The following is the PDF of an official transcript. Official transcripts may only be filed in CM/ECF by the Official Court Reporter and will be restricted in CM/ECF for a period of 90 days. You may cite to a portion of the attached transcript by the docket entry number, referencing page and line number, only after the Court Reporter has filed the official transcript; however, you are prohibited from attaching a full or partial transcript to any document filed with the Court.

```
                                    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                    FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION
```

DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS, DOCKET NUMBER vs.

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL - VOLUME 5A PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE AMY TOTENBERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT SENIOR JUDGE JANUARY 16, 2024

MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY OF PROCEEDINGS AND COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY:

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER:
SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR 2394 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 75 TED TURNER DRIVE, SOUTHWEST ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 (404) 215-1383


```
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS DONNA CURLING, DONNA PRICE, JEFFREY
SCHOENBERG:
    DAVID D. CROSS
    MARY KAISER
    RAMSEY W. FISHER
    MATTHAEUS MARTINO-WEINHARDT
    BEN CAMPBELL
    AARON SCHEINMAN
    MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP
    HALSEY KNAPP
    ADAM SPARKS
    KREVOLIN & HORST
    CHRISTIAN ANDREU-VON EUW
    THE BUSINESS LITIGATION GROUP
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, LAURA DIGGES,
WILLIAM DIGGES, III, AND MEGAN MISSETT:
    BRUCE P. BROWN
    BRUCE P. BROWN LAW
    ROBERT A. McGUIRE III
    ROBERT McGUIRE LAW FIRM
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS LAURA DIGGES, WILLIAM DIGGES, III, MEGAN
MISSETT, AND RICARDO DAVIS:
```

    CARY ICHTER
    ICHTER DAVIS
    ON BEHALF OF RICARDO DAVIS:
DAVID E. OLES, SR.
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID E. OLES
(...CONT'D....)

1

```
(...CONT'D....)
```

FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA DEFENDANTS:
VINCENT RUSSO
JOSH BELINFANTE
JAVIER PICO-PRATS
EDWARD BEDARD
ROBBINS ROSS ALLOY BELINFANTE LITTLEFIELD, LLC
BRYAN TYSON
BRYAN JACOUTOT
DIANE LAROSS
DANIEL H. WEIGEL
DANIELLE HERNANDEZ
DONALD P. BOYLE, JR.
TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA

INDEXTOPROCEEDINGS

## THE PLAINTIFFS' CASE (Continued)

## WITNESS

PAGE
DONNA CURLING
Direct Examination
By Ms. Kaiser
Cross-Examination
By Mr. Belinfante
RYAN GERMANY
Cross-Examination
By Mr. Oles
SANFORD MERRITT BEAVER
Cross-Examination
By Mr. Martino-Weinhardt
Cross-Examination
By Mr. Brown93

Direct Examination
By Mr. Boyle100

Examination
By The Court
Cross-Examination
By Mr. Oles
Redirect Examination
By Mr. Boyle
Reexamination
By The Court114

Recross-Examination
By Mr. Martino-Weinhardt
115
Recross-Examination
By Mr. Brown
119
Reexamination (Further)
By The Court
125
Recross-Examination (Further)
By Mr. Martino-Weinhardt 133

```
(...cont'd...)
```

    WITNESS
    ROBERT GABRIEL STERLING
    Cross-Examination
        By Mr. Cross137
    Examination
By The Court209

Recross-Examination
By Mr. Cross
Cross-Examination
By Mr. McGuire

```
PROCEE E D INGS
    (Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia; January 16, 2024.)
    THE COURT: All right. We are going to continue
Mr. Germany's testimony at this time?
THE PLAINTIFFS' CASE (Continued).
    MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we were going to start
briefly with Ms. Curling and then go back to Mr. Germany.
    THE COURT: Okay. I mean, is that all right with
defense counsel?
    MR. RUSSO: That's fine, Your Honor. Thank you.
    THE COURT: Okay.
                            (There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
    COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please raise your right
hand.
```


## (Witness sworn)

```
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. If you would, state your name and spell your name completely for the record, please.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Donna Curling, D-O-N-N-A, \(\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{U}-\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{L}-\mathrm{I}-\mathrm{N}-\mathrm{G}\).
Whereupon,
DONNA CURLING,
after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION
```

```
BY MS. KAISER:
```

```
BY MS. KAISER:
```

Q. Good morning, Ms. Curling.

Can you please introduce yourself to the Court?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. Can you please introduce yourself for the Court?
A. Yes. Good morning. Donna Curling.
Q. Where are you from?
A. I am from Georgia.
Q. Have you lived in Georgia your whole life?
A. I moved to Charlotte, North Carolina, as a child and to California as a young adult. I came back to Georgia in 1987 and have lived in Roswell, Georgia, ever since.
Q. Did you go to college, Ms. Curling?
A. I went to UNC Charlotte.
Q. What did you study there?
A. Psychology.
Q. Are you currently employed?
A. I am not employed. I just have volunteer work.
Q. What kind of volunteer work do you do?
A. I have worked with election protection organizations since about 2005. Most notably would be Vote Trust USA. And I partnered with Donna Price forming Georgians for Verified Voting.
Q. Are you a registered voter here in Georgia, Ms. Curling?
A. I am.
Q. When did you register to vote?
A. I registered in 1988.
Q. And to the best of your knowledge, have you voted in every election since 1988?
A. I have voted in all presidential and midterms and most special elections in municipals. I think I probably missed some municipal elections along the way.
Q. Do you believe that it is important to vote?
A. I believe it is very important.
Q. Why do you believe that voting is very important?
A. Well, I think voting is a right and a privilege and a duty that was granted us by our Constitution, granted U.S. citizens, and it is our means of choosing our representative government.
Q. Do you intend to vote in future elections in Georgia?
A. I do.
Q. Is it your wish to vote in person in future elections?
A. I would like that. I used to enjoy voting in person. It is kind of you get a sense of community and everybody is at your precinct exercising their right and their duty to vote. Q. As a voter in Georgia, Ms. Curling, do you feel that you can cast your vote with confidence that it will be counted as cast?
A. I do not.
Q. And why not?
A. Because Georgia's voting system is just not sufficiently secure.
Q. What has led you to believe that Georgia's voting system is not sufficiently secure?
A. Well, for one, all my years of working on election protection, I have talked with experts and activists and learned a lot about the DRE system first and now the BMD system.

And -- but the things that we have uncovered in this case and the knowledge I have acquired over the years, I just do not feel like Georgia has a secure enough system for my -- to count my vote as cast.
Q. You mentioned the BMD system.

Are you familiar with Georgia's current BMD voting system?
A. I am.
Q. Have you ever voted on a BMD?
A. I have.
Q. How was your experience voting on a BMD?
A. Well, my experience both times that I voted on a BMD was only one race, so I don't feel like I've had the full treatment of voting on a BMD.

What I was acutely aware of is the screens are very large, the rooms are small, there are people milling around everywhere, and you feel very exposed. And with no effort at all, somebody could see how I am voting, and I am not really comfortable with that.
Q. Have you voted absentee in Georgia, Ms. Curling?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Generally speaking, how does absentee voting work in Georgia?
A. Well, they changed the law in the last three years. Three years ago, if you checked the box saying you were 65 years old or older, all of your ballots would be sent to you without a request. But they have changed that, and now you have to pay attention to the calendar, make sure you request your ballot in plenty of time for it to be processed and sent to you. And then, likewise, you have to figure out the best way to return that ballot to make sure it is most likely to be counted.

Q How has your experience been voting absentee in Georgia?
A. Not good.
Q. Why is that?
A. Well, sitting in this very courtroom, I learned that I had been disenfranchised one of the first times $I$ voted absentee.

If I were not involved in this case, I don't think I would have ever known.

But my vote did not count at that time.
Q. And I was -- can you just explain what you mean by you were disenfranchised?
A. Disenfranchised just means that my vote did not count. Even though I had done everything by the book, followed the instructions, for whatever reason, my vote did not count.
Q. Is that the only instance in which you thought you had voted but found out that your ballot was not counted?
A. Unfortunately, no. I was in my attorney's office one day looking through the eNet report and found that I was disenfranchised again in 2020.
Q. How does it make you feel, Ms. Curling, to know that on at least two occasions your ballots were not counted?
A. It is very upsetting. My right to vote is very important and personal to me, and knowing that $I$ was using the system that was recommended if you do not want to vote on the machines, and still the system failed me.
Q. And, Ms. Curling, I just wanted to clarify.

When you say you found out that your vote did not count, do you mean that there was no record of your absentee ballot that you cast?
A. I don't actually know if there was -- I mean, I think on My Voter page it showed that it had been returned, so I'm not real clear about how those things are recorded.

But I did see -- well, I am assuming the attorneys who said Ms. Curling hadn't bothered to vote in the last election had some information to go on.
Q. So your understanding was that you cast a ballot, an absentee ballot, but that the record showed it had not been processed properly; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Based on your experience, Ms. Curling, do you plan to continue voting absentee in Georgia in future elections?
A. Well, that is a very difficult question. Most likely if we continue to use the BMD system in Georgia, I will more than likely opt to vote absentee and take my chances there because at least then there is a permanent ballot of record for my vote.
Q. When you say permanent ballot of record for your vote, could you explain what you mean by that.
A. I really mean to say verified that $I$ know it is my selections on that ballot.
Q. And are you able to verify your selections on a BMD-generated ballot, Ms. Curling?
A. You are not. Because when you vote on a BMD, after you cast your vote, you can read the human readable portion to make sure that your selection is correct. But after you print, that screen goes blank and the vote is translated into a $Q R$ code, which no human can read. It is a machine language. So you have no idea whether that $Q R$ code reflects your selection or not.
Q. And is it important to you, Ms. Curling, to have a verified ballot of record?
A. It is very important, yes.
Q. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Curling. I don't have any further questions --
A. Thank you.
Q. -- at this time.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Good morning, Ms. Curling.
A. Good morning.
Q. I'm Josh Belinfante. We met via Zoom from your deposition --
A. Yes, we did.
Q. -- if you recall. Good to see you here today.
A. Thank you.
Q. Just a few questions for you today.

You testified a moment ago that you lack confidence in the BMD system, but do you agree that no election is flawless?
A. I absolutely agree.
Q. Okay. And you would also agree with me that there are real risks in any way that you vote?
A. I agree.
Q. And you would further agree with me that when you vote absentee, that absentee ballot is run through a scanner to count the votes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have no way of knowing if the scanner actually counted your ballot as cast; isn't that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you have no personal knowledge that any vote cast using a BMD was not counted as cast; is that right?
A. I have no knowledge of that.
Q. You testified a moment ago that you learned through counsel and through this litigation that in, I believe it was, 2020 you cast an absentee ballot that was not counted?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall which election in 2020 that was?
A. I think it was the primary.
Q. The general primary?
A. The general primary, yes.
Q. Do you have any understanding as to who administers the absentee process, whether it is the state or county governments?
A. I believe it is the county.
Q. Ms. Curling, that's all the questions I have for you. Thank you.
A. Thank you.

THE COURT: May this witness be excused?
MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor.
MS. KAISER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you very much.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Did you-all have an opportunity to confer with -- with Mr. Davis' counsel?

```
MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Davis' counsel sent us an email outlining the topics that were going to be covered. THE COURT: And you-all were able to resolve any -if there were any differences, resolve any?
MR. BROWN: We will see how it --
THE COURT: You will see how it goes. All right.
MR. BROWN: -- Your Honor, and we will take in mind
your comments from last Friday concerning the difficulty of managing the scope of the cross and do the best we can.
THE COURT: All right. Remember that you are still under oath, sir. Thank you very much.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
Whereupon,
RYAN GERMANY,
after having been previously duly sworn, testified as
follows:
```


## CROSS-EXAMINATION

```
BY MR. OLES:
```

Q. Good morning, Mr. Germany. My name is David Oles. I represent Ricardo Davis, plaintiff in this case.
A. Good morning.
Q. I have a few questions for you concerning the testimony that you gave last week.

Are you familiar with the two-page investigative report that you prepared for the Secretary of State's office dated

October 3rd -- 30th, 2017, concerning the alleged deletion of data from the CES server at KSU?
A. I recall that generally, yes.

MR. OLES: May I approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, I gave you a two- or three-page document there.

Do you recognize that document?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is it?
A. This looks like an investigation report of an investigation that I did regarding -- it says I was asked to look into allegations that data was deleted from servers housed at the KSU Center for Election Systems.
Q. Okay. Thank you, sir.

MR. OLES: Judge, I move to admit this investigative report into the evidence -- the record in the case. This has not previously been disclosed as a -- an exhibit, to my knowledge. But since it does involve the testimony that Mr. Germany gave last week, I would like to ask him a few questions about it.

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: What is the exhibit number?
MR. OLES: I didn't know how I should number it, so Davis 1.

THE COURT: Well, I think for purposes of the
record --
MR. BEDARD: For numbering purposes, that's fine, Your Honor. I think we would lodge a relevance objection at this point just because I fail to see how this ties in with the BMDs which are the remaining issues in the case. We're obviously not dealing with DREs anymore.

So subject to that, I was going to let Mr. Oles go for a little bit to see if he was going to tie it somehow, but that is my objection to this.

THE COURT: All right. Let's see if he ties it at all. And at least for the record, I'm going to -- we're going to -- I'm not admitting it yet. I'm going to see how it is tied in. All right? But I'm looking at it now.

MR. OLES: Thank you, Judge.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, can you tell me, for your report, who was the complainant for your investigative report?
A. I don't know that there was one.
Q. Okay. Isn't it true, sir, that most investigative reports, there is a complainant -- in investigative reports prepared in the Secretary of State's office, there is a complainant?
A. Not investigations that I would do. Those were more --
that was a different -- with -- what you said is true for
investigations done by our Investigations Division.
Q. Okay. Can you tell me who the respondent was for this report?
A. Again, that doesn't really apply in investigations I would do.
Q. Isn't it also true that for most Secretary of State investigative reports there are respondents who are responsible for the incident being investigated?
A. In investigations that our Investigations Division would do -- that is the law enforcement kind of wing of the agency -I think that would be true.

Again, the investigations $I$ would do in my role as general counsel weren't -- weren't under that -- that division of the office.
Q. Now, in your report, there is no -- isn't it true there is no listing of any documents or other evidence that you reviewed in preparing your investigative report?
A. I'll have to read it.
Q. Please.
A. (The witness complies.)

The report says that I have reviewed applicable documents and spoken to various involved parties.
Q. Okay. But not a single specific document is listed in here; correct, sir?
A. The report references a KSU IT after-action report.
Q. Other than that single report, have you -- did you, in fact, review any other documents in preparing your -- in conducting your investigation?
A. I don't recall at this point.
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Germany, that for Secretary of State's investigations, the reports typically include a listing of the documents that were reviewed by the investigator?
A. So again, what you are referring to are investigations undertaken by the Investigations Division in their law enforcement capacity. This is an investigation done in my capacity as general counsel. It is generally more for internal, not law enforcement-type issues.

So I think what you are saying is true in regards to investigations done by our Investigations Division.
Q. Can you tell me what staff members of $K S U$ you communicated with in conducting your investigation?
A. I don't recall at this point.
Q. Can you tell me what other individuals you may have communicated with in preparing this report?
A. It does say I had discussed the KSU after-action report with SOS IT.
Q. And who would SOS IT be?
A. SOS IT is a division within the Secretary of State's office.
Q. I understand.

But do you recall a person?
A. I don't recall specifically who I spoke to at this point.
Q. Can you tell us what elections were impacted by the CES server data that was deleted?
A. I don't think any elections were impacted.
Q. You don't think? You don't know for sure?
A. I don't think I can say that, sitting here right now. To the best of my recollection and in this report that I just reviewed, it suggested that, that same thing, that no elections -- that the data on the server wasn't a crucial election functionality and it wouldn't affect any elections.
Q. But as you sit here today, can you categorically state that this did not affect the results of the 2016 election?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you reach a conclusion at the end of your report that the data contained -- well, let me -- can you turn to Page 2, please?

You reach a conclusion in your report that the data contained on the servers as being held by the FBI and will be available for use in ongoing litigation.

Do you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn't it true that that data was never provided for use in ongoing litigation?
A. I don't think that is true.
Q. What specific evidence do you have that it was provided?

MR. BEDARD: And I'll just object on relevance grounds, Your Honor. Again, I think we've given Mr. Oles some space here to tie it together. And now we're talking about, again, discovery issues related to claims that aren't in the case anymore.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to let him ask the question and obtain an answer to the extent that it can be provided.

Do you want to repeat the question?
MR. OLES: Yes, Judge.
Can -- Madam Reporter, can you read that back for me?
(The record was read back by the court reporter.)

THE WITNESS: So my recollection is that SOS, we were able to obtain a copy of it from the FBI, and that was provided to our attorneys in this litigation.

Again, this is to the best of my recollection.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Okay. Mr. Germany, isn't it true that the Court -- this Court, in its 2019 order, found that given the entire course of events described here, the defendants' contention that the servers were simply re-purposed and not intentionally destroyed or wiped is flatly not credible?
A. I -- I can't say one way or the other.
Q. Mr. Germany, isn't it true that this report here, which cites no individuals, which cites no specific documents, was merely prepared to provide a cover for the loss of the data?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Mr. Germany, when you were on the stand last week, do you remember talking to the Court while under oath -- I believe it was Friday -- that Scott Hall filed a false affidavit claiming that he saw pristine ballots during the 2020 Fulton County mail-in ballot hand re-count?
A. I think what $I$ said was that we were familiar with

Mr. Hall based on claims he had made following the 2020 election and that those claims he had made we were not able to substantiate after -- with an investigation.
Q. Did you personally review Mr. Hall's affidavit before making that claim?
A. I have reviewed it in conjunction with numerous affidavits I reviewed following the 2020 election.

MR. OLES: May I approach, Judge?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, I direct your attention to what I just marked as Davis Exhibit 2.

Can you identify that document?
A. This document is entitled Affidavit of Scott Graham Hall in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order, and it is in the case Lin Wood, Jr. v. Raffensperger and then members of the State Election Board.
Q. And is this the affidavit to which you are referring that you reviewed?
A. I'll have to review it.
Q. Please.
A. (The witness complies.)

Yes, I believe this is the affidavit I was referring to. MR. OLES: Judge, I would like to tender Davis

Exhibit 2 into evidence.
MR. BEDARD: Again, I object just to relevance and also to the extent Mr. Oles is offering it for the truth of the matter, of course.

THE COURT: I haven't seen it.
MR. OLES: It is right here.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we also object to the
relevance. This doesn't pertain to anything at issue in this case.

THE COURT: Mr. Oles, I don't see any relevance of this. I mean, it seems to be about -- I mean, there obviously were issues for Mr. Hall and also for the plaintiff, Mr. Wood, but that -- that were separate and apart from what is at issue in this case. I mean, this deals about -- I mean, describing the nature of the ballots and --

MR. OLES: Well, Judge --

THE COURT: -- the mail-in ballots. So I don't really understand how the mail-in ballots and the questions regarding whether they looked like they had -- were proper is -- why that is relevant.

MR. OLES: Again, Judge, we're within the scope of what the Court has identified as the issues for trial. I believe that Mr. Germany -- we're offering it for the purpose of impeaching Mr. Germany's credibility in this case as to the testimony that he has given. He has given testimony regarding this, and I would like to --

THE COURT: Well, given testimony in this case regarding -- I mean, while he has been on the stand regarding this?

MR. OLES: Well, he just said a few moments ago that he testified about these claims, and he found that these claims were not founded.

THE COURT: Counsel, go ahead.
MR. BEDARD: I was just going to say, I think the context for which Mr. Oles is referring to is Mr. Germany last week explaining his course of conduct and not taking Mr. Hall's claims seriously because of his personal view that Mr. Hall was incredible.

So I don't think this is really impeaching that statement because it was Mr. Germany's personal opinions about Mr. Hall. And if he is going to impeach him on this, then
we're going down a whole rabbit hole of Mr. Hall's claims.
So I don't think it is appropriate impeachment for what Mr. Germany said.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I would just add to that: Not only is it hearsay, but just so the Court knows, Scott Hall evaded service of a subpoena for months while we tried to develop discovery of what happened in Coffee County.

This is exactly what we predicted. This is a backdoor effort to build some case that has nothing to do with why we are here. It is driven by VOTER GA and Mr. Favorito.

Mr. Hall could have testified under oath. He chose not to. If memory serves, he is under indictment.

THE COURT: All right. Well, $I$ think it is too far astray in terms of -- at least for the purpose it is being tendered for because, you know -- so I'm not going to allow admission of Davis Exhibit 2.

Was there -- Davis Exhibit 1 is admitted if I didn't do that before. If you want to explore further why it was -the witness' evaluation of Davis' testimony in this Court, you can do that, but I just don't think that this is a proper way of -- is too tangential at this point on this particular exhibit, Exhibit 2.

MR. CROSS: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Thank you.

BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, isn't it true that you did not -- you have not personally spoken with Mr. Hall?
A. Yes.

I would want to correct one thing that Mr. Bedard said. So I don't think it is true that we didn't take Mr. Hall's claims seriously. I think it is true regarding Coffee County. I think it is true to say that we didn't take -- or at least I didn't take them at face value given that he had made, in my view, what turned out to be false claims previously about the 2020 election.

So they were not something that I thought we could take at face value without further investigation and evidence.
Q. So are you saying here today, sir, that you did not pursue this investigation any further on the claims that he was making?
A. Are you referring to his claims about the pristine ballots?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Our investigators in the Investigations Division did an investigation into that.
Q. Okay. Is there -- and is there a report concerning that investigation, sir?
A. Yes, I believe there is.
Q. And do you know what the result of that report was?
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we're still on the same topic.

