Strongly prefer to vote in person.
Q. What is it about the in-person voting process that you prefer?
A. Well, Mr. Sterling used the word "pageantry." I'm not sure it is exactly pageantry. But it is an activity that you do with other members of the community. And I like that. I like participating in that way.

I always thank the poll workers whenever I go to the poll. I think it is important to participate in that way to show that somebody cares that people are putting in the effort to make the election work.

When my children were small, I thought it was an important teaching opportunity, and I always took my children to the poll with me when I could so that they would be there to see that voting was an important part of my life and that I wanted them to honor it and respect it and want to do it when they grew up.

Most recently, I've been taking my 97, 98-year-old father to the polls when it is time to vote and helping him vote. And

I think it is an inspiration to other people to see somebody his age still participating.
Q. Now I want to move on to the particular voting system that is at issue in this case.

Are you familiar with Georgia's current voting system?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. What's your understanding of what that system is?
A. It is an electronic voting system, relies on ballot-marking devices for the voters to use and a system of scanners and supporting software to make that system work.
Q. Do you see a ballot-marking device in this courtroom?
A. Right in front of me, yes.
Q. Could you just summarize at a high level how voting on a BMD works.
A. Sure.

The voter is given a voter card by the person that checks you in at the poll. With that voter card you activate this machine. And by touching your selections on the ballot style that pops up, you indicate your choices for the elections -you make your selections for the election at hand.

You print the ballot out from a printer that is attached to the machine. And you take that ballot to the scanner where it reads the $Q R$ code that is printed on the ballot.
Q. And since Georgia has implemented the BMD system, have you had experience voting on a BMD?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the first time you voted on a BMD?
A. I think the first time $I$ voted on a BMD was the runoff election in early 2021.
Q. Did you plan to vote on a BMD in that election?
A. No. That was a circumstance where I had asked for a absentee ballot initially for the public service commission race, as I remember. And there were -- because there were two runoff elections and they were going to be run very close to one another, I had asked for an absentee ballot.

They then combined those races, is my understanding. I never got an absentee ballot for any race. And I realized it was too late to go through the process again. So I gave up waiting for an absentee ballot to arrive and just voted in person that election cycle.
Q. And in that election, when you voted on a BMD, were you confident that your vote was accurately counted?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because there was no way I could verify that the information on the ballot that printed out of the machine was going to reflect my intentions.

I know enough to know that the $Q R$ code rather than the printed words on the page are the active part of the ballot. And the $Q R$-- I can't read the $Q R$ code.
Q. What is an example of a voting system that would give you confidence that your vote is counted as you cast it?
A. Well, the simplest answer to that question is hand-marked paper ballots where you can physically mark what you're interested in voting in and know for certain that the marking is for the -- reflects your intent.

I imagine there are plenty of other ways one could do it. But that is the simplest.
Q. Based on your experiences voting, do you consider the option of mailing in absentee ballot an adequate alternative to voting on a BMD?
A. No. For a couple of reasons.
Q. What are those?
A. I tried it once and it failed. The system failed. I didn't fail.

I also find that just generally it takes a lot of planning. You have to -- you need a bunch of equipment. You need a printer at home now. You need a bunch of -- you have to go through a bunch of hoops to make that system work. That is not something that I particularly want to have to do in order to vote.

Additionally, I know that using a -- the absentee system, if there is something wrong with the absentee ballot that you submit, my understanding is somebody at the county will convert it to a BMD cast ballot and you are back where we started.
Q. And in terms of the voting experience between voting in person or mailing an absentee ballot, do you have feelings about how those compare?
A. The feelings --
Q. About the process of voting in person.
A. Yeah. There's -- for what pageantry there is in the system, that pageantry certainly does not follow the absentee ballot process. There is no joy in civic or very little joy in civic participation by filling out a ballot at home and putting it in the mail.
Q. What about the timing of voting as between absentee or in person?
A. That is another thing. If you are voting in person, even if you are voting early in person, it is going to happen close to election day and -- which gives you the opportunity to know whatever facts are going to come down toward the end of that election cycle that might have an impact on how you want to vote.

In order to make sure that an absentee ballot gets in on time, you generally have to vote awfully early, uncomfortably early as far as I'm concerned.
Q. You already touched on this. But just to be absolutely clear, do you dispute the outcome of any elections that have taken place in Georgia?
A. No.
Q. Why then are you participating in this lawsuit?
A. Because I think I deserve -- I know I deserve a constitutionally adequate election system. I need to know that when I vote my vote will be counted as cast, and I know that I don't have that now.
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, you have had experience voting on a BMD as you have explained.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Your Honor, if I may, I would
like to ask Mr. Schoenberg to come down to the BMD and briefly demonstrate to the Court how the voting process on a BMD works?

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: And if I may, Your Honor, if
I could --
THE COURT: There seems to be some commotion over on defense table. So I want to make sure there is no objection.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Wait. Just wait one moment.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, if I may, I'm just going to come around so I can see what the witness is doing.

THE COURT: Sure, of course.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: I was going to ask the same thing, if I could.

THE COURT: Of course.
MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, I would like to do the same.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we probably should have
had this a little further out. But that is fine.
MR. BELINFANTE: I'm sorry. I can't see what is on
the screen.
THE COURT: Do you want to come over here?
MR. BELINFANTE: If you don't mind, Your Honor. I
certainly don't want to block your view.
THE COURT: That's all right. I'll just walk on out.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, before you start on the BMD, could you briefly describe what happens when you arrive at a polling location.
A. Sure.

So when you -- when you get to the front of the line, you'll identify yourself with ID to the poll worker.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just get this -- it is a little further -- closer to you. I just am not sure.

All right. Thank you.
MR. BELINFANTE: Actually, Your Honor, forgive me if it's a bit delayed. I would object to the question only on the grounds that $I$ think it is -- if he is speaking about his own experience voting, that is one thing.

I think the question was more generalized about what happens. And there is 159 counties in Georgia with different

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precincts and so on.
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It is an easy cure. I would just object on the grounds that the question itself is too broad for Mr. Schoenberg's personal knowledge.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: I can rephrase it.
THE COURT: All right. Maybe he has also been --
worked in the polls, so you can explain what the basis of your knowledge is.

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. In your experience voting on a BMD, what have you observed happens when you arrive at the polling location?
A. So you -- you are asked for an identity card of some sort to prove who you are. The poll worker checks you in with the electronic pollbook. Assuming that you have the right to vote where you are, they prepare a voter card for your use to use the BMD.
Q. Could you please take the demonstrative voter card and insert it into the BMD.
A. (The witness complies.)
Q. Would you please describe what you see on the touch screen.
A. I see a ballot style that says, Fulton County Official Ballot, General and Special Election, the State of Georgia, November 5th, 2024.

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection, Your Honor. What is
the -- where did this information come from?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: It is a demonstrative that we have prepared.

MR. BELINFANTE: I mean --
THE COURT: It is obviously not the actual election but --

MR. BELINFANTE: Understood, Your Honor. But I mean, for example, then where did the card come from? Who prepared the card? All of these kind of questions for something we're just now seeing.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Dr. Halderman prepared the cards for this demonstration.

MR. BELINFANTE: Then I would object to this witness testifying about a preparation he has not prepared, not seen, and cannot determine if this is similar to a BMD that will be used in a Fulton County special election or any other.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, this all goes to cross-examination and weight. It is a demonstration. We didn't want to use a real ballot because we didn't want to get into issues about us making suggestions about past elections.

So it is a demonstration just to show Your Honor how it works. Mr. Belinfante can cross-examine him on how this might differ from his real world experience. He will lay the foundation that it is exactly the same.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, the witness has no
knowledge and certainly no foundation has been laid that the witness has any knowledge about how a card is created, how it is being read in a machine, how it is being appeared on the machine, much less where I anticipate the testimony is going. THE COURT: Well, I don't know where the testimony is going.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Your Honor --
THE COURT: He can testify as to what his experience has been. Not that this is an identical replica. He can -obviously, there are other ways that can be addressed. But we can walk through the steps of how -- what usually -- what happens when he puts in a card, what is the process in his experience. That is all we're doing.

MR. BELINFANTE: And if that is --
THE COURT: And it is -- I mean, frankly, there is probably everyone in this courtroom who lives in Georgia has had this experience. So this is not unique. But nevertheless, it is not -- we're not treating this as if this is an actual voter -- that it is -- there is no indication, and you can certainly raise it. It is a bench trial. I'm -- there is no one who is being prejudiced. You can raise any of this, but we're going to spend more time than it is worth.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I don't disagree, certainly -- and it wouldn't matter if I did anyway -- with what Your Honor just said.
But just for clarity's sake, I want to make sure. My
objection is not that Mr. Schoenberg can't testify about his
experiences with machines. The objection is that he can't
testify using this machine and then as -- and then saying that
this is how something operates when we have no idea how it is
being created. The foundation hasn't been laid.
THE COURT: I don't know the entire scope of what his
testimony is, frankly. So, you know, I'm going to give you
some latitude to move forward.
Obviously, Dr. Halderman, who has done this many
times, can also do this. And he is certainly familiar with
this. So -- and there are other people too you can call for
cross-examination purposes -- somebody from the State, if there
is a problem.
But for now, just so we move forward -- and it is a
bench trial, and we are not affecting any jury members -- you
may proceed. But don't go too far.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: That is right, Your Honor.
The point is to show how an ordinary person interacts with this
machine and the concerns that Mr . Schoenberg has.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, could you please describe again what you
are seeing on this screen.
A. So it looks the way you often -- in my experience, it
looks the way it typically looks. You get the front page of the ballot style of the thing you're going to be voting that day. That is what I'm looking at.
Q. Could you please advance to the next screen.
A. The first race that appears on the ballot is for President of the United States.
Q. And in this demonstrative, what are the options?
A. George Washington of the Framers' Party, Benedict Arnold of the Redcoats' party, and write-in.

THE COURT: Write-in?
THE WITNESS: Write-in.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. So obviously not an actual election you voted in?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, could you please, as if you were at a BMD polling place, as you have experienced it, go ahead and make a selection. Then advance to the next and continue making selections.
A. Sure.
Q. If you could please describe, as you are doing so, just the name of each of the contests and when you are moving along.
A. Understood.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I would just again
object. We have not seen -- now that we continue to see what
Mr. Schoenberg is doing, we have not seen this -- it has not
been provided to us.
And it would be prejudicial for us to have to even cross-examine him when we have no information about what this is or how it got here.

THE COURT: Well, tell me -- how much more have you got here?

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: It should be on the total under ten minutes of going through this and Mr. Schoenberg walking through.

THE COURT: Is there a way of cutting to the quick? Because I know you're going to be able to do this at minimum with Dr. Halderman and likely with others as well that you're calling on cross-examination.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, what he is doing right now is -- I mean, it takes a couple minutes. He's just going to vote it the same way he would in a voting booth so Your Honor can see the process of that, the steps on that. Because that goes to our burden. So we need that in the record beyond him just saying it. We think the demonstrative shows Your Honor step by step the burdens that the voter incurs when they vote.

THE COURT: Do you want to take a ten-minute break or five-minute break so that opposing counsel can see your demonstrative?

I thought you would have shared it, frankly, beforehand.

MR. CROSS: We had talked about exchanging
demonstratives. We are where we are.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, then let's just stop for five minutes and let them look at the demonstrative.

MR. CROSS: Can I just ask a question? I guess what I don't understand is, is the State's counsel saying they don't understand -- the BMD is just voting the way you would at a poll site, which is the foundation that is laid?

THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that.
MR. CROSS: They don't understand how that works?
THE COURT: Let them look at it. That is all.
MR. BELINFANTE: That is not our objection. I think the Court recognizes that.

THE COURT: All right. So let's take a five-minute recess for anyone who wants a recess and let the -- and let them look at it.

And you don't need to be the guide either -- well, you will be if I let you proceed. But let them just -- let counsel come up and be familiar with the document.

## (A brief break was taken at 11:42 AM.)

THE COURT: How are we proceeding?
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, having reviewed the demonstrative, I have an objection that I need to discuss in chambers regarding the -- regarding what we have looked at on the demonstrative, if we could.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BELINFANTE: For the record, Your Honor, this is not a situation under the Court's warning about one counsel having responsibility for objections and so on. I think the Court will soon learn why it is Mr. Tyson making the objection.

THE COURT: Just being particularly argumentative?
MR. BELINFANTE: It is me, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen --
How long do you think that is going to take us to
chat?
MR. TYSON: Five minutes. I don't think it is long.
THE COURT: Well, just hang out because I want to keep on running and get -- be able to at least to finish this witness or get somewhere, like, by 12:30.

COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: Court will stand in recess for about five minutes.

## (A brief break was taken at 11:50 AM.)

THE COURT: Thank you for your patience. I had a conference with counsel in chambers, and I determined that it would probably be more efficient, in terms of resolving any concerns and addressing the fact that the defense counsel hadn't looked at the assembled software that Dr. Halderman did before, that it would just make more sense to wait until Dr. Halderman testifies for them to clarify any of their questions.

And then we will end up having Mr. Schoenberg back to describe his experience as a voter using the software assuming everything has been looked at and defense counsel feel they have had an adequate opportunity to review the demonstrative here.

So we're going to halt where we were at. I
understood also that plaintiffs' counsel -- that this was the remainder of the questioning for the testimony of Mr. Schoenberg by plaintiffs' counsel; is that right?

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then I will allow you to resume this after we have had done the two steps of having the opportunity for the defense counsel to look at some of the software issues and also examine Dr. Halderman regarding this. And then we will have Mr. Schoenberg back.

But, Mr. Schoenberg, they still can cross-examine you about the rest of your testimony and thank you for your -waiting until whenever it is that we are through with Dr. Halderman's testimony.

All right.
MR. BELINFANTE: So, Your Honor, so I understand Mr. Schoenberg is going to return to the stand to continue direct examination?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BELINFANTE: Okay.

THE COURT: Just as to this -- the issues relating to what his experience as a voter would be --

MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: -- in using the touch screen and what happens after that and -- and what happened -- what might happen if there were -- if it was not normal software.

MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. If that is the case, Your
Honor, and I defer to the Court, would you rather me cross-examine him within what the questions were so far or just reserve until he comes back?

THE COURT: No. Go ahead and ask him the questions about -- up to the point that he came down for the demonstrative.

MR. BELINFANTE: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But we'll just not revisit those again later. All right.

MR. BELINFANTE: Will do my best. CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Schoenberg.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. My name is Josh Belinfante. I'm one of the outside counsel for the state defendants. I know we haven't met. At least I don't believe we have. Although we may have crossed paths politically somewhere along the way.

Speaking of that, you testified a moment ago that you had worked in various campaigns in Georgia. One of those was now State Representative Scott Holcomb's campaign for Secretary of State; isn't that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. And in that race, Candidate Holcomb made an issue of the old voting machines, the DRE machines as they are called? The Diebold machines; isn't that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And he focused that campaign, at least in part, on talking about the need to change the voting system when he was out campaigning across the state; right?
A. Very specifically talking about needing a paper trail, an auditable paper trail.
Q. An auditable paper trail?
A. I believe that was the phrase that he usually used.
Q. Right. And, in fact, a verifiable paper auditing trail; isn't that right?
A. Yes. Could be.
Q. Okay. And that is because the Diebold machines did not have a piece of paper that was -- a voter then took to the poll worker after they concluded voting; isn't that right?
A. Yes.
Q. It was all done on the computer system?
A. There was nothing machine independent about that system.