THE COURT: I mean, I think that the issue here, Mr. Oles, is that you seem to be going through the back door to try to get -- pursue the question of what Mr. Hall observed as to the hand-marked ballots that he doubted were in some way -apparently were valid, and that really is not the issue in this case.

So, you know, I understood that you wanted to explore a little bit about why he was just tossing out -- why you believe that he was -- this witness had not followed up on Mr. Hall's concern -- other concerns that we've identified regarding the operation of the Coffee County election system that related to the -- the data system, but -- and it being accessed, but that is something different.

And so I don't think you can restore -- this is not a viable way of proceeding, for us to be dragged down into discussing the details of this -- of the investigation into the hand-marked ballots that is referenced in his affidavit of 11/17/20. It is a little bit of a rabbit hole.

So since you don't have all the time in the world, move on to what you think -- another subject, or follow up on something else that you wanted to follow up on. BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, do you recall telling the Court on Friday
that Coffee County did not have any 2020 general election problems?
A. No, I do not recall saying that.
Q. Okay. Do you believe that Coffee County had 2020 general election problems other than -- other than the imaging of the system, do you believe there were any problems with the operation of Coffee County election systems in 2020?
A. I don't believe that their equipment had any problems. I believe they committed some violations of Georgia law that I know were identified and then an investigation was opened into them. The one I can remember, of course, is the YouTube video that Misty Hampton put out shortly after the election.

I recall there being issues. I can't recall if it was in the re-count. I believe it was in the re-count where they were -- they had to re-count all of our ballots like every other county did.

So I do recall them having issues where I don't think the people in Coffee County properly followed, you know, all applicable procedures and laws.
Q. So you are not aware, sir, are you, whether or not Coffee County had been reporting problems with their election system?
A. I'm not.

MR. OLES: Is it possible to put up PX 309? 309.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, I direct your attention to what has been
marked as PX 309 for identification.
Is this document familiar to you?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. What does it appear to be to you, sir?
A. This is a document, from what $I$ can see, on letterhead of Coffee County Board of Elections \& Registration. I can't see who it is signed by.

It seems to be signed by Eric Chaney. Okay.
Q. Do you know who Mr. Chaney was?
A. It says beneath his signature that he was a Coffee County board member.
Q. Sir, who is the letter addressed to?
A. The letter is addressed to the House Governmental Affairs Committee.
Q. And the next line?
A. Elections investigative hearing.
Q. And the next line?
A. Shaw Blackmon, chairman.
Q. And is this on particular letterhead, sir?
A. It is on the letterhead of Coffee County Board of Elections \& Registration.
Q. So does this appear to be to you a letter from the Coffee County Board of Elections to House Governmental Affairs Committee elections investigative hearing?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. OLES: Judge, I'll move to admit PX 309.
THE COURT: Are there any objections?
MR. BEDARD: I don't think Mr. Germany can authenticate the document.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?
MR. BEDARD: I don't think Mr. Germany can authenticate the document.

MR. OLES: From my understanding, this is authenticated by agreement.

THE COURT: Well, there were no objections to this in the -- I'm just --

MR. OLES: Not as to --
THE COURT: I'm just asking the Curling plaintiffs since it's their exhibit.

MR. BEDARD: I actually don't have the pretrial order in front of me, Your Honor, so --

Well, Mr. Oles is correct. We don't have an authentication objection in the PTO about this. I think we would object again to hearsay to the extent any of the truth of the matter asserted therein is --

THE COURT: Well, it is admitted -- it clearly is a letter from who it says it supposedly is. You know, whether everything is true in it is a whole other matter. But that is -- that is -- so for all -- many a document that comes in.

```
    So anyway, I'm going to admit it just simply for the
purpose of that it is a letter that was written to the House
Government Affairs Committee and signed by Mr. Chaney,
apparently on behalf of the Coffee County board or some members
of it.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, are you aware that Mr. Chaney, the signatory
of this letter, testified before the House Government Affairs
Committee on December 10th about Coffee County election
problems?
A. No.
Q. I direct your attention, please, sir, to the first paragraph of the letter.
Would you read that paragraph, please, out loud.
```

A. We want to thank the Governmental Affairs Committee for allowing the Coffee County Board of Elections to express its dilemma regarding certifying the electronic re-count performed in the November 3rd, 2020, general election. As you know, the certification process requires the election supervisor to swear under oath and under penalty of perjury that the certified votes are a true and accurate reflection of the count or re-count. In the instant case, the election supervisor of Coffee County could not honestly make such an attestation given the inherent inconsistencies existing within the electronic summary report generated by the Dominion voting system.
Q. Thank you, sir.

Now, on the top of Page 2 of the letter, Mr. Chaney refers
to an Exhibit 5.
Do you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you turn to that Exhibit 5, please.
A. I don't have a copy of this.
Q. Oh, I'm sorry, sir.

MR. OLES: May I approach, Judge?
THE COURT: I'm letting you explore this, but let me just tell you that we're 35 minutes in.

MR. OLES: I'll be quick, Judge.
THE COURT: And I'm not sure that this is relevant at all, but I'm going to let you -- for purposes of just proceeding here more efficiently, I'm going to let you at least put something in here that you want to try to elicit. I know that it is obviously not consistent with what apparently the rest of the plaintiffs believe is relevant.

But go ahead.
MR. OLES: I'll get right to it, Judge.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. I direct your attention to that Exhibit 5.

Did you find it, Mr. Germany?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what is the title on that exhibit?
A. The title is Discrepancies in the November 3rd, 2020, General Election and Re-counts.
Q. Okay. Thank you, sir.

Now, I want to take you down to the line that says
11/3/2020, election day one.
Do you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you see the total votes there, 1000 -- or 15,237 ?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you see the next line where it says 11/17/2020 hand re-count with a total votes of 15,238, which is an increase of one from the election day results.

Do you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, if I can take you down to the line that says 11/30/2020 electronic re-count. You walk over to the total votes, it says 15,127 [sic].

Sir, do you see that?
A. The one I'm looking at says 15,258 .
Q. I'm sorry. 15,258; correct.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the next column over, it says, internal delta that was an increase in 39 votes from the original.

Do you see that, sir?

```
And an increase in 40 votes from the hand re-count.
Do you see that, sir?
```

A. I think it would be the other way around, but, I mean, I see the -- I don't think what you said was exactly what this -I see it says compare three to one plus 39; compare three to two plus 40.
Q. Correct. Comparing the --

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interject. We are on a clock. I don't understand what the relevance of this is.

As I understand it, this has to do with a hand re-count and the counts coming out of the tabulators. We're not -- no one in this case is asking this Court to get rid of tabulators, scanners.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I would just like to add that the evidence further shows that in further reference, all of the numbers were reconciled within one number, and that is why the plaintiffs, including Mr. Davis, did not make an issue out of the accuracy of the Coffee County 2020 election results. And as Mr. Cross said, it has absolutely nothing to do with this case.

MR. OLES: Well, Judge, again, what we're here for, as I understand it, is the constitutionality of the system, and the system is more than simply a ballot-marking device. This system is when you walk into that voting booth to the time that
that is counted.
THE COURT: When you walk into the voting booth, what? I didn't hear the last part of it.

MR. OLES: It is from when you walk into that voting booth and select your candidate to the time your vote is actually counted. And what we're showing here is that -- or what we are attempting to show here is that there is a problem in that --

MR. CROSS: There is no --
MR. OLES: -- and that this is real evidence of a problem in Coffee County which was reported to our state legislature of problems with these counts.

THE COURT: I've allowed you to present it. I think there are -- I'm not going to go through any of the possible reasons or whatever else. But I have allowed you to because it was listed in the evidence for you to do that. But I don't think that we can go further than that at this juncture.

If there is some wrap-up question you want to ask about this, go ahead and do it. And I duly note that the plaintiffs' counsel believe -- have articulated that they believe this is a distortion of what they -- of their -- what they are trying to present here in this case. BY MR. OLES:
Q. All right. I have one more question then, Mr. Germany. On that same chart, do you see the next line down where it
says, second uploaded -- uploaded an additional 185 ballots?
A. Second uploaded 185 ballots, yes.
Q. And that there was no change to any of the results or to the total votes counted even though there were an additional 185 votes?
A. It says, no change.
Q. Okay. Mr. Germany, do you still maintain based upon this that you believe that there were no problems with the election systems in Coffee County?

MR. BEDARD: I just object to the question to the extent it is assuming the truth of what was included in that document because it was hearsay.

MR. OLES: I'll rephrase, Judge.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Mr. Germany, do you believe that based upon these reported results from the Coffee County Board of Elections \&

Registration, which they took the time and trouble to go and testify before our legislature on, that you -- that someone in the Secretary of State's office might have stopped to investigate this, sir?
A. What we saw regarding issues in 2020 was -- we saw some operator error of equipment, which is understandable given that this was the first election they had used this equipment in. We saw that especially in the primary in 2020 , but we did continue to see some in the general.
We saw some issues where counties forgot to upload certain
precincts which, fortunately, was then corrected with the audit
and then the re-count. We saw some issues where -- where
counties double-scanned certain ballots. Particularly saw that
in Fulton County.
But I wouldn't agree that we saw issues with the
equipment. I think we saw issues -- you know, the equipment
has to be utilized by people, by election officials. And the
issues that we saw were human error, and I suspect that is what
occurred in Coffee County as well.
Q. Mr. Germany, I invite you please to look at the third page
of the letter, second paragraph.
Would you read that paragraph, please.
A. Which paragraph?
Q. The second paragraph on the third page.
A. The second paragraph?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. The Coffee County Board of Elections has for many months reported various aspects of these problems to the Secretary of State, receiving no assistance in correcting these problems. As for the investigation, the Secretary of State chose not to assist us or help evaluate the root cause of the refusal to certify the election re-count, but certified the statewide election results despite our findings. The Coffee County Board of Elections took action which it believed accurately reflected
the accurate vote of its citizens and certified that vote. If it has done so erroneously, it has been done not nefariously or belligerently, but honestly, humbly, and with one goal, to certify the true vote of the citizens of Coffee County.

MR. OLES: Nothing further, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Are you reserving this witness for later on?
MR. BEDARD: Yes, Your Honor. We'll likely call him
back in our case.
THE COURT: Is there anything else that we need to deal with with this witness, subject to at this point from -the other plaintiffs' counsel respective?

MR. CROSS: Not for Curling.
MR. BROWN: Not for the Coalition.
MR. OLES: Judge, may I tender 309, please?
THE COURT: 309 is this last exhibit --
MR. OLES: Yes.
THE COURT: -- that we were discussing?
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: You admitted it.
THE COURT: I think I admitted it subject to the hearsay objections, but that it was a record that had already been agreed upon by counsel previously in connection with the pretrial order.

Sir, as it appears that defense counsel may recall you, please don't discuss your testimony with anyone else, and
you can go on with life otherwise.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, while we're waiting for
Mr. Beaver to arrive from the witness room, I just wanted to raise one issue with the Court. Mr. Knapp and I were -- I'm sorry, Mr. Persinger and I were in Mr. Knapp's office yesterday, and Mr. Persinger was given a subpoena to appear this morning. He is here. He is not on the plaintiffs' witness list, though.

I just don't want to hold him here if there is not a reason for him being here. He obviously has his employment and other things to do in a variety of cases, especially in some large Fulton County ones.

THE COURT: So he is here for -- under the plaintiffs' subpoena; is that right?

All right.
MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor. We were going to take this up later before a break. We can do it now.

THE COURT: Well, let's take it up now --
MR. CROSS: Sure.
THE COURT: -- if he is going to have to be around here when we -- if we need to know when he is --

MR. CROSS: So, Your Honor, it is a pretty discrete issue, but important. When Your Honor allowed the State to
inspect Dr. Halderman's source code, you imposed certain parameters on what they could do as a protocol, and part of that was on what they could write down and take in the notes. For example, they were not allowed to write down lines of code.

The problem we've run into is Mr. Persinger has encoded his notes deliberately. And I'm going to hand it up so Your Honor can take a look. We have asked for an explanation. We asked for them not to do it again when they did an inspection on Monday. They insisted that he do it. He did it. And so we have no ability to figure out if they have -- what he has written down and what he has taken.

Let me just hand Your Honor copies so you can see what we're talking about. The one-pager is from yesterday. And I'm not going to get into specifics of it on the record, but let me give you the second one, which is from January.

THE COURT: Are these both from the same day?
MR. CROSS: The first one you have is from yesterday. That is the -- if you look at the back of the first one I handed you, you'll see the date of yesterday, the date of January 15, the review.

If you look at the next one, which is multiple pages, that is from -- I think it was January 4th. And if we start with the one from January 4th, Your Honor, and turn to Page 2 of that, you'll see it is paper clipped. If you go to Page 2, you'll see there is a little box in the right-hand corner in
the top. And you see there's arrows there pointing in different directions in that little box, Your Honor.

Then if you go -- there's page numbers on the bottom. If you go to Page 2, you'll see another box. It has numbers, some letters. That is one aspect of the encoding. When you actually read through the substance, there are things sometimes that are written backwards, there are things that are sometimes clearly written in code.

We asked about this on January 4th because Dr. Halderman and Dr. Springall and myself were concerned that the encoding might capture things that aren't being allowed. It may be coding that captures the substance of the source code. They would not answer other than to say this is how he takes notes.

Since we were doing it again yesterday, we emailed them in advance and asked that they confirm he would not do encoded notes again and alerted them that we probably would have to raise this with Your Honor.

We view this as a willful violation of the Court's order because that protocol was specifically designed so that our experts could be assured that nothing was taken down in notes that should not be taken.

And Your Honor may recall, we took that protocol from the protocol they proposed for the GEMS database. So they can't really argue that it is unfair in any way because it was
their protocol, to begin with.
So as we are here, Your Honor, we have got a pretty serious concern because we don't know what this means, we don't know what he took with him, and they have been unwilling to share.

So the last point, why the subpoena? Because they won't answer our questions, and we thought Your Honor may want to put him on the stand and we can ask him under oath what it means.

I do want to be clear. We're not calling him in our trial. We're not going to allow this to be a back door to put him on the case in our trial, but we do need an answer from him ideally sworn, what does this mean, why did he do it, and what did he take with him?

THE COURT: So why can't you take a deposition in the
evening? Do we need to do it in court?
MR. CROSS: That is a fair idea, Your Honor. We certainly could look at that. Yesterday, we were scrambling, and that was the only thing we could think of was Your Honor may want to ask him questions.

THE COURT: Well, given the scope of my knowledge about code, which is --

MR. CROSS: Not much.
THE COURT: -- dependent on others, I'm not sure --
MR. CROSS: We're happy to do that. That is an easy
solution, Your Honor.
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, if I could just be heard briefly to respond to Mr . Cross.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TYSON: I believe, as the Court is aware,
Mr. Persinger has served as an expert in any number of cases involving federal prosecutions, state prosecutions. He is regularly reviewing software and other computer-related items.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TYSON: When there was a question when we were in Michigan regarding some of the arrows and the notes on the code, Mr. Persinger explained to everybody there was no source code in his notes, that this is his method of taking notes.

From our perspective, this has already -- and I think we have raised, you know, concerns about work product having to leave notes with the plaintiffs as it is.

In our view, requiring further disclosure of
Mr. Persinger's methods of taking notes would further disclose what we were interested in looking at, all those various pieces.

I think the only relevant question for the Court is, is there source code in these notes? Mr. Persinger has said there is not. He will say under oath there is not if he needs to say that.

I don't look at Mr. Persinger's method of taking
notes as really any different than if he took notes in shorthand or had especially bad handwriting that the plaintiffs couldn't read. This is the method by which he takes notes. He can testify to that.

So we don't think there is any basis for that. But if Your Honor wants him to say under oath that there is no source code in these documents, we're happy to have him do that or file a declaration to that effect.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, a quick follow-up on that.
The reason that is not enough is the reason the
protocol exists. Again, recall when we were asking for Dr. Halderman to inspect the GEMS database, this was their protocol. So they were not satisfied at that time with Dr. Halderman walking out of there and simply making a representation to them that he had not written down anything he was not allowed to take with him. They themselves wanted to be able to review the votes to ensure that he did not take anything with him. The protocol now is the same.

And so if all we're entitled to is for him to say he didn't take it, then reviewing the notes becomes pointless. This is a deliberate circumvention of that protocol that they created. So it is not just asking in a deposition, did you take this? It is walk us through what this means so our experts can be assured you did not take something here that you weren't allowed to take.

It is their protocol. To object to it now is disingenuous.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, just briefly on those points, I think -- I hate to take the Court's time on this. But if the scope of the deposition is going to be, you must tell us every single thing in the notes, that, $I$ think, is going to be something that is going to require Your Honor's intervention to address that just because Mr. Persinger has a method he has used from what I have -- I'm not testifying for him.

What I have discussed with him, he considers this to be a very personal and trade secret method based on how he conducts these kinds of reviews. He would talk about that in a deposition or on the stand.

But I think, again, the protocol says the reviewer must make copies of all notes taken during the review and leave a copy of those notes with plaintiffs' representative before leaving the inspection facility. There is nothing about scope of review, other pieces that go with that. My expectation would be if Dr. Halderman had utilized a similar review process for the GEMS databases, if this Court had ordered that, that I would expect him to take notes in whatever fashion he would take them.

So, again, I think we're at a point where I think the critical thing is, is there source code in these notes? And that is the issue.

THE COURT: Well, $I$ can't just -- if you want to have an examination of the -- of Mr. Persinger later on in the day or tomorrow morning before we have open court, I'll do that.

Your current anticipation is that Dr. Halderman will testify on Thursday, so we need to do it before then. I don't know how long it will take, and I also just know that there is only so much that the court reporter can -- hands can manage, so we might have to end early on something.

So why don't you-all just discuss between yourselves what will be the most convenient time. And if it is now, then we can just empty the courtroom too.

MR. TYSON: And my only concern, Your Honor, is Mr. Persinger is here right now. He doesn't have any of his equipment with him, obviously, because he had to give up his electronics. If we can send him on his way and then have him come back, he lives a little bit of a distance away.

THE COURT: That's fine. I mean, y'all just figure out a time. But since we've made for short breaks, I mean, we're just going to have to either figure out a time at the beginning or the end of the day if he wants to come back.

I mean, the truth is, there is very little traffic today, so there are some advantages of the day. And I don't know where he lives, so how far his equipment is from him.

But anyway, you-all can converse, and we'll work it out.

| MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor. |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Good morning, Your Honor. |  |
| Matthaeus Martino-Weinhardt again for the Curling pla |  |
| COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please raise your right |  |
| hand. |  |
| (Witness sworn) |  |
| COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. If you |  |
| would, state your name and spell your full name for the record, |  |
| THE WITNESS: My name is Sanford Merritt Beaver. |  |
| S-A-N-F-O-R-D, M-E-R-R-I-T-T, B-E-A-V-E-R. I go by Merritt. |  |
| Whereupon, |  |
| SANFORD MERRITT BEAVER, |  |
| after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: |  |
| CROSS-EXAMINATION |  |
| BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: |  |
| Q. Good morning, Mr. Beaver. |  |
| Mr. Beaver, you were the chief information officer or CIO |  |
| of the Secretary of State's office? |  |
| A. Yes, I was. |  |
| Q. You served as the CIO from about 2013 until the end of |  |
| last year; is that right? |  |
| A. It's | about that, yes. |

Q. But you left the Secretary's office at the end of 2023?
A. The end of '23.
Q. Was it your decision to leave?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you leave?
A. I'm 67. It is time.
Q. Fair enough.

Mr. Beaver, as the former CIO, you agree that election software should not be released to the public; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. If you released election software to the public, you would be giving potentially bad actors a roadmap how to basically get in and access the system?
A. One piece.
Q. If bad actors could get their hands on the election software, they would have a roadmap for how to get in and access a piece of the election system?
A. They would have one piece of a roadmap.
Q. Mr. Beaver, you're aware that Dr. Halderman provided a report on July 1st, 2021, in this case?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. As of February 2nd, 2022, you had not read that report; correct?
A. I don't know what the date was when $I$ finally read it.
Q. Well, Mr. Beaver, you recall you gave a deposition in this
case on February 2nd, 2022?
A. Okay. Yes.
Q. And as of that deposition on February 2nd, 2022, you had not read Dr. Halderman's report?
A. Okay. If that is what it was, yes.
Q. As of February 2nd, 2022, you stated you had never even heard of Dr. Halderman's report; right?
A. Okay.
Q. You agree with me?
A. If that was what the deposition was, yes, because it was 2022. That is two years ago, so what I specifically said I would have to read off the deposition.
Q. We can take a look at the deposition. If you go to the large binder, Mr. Beaver, and you go to Tab 1 in the large binder in front of you, that is the transcript of your February 2nd, 2022, deposition. I'll direct you to Page 155.
A. Okay.
Q. And you were asked beginning on Page 155, Line 10, question: Couple follow-up questions on that I forgot to ask. On Dr. Halderman's report, which was Exhibit 8, are you aware that that report has been sealed, meaning it's been kept confidential since it was issued on July 1?

Answer: As I said, I have never heard of that document, never seen that document, so I wouldn't know anything about how it is being managed.

Did I read that correctly?
A. Yes, you did.
Q. So, Mr. Beaver, as of your deposition on February 2nd, 2022, you hadn't heard of Dr. Halderman's report; correct?
A. It looks like, yes.
Q. And as of March 10th, 2022, a month later, you also had not, as part of your job as CIO, reviewed Dr. Halderman's report at that time; correct?
A. Okay.
Q. You agree with me?
A. If that is what it says, then yes.
Q. You have no basis to disagree that by March 2022, a month later, you had not read Dr. Halderman's report at that point in your role as CIO?
A. No, I don't disagree with that.
Q. You weren't aware that the Halderman report was available to the Secretary of State's office months before that?
A. I think I said it was not. So I was not.
Q. You're not aware that plaintiffs' counsel had asked the Court in November 2021 to make the report available to individuals at the Secretary of State's office?
A. I think I said in this I had not, and I still agree with that.
Q. Well, Mr. Beaver, you said you had never heard of that document; correct?
A. That is what this document says, and I still feel that is true.
Q. And so you agree that at that time in February 2022, you had no knowledge of how the report was being managed; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So you weren't aware that, in fact, several months before that, plaintiffs in this case had asked the Court at a hearing to make the report available to authorize that the Court be made available to individuals at the Secretary of State's office?
A. No. I think it was real clear. I had not seen it.
Q. And as of March 10th, 2022, you weren't aware of any specific security measures that the Secretary's office had implemented since July of 2021 to protect against vulnerabilities with the voting equipment; true?
A. If that is what that says, then it is true.
Q. You don't have any basis to disagree that as of March 2022, you weren't aware of any specific security measures that the Secretary's office had implemented to protect against vulnerabilities with the voting equipment; correct?

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, objection. Asked and answered.

THE COURT: Well, the witness -- I'm going to instruct the witness it is not an answer to just simply say, if that is what it says.

```
I mean, if you need to -- then as so, but -- because we need to know, have you looked at what your testimony is? And -- and if you think that is correct, then you say, I think it is correct that, whatever it was.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I have looked at the testimony. I believe that is correct.
THE COURT: And the testimony is as summarized by plaintiffs' counsel?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
```

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Thank you.

Mr. Beaver, let's talk about some of the measures the Secretary's office took during your time as CIO to try to secure the election system.

The Secretary's office, one of the things it does is hire outside firms to conduct cybersecurity assessments; right?
A. You said a very general question. You said the election systems.

Can you be specific as to what part are we talking about?
Q. Any part of the election system.

You would agree with me that one of the things the Secretary's office does is work with outside firms to conduct cybersecurity assessments; right?
A. We use outside firms -- or we did use outside firms to do
cybersecurity assessments on some of the election systems, the ones that's managed by my office.
Q. One of the firms retained by the Secretary's office to perform those cybersecurity assessments over the years was Fortalice; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. As of 2022, Fortalice was a company that the Secretary's office relied on to help with securing the election system?
A. For some of the election systems, not all.
Q. And for that reason, Fortalice was a company that the Secretary's office relied on to help with securing the election system?

THE COURT: I don't think that -- securing the election system is a much broader term. You're going to have to be a little more specific than that.

You're talking about testing, or are you talking about something else?

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: I'll ask a more specific question. BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. As of 2022, Fortalice was conducting annual cybersecurity assessments for CES, the Center for Election Services; correct?
A. No.
Q. You're saying that is not correct?
A. It is not correct.
Q. Mr. Beaver, do you recall being deposed on February 2nd, 2022, and at that deposition testifying that Fortalice is the one that does the annual cybersecurity assessments for CES?
A. Fortalice does the annual cybersecurity for all the systems for Secretary of State that we managed, which include the election registration system. CES uses data from that system, but that is not necessarily all of the CES systems.

So that is why I asked you to be specific. There are a number of systems that make up the election system. Fortalice was not responsible for a total broad assessment. They focused on the things -- the systems that the Secretary of State managed.
Q. Mr. Beaver, could you turn to Page 72 of that deposition transcript.
A. (The witness complies.)
Q. I direct you to Line 24 on Page 72 of your February 2nd, 2022, deposition transcription.

Question: You mentioned Fortalice. Is Fortalice the one --

THE COURT: Wait. I can't see Line 22.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: 24, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sorry.
Go ahead.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Tony, are you able to bring up Page 72?

THE COURT: It is up.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: You have it, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: My screen at the podium
appears to be the only one that's not working.
THE COURT: It is the bottom. I only have the last
two -- four lines.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Question: You mentioned Fortalice. Is Fortalice the one that done the annual cybersecurity assessment for CES?

Answer: In the recent years, yes.

Question: How long has Fortalice done it?
Answer: I would have to look for sure, but I would guess close to five years.

That was your testimony; correct, sir?
A. I am guessing the context of that question is being taken out of context now.
Q. That was your testimony, sir, wasn't it?
A. That is what is typed there, yes.
Q. That was your testimony under oath, same as you are here today; correct?
A. Correct.

I don't know the context of what led up to that statement. As $I$ said, Fortalice did not do all of CES; it did the parts that -- where they deal with the Secretary of State's systems
that I managed.
Q. But, sir, you don't dispute that Fortalice was conducting cybersecurity assessments of parts of CES; right?
A. No.
Q. You tried a number of different companies before Fortalice as well; right?
A. Yes.
Q. But Fortalice was the first company that you actually felt was doing a very good job; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you specifically retained Fortalice to do certain cybersecurity assessments in 2017 and 2018; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the networks that they examined for that included election-related networks; correct?
A. Fortalice was not dedicated to just elections. They did all systems for Secretary of State, which includes elections, corporations, professional licensing, securities, and all of our in-house systems, such as mail, personal storage, desktop, networks, things like that.
Q. Mr. Beaver, my question was a bit more specific than that.
A. Okay.
Q. You agree you retained Fortalice to conduct certain cybersecurity assessments in 2017 and 2018.

You are with me so far?
A. Yes.
Q. And in those assessments, the networks that they examined for that included election-related networks; true?
A. We do not have dedicated elections networks; we have networks. Our systems run on those networks. So when you say an elections network, that implies that we have specific elections networks. They test Secretary of State networks. Of those, election systems run on that, one of many systems that run on that.

So they are not elections networks. They are Secretary of State systems. I don't want to be misunderstood that they are just focused on elections. They were focused on all systems that Secretary of state manages.
Q. Mr. Beaver, do you recall testifying at a hearing in this case around July of 2019?
A. I remember being in a hearing. If it was 2019, I'm okay with that.
Q. And do you recall when asked at that hearing, the networks that Fortalice examined for that included elections-related networks; correct, sir? You answered yes?
A. Once again -- now you're using the word includes, which would say it is part of a bigger network.

MR. BOYLE: If counsel is going to refer to a transcript, could you please cite the page and let -- so Mr. Beaver can look at the transcript.

```
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Certainly.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
```

Q. If you look at your smaller binder, Tab 3, this is a portion of the transcript from the July 25th, 2019, hearing with this Court.

On Page 29, beginning on Line 16, and states, question: You retained a company called Fortalice to do cybersecurity assessments in 2017 and 2018; right?

Answer: Yes.
Question: And the networks that they examined for that included elections-related networks; correct, sir?

Answer: Yes.
Do you recall providing that testimony?
A. Yes, that's true. And this speaks to exactly what I'm saying. It includes. It is not an elections network. It includes. Elections is part of it.
Q. And to be clear, Mr. Beaver, I was asking you exactly the same question.
A. Okay. It didn't sound like that to me.
Q. Mr. Beaver, what networks -- what election-related networks interact with -- sorry, withdrawn. Let me ask it differently.

What networks interact with Georgia's election networks?
You referred to networks that interact with Georgia's elections networks.
A. So Georgia Secretary of State has a network environment that covers the capitol, the Twin Tower building, we had two data centers, and we have Macon.
Q. What was the last one?
A. Macon. Macon, Georgia.

So those are the campuses where we have networks. And from anywhere in those networks, you can get on the Secretary of State's network, and so we manage all of those under one umbrella.
Q. Turning to the first of the Fortalice cybersecurity assessments, Fortalice conducted a cybersecurity assessment in October of 2017; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if you could turn to Exhibit 18. That is at Tab 8 in the small binder.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you have that?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. And the cover says, Office of the Georgia Secretary of State Cyber Risk Assessment October 2017.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you just briefly flip to the next page, towards the top, it says, Merritt Beaver, chief information officer, Georgia Secretary of State.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. That is you?
A. Yep.
Q. You recognize this as the report that Fortalice provided of its October 2017 cybersecurity assessment?
A. Yes.
Q. And you requested this assessment on behalf of the Secretary's office?
A. Yes, I did.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: We offer Exhibit 18.
MR. BOYLE: No objections, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, if you could turn to Page 13 of 69, you see the header that says Security Risks and Recommendations.

Mr. Beaver, do you see that?
A. No, I don't.
Q. In blue?
A. On Page 18 -- oh, you said 18?
Q. Page 13 of 69.
A. Mine says lack of two-factor authentication.
Q. At Tab 8?
A. In Tab 8.
Q. To be clear, I'm referring to the page numbers at the
bottom of the page.
A. That's what I'm looking at, Page 13.
Q. Do you see it on your screen, Mr. Beaver?
A. Yeah. That is not the page I'm looking at.
Q. Perhaps we can refer to the screen. I have Security Risks and Recommendations.
A. Okay.

MR. BOYLE: Counsel, I think you're referring to the
Bates number, but page number is different. Maybe that is causing the problem.

THE COURT: So you are --
THE WITNESS: That is Page 11.
THE COURT: On the bottom?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Right. I'm referring to the page number at the very bottom where it says Curling Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18, Page 13 of 69.

I realize there's a lot of different page numbers on this.

THE WITNESS: I'm with you.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. And you see at the top in blue the header Security Risks and Recommendations?
A. Yes.
Q. And underneath that, it says, based on the analysis from this engagement, the Cloudburst Security team uncovered the
following 22 risks.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then it lists them?
A. Yes.
Q. So in this October 2017 assessment, Fortalice identified 22 cybersecurity risks?
A. Yes.
Q. Number 10 reads, lack of security controls for PCC, Inc.
A. Yes.
Q. And that corresponds to the security risks with the voter registration database; right?
A. I would have to go look.
Q. Do you recall, sir, that PCC Technology at the time was the vendor that ran the voter registration system?
A. They also ran the corporations system, so a reference as just PCC could be corporations.
Q. If you flip to Page 23 of 69 of Curling Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18, and it says at the top, lack of security controls for PCC, Inc., and under the description it starts with eNet Georgia's voter registration database is owned, operated, and maintained by third-party provider known as PCC Technology, Inc.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. So you would agree with me that this risk analyzed in this report relates to the voter registration database; correct?
A. It looks like it does.
Q. So part of the scope of this October 2017 assessment was the security of the voter registration database; fair?
A. Okay. It is one of many. It is one of the things they identified. We didn't target any system. It is up to Fortalice to find things.
Q. Right. In this October 2017 assessment --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the voter registration database was within the scope of what Fortalice assessed?
A. Yes.

And when you say database, they are speaking to the application that manages the database, not the actual database itself. They write the application that collects the data to put it in the database. So it is the application that PCC writes. So they never store the database itself. That is something that the Secretary of State stored.
Q. But through that application from PCC, that is something that you used to gain access to data that is maintained in the voter registration database; true?
A. Through the application that PCC wrote, we use that to manage the data that is in the database.
Q. So access to Georgia's voter registration database was
within the scope of what Fortalice was assessing back in October 2017 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- right?
A. Yes.
Q. If we could turn to Page 5 of 69 of Exhibit 18. And you see here the colorful grid that is titled Risk Heat Map.

Do you see that?
A. I haven't got there yet.

THE COURT: Remind me what page this is. MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: This is Page 5 of 69 -THE COURT: Thank you. MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: -- at the very bottom of the page. THE WITNESS: Okay.

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. And this colorful grid here is titled the Risk Heat Map; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the horizontal axis at the bottom lists severity from one being insignificant to four being significant; right?
A. Right.
Q. And here, there are seven risks listed as significant?
A. Yes.
Q. And then three risks listed as medium severity?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Beaver, if we could turn to Tab 9 of that binder. This is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17.
A. Uh-huh (affirmative.)
Q. Do you recognize this as a report prepared by Fortalice for its February 2018 cybersecurity assessment?
A. Yes.
Q. And you also requested Fortalice to conduct this assessment?
A. Yes.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: We offer Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 17.
MR. BOYLE: No objections, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm sorry.
Where is it?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: This is at Tab 9, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you.

It is admitted.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. If we could go to Page 8 of 33, again using the page numbers at the very bottom. Curling Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17, Page 8 of 33.

Are you there?
A. Yep.
Q. And here again at the top it says Security Risks and

Recommendations?
A. Yes.
Q. And it says, based on the analysis from this engagement, the Cloudburst Security team uncovered the following 15 risks.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So in February 2018, in its assessment, Fortalice identified 15 cybersecurity risks?
A. Yes.
Q. If you could turn to Page 3 of this report, to Page 3 of
33. And at the top, it refers to PCC Technology again.

Do you see that?
A. Page 3 of 33?
Q. Correct.
A. Mine says executive summary.
Q. Right. And below that it says, between November 2017 and February 2018, Cloudburst Security and Fortalice Solutions -Cloudburst Security team conducted a vendor cyber risk assessment on PCC Technology, Inc.

And then it continues.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. PCC Technology, as we were talking about, that was the vendor that, among other things, operated the voter
registration database or the application, I think, they

```
operated --
```

A. No, they did not operate it.
Q. PCC Technology provided the application through which you would access the voter registration?
A. They wrote the application.
Q. So as in November 2017, this February 2018 assessment again examined the security of access to the voter registration database?
A. Yes.

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, at this point we would object to any further questions about voter registration, which is not an issue in the case. Counsel has asked several questions about it already.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Your Honor, it goes generally to the cybersecurity practices of the Secretary's office, as well as credibility, as will become clear.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allow you to proceed at this juncture, but let's not get too far into the weeds. But that is fine.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I understand there is relevance to the security risks as a whole.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: That's right, Your Honor.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, if you could turn to Tab 10.
A. Is there a question in these, or are we just looking at pages?
Q. I have some questions --
A. Okay. Just checking.
Q. -- if you could turn to Tab 10.
A. I'm there.
Q. This is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 95.

Do you recognize this as a report prepared by Fortalice for a November 2018 cybersecurity assessment?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And as with the others, you requested that Fortalice conduct this assessment?
A. Yes, I did.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: We offer Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 95.
MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, we have several objections in the pretrial order which I will restate.

We object to this document as not authenticated, that it is relevant, that it would violate Rule 403 as confusing or a waste of time, and that portions of it are hearsay.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Your Honor, the witness just authenticated it. It is relevant to the cybersecurity practices of the Secretary's office. This is bench trial, so Rule 403 isn't a concern here.

THE COURT: It is admitted.

```
            I will note that this was also the subject of prior
hearings and findings as well, just for the record.
                        All right.
            MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, if you could turn to Page 5 of 50 in Curling
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 95.
A. Yes.
Q. And do you see a number of bullet points on that page?
A. Yes.
Q. And the first bullet point says there are 20 recommendations of which 14 are low to no cost?
A. I see that, yes.
Q. So in November of 2018, Fortalice made 20 additional cybersecurity recommendations; right?
```

A. Yes. Every year.
Q. 14 of those were categorized as low to no cost?
A. Yes.

I had a standing. If my assessment company doesn't find something, I don't use them again.
Q. And why is that?
A. They are not doing their job.
Q. Can you explain what you mean by that?
A. Okay. So we're talking about IT here, IT and security. IT is made up of many applications that change daily. The
compatibility of applications changes every time something changes. That is why you have to look every year to see if some compatibility has changed.

I expect my security companies to find where those incompatibilities are so we know what to work on. Some things may not have been an issue last year and are an issue this year.

The recommendations they make tell us their basic cookbook solution on how to solve it. That doesn't necessarily mean the Secretary of State will use that cookbook because it may also be in conflict with another system. So mitigation is what you -- I look at. I looked at is, I see a list, how do we mitigate them?

Next year they may come back and say, oh, two of these are still on here. That is right. But we mitigated them differently than they suggested because some -- the issue that is causing it may be something we have to live with because the system won't work without that. The important part of cybersecurity is mitigating. You don't ever get rid of all of the problems. That is IT.

So looking at lists of numbers tells me they are doing their job. They are helping me find where I need to focus. Q. The job of Fortalice is to identify the vulnerabilities; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So if you could turn to Page 8 of 50 in this exhibit, still Exhibit 95, and it lists here 2017, top ten risks status in 2018.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And the last sentence of that paragraph reads, of the top ten risks from the 2017 report, three were not tested during 2018 assessment, three were remediated in the past year with compensating controls, and three remain unresolved.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So Fortalice determined in November 2018 that three of the top ten risks identified a year earlier had been remediated?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. Correct?
A. That's what it says, yes.
Q. But in this November 2018 assessment, Mr. Beaver, unlike the two prior assessments we looked at, Fortalice did not look at PCC; correct?
A. It doesn't look like it, no.
Q. So Fortalice, in November of 2018 , did not reexamine access to the voter registration system; right?
A. That is incorrect.
Q. Well, nothing in this report, Mr. Beaver, indicates that the vulnerabilities identified with respect to PCC in October
of 2017 and February 2018 were remediated; right?
A. It doesn't reference any of that, so you're making an assumption. So I would say the answer is no.
Q. Well, Mr. Beaver, you put PCC outside of the scope of this November 2018 assessment; correct?
A. I had Fortalice look at our network system IT environment. We did that every year. Some years they brought in information about PCC if it needed to be raised; other years they didn't if it didn't need to be raised. I can -- since I don't have the details behind how they picked these ten, I can't speak to why PCC was not included in this. I can only assume that it didn't raise its head high enough to be in the ten.
Q. Mr. Beaver, that is not correct, is it?
A. Why do you say that?
Q. You recall that you put PCC outside of the scope of the November 2018 assessment; right? That was your decision?
A. I don't recall saying that.
Q. If we could go to Tab 3, the transcript from the July 2019 hearing in this case at Page 40.
A. Which book?
Q. It is the small binder, Tab 3.
A. Tab 3 .
Q. Page 40, beginning at Line 2.
A. What page? Page 40?
Q. Correct.
A. Line 2.
Q. And here you were asked, question: In the November 2018 assessment, Fortalice did not look at PCC at all again; right?

Do you remember you put that outside of scope?
Answer: Yes. It is a different data center.
Did I read that correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. That was your testimony; right, Mr. Beaver?
A. Okay.
Q. Right, Mr. Beaver?
A. Yes.
Q. So you put that outside of scope; correct?
A. When you say put it out of scope, I didn't define it as out. I just defined what was in scope for them for work on, which was our data centers.
Q. And that did not include PCC?
A. Did not include the PCC one that you're talking about. Q. Now, moving on from 2018, in 2019, the Secretary's office engaged Fortalice to conduct a security assessment of the BMDs which were beginning to roll out; correct?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Now, the security assessment of BMDs, that was conducted under your standard contract with Fortalice?
A. Was it -- I missed the question.
Q. That security assessment of the BMDs, that was conducted
under your standard contract you had with Fortalice?
A. Every event that or every activity, we did a separate contract, so that was a separate ask. So if that is what you're asking, yes, we asked them specifically, separately to do that.
Q. But it fell within your one standard contract that you had with Fortalice; right?
A. We didn't have just one contract. Every year we had to write another contract.
Q. Well, you would agree with me there was not a separate contract covering Fortalice's review of the BMDs?
A. I don't have memory of the contracting for that.
Q. If you could turn to Page -- sorry, to Tab 13 in your binder.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Tony, if we could have
Exhibit 591 in evidence.
THE COURT: I'm sorry.
Did you say it was 14 ?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: 13.
THE COURT: 13. Okay.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Do you see here this is a State defendants' notice of filing Fortalice contract? Do you see that, Mr. Beaver?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you turn to the second page, Paragraph 3, it states
there is not a separate contract covering Fortalice's review of the BMDs.
A. Okay.
Q. You have no basis to disagree with that; correct?
A. As I said, I don't recall the contracting around Fortalice for this.
Q. Right. So you have no basis to disagree that there was not a separate contract covering Fortalice's review of the BMDs; right?
A. Apparently, it is not.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: If we could bring up Tab 12.
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. If you could turn to Tab 12. This is Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 590 in evidence.
A. Yes.
Q. And directing your attention to Page 2 towards the bottom where it says from Mike Holland.

Do you see that?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes.
Q. So this is an email from Mike Holland sent on Thursday, September 12th, 2019?
A. Yes.
Q. Mike Holland worked at Fortalice?
A. Yes.
Q. And this email is sent to you, Merritt Beaver, as well as

Clark Rainer.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Clark Rainer, he worked for you at the time; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And it copies Paul Brandau at FortaliceSolutions.com.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So the people on this thread are either individuals at Fortalice or -- as well as you and someone working for you at the IT group at the Secretary's office?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you go to the next page, Page 3, it states at the top, the Fortalice team is excited to begin our review of the voting machines now located at SOS GA building in Atlanta?
A. Yes.
Q. And I would like you to -- direct you to the bulleted list below that, the fourth major bullet down that says for on-site at SOS GA.

And that refers to on-site work at the Secretary of State's office in Atlanta?
A. Not necessarily, but it would be one of our campuses.
Q. And the second sub bullet there says on-site work at SOS on Monday and Tuesday, 7 and 8 October; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Understand the physical hardware and the voting process with hands-on machines; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And consider how bad actors might attack the process or the systems in play for an election and tabulation of results from that election; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And below the bulleted list, it says Matt Shirley works for Paul Brandau on our offensive cyber team. Matt is the right person for us to deploy on the review of the machines. He is our best device expert.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So Fortalice was sending their best device expert to determine how bad actors might attack BMDs; right?
A. That is what it says.
Q. And part of Fortalice's 2019 assessment of BMDs was essentially a white hat hacker project; right?
A. I wouldn't necessarily say it was a white hat. We were giving them access. But they did both white hat, they did red hat.