That's correct.
Q. And you testified a moment ago that you had voted on what I'll refer to as the BMD machines or the Dominion voter equipment before and it does spit out a piece of paper; correct?
A. It does spit out a piece of paper.
Q. And on that piece of paper it is listed what a voter's choices are under the QR code; correct?
A. It lists the selections that the voter has made. That's correct.
Q. And as someone who has voted on a BMD machine, when you voted on the BMD machine, did you receive the piece of paper and then turn it in to the poll workers?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And as a concerned voter and understandably and correctly wanting to make sure that your vote counted, did you review the votes that were demonstrated on your ballot?
A. As it turns out, not every time.
Q. You did not?
A. I did -- I know that I did sometimes. And I also realize that when $I$ voted this last election in November that I didn't.
Q. Why did you not, sir?
A. Probably some combination of forgetting and there is -- I will tell you the -- an -- a psychological sense that you are done when the machine prints your ballot and you're finished
expressing your votes.
And I honestly think that part of the reason I didn't is because you feel like, well, I've done what I have done, now I just move on.
Q. But that is your personal feeling? You just felt like you were done?
A. Yeah. I --
Q. Go ahead. I'm sorry. I thought you were done.
A. I expect that feeling is quite common given that I'm having the same experience everybody else is.
Q. Have you conducted any surveys on that or is that just your --
A. Of course not, no.
Q. Okay. Then -- so, Mr. Schoenberg, you testified a moment ago that it is so important for you to understand -- for you to know that your vote counted and now you're testifying that when you have the opportunity to review your ballot you simply forgot?
A. I will tell you another fact that goes through my head every time $I$ use the $B M D$ is that it is a ridiculous nullity to look at the paper because I can't read the important part of the paper.
Q. Okay. You say --
A. So I -- that is a thought that has occurred to me as I'm holding my ballot.
Q. Sure. That is your opinion; correct?

Because you have no firsthand knowledge that any vote you have ever cast using a BMD machine was not correctly counted, do you?
A. Nor do I have any firsthand knowledge that it was.
Q. And you have -- and there is no way that anyone could convince you that it was or it was not, could they?
A. No. Because there is no auditable paper trail.
Q. So given that, Mr. Schoenberg, here is what I don't understand. Would you agree with me that voting by absentee is a hand-marked paper ballot?
A. Yes.
Q. And your reason for wanting to vote, understandably, and many Georgians agree with you, your reason for wanting to vote in person on election day is, as $I$ believe you described it, the pageantry you said might not be a perfect example, but you wanted to thank poll workers and you wanted to do something with the members of your community; right?
A. That is in part what I said, yes.
Q. But if your concern is that your vote isn't going to count and you have just testified that you have no way of knowing one way or the other, and the only thing you have to do to make sure it counts is to give up on the pageantry and thanking poll workers, which you could presumably do just by going by a poll site and being with other members of the community, why not
vote by hand-marked paper ballot in an absentee?
A. Well, a couple of things. You're discounting all of the drawbacks that I just expressed about absentee voting. And also I have enough knowledge to know that if I submit a hand-marked paper ballot, it can be converted into a BMD vote by the -- by poll workers and I didn't avoid the system at all. Q. And how would it be converted -- and what is the basis of your understanding? You say your knowledge that it could be converted. What is the basis of that knowledge?
A. If they determined, for some reason, that the vote can't be read. They can't determine what its intention was.
Q. So even a hand-marked paper ballot, there could be a determination that a voter's intent is not clear on the face of the ballot; isn't that right?
A. Yes. That is possible.
Q. Okay. And you also talked about your concerns with the hand-marked paper ballots -- or excuse me, voting absentee. Let me go back.

Do you have an understanding of whether county governments or the State government administers the delivery of an absentee ballot? In other words, when you request it, do you have an understanding that the request goes to the county or to the State?
A. I do have an understanding.
Q. And what is that understanding?
A. It goes to the county.
Q. Okay. And do you have an understanding of whether the county or the State then sends out that absentee ballot that you have requested?
A. The State does -- I mean, excuse me, the county does.
Q. Okay. And you also talked about some of the burdens you had with it. One was that you had to have a printer. Do you personally have a printer at home, Mr. Schoenberg?
A. I have a printer that's kind of spotty, but yes, I have got a printer available to me.
Q. So you could request and print out a request for a hand-marked paper ballot or an absentee ballot, couldn't you?
A. I could.
Q. And your concern that -- it being converted to a BMD vote is that a county official, right, would misread your intent? Is that right?
A. No. My concern, if a person were to convert my vote to a BMD, I'm not suggesting that they would be doing it in a way that was inaccurate or, you know, malfeasant or anything of that sort.
Q. Sure.
A. My problem would be that my ballot would then be cast by the BMD, again where if somebody has played around with the guts of the BMD that it wouldn't work.
Q. You have no firsthand knowledge of anyone actually playing
around with the guts of a BMD, do you --
A. I have --
Q. -- in an actual election as opposed to Dr. Halderman at the University of Michigan?
A. Okay.

MR. BELINFANTE: Congratulations, by the way, Georgia
still should have been there.
THE COURT: They waited a long time.
MR. BELINFANTE: They did.
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure how much of that I should
respond to.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. That is fair.
A. I really don't know what the question was anymore. I'm sorry.
Q. Totally fair. Sorry. Football was on the brain.

The issue -- the county election official -- and I'm not impugning any bad intent, bad faith, none of that. But if a county election official, even operating in good faith, the only time it is your understanding that they would convert your absentee ballot into one that has gone through a $Q R$ code system is if they could not determine your intent based only the absentee ballot itself; isn't that right?
A. Or if the scanner didn't read it or -- yeah, there are other reasons.
Q. Okay. If the scanner didn't read it.

And you don't have a problem with hand-marked paper ballots that would be read by a scanner as opposed to by individuals, do you?
A. No. Not really.
Q. Now, your concern, though, with the BMDs is that your vote could not be reliably counted as cast? Is that a fair way to describe it?
A. My concern with the BMDs is that I have no evidence that the time that $I$ am in the -- in the ballot box voting that my ballot -- that my intention is being understood properly. So I don't know that it is being recorded properly. I don't know that it is being scanned and read properly. And I have no -- I don't want a guarantee. I want confidence. I want --
Q. Go ahead. Sorry.
A. And I don't get that confidence from the operation of this system.
Q. We'll come back to the guarantee.

So now -- because I think before it may have been that you
wanted certainty. Now you just want a level of confidence.
How much confidence do you need to be satisfied?
A. A reasonable level of confidence $I$ think is the answer to your question.
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, you said a minute ago you went to law school and you practiced law for a little while; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And as a lawyer you would agree with me that reasonable is one of those words that means a lot of different things to a lot of different people; right?
A. It does.
Q. Okay.
A. I didn't have any better answer for you as to how to measure levels of confidence.
Q. Okay. So if that were the case, then isn't it -- but you do have an objection to the General Assembly's decision that a BMD can provide a reasonable level of confidence, don't you?
A. I do. I think there's no question that it doesn't.
Q. And you have an objection to the vast majority of

Georgians who choose to vote in person on a BMD that presumably had a reasonable level of confidence that it works? You just disagree with them; isn't that right?
A. I have not thought about this in terms of disagreeing with my fellow citizens in their -- in their exercise of their right to vote. They are exercising their right to vote as that right is offered to them by the State of Georgia. And I can't fault them for that.

I don't expect everybody has an equal amount of knowledge on the subject of election equipment to have equal amounts of information available come to a decision as to what is reasonable here.
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, we're in Georgia. Certainly since 2020 Georgians reasonably have a good amount of information, whether it is good information or bad, but certainly that there are debates about the accuracy of election equipment in Georgia, don't they? Given the Sidney Powell lawsuits, the Trump lawsuits, the Favorito lawsuits. These are in the news daily; right?
A. As long as we're stipulating that they are getting information that's both good and bad.
Q. Sure. Absolutely.
A. They certainly have heard plenty about whether the system is reliable or not.
Q. And Georgians have also heard about --

THE COURT: I'm not sure where we're going here,
Counsel. I mean, this is all very interesting. But, you know, we might -- we are projecting a three-week trial. If we go at this rate, we will be at a five-week trial.

MR. BELINFANTE: I think, Your Honor, where it goes is several things. One, what Mr. Schoenberg is testifying is that he wants to -- I mean, the goal of this is to deprive Georgians the opportunity to use a BMD, even when they can use the other.

Where I was about to go is concerns people may have with hand-marked paper ballots and I was just asking, once he said Georgians don't know as much as he may about election
equipment, that at least they know there is significant -there has been a lot of attention based on Dominion machines in particular.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: We would object on relevance, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: We would object on relevance.
THE COURT: What is your contention about why it is
not relevant?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Mr. Schoenberg's knowledge of what other Georgians may know through the media or not has very little to do with what he testified about his own experiences.

MR. BELINFANTE: I can probably curl it back.
THE COURT: This is exceeding the scope of what -the examination. And I have let you do that to some extent. But I think at this point you're really taking it to a whole other level. This is not what he -- these were not the scope of his direct testimony.

MR. BELINFANTE: I'll try to curl it back.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. BELINFANTE: And I'm sure the Court will tell me if $I$ get back out of line. And I will try not to.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, you would also agree with me, though, that as -- like you, there may be others who do not want to vote by
absentee; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would agree with me, having lived in Georgia and followed elections, that there are those who make allegations that absentee ballots lead to voter fraud, stuffing of ballot boxes, 21 mules, the movie, et cetera?

THE COURT: But I don't understand why you are converting this plaintiffs' testimony, which is not about all of those things, into that he should express his opinion about them. That is what I'm saying seems outside the scope of the direct testimony. I mean, if you --

MR. BELINFANTE: If I may, Your Honor, it is that Mr. Schoenberg has testified that he wants these machines for folks not to be able to vote on these machines, unless they are handicapped or disabled. That would limit people to hand-marked paper ballots.

And one of the issues that the Court is going to have to weigh is whether it is in the public interest to enjoin the use of the machines except for disabled voters. And if there are allegations of fraud that he is aware of involving hand-marked paper ballots, ballot boxes, et cetera, that is a relevant factor that goes to that element that the plaintiffs have to demonstrate.

THE COURT: I think you're going to have to elicit it in a different way from somebody else. You can ask him does he

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have any -- I just don't think they covered this.
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I'm going to allow you two minutes to ask what question you want that you think is going to illuminate the issue.

But $I$ think that this is not going to be helpful and it is beyond the scope of the cross, no matter what you say here. It is clearly beyond the scope.

If you want to have somebody -- call some other
citizens about those same issues and put on the testimony yourself, that is fine.

MR. BELINFANTE: I think he answered the question. So if the answer stands, I can just move on.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you, Mr. Schoenberg.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Now, you said a moment ago that you were looking for reasonable confidence that your vote was cast or counted as cast; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said that you don't get that with looking at the ballot that is provided to you by the BMD machine printed out; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Even though it lists the choices that a voter makes underneath the $Q R$ code; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And even though poll workers could run an audit after an election comparing the identity of the names as opposed to just running it through a $Q R$ code; is that right?
A. My understanding is that is not done.
Q. But it could be done; is that right?
A. I guess it could be done.
Q. Okay.
A. I understand from our experts that it is wildly impractical, but it could be done.

MR. BELINFANTE: Move to strike. If you understood from your experts, that would be hearsay.

THE COURT: All right. Motion to strike granted. MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: He opened the door. MR. CROSS: He opened the door to this, Your Honor. MR. BELINFANTE: I asked the question if it could be done.

MR. CROSS: Which he is answering how it could be. MR. BELINFANTE: He's saying it can be done.

MR. CROSS: Based on his knowledge of his --
MR. BELINFANTE: Now he is saying -- I think we're good.

THE WITNESS: My knowledge is it is next to impossible to do.

MR. CROSS: It's okay. Sorry, Your Honor.

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            THE COURT: You may proceed. And if you want to
respond -- if plaintiff wants to bring that out in a different
way and address this, you can.
    Go ahead.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. So, Mr. Schoenberg, sitting here today, you're not looking
for certainty that the system is doing what it was intended to
do?
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A. I think "certainty" is probably too strong a word. I understand that any voting system is going to be imperfect. But I need constitutionally adequate reliability. I need voter verifiability. I need an independent machine -- machine independent audit trail.

I need to know that the system is adequately designed to provide confidence to the voter that everything that can be done is being done to assure them that their vote is being counted as cast. And that is not absolute certainty. That is not a guarantee. But it is also not in the least what the BMD does.
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, you have no formal training in computers or IT security; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. So when you testified just a second ago that you need confidence that something is adequately designed, that is not -- you're not basing -- you're not concluding that the BMD

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is not adequately designed based on any personal knowledge, are
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you?
A. It spits out a $Q R$ code, so it is not adequately designed to provide security, is my sense of adequacy here.

I'm not talking about its internal software or anything of that sort.
Q. Okay. Mr. Schoenberg, do you -- have you changed your view that you're now looking for reasonable assurance as opposed to certainty?
A. I think the view that $I$ 'm expressing here today may -- is the view I've always had. I may be better at expressing it today than $I$ have been in the past, if that is what you're asking.
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, do you recall being deposed in this lawsuit on October 19, 2021?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall being under oath when you were deposed in this lawsuit then?
A. Yes.

MR. BELINFANTE: I'm sorry. It looks like we're missing a page in here.

May I approach the witness, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, I would just like to refresh your
recollection, please. If you could look at Lines 15 to 23 on -- I'm sorry -- Page, for the record, 37.
A. I've reviewed it.
Q. Okay. Is it your testimony today that you have always maintained that you're looking for reasonable assurance or you're looking for certainty?
A. My testimony is that I -- I need reasonable assurance. I recognize that I have used the word "certain" in my answer here. I don't think it fundamentally changes what I have expressed.

THE COURT: Your answer in your deposition?
THE WITNESS: The answer in my deposition.
I'm relying on all the same, you know, reliability, verifiability, transparency kind of things. BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Sure.

And today you're looking for reasonable assurance and previously you were looking for certainty; right?
A. I used different words to try to express my opinion, yes.
Q. But you would agree with me that reasonable assurance and certainty are two different things?
A. Sure. If you would like to say it that way, they are that different.
Q. Well, I mean --

THE COURT: All right. I think you've asked enough.

It is asked and answered. There is no value to further examination on this issue. I'm sorry.

MR. BELINFANTE: I was moving along, actually.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Would you agree with me, given that, that no election is flawless?
A. I previously testified, no, I don't believe any election is flawless.
Q. Okay. Is it your -- is one of your criticisms of the BMD machines, despite voting on them, that they maintain no record of your vote?
A. I'm not sure I know what you're saying. The BMD itself does not maintain any record of my vote.
Q. I'm sorry. Okay.

But does the paper ballot that is printed out, do you deem that a record of your vote?
A. It is -- yeah. That is the ballot that is being cast as my vote. So it is a record of my vote. It is not necessarily a record of my intended vote.
Q. Okay. Mr. Schoenberg, I was -- given the limits, I'm just trying to stay within those that were there before. So we may ask these later.
A. Understood.
Q. You don't dispute, do you, that the DRE -- the Diebold DRE machines are no longer in use in Georgia?
A. No. They have been trashed, as I understand it.
Q. Okay. Given your concerns about the Dominion BMD systems, do you believe that there is a way to verify the validity of elections in Georgia?
A. I'm sorry. Ask me that again.
Q. Sure.

Given your concerns about the Dominion BMD system and the fact that Georgians do vote on them, do you believe that there is a way to verify the validity of elections in Georgia?

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Vague. Is that asking about
outcomes?
THE COURT: Can you rephrase? I mean, that is a very broad question. BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Do you believe that there is a way to verify the validity of vote counts in Georgia in elections?

THE COURT: Generally speaking in elections or as to in this particular system where there is -- with the $Q R$ code or --

MR. BELINFANTE: Sure. Yes, Your Honor. All right. Okay.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. In elections in Georgia using the Dominion BMD equipment, as long as it is made available --

THE COURT: As currently configured?

MR. BELINFANTE: Well, I don't know the witness -THE COURT: Well, he doesn't know anything about if it -- what might be planned for later on and that is beyond the scope.

MR. BELINFANTE: Let's take a past election. BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. The 2022 election, general election, you would agree with me that the BMD Dominion voting system was used; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You would agree with me that at least -- and I don't know, but I'm -- a significant or material number of votes were cast using the BMD system in 2022's general election; is that right?
A. I'm sure that is true.
Q. Okay. Do you believe that the vote count can be verified in the general election of 2022 given the use of the BMDs?
A. You use the word "vote count" or the phrase "vote count." And I think you can count the votes that were cast. What you can't do is verify that you've captured the intention of the votes that were cast, that we have demonstrated that we -there has been evidence in this suit that this is a garbage in/garbage out problem. That you might be recording something that is the audit trail that is an inaccurate reflection of voters' intentions, including potentially mine.