So it doesn't state in here what the ground rules were going to be when he did the assessments --
Q. Part of this --
A. -- making an assumption saying it is a white hat.
Q. Part of Fortalice's 2019 assessment of the BMDs was to attempt to hack a BMD; right?
A. Yes, to assess them. Yes.
Q. And if you turn to Page 1 of Exhibit 590, I'm directing your attention to the email at the top.
A. Page 1.

Yes.
Q. This is an email from you; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. To Mike Holland at Fortalice Solutions?
A. Yes.
Q. And then it copies a number of other people?
A. Yes.
Q. And you wrote, can we get this planning to look at the voting equipment? Gabe has asked for a specific look at the iPad-based pollbooks.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Gabe refers to Gabe Sterling of the Secretary of State's office?
A. Correct.
Q. So Mr. Sterling had also asked for Fortalice to examine the iPad-based pollbooks?
A. That is what it says, yes.
Q. So basically to assess the security of the BMDs and the
system in which they are placed, Fortalice was also going to examine the Poll Pads; right?
A. It doesn't say anything on here about BMDs. It just says Poll Pads, so I don't know -- you pulled in BMDs in that statement. It doesn't say that, that I see, unless I misread it.

So I can say that this asked them to look at Poll Pads.
Q. But the greater context of this project, as we discussed, was a 2019 assessment of the BMDs; right?
A. That is what that other document said. This email talks about Poll Pads.
Q. And this email is following on to the thread with that other email; right?
A. This was four years ago. I honestly don't know.
Q. Mr. Beaver, you agree with me on the basics that in 2019, the Secretary of State's office had Fortalice assess the security of BMDs --
A. Yes.
Q. -- correct?

And one aspect of that assessment was to attempt to hack the BMDs; right?
A. They were looking for the security risks of the BMD.
Q. And, sir, in 2019, Fortalice was able to successfully hack
a BMD; isn't that right?
MR. BOYLE: Objection, Your Honor. We object on the
basis of work product. I believe this came up before with 858 and it was sustained. We reiterate that objection.

THE COURT: I frankly don't know what it was, so if you are wanting to discuss that in camera or you want to come on up here, you can, but I don't recall that one way or the other.

MR. CROSS: What exhibit are you talking about? There has not been a work product objection.

MR. MILLER: Docket 858 is the --
MR. RUSSO: In discovery.
MR. MILLER: It is the order that ended up allowing the Fulton County equipment to be reviewed, and the November Fortalice report was also at issue in that order. And the Court says that that -- that is work product.

MR. RUSSO: That is 858, Your Honor.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, the -- when Your Honor entered that ruling, you relied on testimony from Mr. Germany where he testified that this was done -- that this assessment was done at his direction.

Where is his declaration?
And what we've heard now in this case in trial under oath, he doesn't remember this at all because he said he wasn't involved. He said he had nothing to do with this project. We examined him on this. He said it was done for a normal cybersecurity assessment, and it was done by Mr. Beaver at

Mr. Beaver's direction.
Mr. Beaver has now also confirmed that this was done under the normal contract, a normal cybersecurity assessment. There is absolutely no foundation to treat this as privileged. All the evidence in the record shows that this was a normal cybersecurity assessment that they withheld as privileged but is not privileged. And what Mr. Germany testified under oath is not consistent with what he represented and what Your Honor relied on.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CROSS: And let me just -- I have his declaration. This is at Docket Number 838-5. He says that the Robbins Firm and the Taylor English law firms, their outside counsel, directed him to engage Fortalice in a review of the BMD system and Poll Pads to assess that equipment for the purpose of litigation and allegations of vulnerabilities with that equipment. I then directed other SOS staff to engage Fortalice for that purpose. And he then claims that the report that came out of it is attorney-client privilege.

I actually don't even see a work product claim from him here in his declaration. The live testimony under cross-examination directly refutes that, as does Mr. Beaver. What it appears is that he got an assessment that went really poorly for them in 2019, they hid it behind a claim of privilege, and that has now been laid bare. We're entitled to
know, was the system hacked, and have they known that since 2019?

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, I believe you have already covered this. Mr. Cross referred to Docket 838, and that was -- that was our objection to this request.

But then in your order at 858 where you were considering the defendants' work product objection -- I'm looking at Page 3 of your order -- the Court has reviewed the November 27, 2019, report prepared by Fortalice entitled Voting Process Analysis.

The State defendants' objection to the production of the Fortalice report --

THE COURT: Can you speak a little louder?
MR. BOYLE: Yes, ma'am.
And the Curling Plaintiffs' notice of authority regarding work product protection based on the information before the Court appears -- as it appears that the Fortalice report falls within the protection afforded by attorney work product doctrine. Although the Secretary of State has an existing contract with Fortalice for the performance of cybersecurity services and has prepared reports that have been produced as evidence in this case previously, the Court cannot find that the analysis of the BMD system undertaken at the direction of counsel in response to plaintiffs' claims would have been prepared in substantially similar form, absent
plaintiffs' bringing their challenge to the BMDs in this litigation.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me look at it when we take a break.

MR. BOYLE: All right.
THE COURT: I don't think $I$ can do that on the spur of the moment. I didn't know this was an issue.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, the one thing, just briefly, is while he is reading the order, the key language is, based on the information before the Court.

THE COURT: I understand your position.
MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That's why I said I need to look at it.
I'm not going to just reflexively rule.
Can you move on with other matters, or do you want
to --
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Yeah, I can cover other matters.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then when we take a lunch break, I'll look at it.

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, you're aware that around August of 2019, this Court issued an order in this case preventing further use of

DREs in 2020?
A. I have read that.
Q. Are you aware that in that order, the Court discussed the three Fortalice reports from 2017 and 2018 we were looking at?
A. No, I don't know that.
Q. Sir, after the Court issued its August 2019 order, Fortalice stopped providing reports in writing; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's because you directed Fortalice to stop providing written reports?
A. That's correct.
Q. Why did you direct Fortalice to stop putting their findings in writing?
A. I am in charge over it, charged for security for Secretary of State. Whenever we identify that we have a security problem, it is my responsibility to find a way to mitigate it.

Because of open records and other types of litigation, our reports were being released to the public, which goes against our security guidelines, and so we had to mitigate. Q. Sir, do you recall stating that you directed Fortalice to stop putting their findings in writing because they were being taken out of context by the public?
A. I don't know. I don't recall saying that.
Q. If you could turn to Tab 1 in the larger binder, your February 2nd, 2022, deposition, Page 71, beginning on Line 18.

You were asked, okay, the cybersecurity assessment for CES that is done annually, is that -- is there a written report of that?

Answer: We don't do written reports now.
Question: When you say now, when did that -- when did that start?

Answer: The last two years.
Question: Why are there no written reports of cybersecurity assessments for the Secretary's office as of the last two years?

There was an objection.
Question: You can answer it. Do you know why?
Answer: Yes. They are taken out of context by the public.
A. Okay. So apparently, I said that.
Q. Sir, when you refer to the Fortalice reports being taken out of context by the public, were you referring to the Court in this case that enjoined the use of DREs?
A. It is a general statement. I don't know that I had a specific one in mind.
Q. Now, after you instructed Fortalice to stop putting their findings in writing, is it your testimony that in 2020, nothing was raised to you coming out of Fortalice's assessment in that year?
A. I don't know. I don't remember. I would have to look to
see what came out of the assessment in 2020. That was COVID year, and it could be that we didn't do an assessment during COVID year. I don't recall.
Q. If you could turn to Page 80 of your deposition, we can take a look.
A. Page 81?
Q. Page 81. Page 81.
A. Okay.

Q On Line 2, question: Okay. Do you recall any significant concerns?

MR. BOYLE: Objection, Your Honor. Is this
impeachment or refreshing recollection? If it is refreshing recollection, he doesn't need to read it into the record.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: This is a bench trial, Your Honor. We have had a little bit of latitude with the procedure in that regard.

THE COURT: What are you trying to do? I'm sorry.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Direct the witness to his testimony about the 2020 assessment done by Fortalice.

THE COURT: Do you need to be citing it -- reading it to him, or can you ask him a question?

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: I can ask a question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then if he can't recall, then you can go back.

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, in 2020 -- let me ask it differently.

Is your testimony that in 2020 nothing was raised to you coming out of Fortalice's assessment; correct?
A. Is that what it says here?
Q. You can take a look.
A. What page are you looking at?
Q. Page 81, Line 2.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you see it says, question: Do you recall any significant concerns or any significant findings --
A. And my answer was --
Q. -- or recommendations coming out of the 2020 assessment?

And your answer was, nothing was raised to me; correct?
A. That is what it says, and $I$ have no reason to change that.
Q. And the same is true in 2021; correct? Nothing was raised to you coming out of the 2021 Fortalice assessment?
A. Nothing -- I said nothing was raised to me.
Q. So it is your testimony that in 2020 and in 2021, nothing was raised to you coming out of Fortalice's assessments; right?
A. That is what I said; correct.
Q. Even though in 2017 and 2018 and 2019, Fortalice was conducting assessments and identified over ten vulnerabilities in each of those years; right?
A. That doesn't mean there weren't things that came up. This
asked me if anything was raised to me. I have staff that deal with security issues. If the issues that came up were things they could solve that didn't need me, it wouldn't be raised to me.

You are making a big jump saying that there was nothing assessed. I'm telling you I have staff that handles things for me. So in those two years, nothing reached me that needed my guidance.
Q. And there is no written reports to reflect Fortalice's findings in those years in 2020 and 2021; correct?
A. I think we already stated that, yes. Correct.
Q. All right. Mr. Beaver, do you recall then on a different subject, in 2018, you provided a declaration in this case?
A. Okay. If there is one here, then the answer would be yes. THE COURT: I'm sorry?

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. If you could turn to Tab 4 in your binder.
A. The little binder?
Q. Yes.

You see on the cover it says Declaration of Merritt
Beaver?
A. Yes.
Q. And at the top the stamps indicate this was filed with the court; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you flip to the last page of this declaration, Page 4, going by the page numbers on the bottom, that is your signature; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you executed this under penalty of perjury; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And on the previous page, Page 3 of this declaration, directing your attention to about the middle of the page.

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, I object to this line of questioning. If counsel wants to ask Mr. Beaver questions, he can certainly do that. He doesn't get to just read from his declaration.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: I'm getting to the question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Ask the question without -straightforwardly then. If you have to reference the affidavit, okay, but let's ask the question first.

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, in 2018, you declared under oath to the Court that the Secretary of State's office conducted regular cyber assessments with penetration testing; right?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. But you omitted the fact that Fortalice had actually successfully obtained full administrator access through their penetration testing; right?
A. Is that what this one says?

I don't know what year that happened. I know one year they were able to do penetration testing and were able to access some of our systems.
Q. And that wasn't referenced in your declaration to the Court in 2018, was it?
A. That wasn't, you are asking?
Q. Correct.
A. I don't know. When you say, that wasn't, it doesn't look like -- if it is not in here, then it isn't.
Q. Right. So you don't disagree that in your declaration to the Court in 2018, you referenced penetration testing but not the fact that, in fact, the penetration testing had been successful; right?
A. I don't think we got into a discussion about it. We just said we did penetration testing. We do lots of different kinds of testing. I'm confused with your -- is there -- what is the question?
Q. I can ask you another question.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Tony, actually, if we can go to Exhibit 18 at Page 42.

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. This is the October 2017 Fortalice report again.
A. What tab?
Q. That is at Tab 8, just so we can be specific what we're
talking about.
A. 18 -- 18 of 69?
Q. That's Exhibit 18, Page 42.
A. Yes.
Q. October 2017, Fortalice successfully obtained domain administrator rights on the GA SOS network; right?
A. Yes.
Q. They were able to identify sensitive data; correct?
A. I don't know that it says that.
Q. The Cloudburst Security team used the obtained credentials to identify sensitive data.

That is what it says in this report; right?
A. I didn't see that on there. This is an old, old report, so I don't recall the words.
Q. Fortalice, in October 2017, was able to gain access to network security systems; correct?
A. That is what it says.
Q. And Fortalice was able to review the enterprise architecture and system configurations; correct?
A. That is what it says.
Q. In July 2019 --
A. Is there a question for this?

We seem to be reading documents rather than asking questions.

THE COURT: I appreciate your concern, but I think
that is an objection your counsel has to make and he has made, actually, so just be sure that you are asking a question.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Certainly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But I instruct the witness it is not for you to be objecting on behalf of your counsel who has properly made an objection before. BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, in July 2019, you again provided a declaration to the Court in which you refer to penetration testing but omitted the fact that, in fact, Fortalice had successfully penetrated the Secretary of State's network; correct?
A. I don't think in 2019 they were successful.
Q. In 2019, you again referenced penetration testing in a declaration to the Court, but had left out that at any point Fortalice had successfully penetrated the Secretary of State's system; correct?
A. As I said, we were referencing 2019. We don't go back and talk about history of what we did years and years ago. Technology changes, so something that you could do two or three years ago, you fixed, and you can't do it anymore.

So we don't report old history. When we do assessments, we're looking at today. What's our issues today?
Q. So you never referenced successful penetration to the Court because that was old history; is that right?
A. No, that is not true. We didn't reference it because it
wasn't context of what the declaration was about.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: No further questions at this time.

THE COURT: I'm going to -- I'm putting a pin in your examination regarding the issue of -- the attorney-client privilege was previously asserted on, so assuming you can ask the questions if I rule in your favor, and if not, then you're done with that.

MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Mr. Beaver, my name is Bruce Brown. I represent the Coalition plaintiffs.

Are you aware that on or about February 26, 2021, just several weeks after the breaches in Coffee County, Fortalice sent the Secretary of State a security incident analysis tool?
A. I am not -- I don't recall that. I wouldn't be surprised if that happened, but I don't recall it. That was 2021.
Q. Do you recall Fortalice ever sending your office a security incident analysis tool?
A. I couldn't swear to it.
Q. Do you recall that happening?
A. No, I don't recall it. It doesn't mean it didn't happen. I just don't recall it.
Q. Do you know what might have prompted the Secretary of State to request Fortalice to send the Secretary of State a security incident analysis tool in February 2021?
A. I would have needed to know the context that would have driven that.
Q. The context is it was three weeks after the Coffee County breach.
A. Okay.

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, I object to these questions as assuming facts not in evidence.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I can't comment because I don't recall.

THE COURT: Well, I think that the questions are -the fact is a breach did occur then, and that is an adequate -and I don't think anyone has actually now -- whether or not the Secretary of State's office acknowledges that it did or didn't know about it at that time is a different issue. But -- but in reality, there was a breach at that time. There is a prosecution going on about that time. There is endless depositions in this case about that. So I don't -- I think that the question is appropriate.

And I'm sorry to have interrupted the flow, so you can ask the question again.

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor.

BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Mr. Beaver, the context of the question -- let me back up a little bit.

Are you aware that the Secretary of State's lawyers in this case have refused to produce a .bat file? Do you know what a .bat file is?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is it?
A. A .bat file is basically a file that defines the structure of a hard drive.
Q. And a .bat file is one that is a description of the file "dot" B-A-T; correct?
A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.) Oh, that was what you're talking about. Okay. Yeah. Now I know what you are talking about, yes.
Q. What is that type of file?
A. That is typically a text-type file that inside of it you can script something to run on the computer if you run the .bat file.
Q. Sometimes for repetitive tasks --
A. Yes.
Q. -- correct?

Are you aware that on February 26, 2001 [sic], that Fortalice sent to the Secretary of State a tool that is used to triage an incident for security purposes? Do you recall that?
A. No.
Q. You don't recall anything about that?
A. It might have happened, but I -- as I said, it is so long ago, I don't know the details of what happened then.

MR. CROSS: Bruce, you said 2001.
MR. BROWN: I meant 2021.
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Do you recall Fortalice sending the Secretary of State a tool in a .bat file?
A. I don't. It could have happened, as I said, but I don't recall it.
Q. Do you recall your office ever using a security incident analysis tool that you received from Fortalice?
A. I don't -- I could not say that I recall that.
Q. You could not say?
A. No. It may have happened, but I don't have recollection of any details about it.
Q. How about generally?
A. If we needed something like that, we might have gone to Fortalice to help us. They did that kind of work for us.

But specifically this, I have no recollection of it happening, so $I$ couldn't honestly speak to it.

MR. BROWN: May I approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yep. Yes. Excuse me.
MR. BROWN: Let me hand to you what has been marked
as Curling 127.
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. For the record, Curling Exhibit 127 is a multipage document. The first page of it is entitled Fortalice Solutions

Incident Response: Evidence Collection Process Windows
Operating Systems dated February 26, 2021.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen that document before?
A. No.
Q. Did Fortalice send this to you, to the best of your knowledge, or to your office?
A. To the best of my knowledge, no.
Q. Pardon me?
A. To the best of my knowledge, no. I don't remember this document.
Q. Do you recall this document accompanying --
A. I don't have any -- any knowledge of this document that I remember.

I believe you said this is Coffee County?
Q. I did not. I was asking you if you recognize this document.
A. No. This is about Coffee County?
Q. I did not say that.

Was it?
A. Oh, I don't know. I thought that is what I heard you say.
Q. Why did you think about Coffee County?
A. Because I thought you just said Coffee County.
Q. Okay. Mr. Beaver, when was the first that you learned of the breaches to the Coffee County election equipment in January of 2021?
A. So Secretary of State's CIO -- that is me -- does not manage county infrastructure.
Q. That is interesting, but not remotely responsive.

Will you answer my question?
A. So it was nobody --
Q. I asked you when.
A. I have no recollection when $I$ would have heard about it.
Q. You don't know -- so it could have been February 26, 2021?
A. I don't even know that I could tell you anything about it.
Q. So --
A. I don't recall the event.
Q. Did you ever learn about the event?
A. As I said, I do not recall anything about the event that -- whatever the event is that you're talking about.
Q. So no one informed you as the chief information officer of the Secretary of State about --
A. If the --
Q. -- about the breaches in Coffee County ever?
A. It was never raised to my attention to do something about
it. It may have come up in a conversation because it was on some news feed. But as the Secretary of State's CIO, it does not fall under my responsibility, so I would not have been involved.

MR. BROWN: No further questions. Well, let me
check -- Your Honor, let me check with my --
THE COURT: Were you trying to bring 127?
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, 127 was produced by

Fortalice.
THE COURT: Right. And are you trying to introduce it but just not through this witness because he says he doesn't recall it?

MR. BROWN: He can't authenticate -- he says --
THE COURT: So you are going to do it later on; is
that right?
MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)

MR. BROWN: Just one more -- one and a half or two
more questions.
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Did you ever communicate with Fortalice about the Coffee County breaches?
A. No, not to my recollection.

MR. BOYLE: I just have a few questions if it is my
turn, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yes.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BOYLE:
Q. Mr. Beaver, good afternoon.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. You were asked about networks in the Secretary of State's office that interact with Georgia's election networks.

Do you recall those questions from plaintiffs' counsel?
A. Correct.
Q. All right. Does every network in the Secretary of State's office interact with election-specific networks?
A. No. We do have some dedicated networks that are just for election use, but the vast majority are a common network.
Q. You were asked about PCC in the voter registration database.

Do you recall those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. Is PCC still involved in the operation of the voter registration database?
A. No, they are not.
Q. What company fulfills that function now?
A. Well, it is -- MTX wrote the application, and it runs on top of a Salesforce platform.
Q. Okay. Is Fortalice still a vendor for cybersecurity at the Secretary's office?
A. No, it is not.
Q. What vendor does the State rely on now for security of Dominion voting machines?
A. Before the Breach.
Q. Now, what vendor does the State rely on for security of Dominion voting machines?
A. When you say vendor -- well, Dominion -- restate that question, please.
Q. Okay. Does the State itself take care of security of the Dominion voting machines or rely on someone else?
A. I thought that is what you were trying to ask. No.
Q. And on whom does the State rely?
A. That falls on Dominion. We have vended that out to Dominion.

MR. BOYLE: Thank you.
THE COURT: I'm sorry.
Is this rebuttal?
MR. OLES: Judge, counsel got up before I had an
opportunity to --
THE COURT: Well, if you're going to want to ask
questions in the future, you've got to be faster.
MR. OLES: Yes --
THE COURT: I'll let you do this, but let me ask you a few questions first.

## EXAMINATION

BY THE COURT:
Q. When did you stop using Fortalice for review of your security systems?
A. I don't have the exact date, but it was sometime, I think, ' 20 or ' 21 . It might have been ' 22 , but it was in that window.
Q. And was there a reason at that time for the termination?
A. They decided they were going to go work with other companies.
Q. Are you able to ascertain that and provide that information?

I realize you are no longer with the Secretary of State's office, but I would appreciate if I could get an actual date from the State -- State's counsel then.

MR. BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT:
Q. If you were there still, I would get you to go call up, but you're not.

What was your last date of employment with the Secretary of State's office as CIO?
A. December 31st.
Q. Of '23?
A. '23.
Q. That is what I thought.

But -- and as I understand it, you were working at least
some period of time in two capacities, one as the chief
information officer for the Secretary of State's office and one for a different agency in the State?
A. That's correct.
Q. And which agency was that?
A. The Insurance Commission.
Q. And when did you start having that double role?
A. 19 -- I think November of '19.
Q. So was it half time for one and half time for the other?
A. It is called fractional. So fractional, basically, I work part-time for each. I would balance my load as to based on what I needed, but there was never a time that was set as to how much was needed on one or the other. Both parties agreed that they were okay with me working -- especially since they were one floor apart, I could run meetings one hour and be in the other the next hour. It was all time management.
Q. Who was your second in command as head of -- as chief information officer for the Secretary of State's office?
A. During what period?
Q. Well, let's say '20 -- when we --
A. Two, Jason Matthews and Richard Lysinger -- well, actually had three. And Kevin Fitts.
Q. And did they stay all the way up until 2023?
A. They are still there. Oh, well, Jason Matthews isn't there anymore.
Q. And was one of them in particular working with the

## election system?

A. We -- I divide up my organization by need. So I have technology group, which Jason Matthews did; I have projects, which is Richard Lysinger; and security, which is Kevin Fitts.
Q. Is Mr. --
A. They cover all Secretary of State, not just elections.
Q. Right. So was Mr. -- has Mr. Fitts been the one primarily responsible for security issues with the Dominion system?
A. Prior to him, it was David Hamilton.
Q. Okay.
A. David dealt with much of what is going on here.
Q. And when did Mr. Hamilton leave?
A. It has been at least two years.
Q. But Mr. Hamilton then would have been the one dealing with this in 2021; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And ' 22 as well?
A. He may have left by '22. I think he was gone sometime -it might have been in ' 22 that he left.
Q. Sometime in '22?
A. I would have to go look.

THE COURT: Counsel, you wanted to ask a few questions?

MR. OLES: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

```
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Good morning, Mr. Beaver. I represent Ricardo Davis in the case. I have just a couple of questions for you, and I just want to get one thing clear in my mind.
You were testifying -- you are -- it is my understanding you are in charge of cybersecurity for both the Secretary of State's office and for the election system?
```

A. So elections falls under Secretary of State.
Q. Okay.
A. And I am the CIO for the Secretary of State.
Q. Okay.
A. Election system is a big term. There are numerous systems in elections. I do not manage all of them.
Q. Are you familiar with Dr. Halderman's report that was issued in this case that you're here today for?
A. I am familiar with it.
Q. All right. And have you personally reviewed it?
A. I have looked at parts of it.
Q. Okay. Would you -- you would generally agree with the statement then that -- that any election system should be developed with sufficient intention to security during design, software engineering, and testing? Do you agree with that statement?
A. That is a pretty general statement that anybody doing
software would say is true.
Q. Okay. Is that a yes?
A. That would be a yes.
Q. Okay. Would you also agree with the statement that says it would be -- with respect to the Dominion election system, it would be extremely difficult to retrofit security into a system that was not initially produced with such a process?

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, I object. The Halderman report is not in evidence. It is improper for counsel to be reading from it to the witness.

THE COURT: How much of this are you going to pursue?
Because, obviously, the -- Dr. Halderman is the Curling
Plaintiffs' expert, and they chose -- and to the extent that they chose not to ask this witness about the report, I mean, it seems to me also a little bit strange for you to pursue it.

So, I mean, I understand you want the -- I'm not sure whether he agrees or not. Doesn't agree makes a difference at the moment. So if there is one thing that you want to ask him about from the report more, go ahead and then we're going to move on.

MR. OLES: Well, that literally is my only question that would be -- at least derived from --

THE COURT: You asked the other one?
MR. OLES: Yes, the one that I just --
THE COURT: All right. That's fine.

BY MR. OLES:
Q. So let me repeat.

With respect to the Dominion system, would you agree with the statement that says it would be extremely difficult to retrofit security into a system that was not initially produced with such a process?
A. I would disagree.
Q. Would you agree that it is important to communicate with the application stakeholders within the Secretary of State's office in regards to integrating cybersecurity within their various Secretary of State applications?

THE COURT: All right. Now, both Curling counsel and -- both Curling counsel and the State's counsel have stood.

State your objections and then --
MR. BOYLE: I renew my objection again. Counsel didn't explicitly say he is still quoting, but he appears to still be quoting from the Halderman report. For the same reason, I object.

MR. CROSS: Yeah, I have a different objection, Your Honor, which is this witness is not an expert, and we didn't ask these questions because we don't want to back door for expert testimony whether he agrees or disagrees.

THE COURT: I sustain the objection. I sustain the objections.

Move on, Counsel.

BY MR. OLES:
Q. Previously in the case, Mr. Barnes testified that he had no interaction with you in regards to cyber -- to cybersecurity aspects of Georgia's election system.

To your mind, is that a correct statement?
A. Once again, I'm going to ask you to be specific.

When you say, the election system, what part of the election system are you talking about?
Q. Well, let's start with the easy.

Did you -- would that be a correct statement with regard
to any aspect of the election system?
A. So the system is made up of many pieces. My purview covers some of them.
Q. Okay.

THE COURT: And what were the ones that your purview
covers?
THE WITNESS: Voter registration, election night
reporting, the -- the technical environment -- technology
environment for CES. Those are the main ones.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. You are familiar with Mr. Barnes' role within the Secretary of State's office?
A. Very.
Q. In your experience, does he have some responsibility for cybersecurity within the realm of the systems that he works

## with?

A. I would say no.
Q. Would you agree that it is important, as far as cybersecurity for the Secretary of State in Georgia's voting systems, to monitor cyber issues that have been created or presented in other states concerning the Dominion Democracy Suite system?
A. I can't speak to the Dominion system. I have already said that. We outsource the security for the Dominion system to Dominion.
Q. So my question, sir, was, would you agree -- let me try to rephrase it.

Are you saying that you had no responsibility for the cybersecurity for the Dominion voting system?
A. We have outsourced that to them. I do not have responsibility for county equipment. Dominion is county equipment.
Q. And who have you outsourced that to?
A. Dominion.

THE COURT: And when did that occur?
THE WITNESS: When we bought it.
THE COURT: All right. So it was from the start --
THE WITNESS: That was day one.
THE COURT: -- as to county equipment, but what about anything that was provided via the State?

THE WITNESS: That has still been turned over to counties. So State bought it and turned it over to them, and they are responsible for maintaining the equipment.

THE COURT: I understand they are -- the equipment that they are in possession of, but to the extent that there is software that is supplied by the State and there is interface between the State and the software and the counties, who is responsible?

You are saying that counties are delegated responsibility for dealing with the State's --

THE WITNESS: When you say software, are you talking about the software for the BMDs, the software for the printers, or the ballots that get put on them?

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to be the one examining this. If either of one --

THE WITNESS: It is very different.
THE COURT: I guess I'm somewhat surprised by the answer, so we'll let counsel pursue this after lunch.

But I think, Mr. Oles, others might be better suited to be able to follow up on that than you.

But go ahead. Finish your questions.
MR. OLES: Okay.
BY MR. OLES:
Q. Did Dominion -- was Dominion then required to report to you with regard to anything regarding the cybersecurity of its
electronic voting systems?
A. Dominion did not report to me.
Q. Did they report to anyone within the Secretary of State with regard to cybersecurity on their voting systems?
A. I can't speak to that.
Q. Is that because you don't know, or you're not permitted?
A. I don't know. It is a contract with Dominion.
Q. Is it fair to say then that you never inquired as to whether or not there were any cybersecurity incidents with regard to their equipment?
A. I have never gotten into or involved with any of the Dominion hardware or software.
Q. Do you have an understanding then of who would have been?
A. I can't speak to that.
Q. Okay. Again, is that because you don't know?
A. I don't know. If $I$ said so, it may not be right.
Q. Okay. Okay. I only say that because --
A. I can only speculate, so I can't -- I'm not going to say.
Q. I only say that because $I$ find it a remarkable statement that you as the head of -- as the CIO and head of cybersecurity are now telling this Court that you didn't have any responsibility over Dominion for the cybersecurity of the voting system that is implemented throughout the State of Georgia.
A. I'm the CIO for the Secretary of State's IT environment.
Q. So would it -- would it be fair to say then that you have not monitored -- you have not undertaken to monitor any cybersecurity weaknesses or events or intrusions that may have occurred in any other state with regard to the Dominion system? THE COURT: Any other state or any other -MR. OLES: Any other state. THE WITNESS: I only manage the Secretary of State's IT environment. Dominion does not fall in that. BY MR. OLES:
Q. Okay. So the answer to my question would have been, no, you did not?
A. I don't deal with other states, either.
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, is there anyone else in the Secretary of State's office that would have that kind of knowledge?
A. I can't speak to that.
Q. And then, Mr. Beaver, is there anyone else in the Secretary of State's office that has greater authority than you for cybersecurity on the electronic voting systems?
A. I report to Gabe Sterling.
Q. So --
A. And so for Secretary of State's IT environment, I own that.
Q. All right. So is it your testimony then that Mr. Sterling would be responsible for the cybersecurity?
A. I can only speak to my job description.
Q. Okay.

MR. OLES: I have no further questions, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. I know we got fragmented, but was there anything you wanted to ask based on Mr. Oles' questions?

MR. BOYLE: Yes. Just one follow-up question or two.
THE COURT: And then we'll have the -- we'll deal
with the other matter that -- after lunch.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BOYLE:
Q. Mr. Beaver, does the State have a current cybersecurity vendor?
A. Yes.

You say the State.
Q. The Secretary of State.
A. The Secretary of State have a vendor that --
Q. For cybersecurity.
A. For doing assessments?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Yes.
Q. And who is that?
A. Before the Breach.
Q. Okay. Thank you.

REEXAMINATION

BY THE COURT:
Q So when was Before the Breach hired?
A I think it is two years now. It would have been probably sometime in '22.

Q And what is the scope of their responsibility?
A They do cyber assessments of our systems that fall under the Secretary of State's IT department. So that's

Corporations, Elections, Professional Licensing, Securities, and all infrastructure, which includes our two data centers and all of our campuses.

Q So did they take over -- did you contract with Before the Breach when you stopped -- ceased your contract with Fortalice?

A Yes.
Q And did they have the same scope of responsibility?
A Yes.
Q Did they have any responsibility for the sorts of cybersecurity issues arising in the actual operation of the election system and the software, the reliability and integrity and security?

A Are you talking about the Dominion system?
Q That's right.
A I am not aware of that. That doesn't mean they haven't been contracted outside of my aware, but I have not contracted them to do that.

THE COURT: All right. Any questions because of
mine?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Very briefly, Your Honor. RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, the vendor you hired to replace Fortalice is called Before the Breach?
A. Yes.
Q. And you hired Before the Breach after the breach in Coffee County?
A. I don't know. As I said before, I am not familiar with Coffee County other than rumors, so I can't speak to when it happened or what happened there. It was strictly rumors, so I can't really talk about it.

Not that $I$ don't want to. I just can't.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Annie, do you have the exhibit numbers that we're going to look at?

All right.
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, if I may, I would like to get into evidence the document that $I$ was referring to in my examination where the defendants' counsel raised the tool as a state secret, and $I$ would like to just mark that.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and have it marked.
I have that; is that right? What was the number?
MR. BROWN: It is Document Number 1229-3 in this
case, and the reference is to Page 4 of 10.
THE COURT: And was it -- it was a tab, though, in
the Curling Plaintiffs' --
MR. BROWN: No, it was not identified.
THE COURT: Right. So do I have it or not?
MR. BROWN: You do not.
THE COURT: Fine. Send it up then.
MR. BROWN: I would like to mark this as the next
exhibit, which would be Coalition 61.
Your Honor, the reference to the Fortalice tool is on
Page 4. It is about two-thirds of the way down, and it is
withheld on the basis of a state secret privilege. And we
would introduce that into evidence. It is a document that was prepared and filed by the defendants.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have any objections?
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'm sorry. We're trying to figure out where this document came from, if you can just give us a minute.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to have to have eye surgery.

If you have an electronic version of this -- and I do recall this document. But could you send it to Mr. Martin for us so that I can enlarge the cells and look at them?

MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I do recall the document, though.
MR. TYSON: So, Your Honor, this document appears to have been attached to a discovery dispute about discovery from Fortalice. I'm not sure we have anybody that can authenticate that this is, in fact, Fortalice's privilege log here.

THE COURT: I thought the State supplied it, frankly.
MR. CROSS: I thought they prepared that.
Is that not right, Bryan?
MR. TYSON: This is the first time I have looked at this in a couple of years.

THE COURT: Why don't we look at it over lunch.
Everyone look at it, I'll look at it, and we'll see whether we can expand the cells ourselves since it is on the docket.

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Sir, please don't discuss
your testimony with anyone substantively. It doesn't mean you can't have lunch with your counsel, though.

And we're going to start -- let me see. Since it is 12:30, I'm going to just take an extra five minutes because of things we have to look at.

So let's see you in 50 minutes, which is 20 after 1:00.

Is that right? No, that's -- no, 1:20.
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. Court is in recess until 1:20.

## (A lunch break was taken.)

THE COURT: Very slow on my homework. My apologies. Have a seat.

All right. So we had a -- a number of outstanding little items -- little or big. One is to Mr. Persinger. I think that there is an essential need for the plaintiffs' counsel to be able to understand his note-taking, especially in the context of the confidentiality agreement and protocol as to taking notes. So whenever it is -- counsel agree that you want to have an ex parte hearing, we will do that.

I've had also enlarged the pages on the document log regarding the Fortalice triage that Mr. Brown was asking about. So when you are ready to ask that question -- want to go back, return to that, we can do that. That is that one, the unreadable one.

And our quick review of what Mr. Germany said, we might not have caught all the pages in his testimony. They were on Pages 84 through 87.

Was there something else that you were wanting us to look at when you relied on saying, based on his testimony and probably something else, you thought it was appropriate for me to revisit the prior ruling about the confidentiality of the Fortalice review of the -- of their specially contracted review of the voting equipment in 2019?

MR. CROSS: We flagged the same pages, Your Honor, 84
and 87.
THE COURT: Thank you.
When you are through with your examination -- and I don't know if you are -- I'll have a few more questions of the witness before I make a decision on -- as to the report and whether I should lift or modify the seal on it.

Where were we with Mr. Beaver?
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Sorry, Your Honor. No other questions for Mr. Beaver from me other than about that report.

THE COURT: All right. And was there anything more you wanted, Mr. Brown, to ask him in connection with the tiny print one?

I have enlarged it in case he needs to see it.
MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But this one says -- is classified. The privilege is classified as state secret. On February 26, 2021, FortaliceTriage.bat. And it says, file used by Fortalice for data triage withheld on state secret grounds text.

That is just for the record because I think the tiny print is a little bit hard to understand.

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. That is in reference to the document that we had marked but it has not been admitted as Coalition Plaintiffs'

Number 61.
And let me just ask you, Mr. Beaver: Are you aware of any kind of tool that fits that description coming from Fortalice while you were the CIO?
A. No.
Q. And do you know who in your -- if you were conducting discovery of this, who might -- from your office might have requisitioned that tool?
A. It could have been -- what year was this?
Q. 2021. February 26, 2021.
A. I think David Hamilton was there.
Q. Okay.
A. He might have asked -- somebody from the elections department may have since it was -- it sounds like it was a county question, and our group typically doesn't deal with county issues.
Q. What makes you -- sorry. Go ahead.
A. So it could have been somebody from the elections department that dealt with the counties that knew that we had a vendor that helps us, could have made the request. I can only speculate.
Q. Right. I'm not suggesting there would have been anything wrong with this.

But did you learn anything in the break about the providence or the disposition of that tool?
A. We didn't talk about anything that was involved in here other than weather.
Q. Fair enough.

Now, do you recall any counties asking the Secretary of State to obtain this kind of tool on or about February 2021?
A. No, I do not.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I would move to admit
Exhibit 61 on the following grounds --
THE COURT: Could I see it again, unless I
confiscated it? Thank you.
Yes, I have this, the Exhibit 3. I just wondered, didn't we have an instrument? I don't -- no?

MR. BROWN: No.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BROWN: We don't have the actual artifact, Your
Honor. The basis for its admissibility is the following: It was filed by the defendants in this case and is on the docket; therefore, it is authentic because the defendants will tell you that they would never have filed a document that was inauthentic. So it is authentic.

It is highly -- it is relevant because it shows that the State received from Fortalice in February '21 something that is described by Fortalice as being a tool, and therefore it is relevant.

In terms of -- since we're not using the witness to get
that document in, we're getting it in because it is a fact in the case. It was a document that was provided in the case. It may not be necessary technically, Your Honor, to have it introduced in evidence in light of the fact that the State has filed it of record, but we would like to tender it in evidence as an exhibit nonetheless.

THE COURT: You want to introduce the description of it as a document, Fortalice for data -- for data triage that has been classified by counsel as state secret because you think its very existence then, which we don't have the content of it at this moment, would be relevant?

MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. What it does and who used it would be additional information that would be relevant, but that is not established by the document, nor would that be the subject of what we are moving to admit.

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, we object. The witness has said he knows nothing about the document. It is a Fortalice document. Both sides agree with that.

THE COURT: You're just going to have to talk up routinely. I'm sorry.

MR. BOYLE: Okay. Sure. It is a Fortalice document. Both sides agree with that. I don't think there is any question about that.

Just because it is on the docket doesn't mean it is admissible in the case. I mean, if the Court can take notice,
we're up to 1,700 -some entries, not counting subentries in the case. Surely not everything that is on the docket comes into evidence in the case. That is not enough.

THE COURT: Well, that is not -- we're not having everything. It is saying that it is being withheld on state secret grounds, and it is -- there is the -- there is an inference here that it is related in some vital way to the election system or its operation or the security issues, or else it wouldn't have been classified a state secret.

So I don't know that it is actually -- has any -bears any weight, but I'm reluctant to not allow just the description of it. I don't think I can draw any inferences at this moment, but I can -- but if the -- if the plaintiffs can hook up anything with this, I would allow it.

So let me just say, it is -- while I am not admitting it at this moment, I'm not excluding it. I leave it to you to try to get it -- to basically connect the dots.

MR. BROWN: Fair enough.
THE COURT: Even if we don't have the document itself, it does seem to me to invoke state secret would seem like it is a very high standard. And I don't think it was ever provided to me. If it was, then please let me know so that I can just resolve this once and for all.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, just one other -- and, Mr. Tyson, I don't want to mischaracterize this.

But my understanding is that Fortalice designated it as a state secret in response to counsel's request for it -for counsel for the defendants' request for Fortalice to do so.

But I understand your ruling, and we'll connect it up. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, just to clarify, my recollection of this, given that it was several years ago, is that Fortalice asked for recommendations related to privilege issues. They had identified documents they believed were privileged. I believe they made suggestions to that that they then decided if they wanted to take those or not, is my recollection.

THE COURT: Okay. Have you identified the document yourself?

MR. TYSON: I have not, Your Honor. I was sitting here trying to remember if $I$ have ever seen any of these documents on Fortalice's privilege log. And I don't know the answer, sitting here.

THE COURT: But if you do and you see it is relevant, I would ask you -- because even if we had to have it as a sealed document, I think, could be relevant. So I think this is my concern of just about what was relevant in ' 21 might be more relevant now. It might be marginally relevant and therefore warrant a state secret might not be in the same posture at this juncture.

```
MR. TYSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I don't want to interrupt anyone who had questions that were outstanding that I may have missed, and I didn't know whether defense counsel were going to ask any other questions based on the follow-up questions. You can obviously ask questions once I do. But if you aren't through, just tell me now.
Okay. No one has raised their hands, so I'm proceeding.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Only about the 2019 report. THE COURT: Yes.
``` REEXAMINATION (Further) BY THE COURT:
Q. So I reviewed everything about that again. And so you were asked by counsel for plaintiffs some questions about -relating to Fortalice that I wanted to follow up on, sir.

And you were asked, do you recall in 2019, the Secretary's office engaged Fortalice to do a security assessment of the BMDs -- the Dominion BMDs that it was just beginning to roll out into the State?

Do you remember that discussion?
A. You said for the what? You said BMD?
Q. That is right.
A. Okay. Yes. This was the assessment we asked them to come in and just look at BMDs for us.
Q. Right.
A. Yep.
Q. And you indicated in response to counsel's questions, I do not recall being very involved.

And then you were asked, who was involved? And you said, I'm not sure. I think that Michael Barnes would have been involved because the Center for Election Systems would be overseeing -- they would have kind of equipment, basically, that we would have had -- we would have and then be delivering it to counties, so I would be speculating in addition to that.

And then --
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: Your Honor, I believe that is
referring to Mr. Germany's testimony from Friday, not
Mr. Beaver's testimony.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Excuse me. Let me
stop there.
BY THE COURT:
Q. Is it your understanding that Mr. Barnes was involved in that project?
A. So Mr. Barnes runs our CES group.
Q. Right.
A. He is responsible for managing the distribution and working with counties with election equipment that is in the counties.

So that means when the State bought thousands and
thousands of pieces of equipment, he had to manage the inventory and distribution of that. So he was very much involved with that. He is also responsible for ballot generation, and those ballots get put on the BMDs, so that is his involvement.

Now, as for security --
Q. That is what I was trying to determine.
A. He is not responsible for the security. We have vended that to Dominion.
Q. All right.
A. So --
Q. And that was already so in 2000 -- the fall of 2019 that you vended it to Dominion?
A. To Dominion, exactly.

And when we brought Fortalice in, that would have been because they are our security vendor of choice. I was not involved with that inspection and that assessment, but I am pretty confident that Dominion had people there with them, so -- because they would be the ones to respond to whatever came out of the Fortalice assessment.
Q. And do you know whether they did provide a response to the assessment?
A. No. I had asked -- that was, I think, in the time frame I had asked not to get paper reports.
Q. Okay. There was a paper report issued in -- on

November 27, 2019, by Fortalice Solutions regarding its sort of initial review, and that was in a pretty early time, I realize, in this life of the BMD system in Georgia.