So you can count the number of votes over and over again
that were produced by the BMD system and know that you're getting an accurate count. So I don't doubt that you can count the votes. What I don't know is that you can be certain that you're counting the votes accurately.
Q. And when you say counting the votes accurately, you mean we can't be -- we can't be certain that you're counting the votes per candidate accurately; is that right?

In other words, we know, for example, that 20,000 votes were cast. But we'll never know of those 20,000 votes how many went for one candidate to another.
A. No. You're getting that count too. The problem is at the beginning, not the end. The problem is that you're not capturing voter intent.
Q. Correct. So if we'll never know how many Georgians intended to vote for a particular candidate -- we'll never know if in the 2022 general election the number of voters that the vote count shows voted for, for example, Governor Kemp, accurately reflects the number of voters that intended to vote for Governor Kemp? Is that your testimony?
A. I am more interested in what happens to my vote than $I$ am in that question. That is what brings me here.

But to try to answer your question, I have little confidence that you can know for certain that with a degree of reasonable reliability that what you have counted reflects what the voters intended to be the count at the end for any
particular candidate.
THE COURT: So when you say that, when you say what the voter intended, do you mean just what was in their brain or what they actually -- what they thought --

THE WITNESS: What they actually touch on the touch screen.

THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: I -- I know enough to know that it is entirely possible that a touch on the touch screen does not equate to a vote that is counted at the back end that says, I voted for George Washington if I, in fact, vote for George Washington. That is -- that is not something that is reasonably reliable. BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, how much -- you would also agree with me, though, that it is -- there is a possibility or risk that the person who votes for George Washington with a hand-marked paper ballot may not have that intent reflected when the vote is actually counted?
A. Yes. There is a possibility that counting a hand-marked paper ballot there are errors in the count.

MR. BELINFANTE: All right. Then, at this time, Your
Honor, I would have no further questions and would reserve obviously when he is called back at the end and ask at that time.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any redirect?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Schoenberg, just a few follow-up questions.

Opposing counsel asked you about voting on a hand-marked paper ballot.

When you cast a vote with a hand-marked paper ballot, can you be reasonably confident that what is tabulated reflects what was marked on the ballot?
A. It is in my --

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection.
THE WITNESS: -- it is in my control, yes.
MR. BELINFANTE: Speculation. He is asking if it can
be reasonably calculated that the acts of a third party are
going to be completed as he's preferring. He has already testified he doesn't know.

THE COURT: Overruled.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I can be.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Why is that?
A. Because when you fill out a hand-marked paper ballot, you're doing it on your own. You can see if you filled in the dots where you intended to fill in the dots and fully. So you have some control over whether the scanner is going to read the
document the way you intend. And I think that that provides a level of confidence.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: No further questions.
THE COURT: Thank you.
All right. May this witness be excused subject to being re-called pursuant to the understandings I have already articulated in the record?

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: We have lost a fair amount of time here.
Let's start back at 1:30, 45 minutes.
Thank you.
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: Court will stand in
recess until 1:30.
(A lunch break was taken.)
(A bench conference ensued, as follows:)
THE COURT: That went a long time. I think it was excessive, and I don't like having to interrupt constantly. So I just wanted to say -- I mean, we will be here for six weeks if we're going at that rate.

If I thought it was anything that was really
important or valuable for the Court's decision-making or your record on appeal, I would have -- I would say, well, there is another way of doing this. You call the persons required in

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your case.
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But I didn't think it was really contributing anything. It was more like a deposition. So, you know, you get to explore all sorts of things. So -- just I'm not sure what triggered it.

But I mean -- and I took action on the very legitimate issue that you-all raised, but I just really hope that we can move more quickly through the next witnesses.

MR. TYSON: We can communicate that to our team.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
(The bench conference was thereby concluded.)
THE COURT: All right. Who is the plaintiffs' next witness?

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, one administrative thing. We do have the slides to hand up so Your Honor has those in the record.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. CROSS: Can I approach on that?
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I have slides to hand up as well. I'll just give you my set.

THE COURT: Thank you.
I just want to just compliment both -- all counsel who participated and the parties' respective opening statements. They were really excellent. And I gave you grief

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about doing them yesterday, but I thought they were really
excellent, and just congratulations to all involved.
Do plaintiffs have a next witness?
MR. McGUIRE: Yes, Your Honor. The Coalition plaintiffs are going to call Rhonda Martin.
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Raise your right hand, please.
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## (Witness sworn)

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. If you would, state your name and spell your last name for the record.

THE WITNESS: My name is Rhonda Martin. The last name is spelled $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{T}-\mathrm{I}-\mathrm{N}$.

Whereupon,
RHONDA MARTIN,
after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Thank you.

And, Ms. Martin, what is your full name?
A. My full name is Rhonda Jo Martin.
Q. And, Ms. Martin, where do you live?
A. I live in Fulton County, Georgia.
Q. How long have you lived there?
A. I first moved to Atlanta in 1975 to go to school at Georgia Tech, and over the years I've moved around some. Most
recently, I moved back to Atlanta in Fulton County in August of 2002.
Q. Now, what is your educational background?
A. I have a Bachelor of Science degree in applied math and a Master of Science degree in operations research from Georgia Tech. I also have a teaching certification in math -mathematics major, science minor education from Purdue University.
Q. Can you please give us a brief summary of your professional career thus far?
A. Sure. So my first job after getting my bachelor's degree from Georgia Tech was as a software engineer working for IBM Corporation developing avionics software for the space shuttle.

Following that, I worked at Georgia Tech where I led a team of people that developed new -- new DOD guidance and policy for software -- computer software for mission-critical applications.

After that, I was research coordinator for the National Science Foundation Software Engineering Research Center which was a consortium of universities and industrial members.

Since 2010, I have been the executive secretary of the Qatar Computing Research Institute Scientific Advisory Committee.

And let's see. And along the way, I also worked as an upper school math teacher at Kent Place School in Summit, New

Jersey.
Q. Thank you.

And what is your connection to the plaintiff, Coalition
for Good Governance, in this case?
A. I'm a member of the Coalition for Good Governance. I volunteer for the organization, and I'm also a board member.
Q. And just to save time, I want to call it CGG.

Does that work?
A. That would be really good. Thank you.
Q. When did you become a member of CGG?
A. I became active with CGG in the fall of 2018.
Q. And when did you join CGG's governing board?
A. In February -- I joined the board in February of 2020.
Q. So I would like to talk to you about CGG a little bit.
A. Okay.
Q. What kind of legal entity is Coalition for Good Governance?
A. It is a $501(\mathrm{c})(3)$ nonprofit corporation, and it was formed under the laws of the State of Colorado.
Q. Has it always been called CGG, Coalition for Good Governance?
A. No. It was originally called The Rocky Mountain Foundation.
Q. And do you know when it was formed in Colorado?
A. I believe that was in 2008.
Q. When did CGG change its name from Rocky Mountain Foundation to its current name?
A. I think that occurred in 2017.
Q. And do you know why that name change happened?
A. It changed because the mission and the area where CGG operated changed. You know, they expand their mission. They started doing things in states other than Colorado, so changing the name from Rocky Mountain Foundation was totally appropriate.
Q. And is one of those states where it operates now Georgia?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Is CGG actually in any way legally registered to operate in Georgia?
A. It is registered as a foreign charity for fundraising purposes in the state of Georgia.
Q. Now, this lawsuit has been going on since 2017.

What has CGG's mission been during the life of the lawsuit?
A. So the mission of CGG is focused on constitutional
liberties and individual rights specifically in terms of the First Amendment, due process, and equal protection under the law, really focused on elections as well as Government transparency.

So those are the areas that we really look at, and we work to -- you know, sometimes we are involved in litigation.

Sometimes we are working to inform legislative policy. Communication, education, those are things that we're really interested in in forming the debate space in these areas.
Q. And when you say "education," who is sort of in the target audience for CGG's educational efforts?
A. So we have a large audience, you know, a number of constituencies, I would say. We want to educate legislators. We want to educate voters. We want to educate just the public in general. We want to educate candidates. I mean, you know, poll observers, poll workers. I mean, it really goes across the board.

Obviously, the messages, you know, are tailored to the different groups, but we really go across the board in terms of wanting to educate people on issues.
Q. How does the organization govern itself?
A. We have a board of directors.
Q. And I think you mentioned you were a director; right?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. How big is the board of directors?
A. We used to have five people. Unfortunately, one of our directors passed away, so we currently have four.
Q. And who besides yourself makes up the board currently?
A. So there is Lisa Cyriacks, who is the chairman of the board and also the president. Marilyn Marks is vice president and executive director. Virginia Forney is a director, and I'm
a director.
Q. What is the source of CGG's funding, if any?
A. It is totally donor-funded.
Q. Do you have any idea approximately how many donors the organization has?
A. Yes. We have 800 donors that have provided donations via PayPal, and then we have other donors that have written checks, so more than 800.
Q. And what kinds of things does CGG spend its money on?
A. So we spend our money on litigation activities. We spend our money reimbursing people for expenses that have been incurred within our mission and to support our activities. And then, of course, just the normal operating costs of an organization.

So we'll spend money for, you know, accountants, filing taxes, renting a P.O. Box, getting a subscription to a file share service, Constant Contact, things along those lines. Just the normal operating expenses that you would expect. Q. As far as the human time spent on the organization, who does the work of the organization to advance its priorities?
A. The work is done by the volunteer board, the volunteer executive director, and some really involved volunteer members.
Q. Does the entity have any paid staff?
A. From time to time, we will pay college-age analysts or assistants. But the board and the executive director get no
compensation for any of the activities that they do.
Q. If they spend money, are they reimbursed?
A. What's that?
Q. If they spend money, are they reimbursed?
A. Yes. Yes, they are reimbursed for expenses, but they aren't compensated for their time.
Q. I would like to ask you what kind of activities CGG strives to do to further its mission.
A. Okay. So first of all, it monitors election policies and procedures and developments across the country and elsewhere. You know, we want to know what is going on and we want to know what is coming down the road, so that is the first thing.

We are involved in working groups and various forums with experts around the country. We perform a lot of education activities. I have already described various groups involved there. And we also -- getting a little bit away from elections, but talking about government transparency and accountability, we monitor what is going on in terms of local governments actually adhering to open meetings laws, open records laws, and things along those lines.
Q. Does CGG ever partner or cooperate with other organizations on other things?
A. Oh, yeah, yeah. Definitely, we do. We look for other organizations that have similar missions, and we will join -join them in various activities or ask them to work with us.
Q. Now, earlier, you mentioned litigation.

Is this case the only case in which CGG has ever been involved in litigation?
A. No, I don't believe so. I know we have other cases ongoing, actually, so --
Q. And have you yourself been a named plaintiff in other litigation?
A. Yes. Yes. In the fall of 2018, Martin v. Kemp -- I'm Martin -- we were happily successful in Gwinnett County in that Gwinnett County was stopped from rejecting absentee ballots where people accidentally wrote the wrong birth year on the envelopes. So we were very pleased to participate there.
Q. And when you were named a plaintiff in, Martin v. Kemp, were you a board member of CGG?
A. No, I was not a board member.
Q. Were you a "member" member?
A. That was kind of the start of my involvement, yeah.
Q. So was CGG involved in that case?
A. I think CGG was involved in kind of advising and just working, but they were not a plaintiff.
Q. So for all of these activities, does the organization have sufficient volunteer time to do all of those things at once?
A. We have to make decisions on that. I mean, since this litigation has really kind of come to a head, we have had to stop a lot of our other activities, but we do the best we can.

The board makes decisions.
Q. And similar question about money, how does -- does CGG have enough funding to do all the activities that it --
A. No, we can't do everything at once. No.
Q. So when resources like time and money are not in sufficient supply to do everything CGG wants to do, who decides which activities the organization will focus on?
A. The board decides.
Q. And has the State of Georgia's -- turning to this case, has the State of Georgia's enforcement of legal requirements for all in-person voters to vote on BMDs impacted how CGG has allocated its resources?
A. Absolutely.
Q. How so?
A. So we have had to really stop most of our other activities at this point. In September of 2021, the board explicitly discussed this and reaffirmed that this case was, in fact, consistent with our mission, and we reaffirmed our commitment to working on this case understanding that it meant that there were a number of other things that we were no longer going to be able to do.

So examples of things that we normally would be doing now that we just can't because we don't have the resources, first of all, the Georgia legislature just started a new session, and typically, at this point in time, we would be very busy working

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to educate the legislators on the various issues that pertain
to elections. Again, we have got a lot of experience from
gathering data around the country, working with experts around
the country, and we would be trying to share that with the
legislators, but obviously, we can't do that right now.
Q. So you would say that is something that you are spending less money and time on?
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A. Exactly. We're not doing it at all right now, where, normally, that is where we would be right now.
Q. Can you think of any other things that CGG has done that it is spending less money and time on because of this case?
A. Oh, yeah. Absolutely.

So beyond that, we would typically be performing a lot of the education activities that I mentioned about with the various groups about election security, BMD issues, other election-related issues.

Education is one of our primary activities, and, in fact, we had planned to work on some educational videos, and we have had to totally stop that effort because of our focus here.

Other things, we've had, you know, Georgia members who wanted us to work to educate the public about ranked choice voting and some of the issues associated with that, and we haven't been able to follow up on that.

You mentioned before -- we mentioned that we like to cooperate with other organizations and work with experts around
the country. We have had to cut way back on our involvement in terms of speaking engagements on election security. We've had to really not participate in discussions about internet voting. We've had to cut back on our involvement with the election verification network, which is made up of experts from around the country. We've had to cut back on our involvement with the state audit working group, which is looking at coming up with new kind of audit procedures specifically for post election audits, and we have had to step back from that.

So there are a number of things there we had to stop with. We've had to cut back on the open meetings and open records kind of monitoring. We've had -- I know it is a long list. We are a very active organization.

Sadly -- again, we started in Colorado. Sadly, when the Colorado members came forward and wanted us to work to educate the Boulder City Council on issues associated with instant runoff voting, we had to say no. We didn't have the resources to do that.

We have been extremely active in the neighboring state of North Carolina. And there, we've had to really cut back. We had started a project there on drive-thru voting which we had to stop. We had to stop our cooperation with the election transparency groups in North Carolina. We had to cut back on our work with the NAACP.

We had to -- we weren't able to provide consulting support
with regard to North Carolina's state case -- court case on ballot-marking devices. We had to put on hold our plans to actually have litigation in North Carolina about ballot-marking devices, and we've had to delay plans for litigation on ballot secrecy issues in North Carolina.

Other places in the country, we've been unable to really participate in discussions in the State of New York about ballot-marking device issues there.

And let's see. Oh, and kind of underpinning everything, we haven't been able to really maintain or upgrade our website, our fundraising activities, and our membership tracking capabilities which we have wanted to do for a very long time, but we just don't have the bandwidth right now.
Q. Now, of all these things, is the organization actually getting invitations that it is turning down, or are these just the organization deciding what it is going to pursue?
A. No, we have been getting invitations and requests for speaking engagements, requests to write out bids. We had requests from Coffee County to come down and do some more town halls to help educate the voters there about the breach that occurred, and we have just had to say, No, we can't do that anymore.

So we are turning down requests.
Q. Now, instead of doing all those things, what has CGG instead been spending its time and resources doing?
A. Focusing primarily on this litigation, but we also have spent a fair amount of time monitoring the activities of the State Election Board here in Georgia specifically relevant to ballot-marking device issues, and we proposed specific rules to the State Election Board having to do with the use of ballot-marking devices.

So those are other things that we have been doing.
Q. And are those proposals about ballot-marking devices directed at the same concerns or different concerns than this litigation?
A. The proposals had to do with if we're living in a world where BMDs are being used, how can we try to have them be used more effectively, how can we try to protect ballot secrecy, for instance, things along those lines.
Q. So if the State of Georgia ended its requirements for in-person voters to use BMDs starting tomorrow, how would that affect CGG's use of its resources going forward?
A. Well, we could become involved in that long list of things that I just went over. We could turn all that back on, become more active in the various organizations, support other organizations with similar interests, allow our members that desperately want to make educational videos to jump in there. I mean, we could just go back to all those other things.
Q. So let me transition you a little bit over to members.