Did you review that yourself?
A. No. It wouldn't make sense for me to review it because I wasn't responsible for the security. I would have deferred it to the Dominion folks.
Q. I see.

And would it be your practice then that anything that
Dominion handled as to security, you would not have been involved in?
A. Correct.
Q. All right.
A. That's part of their responsibility.
Q. So in turn, at the time there were issues in Coffee County, would it have been still Fortalice's responsibility then to handle the security issues?
A. So once again, Coffee is a county, so I wouldn't have been pulled in at all. The most \(I\) might is hear it as a rumor that something happened after the fact.

People in the Secretary of State's office knows that Fortalice is our cybersecurity vendor, so they could have easily been called on to come help and evaluate or help Coffee County do whatever they needed to do. That is very possible. And the results out of that, if it was a Dominion software they
are looking at, would have gone to Dominion.
Q. Well, what if the State was concerned about the possible, essentially, infection of other parts of the system because of whatever was happening in Coffee County, such as the distribution of confidential software as a result of their handling?
A. Okay. So the systems -- it is -- now we're going to say election systems -- are broken in pieces. Each one is isolated. Most of which data runs downhill.

So if you imagine a water tower and you've got a person's house, if you put infectious stuff in someone's tub and you fill it up with water, there is no way that infection is going to get back up in the water tower. The elections system is much like that.

So doing something out in the county to infect that data isn't going to work its way upstream because we feed down to the counties. Results are hand-filled in for the elections up.

So malware or something at the county level would stay in the county level. And we have tools that help the counties look at their systems that say, your BMD or this device or that device has ten files on it that make up the application that Dominion gave you.

If anybody was to put malware on it -- and we talked about this on one of my depositions before -- malware has size, takes up space, is identifiable. And the tools we have let the
counties scan their devices and look at, if there's ten files, then this should only have ten files on it, and each of them should be this size, and if somebody puts something else in there, it is going to be a different size. If it is going to be at least -- someone could say, well, what if it's the same size?

Then it has not got the capability to do what it needs to do as well as be a malware. Because, remember, malware has size. So it would have to be additive. So that is why we do a scan to verify that the applications that are on our tools meet a level. Basically, this is what they should look like.
Q. And --
A. And we have never run into a problem. We have tested and tested and tested and never run into a problem that sizes were wrong.

Now, you might have a machine that gets corrupted, meaning the computer hard drive died or something on it died. It is just broken. And when you scan, yeah, the files are corrupt, so we wipe them out and either start new or replace.
Q. And when is the scan done for the size which you are identifying is a critical component of your security system?
A. When is that done?
Q. Yes.
A. Michael Barnes would know that. Once again, that is a county thing. I just know that there is a tool that they use.

The actual execution of it would be something he deals with the county. And it more than likely is an advice to the county as on how to manage their systems. I do not believe he actually goes and does any of that. He will educate with them on how to do it.
Q. So at this juncture without -- since you say you had never read the report and it still -- it has been sealed in the past because of the assertion of attorney-client privilege -- and I'm not quite at the point of making a decision about that, but I want to ask you this.

The -- it is indicated that the purpose of the report is to highlight any areas of weakness in process or procedure in which a malicious actor may find themselves in a position to affect input or output of election data.

Did anyone, whether from Dominion, a representative of Dominion, Mr. Barnes, or anyone else discuss with you the weaknesses that they did -- that Fortalice did identify?
A. No. I have never had a discussion -- and I presume you're talking about Coffee County?
Q. No. I'm really talking about the system as a whole, the software system -- the Dominion system as a whole.
A. The things that have been discussed were the tools that were needed to do that testing, and we have helped with packaging and helped them do those scanning tools for the counties --
Q. Okay.
A. -- to be able to do that.
Q. Well, this particular evaluation was an initial one in 2019 prior to full implementation of the system, and the purpose was to highlight any areas of weakness in process or procedure in which a malicious actor may find themselves in a position to affect input or output of election data.

Did Mr. Sterling or anyone else or counsel discuss that with you, what the results of that review were?
A. No, it has never been discussed with me anything about this --
Q. Were you --
A. -- or anything relevant to what sounds like you're talking about.
Q. And did anyone identify -- without reference to the specific, you know, that it came from Fortalice -- the weaknesses, the particular weaknesses flagged?
A. No, I have not heard of any weaknesses that have been flagged with the system.
Q. Okay.
A. As I said, the only thing that we have been involved with is that tool to help them verify file sizes.
Q. Now, Mr. -- Mr. Barnes did testify before you. And my understanding -- I don't want -- was that he was not a person who was responsible for security, though.
A. Correct. He was operations. Think of him strictly operations. He was in charge of training, distribution, those big things.

THE COURT: Are there questions occasioned by mine?
Because if this witness is not familiar with the report other than, you know, as to the questions I've pointed, I don't know that it is -- how worthwhile it would be to examine him about it, given what he has stated so far. It doesn't mean \(I\) have made a final decision on the report, but I'm not sure it is essential at this point.

MR. CROSS: That may be right, Your Honor. I know my colleague had a few questions just to see if he knows -understanding he hasn't seen the report, I don't know if anything was conveyed to him, so I thought my colleague may have --

THE COURT: He can ask that.
MR. CROSS: -- just a couple of questions to see if he has any insight.

THE COURT: All right.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION (Further)
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Just briefly, Mr. Beaver.

You were involved in the coordination in setting up this 2019 assessment of the BMDs; right?
A. I would have been the person who would have approved
having Fortalice do it, but the actual working as a project with them would have been one of my project people.
Q. Are you aware of any of the results of that assessment?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware whether Fortalice was able to hack the BMDs?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware whether Fortalice was able to obtain access to log files?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of whether Fortalice was able to change any \(\log\) files on the BMDs?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of whether Fortalice was able to obtain super-user access?
A. No.
Q. Whether they were able to access the operating system of the BMDs?
A. No.
Q. Do you know whether Fortalice in their 2019 assessment were able to change the operation of the BMD in any way?
A. No.
Q. Do you know whether Fortalice in their 2019 assessment was able to change the way votes would be tabulated when voting on a BMD?
A. No.
Q. Who would have that knowledge?
A. Probably have to ask Fortalice who worked with them on this.

MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, I'd just like -- for the record, I just -- clearly, Mr. Beaver has testified repeatedly he has no knowledge of this report.

I don't want my silence to be taken as a waiver of these questions to any other witness because we think the report is work product, and you have already ruled on that. And even if there were a witness with knowledge, that would be improper questions of that witness.

THE COURT: All right. Your assertions are all properly done to document your record as to your position. BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT:
Q. Mr. Beaver, you weren't at all curious about what

Fortalice found in its 2019 assessment of these BMDs?
A. I wouldn't say I wasn't curious. I have lots of other things that are on my plate. Nothing got flagged to me that I needed to address, so it never came up again.
Q. So as CIO, you had -- it wasn't raised to you what the results of this assessment of your new voting system that would be implemented across Georgia were?
A. And I have said before, I am the CIO for the Secretary of State's IT systems. BMDs are not part of my domain.

THE COURT: Whose domain are they under then?

THE WITNESS: That would be the counties.
THE COURT: You mean when they are implemented there?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: No further questions, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Brown, did you have anything more?
MR. BROWN: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Oles?
MR. OLES: Nothing further.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BOYLE: Yes. We are done. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Please
don't discuss your testimony with anyone because you could
still be recalled. All right? Thank you very much.
And you have gone on post December to where? I know
you went --
THE WITNESS: To Austin.
THE COURT: To Austin?
THE WITNESS: Austin, Texas --
THE COURT: Wow.
THE WITNESS: -- to take care of grandkids.
THE COURT: To take care of grandkids. Well, good luck with that, and I'm sorry that you might still be subject to recall. But that is great.

Who is plaintiffs' next witness?
MR. CROSS: The plaintiffs call Gabriel Sterling to the stand.
(Witness sworn)
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. If you
would, loud and clearly state your name and spell your full name for the record.

THE WITNESS: My name is Robert Gabriel Sterling, R-O-B-E-R-T, G-A-B-R-I-E-L, S-T-E-R-L-I-N-G.

Whereupon,
ROBERT GABRIEL STERLING,
after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Sterling.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. I appreciate you being here.

Mr. Sterling, what is your current role with the Secretary of State's office?
A. I am the chief operating officer, chief financial officer, and the director of licensing.
Q. Sounds like a hat trick.

What are your general roles and responsibilities at the Secretary of State's office?
A. They are very broad. We're a small agency. I am --
oversee operations, generally speaking, both the financial side. IT reports to me.

Obviously, being director of licensing, the licensing division reports directly to me, admin, which involves AR, AP, all the financial side. And I have an indirect operational role in most of the different divisions of the agency.

I also handle some duties in terms of speaking to the public. And although it is not a direct thing of dealing with legislative issues and budgetary issues as in like -- as in this week, it is budget week. And the Secretary has a joint budget hearing tomorrow, and I'm having to work on preparation for that if I'm not here.
Q. How long have you been the chief operating officer?
A. There's two different sections of time. Originally, from January 14 of 2019, until sometime in November of 2019, I held officially that role. I exited that role to be the implementation -- what was our full title for that one -implementation manager for the statewide voting system. And part of the rationale for doing that was we had to hire somebody to do my duties. And the budget constraints, I had to exit that role. And also, bond money which was paying for the project could not pay for direct employee of the State. So we were going to be paying for the project management out of that bond anyway.

So I held that role in November, exited it for a short
period of time during the budget period, I believe for about two weeks in January of ' 20 to go assume those duties again, then resumed it right after that, probably February 1 or late January until December 31st of 2020.

And then I have been chief operating officer since then.
I left the CFO position for a while. We had a CFO that subsequently left the office. I hired a deputy who has been handling some of those things -- officially CFO duties. And I picked back up. I began the division of licensing duties in January 1 of 2021.
Q. Mr. Sterling, you agree that the Dominion voting software used in Georgia's current voting system is not secure proprietary software in many respects? You agree with that right, sir?
A. Not with the way you frame it. I'm not understanding your question fully. I mean, I need more context.
Q. Do you agree or disagree with that statement?
A. I would disagree -- I mean, when you say not proprietary, I don't know exactly what that means from your point of view.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir. Could you just talk a
little bit slower. It will make the record clearer. And because we're dealing still with complicated issues, it will probably be more illuminating to me too.

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I apologize on the front
end. And anybody who has sat through a deposition with me
knows I struggle with this, but I will do my best. And feel free to call me down as you can.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling --
A. Repeat the question for me.
Q. Yeah. Do you recall being deposed in October of 2022?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And if it helps you to take a look, one of the binders in front of you is the transcript of your October 2022 deposition. If you flip the cover -- I'm not sure which is which.
A. There is no date on one, but the other one is --
Q. The bigger one, the one you are holding.
A. This one?
Q. Yep. And if you turn to page --
A. No, this is February of 2022. So this must be the -- it is in the same one.
Q. Sorry. I confused you.
A. I'm on Page 1 of the document, yes, sir.
Q. So if you flip to Page 178 , Line 15 , if you would. You can read that to yourself if you need to.

But do you recall that I asked you the question, but it is not just that this Dominion software is more modern? It has more vulnerabilities in its design, including some -- that some of it is just off-the-shelf software. It is not -- it is not secure proprietary software in many respects; right?

There was an objection interjected. You started to answer. You said there's two ways of looking at proprietary software. Usually, when you have --

And then I asked you, well, hold on. Just answer my question. Do you disagree with what I just said?

And your answer was, no, I don't disagree.
Did I read that correctly?
A. You've read this transcript correctly.

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection, Your Honor. If counsel
is trying to impeach the witness, he should first be permitted to refresh his recollection because the question was about what the question Mr. Cross posed actually meant. He didn't know what proprietary meant, so he should be at least allowed to review this before it is read into the record.

THE COURT: I agree.
Would you like to review it now? It is also next to you on the screen.

THE WITNESS: I would like to, if I could, read sort of the context on both sides to lead up to it.

THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Just to be clear, I didn't ask you what proprietary meant. I asked you just a simple yes-or-no question, whether you agree or disagree with the statement that the current Dominion software is not secure in many respects.
You said you disagreed with that. You still disagree with
that?
    THE COURT: You mean here?
    I'm sorry.
    MR. CROSS: Sorry.
    THE COURT: The problem is, I'm getting -- and the
witness might be confused.
    Are you clarifying what your question was there at
the deposition or right now?
    MR. CROSS: Just a moment ago. I didn't want to get
into a debate of what proprietary means because that is not
what I was asking.
    THE COURT: That's fine.
    MR. CROSS: Right. So the question I was --
    THE COURT: It has gotten more muddled at the moment.
So let's just step back and pretend that all of that didn't
happen. He has the deposition.
    If you want, ask your question again.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Right. So my question is this: Do you agree or disagree
with the statement that the Dominion software that is currently
used in the Georgia's voting system is not secure proprietary
software in many respects? Do you agree or disagree?
    A. I'm going to take a moment to kind of refresh where I'm at
on this --
Q. Sure.
A. -- because I -- now I think I have a clearer understanding of your question.
Q. Mr. Sterling, can I ask you, is there a reason why you need to read your deposition just to figure out if you agree or disagree whether the system has --
A. Because I'm trying -- sir, I'm trying to answer your question.

Because I'm trying to understand the context leading up to that answer because there is a lot of things that I've said previous to this talking about how from a point of my view was more secure. And then you asked a very specific question, which I'm getting down to. I just wanted to understand what I'm answering to before and what I'm answering now. So I apologize for taking a moment.
Q. I think we're losing each other. I'm not asking you about the deposition. I showed it to you purely for impeachment purposes.

I asked you -- we can go back and read it -- simply where you agree that the Dominion's software used in Georgia is not secure proprietary software in many respects.

Nothing to do with the deposition. I just asked, do you agree with that. You said you do not agree.
A. In many respects, it is a very broad question, so I'm not going to just flat-out agree to that. Give me some specifics,
and I'll be more happy to do it.
The, \(I\) don't disagree, which was the answer to that question on Line 4 was to this narrow question after a series of other questions. That's kind of my point. I was trying to understand what the context was in your attempt to impeach that.
Q. Okay. I'm sure Mr. Belinfante will be happy to ask you to explain that.

But I read your deposition testimony correctly; right? When you stated under oath that you did not disagree with that statement?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. Thank you.

Now, you're aware that Dr. Halderman served a nearly 100-page report in July of 2021 detailing certain vulnerabilities that he had identified with Georgia's current voting system; right, sir?
A. I knew that it existed, yes.
Q. Okay. In fact, you didn't know that it existed in July 2021; right?
A. I honestly don't remember when I knew about it, but I know now that that was when it occurred.

So you are asking me if I knew that happened, so I'm saying yes.
Q. But you don't recall when you -- in the last three and a
half years, you actually don't recall when you first heard that that report even existed; right?
A. Something to do with this case, if memory serves, but I don't recall when.
Q. So as of February of 2022, about seven months after that report was provided to your lawyers, even at that point you had not read the report; right, sir?
A. No, sir. I mean, that is correct that \(I\) had not read the report.
Q. You hadn't even asked to read it at that time; right, sir?
A. I don't know if \(I\) had or not.
Q. So if you want to flip to the February deposition, which is the first one, Page 24, and just go to Page 24, Lines 10 to 12. And if you read that to yourself for a moment and just let me know when you are done.
A. What line do \(I\) start on again?
Q. Page 24 , Line 10 to 12.
A. So as of February, no, I had not asked for it.
Q. Does that refresh your recollection that as of February of 2022, you had not asked to read the report?
A. Correct.
Q. In fact, you relied on your litigation counsel to determine whether you should read the report; right?
A. That is accurate.
Q. And the Secretary himself also relied on counsel to advise
him on whether he should read that report; right?
A. Yes.

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection to the extent it calls for attorney-client communication and certainly client's reliance on counsel.

MR. CROSS: Well, he testified to it in his deposition, so that is waived.

THE COURT: I would agree with that.
MR. BELINFANTE: I don't think he can waive it for the Secretary.

MR. CROSS: Well, then bring the Secretary in. We're happy to question him.

MR. BELINFANTE: Sorry, the Eleventh Circuit told you no for the third time.

MR. CROSS: Actually, the Eleventh Circuit said he is free to come in. He is choosing not to. He just cannot --

MR. BELINFANTE: The Eleventh Circuit said he does not have to because the testimony which you seek is not essential to the case.

THE COURT: All right. The thing is, I think that in his role, this witness could testify whether the Secretary had read it or not.

MR. BELINFANTE: He could testify to that. No objection there. It's just whether he was doing it on advice of counsel is the concern.

\section*{THE COURT: Thank you.}

MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. As of February of 2022, Secretary Raffensperger, to your knowledge, still had not read Dr. Halderman's report; right?
A. Not as far as I know, sir.
Q. And as of February 2022, to your knowledge, the only person who had read Dr. Halderman's report outside of your litigation counsel was Ryan Germany?
A. I believe that is correct.
Q. And Ryan Germany has no computer science training background; right?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. He is not a cybersecurity expert; right?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, just a month earlier in January 2022, when Ryan Germany was the only person who had read Dr. Halderman's report besides your litigation counsel, the Secretary of State himself called for the public release of that report; right, sir?
A. Yes, sir, I believe that is correct.
Q. And if you would take the other binder and flip to Tab 1 --

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honor.
I'm assuming this bottle of water is mine?
THE COURT: It has not been opened?

MR. CROSS: Yeah. If it has been opened, we can get you another one.

THE WITNESS: It is not open.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. I was hoping you were going to get the open one. I may have put something in there for you.

He knows me too well.
A. I doubt that, sir.
Q. Oh, thank you.
A. Now, what tab am I going to, sir?
Q. Go to Tab 1, if you would. It is Exhibit 85.

And do you recognize Exhibit 85 as a press release that the Secretary put out on January 27 of 2022, concerning Dr. Halderman's report?
A. Yes, sir.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 85 into
evidence.
MR. BELINFANTE: No objection.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. If you come down to the third paragraph. Do you see it begins with, I'm calling?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And here, Secretary Raffensperger himself states in the press release, I'm calling on J. Alex Halderman, the author of
```

a report on alleged vulnerabilities in the Dominion equipment,
to ask the judge to publicly release his findings on Georgia's
election system and his pre-2020 election testimony.
Do you see that?

```
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whether the Secretary was aware when he made
that statement that Dr. Halderman and the plaintiffs had been
asking the Court in a span of about six months to publicly
release the report, but the Court couldn't do it because the
State was objecting?
A. I do not know.
Q. Never heard that before now?
A. I might have, but I'm saying I don't recall right now.
Q. That's fair.

But do you know who made the decision on behalf of the Secretary, or do you know whether he made it himself to ask this Court, insist that that report remain under seal for about six to seven months?

THE COURT: I'm --
MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. Relevance.
Whether the Secretary wanted it published or not, I don't see as relevant to an Anderson-Burdick analysis. And as plaintiffs have framed it, the question of whether the State has done enough to address issues, these are public statements, not issues directly to the security concerns at issue.
MR. CROSS: It goes directly to security concerns
because the Secretary's office represented to this court for
about six months that this report was so sensitive that it
could not get to the press, it could not get to the public, it
could not even get to CISA. We asked that in August, and they
said it was so sensitive that it couldn't even get to CISA and
they wouldn't even share it with Dominion. And as we're going
to establish, out of the blue, the Secretary did a complete
reversal that bears directly on the decision-making and the way
they went about approaching election security.
And I'll make a proffer that what you're going to
hear -- well, you already heard, actually. We already heard it. He -- the Secretary called for this without a single computer science -- anyone having read this report other than a lawyer, Ryan Germany. It bears directly on the decision-making and how they approach election security.

MR. BELINFANTE: There is no link between what the Secretary -- how the Secretary viewed the information, and then in the light of continued press reports, Tweets other things coming in, including from the plaintiffs' side. He decided to release it. That doesn't speak to what is going on in terms of security. I think most people -- I mean, well, I'll leave it at that.

MR. CROSS: He decided to release something he said was dangerous to release for months, and what is frustrating is
we're hearing a lot of arguments from Mr. Belinfante about why the Secretary decided what he decided, and they told you in the Eleventh Circuit that it didn't matter.

THE COURT: I don't want to visit that at the moment. All right?

MR. CROSS: Understood.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. But, you know, I can determine myself whether or not it is relevant to the Anderson-Burdick analysis, and, you know, whether counsel can hook this statement up in his disclosure with anything else that he must -- that the plaintiffs must do in terms of an Anderson-Burdick showing.

MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I mean, it is -- it is -- it may be relevant to the entire what happened next, whether intervention issues and how fast things happened, but I don't know that -you know, that it is a high level of relevance. And I just highlight that for you so we don't waste too much more time on it than we already have. Thank you.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling, do you understand that the plaintiffs in this case rely in part on Dr. Halderman's findings for their position that Georgia's election system as it is currently designed and implemented is not sufficiently safe and secure?
A. The plaintiffs, yes, they do rely on that; correct.
Q. And if you come back to Exhibit 1 -- or sorry, Exhibit 85, at the end of that paragraph --

THE COURT: The third paragraph?
MR. CROSS: The third paragraph, yes, ma'am.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. The same one we were reading.