So how do people become members of CGG?
A. Membership is totally voluntary. All anybody has to do is just show an interest, and, you know, they are a member.
Q. Do they pay dues?
A. No. There are no dues.
Q. Do your members typically donate?
A. Yes. A lot of members do donate, but it is not a requirement, so --
Q. And you mentioned that you have volunteers.

Are the volunteers typically members or --
A. Yes. Yes, the volunteers are members.
Q. Okay.
A. So we have a lot of members, but a core group of volunteers that are just amazingly active, very impressive group.
Q. So why would someone become a member? Like, what would motivate them to become a member of CGG?
A. Well, someone would become a member of CGG if they believed in our mission and were interested in our activities and supporting our activities. They would become a member if they wanted to be educated on the issues that we're pursuing.

And interestingly, a lot of the time, we have information that we can share with our membership that you're not going to find in the press. It is just -- it is a different level of detail. We might be ahead of the game on some things.

So people want to be involved with us because we've got
the information before other folks do.
Q. So specifically with respect to this case, what relief is Coalition for Good Governance asking for from the Court?
A. We would like an injunction prohibiting the State of Georgia from requiring the use of BMDs for in-person voting. Q. And let's say CGG wins.

How does CGG expect the State to conduct elections if BMDs are not the standard method used for in-person voting?
A. Well, we trust that the Secretary of State and the State Election Board could work with the Georgia legislature or actually look at existing law to ascertain what the available methods are for voting when the use of a BMD is either impracticable or impossible. And there is existing law that addresses that.
Q. So is it -- what is the organization's position on whether the Court has to order hand-marked paper ballots if it gets rid of the BMDs?
A. There is no need for any further order. Again, existing law already gives the answer for what you can do if you don't have BMDs. There is no need for an additional order from the Court.
Q. What about the existing scanners that are used with the BMDs?
A. We would like the existing scanners to continue to be used. The scanners should be used for tabulation, but it
should be backed up with meaningful audits of the tabulation outcomes.
Q. Do you have an understanding of the difference between audits of the BMDs and audits of the scanner tabulations?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. What is your understanding of the difference?
A. So my understanding is, if you're auditing the BMDs, you're trying to make sure that that piece of equipment is actually doing what it is intended to do.

So I touch the screen and do different things. What it prints out, does it actually print out a vote that would match what I intended, which is, of course, problematic because of the $Q R$ codes and everything.

But anyway, so that is auditing the BMDs. Auditing the tabulation outcomes is concerned with the scanners. And scanning these documents, is the outcome exactly what the tabulation says it is?
Q. And between those two, is there one kind of audit or both that CGG is advocating for?
A. We're advocating that, the audit of the tabulation outcome.

MR. McGUIRE: No further questions on direct. CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WEIGEL:
Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Martin.

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I don't know if you recall. But while I've not had the pleasure of speaking with you in connection with this litigation, we met when I took your deposition back in May of last year on behalf of the State of Georgia in connection with the SB 202 lawsuit.
So that one was over Zoom, so it is --
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A. I was going to say, that was a Zoom thing, so yeah.
Q. It is great to meet you in person.
A. Hi.
Q. Just starting off -- and you touched on this a little bit with Mr. McGuire in connection with the Martin v. Kemp lawsuit, but how did you become a member of CGG?
A. I was concerned about the things I had been reading in the news about elections, and, you know, at that time, specifically the number of absentee ballots that were being rejected. CGG was involved on the issues in that area, and so I jumped in and decided I wanted to help and was then asked if I wanted to be a plaintiff on that suit, and I said yes.
Q. And if $I$ understood your testimony correctly, you became a member in 2018; correct?
A. Yes, that was 2018 .
Q. So that would have been after the commencement of this litigation; correct?
A. It was about the same time. It was all in the fall of 2018. The litigation was actually in November of 2018.
Q. And part of CGG's strategy to accomplish its mission that you testified to is litigation; correct?
A. That's one thing that we do. We're also, as I said, very interested in education and things along those lines and working with people. But when we need to, litigation is something we do.
Q. And over the last three years, CGG's primary monetary expense has been litigation; correct?
A. Over the last how long?
Q. Three years.
A. Yeah, I would say that is true.
Q. And CGG lobbies for hand-marked ballots at the state capitol; correct?
A. We're not a lobbying organization. We do education. You know, our role is not -- is not as lobbyists.
Q. And does CGG reimburse any costs for that education, those education efforts that occur at the capitol?
A. In terms of to individuals for their time, no. If you spent a lot of money on making copies or something, maybe you might ask to be reimbursed. I don't really know at that level of detail, but I have never been reimbursed for anything.
Q. Are there any CGG member plaintiffs in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. And who are those?
A. Let's see. I'm trying to remember exactly who the list of
plaintiffs is.
Can you tell me the list of plaintiffs? I can tell you if they are members.
Q. Just to the best of your recollection.
A. So I mean, I know some -- I can't -- I don't want to start giving a whole list of our members and have them not actually be plaintiffs.
Q. Okay.
A. But I know there are additional members.
Q. And CGG supports hand-marked ballots as an election system; correct?
A. I'm not sure I understand what you are asking me.
Q. The use of hand-marked ballots to cast your vote in election, CGG supports that use; correct?
A. We do support that as a method of voting.
Q. And you talked about CGG not being able to do its education and involvement with other organizations; correct?
A. Because of our focus on this litigation, right now we've had to cut back on those things.
Q. And you went right to my next question.

So that -- the inability to do that is because of the focus on this litigation?
A. Exactly. Exactly.
Q. And CGG uses its participation in this lawsuit to help it raise funds from donors; correct?
A. I wouldn't say it that way. I would say that donors choose to support our activities on this lawsuit.
Q. So, for example, in emails or any sort of marketing materials, would this lawsuit be referenced by CGG?
A. Yes, it would be referenced.
Q. And CGG doesn't maintain a roster of its members; correct?
A. As I said earlier, we would love -- we have wanted for a very long time to improve our membership management, but we just have not had the time or resources to do that, so -Q. So just based off that understanding, you wouldn't be able to say how many members CGG has at this moment; correct?
A. So what $I$ can say is if we look at members coming from a number of different groups, you know, we have an email list that is about 10,000 people. We have the 800 people who have donated via PayPal, which may or may not be that same 10,000 group. We have got other people who have been just asked to be members.

And so we have got all these different groups. So we have got at least 10,000 because that is the email list. But then there is likely more because of the other methods that people use to want to be involved with us, so --
Q. But just to confirm, as we sit here today, you wouldn't be able to provide an exact number of members that CGG has?
A. Not an exact number, no.
Q. And just to understand the relief that CGG is seeking in
this lawsuit, CGG wants an injunction in connection with the use of BMDs for in-person voting; correct?
A. With respect to the required use of BMDs for in-person voting.
Q. But that injunction would not extend to voters with disabilities; correct?
A. No, it would not.
Q. And CGG would be fine if voters voluntarily chose to use BMDs; correct?
A. What we want is an injunction prohibiting the required use of BMDs for in-person voting.
Q. So as --
A. If people choose to use BMDs because they have a disability or for whatever reason, you know, that is fine. We object to the required use of BMDs for in-person voting.
Q. And just to confirm, my understanding with that -- and you probably touched on this.

So if a nondisabled voter voluntarily chose to use BMDs, that would still be consistent with the relief that you're seeking?
A. Well, $I$ mean, it is not up to me. I don't think it is up to anybody to say to somebody, what is your disability, before they decide whether to open the gate to the BMDs.

So I don't understand how that question even works.
Q. And CGG wants Georgia to continue to use all Dominion
components except the BMDs; correct?
A. I don't -- I don't know. We want to continue the use of the scanners. The other things, I'm not really sure what all you're referring to. But it is the BMDs that we're objecting to.
Q. And just to confirm, in connection with the relief, there's no objection to the other Dominion components of the voting machines other than the --
A. Right.
Q. -- BMDs?

Thank you.
Thank you so much, Ms. Martin. I believe that completes my questioning. I just want to confer with my co-counsel.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
MR. WEIGEL: Ms. Martin, that completes my
questioning. Thank you so much for your time this afternoon.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
MR. McGUIRE: And we have no redirect.
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. Thank you very much.

MR. McGUIRE: Just as a point of housekeeping, obviously now that Ms. Martin has testified, I'm not sure if she's on the list -- will call list from the other side, but if she's not, I'm sure she --

THE COURT: Well, she's a party?

MR. McGUIRE: Yeah. Oh, yeah. No, she is not a party. She's a witness.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I believe we have all the individuals on the plaintiffs' list as may calls for our case. I don't anticipate we're going to call Ms. Martin, but I don't think I can say right here for sure we're not. So I'm not quite sure to release her from sequestration yet. We'll discuss this at the next break as well.

THE COURT: Ms. Martin, they are going to discuss at the next break whether you can leave today and come back another day. They are going to discuss it and -- or you can wait outside until we have a break, but that is probably another hour.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: I'll leave it up to you.
THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: You need to chat with your --
MR. McGUIRE: Yes.

Our next witness I don't think knows we are ready for her.

We're going to be calling Jeanne Dufort, and she is on her way.

THE COURT: She's on the floor?
MR. McGUIRE: Yes. She's in the witness room, and she has just been told.

THE COURT: All right.
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: If you would, please raise your right hand.
(Witness sworn)
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. If you would state your name and spell your complete name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Jeanne Dufort, J-E-A-N-N-E, D-U-F, as in Frank, $\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{T}, \mathrm{as}$ in Thomas.

Whereupon, JEANNE DUFORT,
after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Good morning -- or good afternoon, Ms. Dufort. I'm still
on Pacific Time. Sorry.
Ms. Dufort, where do you live?
A. Morgan County.
Q. Here in Georgia?
A. Yes.
Q. And how long have you lived there?
A. Since 2002.
Q. How would you describe Morgan County?
A. It is a beautiful rural county with about 20,000 people.
Q. How many of those 20,000 people are registered voters, if

## you know?

A. About 13,000 active voters.
Q. And what do you do for work in Morgan County?
A. I'm a realtor. I help people run away to the country.
Q. Apart from work, are you otherwise active in the community there?
A. I am. I have served on our Comprehensive Plan Steering Committee for two cycles. I'm currently serving on an Affordable Housing Task Force, and I am the first vice chair of our local -- the Morgan County Democratic Committee.
Q. What other activities do you spend time on?
A. Well, I'm a very active volunteer for CGG. That is like a part-time job. I also was active in the efforts around the Rivian massive plant that has come to our -- western edge of our county.
Q. And is there a group you worked with on that, or was that individual effort?
A. There is a group of citizens that have gotten engaged in that.
Q. Great. So are you currently registered to vote in Morgan County?
A. I am.
Q. How long have you been registered there?
A. Since 2002.
Q. How regularly do you vote?
A. Always.
Q. Every election?
A. Every election. When $I$ was 18, I did two things. I registered to vote, and I gave blood because you could, and I have done that ever since.
Q. Do you plan to vote in any elections coming up in 2024?
A. All of them.
Q. When you vote in 2024, do you know how you will be voting, meaning by what voting method?
A. Pending the outcome of this, $I$ will be voting by hand-marked paper ballot, absentee mail.
Q. So meaning -- when you say pending the outcome --
A. If I have to.
Q. If you have to, you'll vote by --
A. I will vote on a hand-marked paper ballot however I am allowed to.
Q. So if nothing changes as a result of this litigation, you're going to be voting --
A. I'll be voting by mail.
Q. -- by mail.

Why do you intend to vote by mail?
A. Well, I value voting a secret ballot, I value my privacy, and I have -- my hours of observation and my listening to experts causes me to be concerned that a BMD ballot is not a reliable ballot.
Q. So your reason for voting by mail is that you don't want to vote on a BMD?
A. Correct.
Q. You mentioned secrecy and reliability.

Are there any other reasons why you don't want to vote on a BMD?
A. Well, yes. The secrecy thing, right, is a problem for me because I live and work in a small county. We say that everybody knows your name, but they shouldn't get to know how you vote unless you tell them.

And my hours of observation lead me to understand that that is a risk with in-person voting on a BMD.
Q. So when you're -- let's make sure we're talking about the same thing.
A. Yeah.
Q. So when you vote on a BMD, which components do you have in mind that you are concerned about?
A. So everything that involves marking your ballot. The issue here is how you mark your ballot; not any of the rest of the system; right? So it is the touch screen, which is big and bright. It interprets your vote and sends it to a printer and prints out -- it prints out a version of your vote in two ways, both on a $Q R$ code and in a printed text.
Q. And let's talk about the touch screen and the printout.

Do you have any particular concerns with the touch screen?
A. Well, just that very language in the law of, it interprets your vote to a printer; right? Just start right there. I would rather know that my hand interpreted my vote with a Sharpie.

Does that make sense?
Q. Uh-huh (affirmative). And you mentioned secrecy.

Is that an issue with the touch screen?
A. It is. It is big and bright and visible from quite a distance, and --
Q. And why does that concern you? Why does it concern you that people might see how you vote?
A. So three real reasons; right? One is, I have a federally and Georgia constitutionally protected right to secret ballot, end stop. I don't have to justify it. So that is number one for me; right?

Number two is, because $I$ work and live in a small town, my choices, particularly on local non-partisan races like judges -- as a realtor, I work with all kinds of attorneys. They sometimes compete with one another on my ballot. It is not good if I let them know which one I chose; right?

And third, as a local party official, when we have our primaries, the leadership is expected not to take sides before the primaries are decided. So keeping my ballot, my personal choices private until after the primary is really a requirement of the job.
Q. Now, just because the touch screen is big and bright and visible from a distance, what makes you think anybody would be looking at your screen while you are using the BMD?
A. So I have spent --

MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor --
THE WITNESS: -- hours and hours and hours --
MR. PICO-PRATS: I'm just going to object for -- it is outside the scope of relevance for this case. The ballot secrecy is out.

MR. McGUIRE: Yeah, we're talking about ballot secrecy as an injury-in-fact for purposes of standing. We're not talking about it as a merits burden on voting; we're just talking about an injury-in-fact.

And given that we understand -- we understand it is out of the case as a claim. We're not trying to argue any violation of laws, but an injury, for purposes of standing, doesn't have to be illegal. It just has to be something that invades a legally protected interest, burdens it in some way.

And so the invasion of secrecy is an injury for standing even if it isn't something on the merits. So we are cognizant of that line, and I don't intend to --

THE COURT: All right. Well, try to wrap it up because I understand your argument. But at some point it becomes -- -- you know the expression -- maybe the ears of the dog wagging the tail.

BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Okay. Let me just ask you a couple of questions about why that isn't fixable.

We're not going to go into secrecy anymore.
But why couldn't that problem be remedied by a curtain around your BMD?
A. So the machines, by law, need to be visible to election officials to see to protect from tampering, so we don't have curtains around the BMDs.
Q. And why couldn't it be remedied by one of those polarized screens that they put over laptops on airplanes so your neighbor can't see how you're --
A. Like they use in banks. It is the best idea that isn't executable because there are none certified anywhere for use with BMDs.
Q. And finally, why couldn't you just fix that problem by arranging the BMDs in your polling place so that nobody has a line of sight to each screen?
A. So I have spent lots of time observing elections in lots of places, and so has the CGG team. Polling places come in all kinds of shapes and sizes from little cinderblock buildings down in south Georgia to the State Farm Arena and everything in between.

Election officials have a three-part rule; right? They have to deploy one voting station for every 250 voters. They
have to deploy them in a way that can still be visible for monitoring to prevent tampering, and they have to protect absolute ballot secrecy.

So when you think of the shapes and sizes of polling places and apply those requirements, and then you account for windows and doors and shapes, the record of the last four years just shows that if it were possible to do it every time for every voter, it would have been done, and it has not been done. Q. So let's turn to the ballot card that the BMD prints out after you are done on a touch screen.

What concerns do you have with that BMD-printed ballot?
A. So to begin with, it contains two versions of my vote, one in the BMD -- or under the $Q R$ code that $I$ can't read because I'm human and we can't read $Q R$ codes, and the other in a modified version of the text you would see on a normal ballot. Q. Now, why is it -- why does it concern you that you can't read the $Q R$ code if you have the human text right there?
A. So almost always, the $Q R$ code is the only thing we use to tabulate results. So fundamentally, there's separate problems with me being able to accurately review the text. But even if I did and could and all my neighbors did and could, that is not what is being counted.
Q. And you say you might not be able to accurately review the text summary.

Can you explain that?
A. Once upon a time when $I$ was young, I was very good at cognitively reading long lists and keeping them in my head. I'm presenting to you today as not such a young person. And I've tested myself, and I'm just not capable of memorizing a 30- or 40-question ballot, which is typical in our general elections or even some of our primaries.
Q. Why can't you just refer back to the screen when you are verifying your printed ballot?
A. So the screen has gone blank by the time the printer prints that ballot out. The additional option is that I could get a sample ballot, mark it privately by hand in the comfort of my own home, bring that into the polling place and check. But isn't that kind of absurd to walk in with a hand-marked paper ballot and be forced to convert that to a BMD ballot? At least, it seems that way to me.
Q. Now, would it fix these two problems on the ballot printout, meaning the $Q R$ code and the text summary, if the BMDs were somehow changed to print out a full-face ballot instead of one that has a $Q R$ code and a text summary?
A. Right. So --

MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor, objection on speculation and calling for a legal conclusion.

THE COURT: Overruled. Everyone has been --
including counsel for the State, have been discussing possible remedies.

So go ahead.
THE WITNESS: It doesn't solve for the problem of having to verify. It solves for one problem. There are no longer two versions of my vote on one piece of paper.

But it doesn't solve for the challenges of being able to verify that long of a list, and it is a computer's interpretation of my vote, not what I marked. BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. And are you aware of whether that kind of fix is even authorized here?
A. It is -- it first would require the upgrade, which has been discussed. The Secretary of State has announced that won't happen until after the 2024 election due to time and effort constraints. Therefore, it is not authorized yet. It is not certified yet in Georgia.

And if we were to both take on the burden and cost of upgrading to the new software, our printers -- we have 30,000-plus printers that won't print those full-face ballots, so we would have to further invest in all new printers. Q. Now, let's say you are voting on a BMD and you spot an error.

What would you do?
A. I would call it to the attention of my local election official. I would be allowed to -- they would spoil that ballot, and I would be allowed to, you know, make a new
selection.
Q. Why doesn't the fact that you can do that solve your concerns about voting on BMDs?
A. So it is very hard for both a voter and an election official to understand why a printout from a BMD ballot doesn't match the voter's selection. Did the voter make a mistake? Was the system mal-programmed? What happened?

North Hampton County, Pennsylvania, is a perfect example of that. That just happened in the last election; right? Voters went in, they made their choices, and very early in morning, they said, Hey, wait, this is opposite of what I chose in the printed text they could review.

As I understand it, election officials were told, Well, the BMD is -- the $Q R$ code is correct; it is the text that isn't. So now we have this horrifying problem that -- two versions of your vote on one ballot. Some of those officials directed voters to just, Well, then make the opposite selection on the BMD, and it will print out right in a way that agrees with what your choice was.

That turned out to be terrible advice because in reversing that so that the printed text was accurate for them, the $Q R$ code was not accurate. I don't think voters or election officials should ever be faced with that conundrum of trying to deal with a ballot that is irreconcilable, right, that has two versions of a vote on one ballot.
Q. And if you walked into a polling place in Georgia and did vote on a BMD and were faced with that problem, would you -what would you do?
A. Golly gosh, I would be stuck, right, because by that point I wouldn't be allowed to vote by hand. I would be voting on a machine I had no confidence was actually recording my vote the way I intended it to be.
Q. So you said you voted by mail?
A. I do.
Q. Why doesn't voting by mail solve this entire problem?
A. It introduces a new set of problems. In the aggregate, that is my choice; right? But think about the experience. When you vote in person in my rural county, right, you show up, you show your ID, you get a card, you go to the machine, you vote, you go to the scanner, you get your sticker, you leave. 15 minutes max for most people, most of the time; right? Super easy. One little chunk of your day you can plan, in and out.

Voting by mail is a journey and a process. You request a ballot. You watch to see that the ballot arrives; hope it does. You mark your choices. Now you've got to return the ballot.

I personally will not put it through the mail for two reasons. One, the uncertainty of the mail. You know, all of our senators and congressmen just wrote a letter to the Postmaster General going, what is up in the bad mail delivery?

But also, the way it is designed, the ends are open and you can literally see my personally identifying information in there. I'm not willing to put that through the U.S. Mail, so I have the extra burden of having to go to my election office and hand my ballot in.

In 2022, I requested a ballot and it never arrived. The records show that they had mailed it out on the 18th, like well-before election day, and yet, it never arrived. So I went to the office, reported it hadn't arrived. They spoiled that one, issued me a new one. They couldn't hand it to me. I literally had to watch them go to the post office with the replacement ballot.

And luckily, it did arrive before. It got there Friday or Saturday before election day. So I was able to vote it and not have to work on the BMDs, but that is a hassle. So that is sort of part of one.

But a really important piece is, when you vote in person, you don't only mark your ballot, you cast your ballot. You personally put it through the scanner. So anything that might or might not be wrong with that ballot, right, you get a chance to remedy because you're the one casting it.

With hand-marked paper ballots with vote by mail, let's say, you can confirm that the election office has received your ballot, but you lose control of when and how it is scanned. And if there is any reason that there is a stray mark or
anything on any particular contest, you can lose your vote in that contest. Because if it is deemed an overvote, unlike when you scan it, it kicks it back and you get a chance to remedy it.

When election workers are scanning your ballot -- I mean, I'm a vote review panelist. I see this all the time. If there is any reason that it is deemed an overvote, you lose that vote.

So that is a lot to risk, but I do that. Because in the aggregate, that is still a better choice for me.
Q. And that is under the current system, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So if you were allowed to vote in person in 2024 without using a BMD, would you rather vote by mail in that case?
A. 100 percent. If I'm allowed to mark a hand-marked paper ballot in person, I will be there on election day with bells on my toes happily marking that ballot and scanning that ballot.
Q. And why would you rather vote on election day instead of earlier?
A. So I'm a -- two real reasons. One is kind of small townish; right? It is a -- it is sort of an annual community rite of passage to show up in your local precinct, greet the workers that have been working for years, see your neighbors. It is a thing, and it is fun; right? It's like a celebration of democracy. So that is an important piece.

But also, things happen. It is super useful to be able to cast a ballot with absolutely all the information available about candidates, about issues whatever. So the last possible day to vote is a good day to vote.

But under Georgia law, I'm not even allowed to mark my hand-marked paper ballot on election day.
Q. I'm going to shift gears now and let's talk about Coalition for Good Governance.

How are you connected to Coalition for Good Governance?
A. I am -- two ways. I'm both a member and an active volunteer.
Q. When did you become a member of CGG?
A. In 2018.
Q. And how did you become a member?
A. I was recruited to be the moderator for a panel of experts that was -- that had a program designed to educate local election directors.
Q. And from being a moderator, how did that turn into membership?
A. You know, I fell in love with the mission and the story and asked how else I could help.
Q. You said you were also a volunteer?
A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.)
Q. As a volunteer, what do you do for CGG?
A. Well, I am a pretty good communicator, so I love our
activities that involve educating voters, educating assembly members and local election officials. I like that part. Sometimes I'm called on even to be on panels, you know, of groups. So I like that part.

But I'm also a human that will do lots of grunt work if required, so I do some pretty wonky things as well.
Q. How do you know what the organization needs you to do?
A. The organization has a board and an executive director. They set the priorities, and I am in regular communication with them as far as what the work is.
Q. How much time would you say you typically devote to your volunteer work for CGG?
A. It ebbs and flows, but safe to say it is thousands and thousands of hours since 2018.
Q. And that has been during this lawsuit.

Has your work mostly focused on BMDs in Georgia, or have you worked on other things?
A. So I have taken part -- CGG coordinates with some other national and other regional election groups, so I have worked on that to some degree. I have been on some panels, you know, with the groups from other areas. I have been, you know, on radio shows a few times explaining things that are going on. So I have done that work.

We have done -- do you want to --
Q. Oh, no. Go ahead.

## Are you done?

A. Yeah. So we have done four projects that come to mind that were particularly fun. This last fall, we organized a pair of town halls in Coffee County.
Q. Let me ask you to interrupt because I think you may be going on to a different topic.

Let me just ask you this: So of your work, how much of it would you say is directed at BMDs, how much of it is directed at something else?
A. The fight through this case and through education, right, to end the requirement for in-person voters to use the BMD certainly takes up a huge amount of our time.
Q. What are some examples of the work that you have done that is directed at helping CGG stop the required use of BMDs?
A. So I have worked, for example, with Indivisible groups. I'm in the leadership team of Indivisible 10, but I have worked with other Indivisible groups around the country just to educate them about the issue. There is a group organized in Greene County, and I went and made an in-person presentation for them.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.
What is Indivisible?
THE WITNESS: Indivisible is a grass roots national organization that was founded after the 2016 election to help citizens figure out how to communicate with Government
officials on policy in an informed and constructive way, and I have been active with them separately from CGG since 2016, so even before I knew CGG.

BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. So Indivisible. And have you done any election observation?
A. I have done a lot of election observation from, you know, as far down as the south end of Georgia to north and northeast Georgia to, of course, in my own local area.
Q. Why does CGG have you observe elections?
A. It is really useful that we understand the nuts and bolts of how election processes really work, how voters are impacted.

A good example of why that knowledge is helpful, I recently went to observe the Fulton County re-count, and I had an opportunity to, you know, be there with a couple of elected officials, the new Chair of the Fulton County board, with a State Election Board member, and it turned out that I knew a little bit more about how that stuff works, so what they were doing.

And they asked questions, and I was able to answer them in a helpful way. In fact, Dr. Patrise commented in the subsequent board meeting that our presence there was super helpful to, you know, that. So I was really proud that my CGG work was able to be useful.
Q. And have you observed any non-BMD elections?
A. I have.
Q. Can you tell us a couple of those that you have observed?
A. So I observed one when my local county had to go to emergency paper ballots. So for a period of time, we became a hand-marked paper ballot election.

But I also recently this fall observed Snellville, which, for 20 -odd years has been voting as a municipality with hand-marked paper ballots.
Q. I'm going to ask you about those. But before I get off of this subject, what else does CGG work on currently besides BMDs?
A. So think of us as kind the policy wonk team; right? We focus on all of the parts of the election process that make you sure that your vote is counted the way you cast it.

So it is not just BMDs. It is scanning and tabulation. It is processes that help make sure that the count of the votes and the voters checked in matches. It is audits and re-counts, and it is protecting the rights of citizens to observe those elections.

So we -- it is kind of an inside baseball thing. We see that as our mission.
Q. Let's say Georgia had not started using BMDs in 2019.

What else would you have been working on with your volunteer time over the past several years?
A. So elections still matter; right? Even if we were
hand-marked paper ballot elections, all those things I said, right, how is tabulation working, how are audits working? We are woefully behind on audits, for example, in Georgia; right? We have -- we weren't great on citizen observation before the events of the 2020 election, but we're pushing citizens farther and farther out in an understandable but misguided effort to protect election workers.

And citizen observation of elections is a core part of us knowing and having confidence in election outcomes. So we would be working on all those things.
Q. So I want to talk about the general election you said you observed in Morgan County.

What year -- what election was that?
A. Well, I mean, I have been observing elections for a long time, but $I$ think the one we want to talk about today is the 2020 general election.
Q. Is that the one where you saw a switchover?
A. It is. You know, before dawn had dawned on election day of 2020, when we opened up the polling place and I was assigned -- I was running a team of poll watchers, but I assigned myself to start the day at my local polling place, right, so $I$ could greet people and all that stuff.

When the polls opened at 7:00 A.M., it was the first time we were doing a general election with the new equipment; right? And everybody was kind of like, new thing. Well, voters came
in. They checked in. They were handed out a ballot access card. They walked over to the machines, and they weren't able to pull up ballots.
Q. Let me stop you there.

So it was meant to be a BMD election?
A. Absolutely meant to be a BMD election.
Q. How quickly -- so what was the problem that happened?
A. The -- when a voter checks in, a ballot access card gets encoded with their particular ballot style. In the precinct -the polling place I was observing, we had two precincts, so two ballot styles.

So you encode it. The voter goes to the BMD, puts it in, and the correct ballot is supposed to show up and they can start making their choices. It didn't work.
Q. So what was it doing?
A. They were getting nothing.
Q. Just a blank screen?
A. It just wasn't -- so I'll say this. I was in a position to observe all of it, but I wasn't looking at the screens. I was sitting back against the wall.

But they were reporting -- I could hear them reporting, like, nothing is here. Like, what is up with this?

So the poll manager quickly went over. So now there's one, there's two, there's three people there, right, because check-in happens reasonably routinely early in the morning.

She took the card that hung around her neck. Poll
managers have a super card where they can put it in. And instead of it automatically pulling a ballot up, they get to punch a code in for a ballot style and it will come up. That worked.

So the first few voters, that is what happened. But I saw her kind of look at this and look at that, look at the third voter arrive, then fourth voter arrive, same problem. And she realized this wasn't a good plan for two reasons. One, it was super slow for voters to have to wait for her to come over and do that for them.

MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor, objection to hearsay. Layperson opinion for expertise of what is going on over here. MR. McGUIRE: I'd respond to that that she's describing what she witnessed and that she is a fact witness of what happened. And so I'm not asking her to say what anybody said for the truth of it. She's just describing what she saw. THE COURT: No? All right. Overruled. Just try to not put words into anyone's mouth. Okay? THE WITNESS: Okay.

BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Let me back up.

So the poll place manager realized there was a problem?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said she initially was trying to fix it?
A. She was initially trying to fix it by manually bringing up ballots for people.
Q. What were the voters doing while the manager tried these initial fixes?
A. Most were waiting.
Q. And you said she could punch in her own code?
A. She could punch in the ballot style and get one individual voter working at a time.
Q. So is that what she did?
A. For a couple of voters.
Q. And then what happened?
A. She said, Everybody, wait.

I could hear this; right? I walked over because the
voting stations are like where these folks are, and the check-in is like where you are, so not far away.

THE COURT: So are you referring from the witness stand to where the jury would be sitting?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I was super close to it, so I could see it, I could hear it, yes.

So she went over to her poll workers at the check-in stations and said, Open up the box of emergency paper ballots. We have to go to this. They are not working. The BMDs aren't working.

BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. And how long into voting did that happen?
A. Minutes.
Q. And so when she said -- she told her workers go open the emergency ballots, what happened next?
A. Instead of -- so from then on, instead of encoding ballot access cards, as voters checked in, they handed them the appropriate ballot style and a Sharpie and directed them to go to the voting station like normal.
Q. How quickly did that --

MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor, objection to hearsay again. Everything that someone else is saying, that can't be used for the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: Well, let me just say once again, I don't think he is -- it is being introduced for the purposes of the truth of what the individual poll worker was. The witness is testifying as to what she observed. If people were using paper ballots instead of the machines, she's capable of seeing that. To the extent that there is hearsay that is used here to facilitate the -- her testimony, I will disregard it.

MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor, another objection for speculation. If it is not being used for hearsay, it is speculation of what they are doing.

THE COURT: Well, it is speculation only if she didn't see it herself or have other reliable information upon which she is testifying, and I think she's telling us what she observed.