Do you see that again, Secretary Raffensperger himself says, Georgia's election system is safe and secure? Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have an understanding in your work with Secretary Raffensperger and as the COO, was Secretary Raffensperger just offering a personal opinion with that statement?
A. Opinion based on the work of our elections team and various outside inputs of it. I don't want to get too much into his mind, whether it was a personal belief, a belief based on what the office is doing, but they are kind of conflated, in my mind, as a similar situation.
Q. The statement he is making there, fair to say he was making it as the Secretary of State, he wasn't just personally pontificating on his views?
A. Sure.
Q. And he was relying on information provided to him in his role as Secretary of State?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether Secretary Raffensperger understands the workings of the Dominion BMD the way it works?
A. In a generalized sense. No more than I know computers work, but \(I\) don't know exactly how they work, so in that kind of way.
Q. But he has a general understanding of the workings of the Dominion BMD; is that fair?
A. I think that would be a fair statement.
Q. Were you aware that in 2021, your litigation counsel objected to Dr. Halderman providing his report to CISA?
A. I believe I was, yes.
Q. And do you know who at the Secretary's office made that decision to assert that objection?
A. It would -- I know that Ryan would have had a part -- a good part saying in that, yes.
Q. Do you know whether the Secretary himself was involved in that decision?
A. He would have been in discussions, obviously. And at the end of the day, I would assume, you know, we -- there's sort of like a sort of flat leadership internal to it. And the Secretary is informed of these things --

\section*{(Reporter admonition.)}

THE WITNESS: I apologize.
We have sort of a flat leadership structure
internally, and there were discussions with the Secretary. And we've kind of come to a generalized consensus, but he is obviously the elected official. He's is the final arbiter on anything, where there might be -- there wasn't any real -- I don't recall the exact nature of the conversation, but he would have been aware of it and been involved in it. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You yourself did not participate in any discussions where the decision was made in January of 2022 to call for the public release of the report; right?
A. I may have been.
Q. So flip back to your February deposition, the one in the front of the deposition binder, and to Page 74, if you would.
A. You said 74 , sir?
Q. Yes, sir. The February 1, Page 74.

You can start at Line 11 and just read that to yourself, if you would. Through Line 18 is what I'm focused on.

THE COURT: What was the exhibit number?
MR. CROSS: It is the February deposition.
THE COURT: Oh.
MR. CROSS: And does Your Honor have a copy of the deposition?

THE COURT: I probably do, but I don't see it.
MR. CROSS: We can get you one.
THE WITNESS: Mr. Cross, can you give me the line
numbers again, please?
MR. CROSS: Yes. Sure. It is Page 74, Lines 11 to 18 is what I'm focused on.

And just read that to yourself and then the --
THE COURT: These are the documents.
MR. CROSS: Yeah. It is two binders, one with
documents, one with the deposition.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And just tell me whether that refreshes your recollection that you did not participate in any discussions where the decision was made to call for the public release of Dr. Halderman's report in January of 2022.
A. It does. My memory there would have been obviously closer the time period.
Q. Right. And so you learned about the decision after it was made; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you yourself first read Dr. Halderman's report in October of 2022 ; right?
A. I believe that is correct, yes.
Q. And do you recall that you were deposed on October 12 th of 2022?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you read Dr. Halderman's report for the first time over the weekend before that deposition.

Do you recall that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the version you read, you didn't see any redactions; right?
A. I don't recall any, no, sir.
Q. Mr. Sterling, you're familiar with something called the SAFE Commission; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the SAFE Commission was set up by the Secretary's office to help make the decision on what the next voting system would be in Georgia after the DREs were replaced?
A. Under Secretary Kemp; correct.
Q. And the only cybersecurity expert who served on the SAFE Commission was a man by the name of Dr. Wenke Lee; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And he was chosen by Secretary Kemp; right?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. And you're aware that Dr. Lee, as the only cybersecurity expert on the SAFE Commission, vocally objected to using BMDs as the new system; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If you could flip to Tab 3 in the exhibit binder.
A. That is the other one?
Q. Yes, sir.

MR. BELINFANTE: Which tab? I'm sorry.
```

MR. CROSS: Tab 3, Josh. Yeah.

```
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. This is going to be -- it is marked as Defendants' Trial
Exhibit 1020.
A. Any particular page, or just the whole thing?
Q. We're going to get there.
    Do you recall -- well, let me take a step back.
    What was your involvement with the SAFE Commission?
A. When the Secretary came in and when he was sworn in on
January 14th, but even before that, I think he sat in on the
SAFE Commission meeting in Macon. I attended it, and it was
probably, I think, the last one of them before they filled
their final report.
    So we weren't really -- I wasn't really involved in the
SAFE Commission. I was sort of there to get the final work
product of the SAFE Commission.
Q. Okay. So if you flip to Tab 3, I think you are there. It's Defendants' Exhibit 1020. And you can flip through it.

Do you recognize Defendants' Exhibit 1020 as a PowerPoint presentation that Dr. Wenke Lee made to the SAFE Commission expressing his opposition to adopting BMDs?
A. I recall this, but I mean, only -- I remember the cartoon more clearly than anything.

So yes, I do recall it.
Q. You recall the presentation?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we offer Exhibit 1020 into evidence.

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. One, hearsay. Dr. Lee is not here to testify to it, so it can't be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.

Two, it has been described as expert testimony. I want to be sure that it is limited and not deemed as such.

And, Number 3, I don't think Mr. Sterling's general recollection, and specifically of one page of it, the cartoon, is sufficient authentication for an exhibit that is apparently 20 pages.

MR. CROSS: Briefly, Your Honor, we're not offering it as expert testimony.

And to the hearsay which relates to the same thing, we're also not offering it for the truth, we're offering it simply to show that the statements were made, and so the Secretary's office decision-makers were on notice of the statements being made.

And regardless of whether they are true or not, we'll rely on Dr. Halderman and others to get to the truth of it, Your Honor.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, if it is not being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, then it is irrelevant because having notice of something that is neither
known to be true nor false is not any kind of material notice of anything.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not clear. Is it -- are you only -- are you just showing one page, or is there a full document that you -- did you introduce the full document at the deposition?

MR. CROSS: We are -- I'm moving to introduce the full document. I just asked him to flip through it. I said, are you familiar with -- do you recall the presentation? He said yes.

I understood him to say he remembered it because of the cartoon, not that he remembered only the cartoon.

We can go back and look --
THE WITNESS: And I remember clearly the cartoon of that, but I don't -- I haven't even looked it all the way through yet because you-all were discussing it, so --

THE COURT: All right. Well, why don't you look at the whole document.

THE WITNESS: And I will answer honestly. I remember this exists, but the internals of it, no strong recollection. I just remember the cartoon, I thought, was memorable because I hadn't seen one like that since then, so --

THE COURT: Is it an exhibit number here, or you are doing it from the deposition?

And if it is an exhibit number here --

MR. CROSS: The exhibit -- sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- please let me know what it is.
MR. CROSS: The exhibit number here -- it is an
exhibit the defendants actually themselves put on their list. I'm a little surprised by the authenticity objection. It is Defendants' Trial Exhibit 1020.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to be able to find it at the moment.

All right. If you had referred to it as a tab
number, I might have found it.
MR. CROSS: Yeah. I'm sorry.
THE COURT: That's all right. That's fine.
MR. CROSS: Sorry.
THE WITNESS: Tab 3.
MR. CROSS: I couldn't find a tab number that went up to 1020, so they don't correspond.

THE COURT: All right. So are you just trying to get at this question? If not, then just ignore me.

Are you trying to get at -- did the witness -- was he conscious that Mr. Wenke was, first of all, on the commission and had in his -- based on his professional experience and study introduced some slides outlining the concerns? Is that the question you're trying to ask?

MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Sterling already testified without objection that he was aware that Dr. Wenke

Lee was selected by Governor Kemp, then Secretary of state, to serve on the commission. In his role in that commission, he vocally objected to BMDs.

I was bringing this in just to give the Court the specifics of what his objections were without getting to the truth. We do not need this to prove the truth. We have other folks that will do that.

It is just to show that the Secretary's office and decision-makers were on notice of what the concern was from the only cybersecurity expert on the commission.

THE COURT: All right. With that advisement, I'm not
accepting it for the truth of the statements, but just simply that this is -- would have flagged Professor Wenke's concerns to public officials is -- whether true or not, did it, in fact -- did it flag that for you?

THE WITNESS: To the degree -- I'm trying to answer this question. Because the Secretary of State's office is an executive position, we didn't make the decision to do BMDs. That was a decision -- a policy decision of the legislature, who, in law, said, you have to use a BMD.

So that was kind of -- that was our posture in dealing with the situation at the time because HB 316 hadn't been written yet. This predated that, but not by a lot.

What was the date of this again, or is there a date even?

THE COURT: Do you know when this was generated? It
was likely generated during the legislative session, don't you think?

MR. CROSS: Yeah. My understanding, it was a
presentation made -- well, I mean, I guess let me -- I'll ask the question.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You said you recognized this.

Do you recall that this was a presentation that Dr. Wenke Lee actually made to the SAFE Commission in one of their meetings?
A. Again, I'm assuming it probably is given the nature of it, and I do recall that. Whether it was the one I was at or a previous one or something subsequent, I don't know.
Q. But you -- the cartoon, for example, stands out particularly in your mind that Dr. Lee put on a presentation of this nature with something similar to that in a SAFE Commission meeting where he --
A. Yeah, I may not have seen the presentation. I made a -- I was given a hard copy later on. This is sort of -- this particular page, whatever reason, went to my -- I just remember it more clearly.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I realize that you've ruled it admissible on some grounds. But given that we can't establish the date and that does seem to be relevant to the
timeline of notice, I would again object now on the grounds again of improper authenticity because we don't know the date. And the reason that it is on our list is that Dr. Lee was originally, I believe, on plaintiffs' will call list and certainly on a may call list, so we wanted to have it so that he could testify to it.

THE COURT: Let me just say, Dr. Wenke, I thought, had testified here before.

MR. CROSS: He has not. Dr. Lee has never testified.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. CROSS: Yeah.
THE COURT: All right. We can hook it -- I mean, I can always rule it outside of it, but my understanding from past hearings was that he introduced this during the course of his discussions with the SAFE Commission.

MR. CROSS: Correct.
THE COURT: If that turns out to be wrong, we'll exclude it if he says no, it was later, and therefore it is not really relevant in some way.

MR. BELINFANTE: Correct, Your Honor. The authenticity objection is just as to whether it was -- it was presented before the legislative session, during or after.

THE COURT: Right. And we don't know for sure. And
we'll either -- once we know it, we can know for sure.
So it is conditionally admitted based on the
understanding that we have that it was either before or during the legislative session.

MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you.
MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling, you're aware that at a September 2020 hearing in this case, Dr. Halderman demonstrated one method by which the current voting equipment could be hacked to alter a QR code?

Were you aware of that?
A. I'm sure \(I\) probably was. I don't recall it right now, specifically.
Q. But you also are aware that in response to that demonstration, the Secretary's office took no steps to protect against that particular hack in the November 2020 election; is that right?
A. I think that we had protections already in place to prevent -- I don't know the specific kind that you are discussing here, so I can't say for certain. I know that there are procedures and protocols that we go through in order to defend against any kind of attack in general.

But I mean, specifically, I couldn't say because I don't know which one of the several different kinds he's talking about there.
Q. And it is hard to mitigate against something if you don't
have the details of it; right?
A. Well, again, if you -- without knowing the specific question you're asking me, it would be very difficult for me to answer, you're right.

But in general, if you don't know the details of something, it would be harder to do.

But again, I believe our general procedures and practices help mitigate several different types of potential vulnerabilities.
Q. Georgia's current Dominion system does not -- is not required to scan \(Q R\) codes to tabulate ballots?
A. That's correct.

Not under law. Under operational needs, yes.
Q. Yes. And you agree that Georgia currently does not have enough audits for its elections?

You would like to see more; right?
A. Yes. We have lobbied for more. We got more in SB 222, I believe, in the last session to now every federal race and every -- there is going to be one for every federal election and every statewide election.

But I think we should have more at the local level
randomly done so they can get the muscle memory there to be able to do that and do their ballot manifests and everything because doing it once every two years was inadequate from my point of view.
Q. She is going to yell at you.

Dominion has mobile ballot-printing software that can be used to print ballots on demand at polling sites once a voter checks in; right, sir?
A. They do.

But I will say that they are prone to human error, unlike the system we have set up now.

MR. CROSS: I didn't ask for that. I'll move to strike as nonresponsive.

MR. BELINFANTE: I would object to striking. He can explain his answer more fully.

MR. CROSS: Tony, can you play 491?
(Playing of the videotape.)
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do I understand correctly that Secretary Raffensperger is sitting in his office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is he offering -- in your dealings with him in your role as the COO, do you have an understanding of whether he was offering a personal opinion there or was he speaking as the Secretary of State?
A. I would say he is speaking as Secretary of State.
Q. Let's talk a little bit about Coffee County.

You're aware that there were a series of breaches in Coffee County in January of 2021 involving components of the
voting system; is that right, sir?
A. There was unauthorized access granted, yes.
Q. And you've watched surveillance video from the Coffee County election office from January of 2021; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have seen folks go in and access equipment that they were -- did not have authorization from the State to access; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And only the State, specifically the SEB, can grant that kind of access; right?
A. For an outside group, I think that is legally and by rule correct.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: Let's pull up Exhibit 493, Tony. No, sorry, the video.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you recognize the video slip sheet, sir? Have you seen that before?
A. I do not. I apologize.
Q. I was going to offer it, but Josh is going to object.

Let's play this. And tell me if you recognize what you see here after you have watched it.
(Playing of the videotape.)

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Now, just if you look at the top, you can see there is the date stamps and timestamps. It gives you some context for what is happening when.
A. Yes, sir.
(Playing of the videotape.)
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling, do you recognize what we just watched as surveillance video footage that you have seen in your role as COO in the Secretary of State's inquiry into what happened in Coffee County in January of 2021?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 493 into
evidence.
MR. BELINFANTE: I know Your Honor has already ruled on this, but we just renew our objection to the Coffee County from a few days ago just for the record's purposes.

THE COURT: All right. It is admitted.
MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
Let's play Exhibit 494, please.
(Playing of the videotape.)
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. That's you; right, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And what you were talking about is the allegation of the
type of access we just saw in Coffee County, and you said it didn't happen in April of 2022; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were mistaken?
A. Yes.
Q. To be clear -- I'm sorry, I think I asked you this before. The State did not authorize what we just saw on that video surveillance; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Are you -- do you recall that the Secretary -- Secretary Raffensperger testified before Congress concerning election security, and that was on November 21st? THE COURT: I think there is a water. MR. CROSS: Oh, yeah. Go ahead. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Can you restate your question?

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Yes.

Do you recall that the Secretary testified at a
Congressional hearing in November of 2021 concerning election security issues?
A. Honestly, no, I don't recall that.
Q. Are you aware that the Secretary represented to Congress that the machines were -- in Georgia are secure because they have seals on them and there's never been an instance of a
broken seal? Have you heard that before?
A. What are the dates again?
Q. It is November of 2021 is the actual --
A. Since \(I\) was not aware of his testimony specifically -- I might have been aware at the time. I'm not aware of the specifics of what he said, but I'm willing to read.
Q. But you are aware, in fact, that there have been reports, including in the November 2020 election, of machines with broken seals; right?
A. I have heard claims of that, of things with broken seals.

I have heard -- that is one of the situations we have to deal with here, which goes back to the video you just showed. We were awash in misinformation and disinformation.
(Reporter asked for clarification.)
THE WITNESS: The vast majority of claims were false, so in a generalized sense, that is probably referring to -- and also, I'm not aware of hearing about them in a deployed election, those kind of things. Again, I haven't seen the testimony. I don't know the context.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Flip to Tab 41, if you would, please.
A. And that is in this one. Okay.
Q. Yeah, the exhibit binder.

MR. BELINFANTE: Which number?
MR. CROSS: Tab 41. This is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 104.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And you'll see that Exhibit 104 is an email that comes in from Clinch County, Georgia, on July 9th of 2020.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Clinch County, that is a county here in Georgia; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the report here comes from, it looks like, Laina Ballance who was identified as the Clinch County election supervisor.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And she writes, my tech is doing L\&A testing and discovered that two of our BMD's election data seals were missing.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She asked, do we need to send these back to be resealed?

Do you see that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then Mr. Barnes responds the same day, July --

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection, Your Honor. Sorry.
Counsel is reading hearsay into the record, and we would object to Linda [sic] Ballance's portion of the email as hearsay from
a third party.
MR. CROSS: First, Your Honor, it is a business record, also public record because it would be subject to FOIA or ORR. This is coming directly from the election supervisor to Mr. Barnes. And as we have heard from Mr. Beaver, from Mr. Barnes himself, from Mr. Germany, that Mr. Barnes' job is to oversee and manage this type of thing. This is right within his official responsibilities, and, of course, he responds in that respect.

So I think we have laid the foundation that this is a business record.

MR. BELINFANTE: We're not objecting to Mr. Barnes' portion of the email. We would be -- we are objecting to Ms. Ballance's, as she could be called to testify, and -- and so it wouldn't be hearsay.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know whether it is true or not, but she is obviously -- Exhibit 104 can be admitted for the purpose of this problem, whether it was fully true or not, was brought to the attention of Mr. Barnes. And she's asking the question. It really doesn't matter whether it is -- it is -- they were missing or in some other spot.

But the point here is that there was a concern, it is raised, she wrote to Mr. Barnes, and so it is admitted with an understanding that there might be some other explanation for the missing data seal.
```

            MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I apologize. I should have
    made this easy for you. 104 is already in. It is already in
evidence. Sorry.
MR. BELINFANTE: My apologies then, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. CROSS: I was testing Josh. He didn't remember
either. He didn't remember it either.
THE COURT: You were testing me too.
MR. CROSS: Sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That's all right.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. If we come back to Exhibit 104, you'll see that Mr. Barnes
responds that same day; right?

```
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you recall that July 9th of 2020, coincides with a primary that was happening in the state at that time?
A. That would track, yes, sir.
Q. And in Mr. Barnes' response, he writes back, no, just please put your own seal on the equipment and document the seal number attached.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you seen this before? Was this ever flagged for you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever seen any reports coming in from counties
when they were preparing for elections or during or after elections where seals were broken or missing on election equipment in Georgia?
A. In a specific way of \(a\), here is a specific county doing this, no. But there is always generalized conversations that there is no such thing as a perfect election ever. We have thousands of poll workers, elections workers. And are they going to forget things sometimes? Are they going to move and catch a seal on something and snap it?

That is the reality of running an election in 159 counties with thousands of people, so this is not unexpected. Of course, you always want to document it, which is probably what Michael is saying here. Document the seal number, we'll look at it when he gets back. I don't know what was on --

THE COURT: All right. You're getting faster and faster as this conversation is going on.

THE WITNESS: I apologize again.
THE COURT: That's all right.
THE WITNESS: Like I said on the front end, that is what happens when I start going.

I don't know what might have been done after the fact on this, but this is not -- this is sort of -- I work -- I have talked to people in elections around the country. This is kind of -- if you had 100 percent of your seals done the whole time and it was perfect, that would raise a flag to me, so --
because that -- I think somebody is probably not telling the truth.

But the reality is, this is not something I would be surprised to see. You always want people to do it perfect and do it right.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And so from your perspective, Mr. Barnes' response to just put another seal on it and use the machine, that is not inappropriate? That's --
A. Because I don't know if it is -- I don't know if this is pre or post L\&A, or if he might have -- I don't know how it was all handled, so I couldn't say for certain.
Q. Fair to say his response doesn't trouble you?
A. Not really, no.
Q. Let's pull up Tab 10, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 160.
A. Tab 10 for me on the screen or --
Q. Yes.

Do you recognize Plaintiffs' Exhibit 160?
A. It says Exhibit 4 on my page, so I don't know if that is -- okay. Bottom it says -- okay. I got 160. I got it.
Q. Do you see at the top there is a Tweet that you posted?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we offer Exhibit 160 into evidence.

THE COURT: Any objections?

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, our objection would only be for the Tweets after Ms. Marks on the second page. I don't know who these other folks are. The others appear to be parties or witnesses who we expect to testify --

THE COURT: What is --
MR. BELINFANTE: -- for Mr. Cross.
MR. CROSS: And that's fine, Your Honor. We're -I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Is there an exhibit number?
MR. CROSS: It is Exhibit 160. It is Tab 10 in your
binder. And we're not offering -- the ones that Mr. Belinfante identified, we're not offering those for the Court to consider or rely on. They are just part of the thread.

THE COURT: So you're saying it is Exhibit 10?
MR. CROSS: It is Exhibit 160, and it is Tab 10 in
your binder.
THE COURT: I'm sorry.
What pages of this are you actually asking me to rely
on?
MR. CROSS: It is --

THE COURT: Page 1 or just the interaction between
Ben Adida and --

MR. CROSS: The only thing that I was interested in was Mr. Sterling's Tweet, then the Ben Adida Tweets. That's the only thing that we're offering.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it is admitted for -with that limitation.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, we would ask -- our -we would say that given that the others on here are either parties or counsel or witnesses we expect to testify, we would say the whole thing should come in up to Ms. Marks' Tweet on the second page. And so starting from Doug Patterson down, that is the part -- and I'm sure the Court wouldn't give it much weight anyway, but that's the part we would say is hearsay, and there doesn't seem to be disagreement on that.

MR. CROSS: That's fine.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine as long as counsel agree.

MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. CROSS: All right.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Talking a little more about Coffee County, you're aware that in November of 2020 that then-election supervisor Misty Hampton was involved in a video that went up on YouTube from inside the elections office; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in that video, there was a Post-it note that had something written on it; right?
A. A password to something, yes.
Q. Right. And what the Secretary of State's office concluded
was that it was a password for the Coffee County EMS server; right?
A. I think the investigator said that. I sort of took it on face value of that.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: Let's -- Exhibit 495, Tony.
(Playing of the videotape.)
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. We just played a portion of it.