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    And even if you don't -- aren't reporting on the
    exact words somebody is saying, if they are basically
    marshaling people in a different direction and you can see that
    the machines aren't being used, I think that that is
    sufficient.
    So I note your objections. I'm going to proceed, and
    I can disregard anything that is hearsay if it actually ends up
        becoming an issue. Thank you.
        BY MR. MCGUIRE:
    Q. So just to back up, so after the switchover, how did
    voters get their paper ballots when they checked in?
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    A. The check-in people handed them to them.
    Q. And did --
            THE COURT: Did you see that or not?
            THE WITNESS: Yes.
        BY MR. MCGUIRE:
        Q. And, again, how many ballot styles were in use in that
        polling place?
        A. Two.
        Q. Aside from handing the voters a paper ballot instead of
        plastic card when they checked in, did you see anything else
        change to the check-in process?
    A. No.
Q. After the switchover when the voters were getting paper ballots, where did they go to fill them out?
A. They went to the same voting stations that were set up.
Q. Did you see any voters ask for instructions on how to vote on the paper ballot?
A. No.
Q. Once the voters filled out their paper ballots, what did they do with them?
A. They walked over to the scanners and scanned their ballots.
Q. Did you see any activity that involved the scanners from the workers? Did the workers have to reprogram the scanners to let this happen?
A. No.
Q. Did you see anyone try to cast an overvote into a scanner?
A. No.
Q. What would have happened if that had occurred?
A. It would have kicked it back out for the voter to review.

MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor, objection. That calls
for an expert conclusion.
THE COURT: Well, how do you know that?
THE WITNESS: I know that because I've observed that
in other elections happen.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, had used you -- had you seen
this with this scanner? That's what I'm trying to say.
THE WITNESS: On that day, no voter cast an overvote. THE COURT: All right. Well, then it becomes not

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relevant.
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All right. Go ahead.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. In your experience with the scanners you've seen and then people put overvoted hand-marked paper ballots into them, what happens?
A. The machine kicks it out and gives the voter an opportunity to review and remedy or not, if they choose to, just say, cast this the way it is.
Q. Now, the switchover that you saw, how did that appear to affect the privacy of the voting process?
A. It solved for the problem because you can't really see what is on a piece of paper in somebody's hand without real big effort.
Q. Did the need for the workers to find and give out the right style of paper ballot to the voters affect the speed of the check-in process?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. How did the speed of the overall voting process after the switchover to hand-marked paper ballots compare to the speed of the voting process when the BMDs were working?
A. So on that day, I never saw the BMDs working, so I don't have facts that I can offer.
Q. How did the speed of what you saw compare to the typical speed of BMD voting --
A. What I will say --
Q. -- that you have witnessed?
A. -- I have been at that polling place for the opening of polls many times. On that day, the first voters were out the door by 7:15 when the doors opened at 7:00. So 15 minutes of come in, discover the problem, correct for the problem, and be out the door.

That is consistent with my normal experience at that same polling place when only BMDs are being used.
Q. How confusing did the use of hand-marked paper ballots appear to be for the voters?
A. None.
Q. How confusing did the use of hand-marked paper ballots appear to be voter poll workers?
A. Not at all. We have a terrific election director, and she had them well-trained according to the Secretary of State's procedures.

MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor, just objection on the grounds of what their state of mind was for when they were voting.

THE COURT: I don't think she testified about that.
MR. PICO-PRATS: What was the question?
Whether the voters were confused is the -- was the question asked.

THE COURT: All right. Strike your -- I will strike
her testimony that they didn't appear to be confused, but ask it another way.

BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Did you perceive the use of hand-marked paper ballots to cause any disruption to voting?
A. I will say this. No voters using hand-marked paper ballots asked for help. At other times during my many hours of watching, I have regularly seen voters ask for help with the BMDs, often senior voters.
Q. Did you watch at this polling place all day?
A. No. I was there for maybe an hour because $I$ was running a crew, so $I$ was moving all around the county all day.
Q. Did you ever see a time when that polling place switched back to BMDs?
A. I didn't see the switch. This happened countywide, so all five precincts were affected as confirmed to me by -- directly by the election director and by my poll watchers that $I$ was coordinating. And the election director informed me that it was late morning by the time all of our precincts were back to -- whatever the technical problem was was solved with the help of the Dominion tech, and we were back to BMD voting free in person.
Q. So I would like to switch and ask you about a different election you observed.

You mentioned Snellville.
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. When was the election in Snellville that you observed?
A. November of '23.
Q. And what kind of election was that?
A. Municipal.
Q. Meaning -- meaning what? What were the offices on the ballot? I mean, roughly --
A. Now, you're asking me to remember what the ballots were. There were three ballot styles. I think it was mayor and council. There may have been another office. I don't recall.
Q. And what voting methods were used in the Snellville election that you observed?
A. Snellville used hand-marked paper ballots, and the manager told me she had been running them that way for about 20 years. Q. How is that Snellville is authorized to run an election without using BMDs?
A. Municipalities are allowed to choose their method of voting.
Q. So can you very briefly describe the steps of the voting process that you saw used in Snellville from voter check-in to casting the ballot?
A. Sure. I was there a little over an hour. Voters checked in in a fairly normal way, you know, showed your ID, checked that you were valid to vote, moved you along. And then they were sent to a table where, depending on which ballot style --
because there were three ballot styles there -- they were sent to a table and told go to this person, this person, or this person. They were handed a paper ballot in a folder. It was super cool to see that, right, to protect the ballot secrecy.

Then they were directed to a bunch of stations that were just set up, tables with screens. They were handed a Sharpie too and told to mark their ballot. And then they walked over to the optical scanner and scanned their ballot and left.

Because it was a small election, there were sometimes lines to check in during the time I was there. But once they left the check-in station, it was three to five minutes to walking back out the door. It was super fast.
Q. So you mentioned optical scanners.

Were those -- how did those optical scanners in Snellville differ from the kind of scanners you have seen used in BMD elections?
A. They appeared to be the same.
Q. And do you have any knowledge of where Snellville got those scanners?
A. I didn't ask the manager.
Q. How large was the Snellville municipal election that you observed?
A. Snellville has a population of about 20,000 , the same size as my county.
Q. Do you know how that compares to other jurisdictions in

Georgia size-wise?
A. I do because I've looked up where my county stands; right? With 159 counties, there's about 100 counties that are smaller than us. So that also means there's about 100 counties out of 159 that are smaller than Snellville as a municipality.
Q. Was Snellville's election the only one you observed that day?
A. No. I observed Conyers municipal elections and also Athens-Clarke County municipal elections.
Q. And were any of those other elections conducted using BMD?
A. They were BMD elections.
Q. Did you see any other elections that day that were conducted using hand-marked paper ballots?
A. No. Other members of our team did that day. We spread out.
Q. Were they in different cities?
A. Yeah.
Q. So other cities besides Snellville are using hand-marked paper ballots?
A. Lots of cities have used hand-marked paper ballots for many years.
Q. So you saw BMD and Snellville hand-marked paper ballots that day.
A. On the same day. I got to compare and contrast, yes.
Q. So that is what I want to ask you to do.

How did the BMD elections that you observed that day compare with the Snellville's hand-marked paper ballot election?
A. So, again, the only changes is how you mark a ballot; right? The check-in and the scan, same.

So the question is, how do you mark a ballot? In the Conyers two precincts polling places that I watched, ballot secrecy was not well-protected at all. The workers were super nervous about where poll watchers and election observers could even stand. They were pushing us really far away because I think they were aware of that.

So the -- you know, the ability to observe was really impaired because of the nervousness about how you might see this.

I saw voters in Conyers precincts both -- not in Athens -very typical, some elderly folks that needed some help with operating the BMDs. And, of course, if you have ever watched an election worker try to help a voter who asks for help on a BMD, it is a pretty funny thing. Like, they kind of put their back to it and they are kind of pointing, like, because they don't want to see what is on the screen.

So I saw some of that. That is typical of what $I$ will see when I'm observing elections.
Q. How did the timing or the speed of voting compare between the two different kinds of elections?
A. All of them were very small elections with short ballots, so the timing was very marginally different. You know, some voters take a little longer than others. But with two or three or four contests on the ballot, nobody takes a long time, so I would -- it certainly wasn't any longer to do hand-marked paper ballots. It might have been a second or two shorter.
Q. So switching gears yet again, in all the observations you've conducted, have you made any observations about the physical security of the BMD equipment in polling places when you have seen that?
A. Yeah.
Q. And what have you seen?
A. So I'm remembering 2019, Judge Totenberg, when I was here in this courtroom and Alex Halderman was on the stand, and he described Georgia's voting system as an ecosystem with tens of thousands of pieces of equipment moved from warehouses to 2,500 polling places and back again by an army of temporary workers.

My observation has brought that to life, right, in the five subsequent years that $I$ have been doing a lot of election observation. It is just difficult to say with certainty this stuff is secure.
Q. Have you actually seen any things that you would think of as insecure?
A. Yeah. So depending on the size of the county, mostly, meaning the number of locations that a county has to service,
voting equipment for election day gets moved on-site anywhere from one to four days ahead of time. You see it as often as Friday before election. My county moves it there on Monday before the election day because we're small, five locations.

And large amounts of our polling places are public access buildings like schools or gyms or libraries. They are multiuse buildings. So the multiuse continues, no matter that the election equipment has been delivered.

And I'm aware just recently at SEB meetings, they have heard cases regarding this problem of sleepovers, right, of election equipment being in place not under the supervision of election workers.
Q. And have you yourself seen anyone access election equipment in the sleepover situation?
A. I have not.
Q. Are you aware of it happening?
A. Yes. Some of our CGG volunteers have directly observed that.
Q. What kinds of things have they observed?
A. Arriving at a church for a meeting of their organization, they find themselves in a room filled with election equipment on Saturday.

THE COURT: All right. I think she's testifying about somebody else's observation.

THE WITNESS: Right. It is not my direct
observation.
THE COURT: Unless she was supervising it, I don't see how she can do that.

Thank you.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Were you supervising those people?
A. I was a team member in designing the project for people to go look, but -- you know, so I was part of the coordination team. I don't know where your definition is of supervising.

THE COURT: If everyone was -- if you were actually collecting information from people, I mean, you wouldn't have a direct knowledge, but it was part of your supervisory responsibilities.

THE WITNESS: I collected the reports, and we designed the thing, we assigned locations, we collected the reports. So that was my role.

THE COURT: So you received reports on this?
THE WITNESS: Yes, absolutely.
THE COURT: Written reports?
THE WITNESS: Pardon me?
THE COURT: You receive written or oral reports?
THE WITNESS: Written reports.
THE COURT: So your testimony is based on your review of those written reports?

THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am, in my capacity as a
volunteer for CGG.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I understand that limited capacity that it is, then it is not -- I mean, it is still -you're reporting about -- as I understand it, you're testifying about a report that you were able to read that -- in your capacity as a supervisor of this project, but we don't have any of the reports here.

So, I mean, I accept it for the purpose that this is what you were advised, but not that we have the actual information.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Have you personally seen equipment unguarded in a sleepover location?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Where? I mean, what kind of locations?
A. In my own county.
Q. Okay. You testified earlier that you intend to vote by mail unless -- in order to avoid using a BMD.
A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.)
Q. Are mail ballots ever converted to BMD ballots, that you know of?
A. Yes.
Q. When does that happen?
A. So in my county, which is small, our vote review panelists
are also our duplication panelists. That's a function.
Q. What does the vote review panel do?
A. The vote review panel is a group of three people. It consists of a Democrat, a Republican, and an election official. In my county, it is usually the director of elections. I have done that for lots of years. Because we're small, we also do the duplicate ballot thing. In some larger counties with a bigger pool of ballots, they use different people.

So when you are -- when you are scanning ballots centrally, there are always a certain number of ballots that won't scan properly. Some of the reasons include that they are damaged in opening the envelopes. Some of the reasons would include they have jagged edges where there is a little tab on the top of the ballot and you tear that off. Some reasons are the fold marks are not able to be straightened out. Sometimes coffee is spilled on a ballot.

There are a bunch of different reasons why ballots will not be accepted through the scanner. Sometimes you can't discern the actual reason, but the fact is they just are not taking, so those ballots are set aside for duplication.

Up until 2022 in my county, we duplicated like for like. If we had a hand-marked paper ballot that had come in that couldn't be scanned, we pulled a blank hand-marked paper ballot. One person would be the writer, one person would be the caller, one person would review it. We would alternate
those responsibilities.
So we were very comfortable that what had come -- what the voter had intended was what we were sending through the scanner. You know, you cross-reference the duplicate ballots and all that stuff.

In 2022, I arrived for a typical session, and my election director said, We're going to do it differently this time. And she personally went over the ballot-marking device, used her super card to pull up the right style, marked the ballot, got it printed, and walked it over to us and said, Here is the hand-marked ballot, here is the BMD ballot that matches it, please review it and approve it for duplication.

That was appalling to me. I asked her to actually show me the procedure that authorized it, and she, in fact, had direction from the Secretary of State that said you can do it either way you want. And she just said, I choose to do it this way.

But the idea that I have described, all the efforts I go through to make sure I cast my ballot by hand-marked paper ballot that, through no fault of my own and with no knowledge or consent, my ballot gets converted to a BMD ballot is -can't even wrap my brains around how awful that is to me. Q. So last topic.

You testified earlier that you had gotten your county party to join CGG in proposing rules to the SEB or else -- you

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talked about proposing rules; correct?
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A. Yes. One of the activities we do with CGG is propose rules, and I have recruited my county party to join in certain ones of those.
Q. What are some examples of the kinds of rules that you have proposed to the State Election Board?
A. Some of them -- because we've been at this for a little while, some of them include things as simple as specifically counting the data cards that are used in elections as part of the election material that must be preserved under the law instead of being just reused.

We have proposed rules about cybersecurity practices. You know, every corporation in America has -- that uses electronics has cybersecurity practices. We proposed rules based on CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency's definition of cybersecurity incidents. So we proposed a set of rules for them that said mandatory reporting and swift investigation and mandatory action if it is deemed to be serious. That was another rule.

More recently, we proposed rules about ballot secrecy, and we also proposed rules to make the logic and accuracy testing in practice live up to what is spelled out in the statutes. Q. And how has the State Election Board responded to your rule proposals?
A. They voted no.
Q. I'm sorry.

They've all --
A. They refused all of them.
Q. Has the State Election Board explained why it has rejected those proposals?
A. Yes. They have sent us letters. As required by law, they have sent us letters explaining their decisions.
Q. Okay. You mentioned ballot secrecy as one of the rules you proposed.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And have you done anything with logic and accuracy?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a separate proposal?
A. Yes. I mentioned four; right? The cybersecurity, the media cards, the ballot secrecy, and the logic and accuracy testing.

There have been some others. Like, we proposed one early on that said, Let somebody return their mail ballot at a polling place, at their local polling place on election day.

And that was early on, and their answer then was, that's a good idea, we'll get to it because -- but we don't want to burden officials in the first season we're rolling these out.

But they have never gotten to it, and we have been a little busy and haven't reproposed it to them.

MR. McGUIRE: I would like to show the witness an
exhibit. I'll hand it to counsel.
May I approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. So, Ms. Dufort, I have handed you what has been marked as Coalition Plaintiffs' Exhibit 59.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. Do you recognize that document?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that document?
A. It is a letter dated January 2 nd that was sent to explain why they rejected our petitions at our December -- at their December 20th meeting.
Q. Who is the sender of the letter?
A. Let's see who signed it. The State Election Board, it is Matt Mashburn, the acting chair, on behalf of the State Election Board.
Q. Ms. Dufort, on Exhibit 59, I want to direct your attention to the first numbered point on the second page which refers to the board's announcement at the Athens-Clarke County hearing. Do you see that reference?
A. I do.
Q. What is that reference to Athens-Clarke County referring to?
A. So this is what happened in March of 2020. I was there at the meeting that is referred to, and I was also at many election board meetings in Athens-Clarke County leading up to it.

This was the first rollout of the new equipment, and the election board chair was a young Army veteran who had a special training in logistics, so he was really leaning into this. Like, new equipment, new project, we know the rules, one station per 250 voters, you know, reserving the ability to monitor it and protecting ballot secrecy.

So he had that in mind. He worked back and forth with the election director to try to figure out how to do this and do it right, Army guy, logistics guy.
Q. When you say "do this and do it right," do what?
A. Meet the standards in deploying the new equipment for the first time.
Q. The BMDs?
A. The BMD equipment; right. March of '20 was -- you know, we were just leaning into COVID. But really, it was the first time we ever used that equipment for the presidential primary election.

So on the very first day of early voting, naturally, he and some other board members went over to the early voting location which was connected to their office and observed that ballot secrecy was not being protected despite their best

## efforts.

So they called an emergency meeting that afternoon. They said, you know, we're not meeting the legal standard. We're going to start voting with hand-marked paper ballots under the authority given to us under the impracticable standards. So they did that.

State Election Board and the Secretary of State reacted very strongly to that action. Scheduled a State Election Board hearing in Athens very soon after. It was an all-day hearing. I was there. And the conclusion at the end of that meeting was interesting.

They didn't say affirmatively you can protect ballot secrecy and here is how. They simply said, you haven't tried hard enough, go try harder, and threatened them with really large fines if they didn't immediately return to BMD voting. Q. Then what happened?
A. So they returned to BMD voting, and, you know, sacrificed editorial -- sacrificed ballot secrecy to the rule of you have to use the BMDs, no matter what.
Q. Finally, please look at the second bullet point, the second numbered bullet point there.

Do you see where it says -- and I'm going to quote it with the -- I'll leave out the part in the middle, but it says, the board previously noted -- and I'm going to skip a bit -- quote, that the board's rules and state statutes already provide for
ballot secrecy, so no additional rules were necessary.
Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. Why are they wrong to write that $S E B$ rules and state statutes already provide for ballot secrecy? Why are they wrong about that?
A. Yeah, so it's one of those things that's partly wrong and partly right.

MR. PICO-PRATS: Just objection. It calls for a legal conclusion.

MR. McGUIRE: I'm just asking her to explain her understanding of the letter that they sent her. It is a -THE COURT: All right. Explain the letter that you got without opining as to the law.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Why is that not a satisfactory answer to you?
A. So since that hearing in Athens in March of 2020, I have observed and CGG volunteers have observed lots and lots of elections in lots and lots of places. And there is a body of evidence in this case and in other cases that demonstrates that ballot secrecy is not uniformly afforded to in-person voters.

Election directors have tried their best. They have spent lots of money in pursuit of trying to figure this out. And if
there were a solution, we would know it by now; right?
Lots and lots of voters' votes cast --
MR. PICO-PRATS: Your Honor --
THE WITNESS: -- and it simply isn't protected.
MR. PICO-PRATS: -- objection that this is lay
testimony.
THE COURT: Well, it is lay testimony, but it is her experience, so it can come in. It is her opinion, but she's told us the basis of it.

MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, I would move to admit
Coalition Plaintiffs' Exhibit 59 into evidence.
THE COURT: Are there objections?
MR. PICO-PRATS: To move it into evidence?
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. PICO-PRATS: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. So based on this letter and the SEB's reactions to your other proposals, how optimistic are you about obtaining relief from constitutional violations from the SEB?
A. You know, I'm a natural-born optimist, so $I$ will never quit hoping, but it doesn't look like they are ready and willing to give us relief.

MR. McGUIRE: Nothing further on direct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you fine? Do you need any

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water?
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THE WITNESS: I'm good.
THE COURT: Okay. Great.
THE WITNESS: Thank you for asking. CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. PICO-PRATS:
Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Dufort. My name is Javier Pico-Prats. How are you today?
A. I'm great.
Q. Did I hear that you're a member of the Coalition for Good Governance? Is that right?
A. I am.
Q. And you are self-employed as a realtor; is that correct?
A. I am.
Q. Have you had any training or do you have an expertise in election security?
A. I'm not here as an expert. I'm here as a citizen observer.
Q. All right. And so the answer is no; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you don't have any expertise in elections outside of you being a poll watcher or on the review panel; is that correct?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. You don't have any expertise outside of that; correct?
A. Outside of what? Can you --
Q. Just being a poll watcher or being on the review panel for elections.
A. No. I just have my hundreds and thousands of hours of observation to offer.
Q. So everything you have talked about today is just your opinion; is that correct?
A. As a layperson, it is what $I$ have observed. That is a little different than an opinion.
Q. Okay. But it is your observations as a layperson --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and your beliefs?
A. It is my observations.
Q. Okay. Let's talk a little --

THE COURT: Can you just clarify one thing for me?
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: I know you have been on the review
committee for absentee ballots that are not clear.
And were you part of the -- and you were part of the
Democratic party or you had an office or not?
THE WITNESS: I'm a --
THE COURT: You --
THE WITNESS: -- I'm first vice chair of the Morgan
County Democrats.
THE COURT: In that capacity, do you work with the

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elections office?
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THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: And what sorts of things do you do?
THE WITNESS: I wear a couple of hats.
THE COURT: You may --
THE WITNESS: I wear nonpartisan hats and partisan
hats.
THE COURT: But when you're working on elections, what do you do in that capacity?

THE WITNESS: In my capacity as first vice chair of Morgan County --

THE COURT: Yes.
THE WITNESS: When I work on elections with them. I work on normal voter turnout activities, candidate recruitment and training, and I coordinate our local poll watchers, generally speaking.

THE COURT: And do you work also with the elections office in that connection?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I have -- before I became a member of CGG, I was attending board meetings on -- board of elections meetings on behalf of Morgan County Dems.

Once I became a member of CGG, I kind of had a dual purpose of observing because I had -- realtors are really good at wearing multiple nonpartisan hats, if that makes sense; right? We say we are not red or blue. We're just

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policy-driven.
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THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, sir.
MR. PICO-PRATS: Thank you.
BY MR. PICO-PRATS:
Q. In talking a little bit about your experience on the voter review panel, on working in that capacity, you reviewed hand-marked paper ballots; is that correct?
A. Yes. Mostly.
Q. Okay. And that was really trying to gather the voter's intent when a voter might have made a mistake or some kind of a mark on a ballot that wasn't registered correctly?
A. The way I like to say it is we're responsible for looking at ballots that the computer has a hard time interpreting. There is a bunch of reasons for that.
Q. A reason could be that maybe a voter by accident filled out two letters -- two boxes for the same candidate -- same election; is that correct?
A. It is possible.
Q. Or that maybe they didn't vote -- fill in an oval entirely.

Is that another possibility?
A. People are wide-ranging, and there is a wide range of reasons why ballots wind up in front of the vote review panel. But people are smarter than computers, so we're able to solve with no ranker, right, Democrat/Republic, nearly all of those
things.
Q. And when reviewing ballots, again, this is solely hand-marked paper ballots, is that right, when you are on the review panel?
A. You know, it is not by law that. I'm just trying to think of any examples where we might have looked at a BMD -- no, we did have -- how could I forget?

Yes. We had cause to look at some BMD ballots because an election manager had made the decision to continue a little longer in one of our polling places on that day when the encoding wasn't right. A manager kept encoding for longer and wouldn't let the voters go and scan their ballots. She, for whatever reason, left them to be scanned at the end of the day not by voters.

And it turned out that she had made about 30 or 32 mistakes. She had two precincts in her place, and there were voters that had voted the wrong ballot. So we actually had to look at those and convert them to the correct ballot style.

So that is an example of where we did wind up having to deal with BMD ballots.
Q. This was a human error?
A. Yeah. It was a human error.
Q. Okay. And when talking about the hand-marked paper ballots that you get -- and you just mentioned that you saw it once for BMD.

But outside of that human error, have you ever seen a BMD ballot that was ambiguous?
A. No.
Q. And is this something because this is something that is printed instead of something that is filled out by a human hand?
A. Really, it is because voters scan them, and the ambiguous ballots that come in front of us are because they are not scanning correctly. So as long as the voter has been able to stand in front of a scanner and scan it, no matter whether it is a hand-marked ballot or a BMD ballot, it doesn't come before the vote review panel.
Q. Do you have any professional training with relation to the BMD machines?
A. No. I'm a citizen volunteer. Remember?
Q. Yes, ma'am.

And it is true that you stated you don't watch the voter on a BMD machine because you don't know if your vote is being counted because of the $Q R$ code?
A. The $Q R$ code is one of my objections to the BMD ballot.
Q. And do you have any evidence that a BMD has printed a ballot and $Q R$ code has read differently from what a voter intended?
A. North Hampton County, Pennsylvania. Absolutely.
Q. Do you have any evidence of that in Georgia?
A. No -- yes, actually.
Q. Could you please explain that.
A. Yeah. In June -- so I'm a little fuzzy on the details because I didn't prep for this. But in June of 2020 when we were first using them, there was a problem in -- a very vexing problem in Tattnall County around the outcome of a commissioner's race.

So you had your BMD ballots, and they said what they said, and you had your cast vote record, and it said what it said. And it wasn't coming out right, and they weren't really looking at the cast vote record; right? I later saw those attached. They were just looking at the face of the ballots, and they were like, We can count these by hand and it comes out right, but the count in the system isn't correct.

And it turns out that there was a coding error that was causing some of those Republican commissioner primary ballots to report as Democratic ballots. So the contests weren't aligning.

And so until they discovered that, they weren't able to get to a correct result. So that is one example.

The other example, $I$ think, is DeKalb County where I observed over Memorial Day weekend of 2022, I believe it was, where they had a problem that was discovered because a candidate who voted with her husband in her precinct found her precinct was reporting zero votes for her, and she found that
not to be credible since she and her husband, at least, had voted for her. And it took a while to sort out why BMD ballots that looked correct on the surface weren't reporting correctly.

So those are two Georgia examples that $I$ have personally reviewed.
Q. And this is something that someone put a vote in on a BMD and it printed out and it was -- and when it was scanned, it was a different vote than the one they had put in?
A. It printed out in a way that agreed with what they wanted, but it didn't tabulate correctly in both cases.
Q. But when reviewing it, it did say the vote that they wanted?
A. When they reviewed it, it did say that, yes.
Q. And do you have any evidence that a Georgia BMD has ever been hacked?
A. You know, that is not my department.
Q. But you don't; is that correct?
A. It is not my department.
Q. Okay. But you don't?
A. I will repeat, it is not my department.
Q. Okay. You have previously stated that BMDs are not auditable; is that correct?
A. I'm not sure that I stated that, but I would tell you that I have listened to Philip Stark and read his papers, and I would agree with that statement.

Again, I'm not an expert.
Q. But you're basing it on your expert's opinion; is that correct?
A. I am basing it on the opinion of Philip and other experts, yes.
Q. But you personally don't have any opinion whether --
A. I am not an expert.
Q. Okay. Before, you talked a little bit about issues you've had voting by mail.
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. And you said that voting by mail it is -- not to misquote you, but it has its own set of problems; is that correct?
A. It does.
Q. And you would say that those are problems that generally any voter that wants to vote by mail would have?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have -- would you agree that you don't have confidence in the U.S. voting system, the U.S. Mail system?
A. Those are two different statements, so which one do you want me to answer?
Q. The mail system.
A. I have read enough and seen enough, including my own ballot that went astray, to not have confidence, full confidence that something as important as a ballot is going to get delivered always every time.
Q. And you were talking in 2022 that you had an issue with an absentee ballot request; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you end up voting in that election?
A. I was able to vote a mail ballot because the replacement did get to me on time.
Q. And if it had not gotten in on time, could you have gone in and voted in person?
A. I could have.
Q. And was it -- is it a preference of yours just to vote by absentee ballot?
A. It is a preference of mine to vote in person on election day, but only if I can use a method that I feel confident will result in my vote being counted as cast without sacrificing ballot secrecy.

So as long as Georgia requires me to vote on a BMD as a condition of in-person voting, I will continue to vote by mail. Q. Well, is it not true that you could go in with your absentee ballot and turn it in to the registrar's office?
A. I can, and I do.
Q. So you do vote in person?
A. No. That is not voting in person. Turning a mail ballot in at the registrar's office is not voting in person.
Q. What do you classify as voting in person?
A. So voting in person is -- the ultimate conclusion of
voting in person is being able to scan your ballot and see that it has been accepted, and you can't do that when you vote by mail.
Q. Do you -- however, you believe -- you have stated that you believe that scanning a ballot, you don't know if the vote that you are intending to put -- that you put in the machine is one that is being tabulated; is that correct?
A. In which kind of ballot are you asking about?
Q. Do you have -- let me rephrase this.

Do you have an issue with the scanner itself that is part of the BMDs systems, or no?
A. I think that as long as we have a reliable, fundamental document, a reliable paper ballot, any problems that occur with the scanners can be overcome. You can always reconstruct the correct outcome that voters intended.
Q. Okay. So it is specifically the $Q R$ code that you have an issue that might be reading something different; is that correct?
A. It is the entirety of the BMD ballot for the reasons I have already explained.
Q. Talking a little bit about verifying votes, you've said that you've had issues remembering all the votes that you have after putting them in a BMD, for instance, that you would have issue remembering every one you had voted for; correct?
A. Yeah. I used to be able to look at a phone number over
here and put it in my phone, right, without looking again.
Today, my brain -- you know, it just works a little differently today than it once did.
Q. You talked a little bit about someone being able to bring in a sample ballot.
A. Yes.
Q. And you said that you hadn't seen people bring in sample ballots before or rarely.
A. Rarely.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Rarely.
Q. Would you say that is a personal choice whether they bring in a sample ballot?
A. I mean, many things in life are personal choices, so yes. Q. And in terms of someone bringing in a sample ballot or taking the time to review, would you say that is a personal choice as well, whether they decided to review?
A. So I'll answer it that way; right? My ballot, my vote is super important to me; right? You can clearly see the time I'm spending on this. Mine is important. But I am very cognizant that my own vote leads to an outcome when pooled only with everybody else's.

So to the extent that people can't review their ballots with meaningfulness or don't, or don't exercise personal responsibilities, it doesn't really matter. It affects my vote
because I'm part of a pool of votes that leads to outcomes. So
I am harmed when the pool is spoiled.
Q. But you have the ability to review a ballot once it is printed; is that correct?
A. I have the opportunity to, yes.
Q. Okay. And that someone else doesn't, that doesn't affect your vote personally; is that correct?
A. It absolutely affects -- again, for the reasons I just explained, if the pool is spoiled, my vote is impacted.
Q. It doesn't impact your ability to vote; is that correct?
A. If by ability to vote you mean marking a ballot and casting a ballot, it does not affect that.

THE COURT: You are talking about the paper ballot that you're -- the absentee ballot?

THE WITNESS: Yeah, or any ballot; right? Whatever I choose to vote individually, I can take charge of that. But if the pool around me has flaws, it impacts the impact of my vote. Does that make sense the way I'm trying to describe that to you?

BY MR. PICO-PRATS:
Q. I understand what you are saying.
A. Okay.
Q. But if it is up to the discretion of someone to bring in a ballot and -- or sorry, a sample ballot, as you were saying, and then it is up to their discretion -- sorry. Scratch that.

Do you understand that people are required to review a ballot after it is printed?
A. Yeah. There is a law that says you must do that.
Q. Okay.
A. Have you ever timed people and watched how many actually do?
Q. Let's talk a little bit about -- do you have expertise in timing people before?
A. I do. I have done it.
Q. Okay. But -- you're certified in it, taken a class in it?
A. No. I have done it as a citizen observer.
Q. Okay. Let's talk a little bit about the proposed rules that you brought in at the end.

These proposed rules were brought into the State Election Board; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Have you ever proposed rules to the county election board?
A. The county election board doesn't make rules. It is the State Election Board that -- the process is legislative rules, state -- legislation, State Election Board rules, and Secretary of State procedures, and the counties are bound by those.
Q. Are you aware of anything preventing a county from passing an ordinance relating to cybersecurity measures?
A. The counties --

THE COURT: Are you talking about the county or the
county elections board you're asking about?
MR. PICO-PRATS: The county elections board.
THE WITNESS: Based on the experience when
Athens-Clarke County tried to do as a board what it deemed the responsible thing to do, I have -- and by the way, local election officials across the state called that being "Athened." There's a word for it, what happened that day.

I have zero confidence based on many attempts to propose to individual election boards that they do some action that helps protect local elections at least. They are unwilling to sort of go off the range. They are very clear, we have to live with the set of rules that is above us, the Secretary of State procedures, the State Election Board rules, and what the legislature has said.

So I can't see where that would be a useful exercise or any chance that any election board would actually really try to do something different.

BY MR. PICO-PRATS:
Q. But you're unaware that it is something that the county can do; is that correct?
A. I mean, I could be 150 pounds, but --

THE COURT: I think she's already responded. Let's
move on. I think she's responded to you fully on that.
MR. PICO-PRATS: That's all the questions I have.
THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PICO-PRATS: Thank you, ma'am.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. I have a very short redirect.

Counsel who questioned you asked about your observations of voters reviewing ballots on BMDs.
A. Yes.

THE COURT: Can you speak up?
MR. McGUIRE: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Opposing counsel asked -- Ms. Dufort, he asked you about voters reviewing their BMD ballots.

Have you had the opportunity to observe voters doing that?
A. Yes. I have spent countless hours watching the BMD ballot process.
Q. Have you done it in multiple elections?
A. Yes.
Q. By countless hours, I mean, what do you really mean?
A. Hundreds, maybe thousands --
Q. Okay.
A. -- in lots of locations and lots of counties.
Q. And so based on what you have seen, what do voters typically do with their paper-printed BMD ballot?
A. My observations are fairly consistent with the report I reviewed that the Secretary of State had contracted with the University of Georgia to do, right, where it said 18 percent looked for at least five seconds and everybody else looked for less than that.

You can watch a voter from the BMD station where they are picking their ballot out of a printer on their path over to the scanner. And you can easily observe, are they glancing at it? Are they pausing there for a while? What are they doing?

And it makes sense to me in what $I$ have observed and been able to catalog that fewer than one in five voter looks for at least five seconds.

To put that in context, I have tried to time myself. And I am a pretty fast reader for comprehension. I can't comprehend at a pace much faster than one second per contest, no matter how hard I try.

So five seconds is a pretty low standard, in my opinion.
MR. McGUIRE: Nothing further. Thank you.
THE COURT: Is that it?
Okay. May this witness be excused?
MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.
Pursuant to the agreement with counsel, Ms. Dufort is a one-and-done witness, so she can be excused. Thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome to sit here; you're welcome to leave.

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please leave the exhibit on the counter there -- just right there on the desk.

That will be fine. Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: So you are welcome to sit. You are
welcome to leave. But don't discuss your testimony with anyone who was not here.

THE WITNESS: You'll see a lot of me over the coming days.

THE COURT: Okay.
All right. Let's take a restroom break for ten
minutes.

COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
(A brief break was taken at 3:39 PM.)

THE COURT: Who is plaintiffs' next witness?

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, the Coalition plaintiffs will
call Laura Digges.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Could I get you to please stand, ma'am, and raise your right hand.
(Witness sworn)

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. And if you would, please state your name and spell your entire name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Laura Digges, L-A-U-R-A D-I-G-G-E-S. Whereupon,

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LAURA DIGGES,
    after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
    DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Ms. Digges, good afternoon.
    My name is Bruce Brown, as you know, representing the
Coalition plaintiffs.
    Ms. Digges, are you a named plaintiff in this case?
A. I am.
Q. And are you also a member of plaintiff, Coalition for Good
Governance?
A. Yes.
Q. And when did you become a member of CGG?
A. 2017 .
Q. Backing up a little bit, you are from Cobb County; is that right?
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A. I am living in Cobb County currently.
Q. When did you move to Georgia?
A. To Georgia, I moved in 1996, year of the Olympics.
Q. And just -- could you just outline briefly your employment history since you moved to Georgia.
A. Since I moved to Georgia, I have worked at IBM for 12 years. Then I worked for Bright Horizons. They are an employer-sponsor childcare center, largest in the country. Then I worked for Tokio Marine. They're an insurance company.
Q. And are you now retired?
A. I am retired.
Q. And you said you were a member of plaintiff CGG?
A. I am.
Q. And why did you become a member of CGG?
A. I have always been interested in elections, election integrity and democracy. My whole life, my family was interested in politics. I remember when JFK was elected, my family was ecstatic, we celebrated.

And CGG has given me the opportunity to -- to enjoy that, and they have taught me so much, more than I ever could have learned in any civics class.
Q. And what does CGG do on your behalf?
A. On my behalf? Well, since I live in Cobb County, they keep me updated on Cobb County Board of Elections. They keep me updated on any legislation. I have participated in the State Board of Elections meeting and Cobb County Board of Elections meetings.
Q. And what other volunteer work have you done for CGG?
A. For CGG, they have motivated me to become a poll watcher. And I now realize how important that is and how much the poll watchers do for us. I have also participated in Cobb County Board of Election meetings and participated in the State Board of Election meetings.
Q. At the present time and in the recent past, do you vote
absentee by mail or do you vote by BMD?
A. I vote by absentee mail.
Q. And why do you vote absentee rather than in person?
A. I don't trust the BMDs.
Q. And why don't you trust the BMD?
A. Because I like to know that my vote is counted as cast. I like to be able to -- to me, it is important to know how I vote.

And with the BMDs and the $Q R$ code, $I$ can't do that.
Q. Have you experienced some difficulties with absentee voting that you are doing instead of voting in person on BMDs?
A. Like I said, I have always been interested in politics. We have raised our children to be that way. We used to -- as a family event on election day, we would all go vote together, then go out to dinner and discuss it. And because I can't vote on the BMDs now, I miss that.

It is also -- as far as the mail-in absentee ballot, it is -- you know, you have to go to My Voter page, request the application and the whole routine that you have to go through to make sure that you've gotten it, and it always doesn't happen, which, in my husband's case, they never mailed him the application, so he had to go vote in person.
Q. And so -- but at least for present purposes, the -- going through the difficulties of absentee voting for you is worth it compared to voting in person on the BMD; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And, again, what for you personally are you giving up by not voting in person on election day?
A. By not voting in person on election day, I am -- I'm giving up the community participation. I miss that.
Q. And are you able to -- when you vote absentee, are you able to get the most recent information on elections prior to election day?
A. No. Usually, you have to request the application ahead of time and complete the application, and because I don't trust the mail -- we've had a lot of problems with our mail -- we have to drive it in, which isn't exactly convenient.
Q. Okay. Now, you and the other plaintiffs are asking the Court to enjoin the State from forcing in-person voters to use the BMDs.

And how would that alleviate the burdens that you now face in voting?
A. Well, it is my understanding that if the State decided to not use the BMDs, I could go in and I could mark the ballot personally by hand with a pen or marker and know that my vote that I personally put on that ballot would be cast. I am casting that vote as I marked it, which is not the case with the BMDs.
Q. Ms. Digges, do you plan to vote in future elections?
A. Always.
Q. And will you be voting absentee by mail or in person on election day?
A. If they do not have hand-marked paper ballots, I will be voting absentee mail.
Q. Thank you.

MR. BROWN: No further questions.
THE WITNESS: You're welcome.

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                        CROSS-EXAMINATION
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BY MR. BEDARD:
Q. Good morning, Ms. Digges -- or good afternoon.
A. I know.
Q. We've been here a long time.

I know we haven't had a chance to meet. My name is Ed
Bedard. I'll be representing the State --
A. Nice to meet you.
Q. -- and I'll be asking you some questions.

I appreciate your testimony about working for Bright
Horizons. My kids go to a Bright Horizons daycare center.
A. Oh, which one?
Q. They're great.

Well, I won't say that in open court.
A. Oh, that's true. That's true. Never mind.
Q. But there is a lot of them, so I don't think I have given too much away.
A. They're great.
Q. Yeah, exactly. When you see it, you'll know.
A. Good choice.
Q. A few clarifying questions just to start.

I think you testified you live in Cobb County; right?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. No plans to move anytime soon?
A. No. We are here for the duration.
Q. Great. Just a few other things.

You're not a cybersecurity expert; right?
A. No, not at all.
Q. No formal training in cybersecurity; right?
A. Not at all.
Q. Never had any training on a BMD; correct?
A. No.
Q. Not an expert in election administration either?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Never run an election yourself?
A. No.
Q. Never worked as a paid election worker?
A. No.
Q. Let me ask you, what is the remedy -- I just want some clarification here.

What is the remedy that you're seeking through this lawsuit? What do you want the Court to do for you?
A. I would like to vote by hand-marked paper ballots.
Q. Okay. So you want the Court to order -- to restrain the required use of BMDs for in-person voting --
A. Correct.
Q. -- is that correct?

So that you have the option of voting hand-marked paper ballots --
A. Exactly.
Q. Okay. Thank you.

You have never voted on a BMD machine; correct?
A. Never.
Q. And no plans to vote on a BMD at any point in the future?
A. No.
Q. So you wouldn't call yourself right now an in-person voter as it is; right?
A. No.
Q. Okay. At the same time, you've never been prevented from voting on a BMD; correct?
A. No.
Q. You've just chosen not to?
A. Correct.
Q. Yeah. Georgia adopted the BMD system between the 2018 gubernatorial and the 2020 presidential cycle; right? In your --
A. Excuse me?
Q. Georgia adopted the BMD voting system between the 2018
gubernatorial and 2020 presidential elections; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Yea. And in every election that you've voted in since Georgia adopted the BMD system, you voted absentee by mail; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, before you submitted those ballots, you double- and triple-checked them to make sure they were correct; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Looked them over, made sure that the marks were exactly as you intended them?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't just fill it out and then turn it in; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Have you ever changed anything after you went through it the first time?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Ever found a mistake?
A. Have I ever found a mistake? No.
Q. Okay. So let's talk about your concerns with BMDs.

You don't want to vote on a BMD, I think you testified, because you don't know if your vote is going to be counted as cast; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. What does counted as cast mean to you? Can you define that?
A. Counted as cast means I vote, and I always vote hand-marked paper ballots, and I can see my vote on the ballot.

With the BMD, I push the button, and it goes through and it reads the $Q R$ code, and I don't read $Q R$ code.
Q. But the BMD prints out a printed summary, correct, of your votes?
A. I guess so.
Q. Okay. Well, it is true because you have never voted on a BMD, have you?
A. Yeah, I never have.
Q. How is an absentee by mail ballot, a hand-marked paper ballot -- in your mind, what you want the Court to be able to give you the option to do, how is a hand-marked paper ballot counted as cast?

Or let me rephrase that.
How do you know that a hand-marked paper ballot is counted as cast?
A. Well, they -- I hand it to them. They take it, and I go through My Voter page, it shows accepted, and then they scan them, as far as I know.
Q. They scan them, but you don't know what the scanner tabulates your vote as, do you?
A. I'm not a technical person. I don't know.
Q. So when it comes to a hand-marked paper ballot, you don't know if your hand-marked paper ballot has been counted as you cast it, do you?
A. Well, it scans it.
Q. It scans it, so it counts it?
A. It counts it.
Q. It counts it.

And that's no different than your BMD ballot; right? You
know that the BMD ballot is counted; right? I mean,
hypothetically, because you have never voted on a BMD, of course, but between the two, you can know that both have been counted; correct?
A. Yes, I guess.
Q. So how do you know that a hand-marked paper ballot is counted as cast?
A. How do $I$ know it is counted as cast? I mean, I don't know the technicalities of all of it, so $I$ really don't know.
Q. Okay. You can't be sure that your hand-marked paper ballot has been counted as cast either, can you?
A. Well, I am marking it on my ballot that way. I'm assuming that they are counting it correctly going by the circle that they say I'm --
Q. You are assuming that; right?
A. I'm assuming that.
Q. You are assuming that they are counting it correctly
because you've put it out on a hand-marked paper ballot?
A. I guess I'm -- the question is, why would it not be counted correctly?
Q. I don't know.

You don't know that it has been counted, though, either, have you?

Sitting here today, you don't know if any of your hand-marked paper ballots that you voted by absentee in the last four or so years have been counted as cast, do you?
A. I am trusting that they are.
Q. What is the basis of that trust?
A. Because the scanner scans the marks on the ballot.
Q. Okay. But a scanner just reads your hand-marking the same as it reads a $Q R$ code; right?
A. But it is not reading the BMD --
Q. Sure.
A. -- $Q R$ code.
Q. But if we are in a BMD situation -- again, I know you haven't voted on a BMD.

If you were going to go back and check to make sure that the BMD was correct, you have the printed summary that you can confirm; correct?
A. Could you repeat that, please.
Q. Sure. If you use a BMD and you scan that, the scanner uses the $Q R$ code; right?
A. Right.
Q. And if you use a hand-marked paper ballot and you scan that, it is scanning, as a computer does, what you marked on the paper; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. But in either case, you don't know what the scanner has counted, do you?
A. Well, it is counting -- on my ballot, it is counting my vote. On the $Q R$ code, it is counting the $Q R$ code which I don't know what that is reading, whether it is how I am -- how I marked --
Q. Sure. But you also don't know what the scanner has counted for your hand-marked paper ballot?
A. I have more faith in that than I do the BMD.
Q. So you have more faith, but is there anything in particular that is supporting that faith? What is supporting your increased trust in the hand-marked paper ballot over the BMD ballot?
A. The $Q R$ code is what bothers me.
Q. But in either case, whether it is the $Q R$ code or your hand-marked paper ballot, you don't know what the scanner has counted; right?
A. It is counting what I marked on the ballot.

THE COURT: I think you've gone far enough.
MR. BEDARD: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. BEDARD: I think you understand my point, Your
Honor.
BY MR. BEDARD:
Q. A few other questions.

MR. BEDARD: Well, let me -- hold on. Let me look at my list here and see if $I$ can cut some of this out, Your Honor. BY MR. BEDARD:
Q. Ms. Digges, at the end of the day, your concern right now is that you don't have the opportunity to vote in the method you would prefer in person; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay.

MR. BEDARD: I think that's it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Ms. Digges, just a couple of follow-up questions.

When you vote on a hand-marked paper ballot, whose vote is that that is on that ballot?
A. My vote.
Q. When the computer spits out a BMD ballot, whose vote is that?
A. I don't know.

MR. BROWN: Thank you.

No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: May this witness be excused? May this
witness be excused?
MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Digges.
THE WITNESS: You're welcome. Thank you.
MR. BEDARD: And just, Your Honor, she's still
subject to a subpoena at the moment. Again, we -- like the other witnesses, we don't necessarily anticipate calling her, but for sequestration purposes.

THE COURT: All right. That is fine. You are not excused from these proceedings as a whole, but they will let you know if they need you, and you're welcome to --

MR. BEDARD: You know what? I'm sorry, Your Honor. She's a party.

THE COURT: That's right.
Do you have another witness?
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, we do not have any additional
witnesses. We anticipated that the morning would be -- go longer with what you did yesterday and also that the demonstration would take a good bit of time, and so my apologies, but we do not have another witness available.

We will be ready to go fast right off the start tomorrow morning with our next witness that we will disclose to the defendants.


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schedule first.
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(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: We'll start at 9:30. Let's be sure each day, though, that we're not running into this because it is -you know, I'm worried that we'll run out of time and then I'll end up having to find extra days after I have to take a break at some point.

MR. BROWN: Understood, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I have been counting the number of days even now, given the volume of witnesses, but -- and -- all right.

Well, be sure -- we'll see you at 9:30, same protocol, and that's it.

So, Counsel, if you want to come and talk with me in chambers, that is fine.

I'm going to deal with it like I did before in private, but meanwhile --

MR. CROSS: We can also do it here because people are probably going to leave.

THE COURT: We can do it here then.
MR. CROSS: I just -- we wanted to keep it private to the extent --

THE COURT: That's fine.
Well, I'm going to excuse the public and media from -- we'll just stay in here then.

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(A brief discussion ensued off the record, and the proceedings were thereby adjourned at 4:30 PM.)

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    C E R T I F I C A T E
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
    I, SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR, Official Court Reporter of
        the United States District Court, for the Northern District of
        Georgia, Atlanta Division, do hereby certify that the foregoing
        2 1 5 \text { pages constitute a true transcript of proceedings had}
        before the said Court, held in the City of Atlanta, Georgia, in
        the matter therein stated.
    In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand on this, the
9th day of January, 2024.
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                                    SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR
                                    OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
                                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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| BY MR. PICO-PRATS: [4] 181 | 65/15 65/18 75/1 | 17-CV-2989 [1] 6/5 |
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