Does this look like a portion of the video that you have seen from Coffee County where Ms. Hampton purports to demonstrate how the system can alter votes?
A. Yes, sir.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 495 into
evidence.
MR. BELINFANTE: No objection.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
MR. BELINFANTE: Other than our other, but I guess --
Your Honor, could we just have a continuing objection so we're -- on the Coffee County matters?

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. CROSS: And can we get clarity? Is it --
THE COURT: Is it all on relevance, or is it on some
```

other --

```
```

            MR. BELINFANTE: It is on what we made during -- was
    it Mr. Germany's testimony where we had a brief legal argument
here? Your Honor has already ruled on it. It is just so that
every time it comes up we don't have to --
THE COURT: And I just didn't remember what it was
based on.
MR. BELINFANTE: That's right. It was relevance.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you recall that Eric Chaney is visible in that video
that we just --

```
A. I believe that the -- a member of the board -- I recall
him being somewhere involved in the video, yes.
Q. And Eric Chaney, you understand at the time, was a member
of the Coffee County Election Board; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And your office -- Secretary's office, I should say,
opened an investigation into that video and some related
matters around that time; right?
A. I think -- I don't remember the exact nature. It was this, plus, I think, coming into November, their failure to certify their election properly. I think they made it into a single case, but \(I\) can't recall exactly.
Q. In some of the -- some of the investigators from your
office, Frances Watson, for example, Investigator Blanchard, are you aware they actually went to Coffee County and met with Ms. Hampton and others?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you're aware that Ms. Hampton was uncooperative and combative in that investigation; is that fair?
A. That is a fair statement, sir, yes.

MR. CROSS: All right. Can we pull up Exhibit 143?
THE WITNESS: Is that in my binder or is that a
video?
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. I'm sorry?
A. Is that in the binder as well, or is that --
Q. Yeah, if you go to Tab 15. And it is on the screen if that is easier for you.
A. I like paper.
Q. I'm with you.

Do you recognize Exhibit 143 as a customer notification that Dominion sent out to counties in Georgia on May 6, 2021?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And part of the service that Dominion provides the State with respect to the voting system is to send out these types of notifications to the counties that use the equipment from time to time; is that fair?
A. When appropriate, yes.
Q. When appropriate.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 143 into
evidence.
MR. BELINFANTE: I understood this was already
admitted into evidence.
MR. CROSS: Oh, was I -- I know we brought it up. I
didn't know if we --
MR. BELINFANTE: Yeah.
THE COURT: Well, in case it wasn't --
MR. CROSS: It is in now.
THE COURT: -- it is now.
MR. BELINFANTE: Yes. I believe, Your Honor, we had made an objection on hearsay from a third party, but I thought the Court had admitted it subject to -- perhaps subject to the objection, but it had been admitted either way.

THE COURT: I think it had been, Dominion functioning as an agent of the State, and these were the notices.

MR. BELINFANTE: Yeah. I'm being told the Court had put it aside, and so I think --

MR. CROSS: That's what I thought.
MR. BELINFANTE: -- we were waiting to see what it was.

MR. CROSS: Right.
MR. BELINFANTE: So our objection would be that it is hearsay of a third party. We tried to get Dominion folks to
testify, and we were told we couldn't, so we would object on that ground as well.

MR. CROSS: As we've indicated before, Your Honor, they have represented to the Court on multiple times Dominion is their agent. You heard from Mr. Beaver, I think Mr. Barnes, and Mr. Germany that they rely specifically on Dominion for this type of purpose. Mr. Sterling just testified to the same, so this is --

THE COURT: I think it is appropriate since they obviously were made an agent for the security purposes according to Mr. Beaver.

MR. CROSS: Right. So is 143 in, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, it is admitted.
MR. CROSS: All right. Let's flip to Tab 16, if you would, sir.

Tony, if you want to pull up Exhibit 78. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And let me just ask you, Mr. Sterling, do you recall that in May of 2021, the Secretary's office opened an investigation into whether there had potentially been access to any of the election equipment in Coffee County?
A. At the time, \(I\) was not aware, but \(I\) am now. At some subsequent time to May '21, I was aware of it, yes.
Q. So you are aware -- you're aware now that that investigation occurred in May of 2021, but you were not aware
at the time; is that --
A. No, sir.
Q. Okay. And one of the things that you understand since learning about that investigation is that it was assigned to agent -- or to Investigator Blanchard; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you understand that what Mr. Blanchard did was to reach out to James Barnes who was the then-election supervisor in Coffee County; right?
A. As I understand it, yes, sir.
Q. And he asked Mr. Barnes whether there had been potential access to the equipment; right?
A. I don't know what he specifically asked him. I think it was if Cyber Ninjas had done anything along those lines that he was aware of.
Q. And the Secretary's office was aware in May of 2021 that the Coffee County Elections Office had video surveillance; right?
A. I don't know the answer to that.
Q. Well, certainly the Secretary's office was aware that the counties around the State have video surveillance set up?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you know whether Mr. Blanchard or anyone else looking into this asked the county in May of 2021 whether they still had video surveillance from January of 2021?
A. For this one, I can't specifically speak to it because there was three separate incidents. If you want talk about we had the initial one we just discussed with the video and the certification, then we had this business card, and then we subsequently learned about the SullivanStrickler situation.

So those are three separate things, and I know in the SullivanStrickler one, they specifically asked about video stuff to their law enforcement counterparts who said, we hold only for a certain amount of time.

So it didn't exist when they asked for it from the law enforcement side. Whether they asked for this one, I do not know the answer to that.
Q. If you look here, you can see that the email here is -the exchange is on May 11th of 2021.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The Secretary's office did not do any further investigation into whether there was access to any of the voting equipment beyond May 11, 2021; right?
A. For this particular side, it is my understanding -- again, subsequent to asking about it due to this -- that essentially there was nothing -- nobody, for lack of a better word, fessed up. They wouldn't talk to anybody. There was no other -- they told me at the time that we couldn't find any evidence or trail to go with at that point, so I think it's just sort of --

THE COURT: Just you've got to go a little slower because I'm not catching it and I --

THE WITNESS: At that point, we were told there
was -- our office was internally told -- and I learned of this subsequently and I couldn't say when -- there was really no evidentiary trail to try to track on the Cyber Ninja specific investigation.

So I don't even -- I assume -- I don't know if it had a case number assigned to it or not, but that was my understanding of how that particular one went, which was now the second time something around Coffee County for the 2020 election cycle had come up or post -- during 2020 and post 2020, and then the third one, which is the -- obviously, the breach or the unauthorized access we discovered later on. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. The investigation that was opened in December of 2020 into the YouTube video and some related things, do you recall that that was also assigned to Investigator Blanchard?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So Investigator Blanchard had that, and he also had this assigned to him on May 11, 2021; right?
A. Yes, sir. Because our investigators generally have, for lack of a better word, routes, so that is kind of his area physically.
Q. Flip to Tab 14, if you would, please, sir.

THE COURT: What was the number of this one?
MR. CROSS: The exhibit number?
THE COURT: The one we have just been looking at,
what was the tab number?
MR. CROSS: Let me get back to it.
THE WITNESS: That was 16.
MR. CROSS: 16.
THE COURT: Thank you.
And the next one is?
MR. CROSS: The next one is Tab 14.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And Tab 14 is labeled as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 40.

And, Mr. Sterling, do you recognize this as the official investigative report that Investigator Blanchard prepared on the investigation that was begun December of 2020?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the way the Investigations unit works is when they have an investigation like this, they prepare a final report that gets presented to the SEB; is that right?
A. I don't know if every open case is eventually presented to the SEB. But if they get to investigative summary and filings, that would be, I believe. That is how that would work.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 40 into
evidence.
MR. BELINFANTE: No objection.

THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling, as part of the investigation the Secretary's office conducted into the breaches in Coffee County in January of 2021, just yes or no, do you know whether anyone looked into why Mike Lindell flew into Coffee County on the night of February 26th of 2021?
A. I don't know.
Q. You just don't know one way or the other whether anybody looked into that?
A. I don't know one way or the other, sir.
Q. Do you agree that the main thing that a bad actor may want
to do to affect elections in Georgia is simply to just cause chaos?
A. That would be a -- if you're -- it depends on the intentions of a bad actor. A chaos actor would be something that could be done, yes. That could be a goal.
Q. Right. And, in fact, one way they could do that would be to sort voter registration numbers, assuming they could get access to that information, and then that would affect -- that would cause chaos at the poll sites on election day; right?
A. I believe I said that in my deposition.
Q. Right. I think you said that that would be a brilliant attack to do.

Do you recall that?
A. I believe that is -- yes.
Q. And specifically because it would cause chaos on election day; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The vulnerabilities that Dr. Halderman identified in his July 2021 report, you agree that those vulnerabilities should be mitigated; right?
A. Where possible, yes.
Q. And you're aware that CISA reviewed those vulnerabilities and issued an advisory confirming that the vulnerabilities exist; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Through the CISA process, did you or, to your knowledge, anyone else with the Secretary's office have any communications with CISA while they were doing their assessment of Dr. Halderman's findings?
A. If memory serves, I don't believe the CISA process allows for us to have any direct input into that. I believe Dominion is allowed to have some level of input, but I don't fully know the federal process well enough to really opine on how that is supposed to work.
Q. And do you know -- are you familiar with someone named Geoff Hale?
A. The name rings a bell, but I could not tell you why.
Q. Do you recall that he had an official role at DHS at the
time that this process was --
A. Now that you said that, yes.
Q. And do you recall Kim Weiman also had a role at DHS at this time?
A. More of a communications role, but yes.
Q. And you spoke with Mr. Hale and Ms. Weiman during the CISA process while they were evaluating Dr. Halderman's findings; right?
A. I don't know.
Q. You just don't know one way or the other?
A. I don't know one way or the other. I can't recall if I did or not. I talked to Ms. Weiman. She is a former Secretary of Washington State, a Republican, and I talked to her at NASED.

I see her at things, and I would have probably seen her -I don't know when -- I can't remember exactly when the dates were around this, so there's different meetings I would be at where she would be.

So I could have talked to her around it. I don't know if I talked to them about it. I think -- now, thinking about it, I may have talked -- I don't remember talking to Hale. I think I might have talked to Kim about it, Ms. Weiman.
Q. And you urged Ms. Weiman not to advise against the use of QR codes; right?
A. I believe so, yes. That would make -- that would be
something I would say, yes.
Q. Is there anything else you recall discussing with CISA?
A. Essentially, I remember trying to understand the rationale of how they were reviewing these things. Because, as it was explained to me, you have to essentially pretend like there is no mitigation factors of people in processes and procedures, and then look at just the software itself.

So that is my understanding is that you are just looking at a standalone thing, basically nakedly standing there. And I think I might have expressed my frustration with that being the process in and of itself.
Q. Do you know whether anyone at the Secretary's office has ever discussed Dr. Halderman's findings or the CISA advisory with Dominion?
A. Yes.
Q. And how did those discussions usually happen? Is it email? Text messages? All manner of communication?
A. Phone calls. Some emails, I'm sure. I mean, yeah. I mean, or in-person discussions.
Q. Have you personally ever had any communications, such as by email, with anyone at Dominion about Dr. Halderman's findings or the CISA advisory?
A. I know if I have talked about it. I don't know if there are any emails unless it has been in the production, so --
Q. Would it surprise you to learn that the State has not
produced a single communication, not one, between the Secretary's office and Dominion concerning Dr. Halderman's findings, the CISA advisory?
A. No.
Q. Go to Tab 38, if you would, please, sir. THE WITNESS: Your Honor --

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling, did you have --

THE WITNESS: I was going to ask Your Honor. I'm not
quite sure how to ask this, but comfort break is the word I'm looking for.

THE COURT: Of course. All right. Let's take a
five-minute break.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. Court is in
recess.

\section*{(A brief break was taken at 3:37 PM.)}

THE COURT: Have a seat. You may proceed.
MR. CROSS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
And one procedural thing -- I'm going to do this only
because I have so much affection for Mr. Belinfante. We're going to withdraw Exhibit 160.

THE COURT: Which one was that?
MR. CROSS: It was the Tweet thread because I realize we messed up trying to print that, and it doesn't have what I
wanted in it, so we'll just withdraw it. Sorry for the confusion.

THE COURT: That is all right.
MR. CROSS: I'll make that simple.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling, I just have a couple of more things.

The Secretary's office, including the Secretary himself, including yourself, frequently have referred to the plaintiffs and their experts as election deniers; right?
A. They are cut from the same cloth, in our opinion, yes.
Q. And Mike Hassinger is a spokesperson for the Secretary of State; right?
A. I'm sorry.

What, sir?
Q. Mike Hassinger, he's a spokesperson for the Secretary of State?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And one of the things that he said is -- talking about our experts in this case -- if the Ph.Ds don't like being put in the same category as the pillow salesman, tough noogies, they should stop saying similar things; is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know who made the decision to respond to Dr. Halderman's findings by characterizing him and the plaintiffs as election deniers?
A. No, sir, I can't say specifically who. It was an internal communications decision.
Q. So you weren't involved in whatever discussion occurred when that decision was made?
A. I likely was involved at some level, but again, we have -the communications side is not something I'm directly in charge of making the decisions of the directions on those things.
Q. Fair to say that the people speaking on behalf of the Secretary would not make those statements without his knowledge and authorization?
A. Fair to say that.
Q. Okay. All right.

MR. CROSS: Let's pull up Plaintiffs' Exhibit 127, Tony.

THE WITNESS: Which tab is that, sir?
MR. CROSS: It is not a tab, so you're going to have to look at the screen. Sorry.

Do we have another hard copy of this, Jenna? We had it earlier.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE WITNESS: I can watch on the screen. That's
fine.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Let me just ask you: Do you recognize the document entitled here Fortalice Solutions Incident Response dated

February 26 of 2021?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever had any involvement with any of the security assessments done by Fortalice on behalf of the Secretary's office?
A. I have heard after-actions on some of them, yes. I'm not sure if it is all of them, but I'm aware of them as a former vendor of ours.
Q. As you sit here, you don't have any knowledge -- any recollection about a Fortalice incident response that occurred on or around February 26 of 2021?
A. Not specifically, no. If I read more about the details, I might remember, but \(I\) don't recall this right now.
Q. Let me hand you this copy so you can flip through it. MR. CROSS: May I approach, Your Honor?

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Exhibit 127, just flip through it, if you would, and tell me if it rings any bells.

THE COURT: What tab was on this?
MR. CROSS: It is not a tab, Your Honor.
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. There is no insight? Nothing you can offer? You don't have any awareness of this as far as you know?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That's fine.

Are you aware that one of your lawyers in this case and a consultant that works for you -- and just answer this yes or no if you would -- inspected source code underlying Dr. Halderman's work in this case recently?
A. I know there's an expert. I don't know exactly what he has or hasn't done.
Q. Are you aware that your counsel in this case told the Court for a period of years that the Secretary's office did not need to examine the source code underlying Dr. Halderman's report until trial in this case? Have you ever heard that before?
A. I don't believe so, no.
Q. So as you sit here, you don't have any insight into who made the decision that examining the source code for Dr. Halderman's work is useful only for trial? You don't know who decided that?
A. No, sir.
Q. And as the \(C O O\) of the office, does it surprise you that no one in your office thought it might be useful for election security purposes to understand how his source code worked back in July of ' 21 when the report came in?
A. Again, it depends on how you characterize it. So it is not that surprising to me on the fronts that this is a litigation environment, and I'll leave it at that for right
now. Yeah.
Q. Is it your understanding as the chief operating officer of the Secretary's office that exploiting the vulnerabilities Dr. Halderman has identified since July of ' 21 would require an extremely high level of sophistication?
A. Well, it depends on which ones. Some require higher levels of sophistication than others. But all of them require physical access and limited time windows, yes.
Q. And is it your belief that your typical voter couldn't go in on election day and hack a machine to alter votes in a few minutes? Do you believe that is not possible?
A. I believe it is potentially possible, but we have systems and personnel and processes in place that deal with, you know, protective processes, detective processes, and recovery processes across the board. So I think it would be difficult to do it in such a way as to be undetectable and nonrecoverable.

But yes, anything that relies on a computer could potentially have somebody do something if they had enough sophistication and training to do something along those lines.

But again, most of the things outlined by John Halderman is -- would require -- you can get one BMD at a time. They are not scalable other than one goes to the EMS, and that particular one would require an inside actor.

And if it is an inside actor who is a bad actor, it
doesn't matter which system you have at that point because they are all vulnerable.

THE COURT: It doesn't matter what?
THE WITNESS: What system you have. Because if you have an inside actor who has access to an EMS, whether it is an hand-marked paper EMS, a punch card EMS, a Scantron EMS, a BMD EMS -- if you have an insider, all of the threats go across the board at that point. It is regardless of what kind of system you have. That is the only scalable one in the Halderman report, as I recall it.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So again, you don't dispute that a voter could walk in on election day in Georgia in the span of a few minutes, hack a BMD so that it would alter votes for folks voting after that voter? You don't just --
A. If they had perfect knowledge in the time window, had access to every ballot style, understood what those were, knew the coordinates beforehand -- I mean, there's several stages you would have to go through, and it would be highly difficult, especially to do it in a way --

The way that a polling location is supposed to be set up, you have to allow for the privacy of the voter, but there has to -- you have to have the ability of the poll manager and poll workers to kind of see the actions taking place.

Most things -- I have been in a poll location where
somebody hit the table too hard and the BMD shut down, basically said something has happened. There is a report that goes off that something is trying to happen. If you open one of the back doors, it would be detectable.

It is just very difficult to do this in a -- you might be able to affect a BMD. You would be just as effective taking a hammer and hitting the BMD to make it stop, basically.

But to switch votes in an undetectable way that every subsequent vote after that would not be verified by the voter, again you're taking lots of things into account at that point that wouldn't be noticeable. On election day especially, in early voting as well, especially now we have added subsequent to the -- this report a -- during the election -- open election time parallel monitoring.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I'll object -- I'm going to object. He's getting into information that has never been disclosed in discovery, and he's also far afield of the question.

THE WITNESS: You asked me if somebody could do it, and I said yes, but they would also be detected, which is part of the systems we have and processes to protect the system overall.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Okay. And so just we're clear, what you testified to, everything you just articulated, you think would be required to
do it, and you think it would be detected if it occurred?
A. In most situations, \(I\) believe so. Is it possible? I couldn't say for certain because it would be very difficult. I haven't seen anybody actually do it. We have seen no reports of it actually happening anywhere in America.
Q. You spoke a little bit ago about causing a bad actor might seek to cause chaos in an election.

Why would chaos matter if it occurred on an election day?
A. Because chaos generally begets people mistrusting outcomes of elections.
Q. Chaos can also reach a point where the State might not be able to certify the election.

Is that possible?
A. It depends on the chaos and depends on the recovery, depends on the response. I couldn't say for certain.

I mean, one of the things that I'm most worried about is a rogue county not -- refusing to certify and us having to go to --

THE COURT: One of the things you're most concerned about, what?

THE WITNESS: A rogue county deciding not to certify their election in any one of the states of the union.

I was at a conference just on Friday talking about this -- actually, not Friday. I had to come back early because I thought I was testifying on Thursday -- discussing those

\section*{kinds of things.}

There is lots of things that can cause chaos.
There's lots of things that can cause problems. There's lots of people who get a benefit from their point of view out of this, foreign actors, domestic terrorists across the board.

The vulnerabilities here I tend to see as much lower, which is why I thought the voter registration system was a much more vulnerable system we had previously that we've now addressed in a very large way, in a much more secure way. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. But you understand that -- you just mentioned a number of different actors. It could be foreign actors, domestic actors. It could be insiders. It could be voters.

Their entire intention to exploit this vulnerability could be not to actually affect any votes, but to alter a BMD and then deliberately ensure that it gets caught?

That is certainly a possibility; right?
A. That is a possibility, yes.
Q. And if that were to happen, if someone were to alter a BMD on election day, and it were to be immediately detected by the next voter, what statutory regime exists in the State to then certify the outcome of that election?

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. Two grounds. One, I think we're getting pretty far afield from the actual Anderson-Burdick case of whether a vote as cast is counted.
```

Two, Mr. Sterling is not a lawyer. I don't think he can testify to the legal regime or statutory regime that Georgia has to address a hypothetical situation like that.
MR. CROSS: Let me ask it differently.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. As the chief operating officer, you have responsibilities -- some level of responsibility for overseeing elections in the State; is that right?
A. It depends on how you interpret the question because counties run elections and the level of state involvement is -seems to be at issue on occasion.
Q. And in the situation where a bad actor comes in, exploits a vulnerability to alter votes, literally, the next voter who comes along to that machine catches it, as you sit here, what is your plan? What is the Secretary's plan for dealing with that?

```
A. The normal plan would be they would notify the poll manager. They would then test -- they would probably test that machine. And normally, they would just take it out of service as in any other situation that happened like that, and then election voting would go on as normal.
Q. And so in a situation where a machine is actually confirmed to be flipping votes, your plan is to simply take that one out, assume that all the rest work fine, and continue with the other 30,000 minus one BMD and certify an election?

That's the plan?
A. Well, since they are not connected to each other, one doing one thing has nothing to do with if the other one is doing anything. And if nobody is detecting it, then if there is no -- if people are examining their ballots and they are putting it in there, even if it is only 10 or 20 percent, enough times, it would be noticed because the vast majority of voting in Georgia is done in person on a BMD.
Q. And what is the Secretary's plan if that happens on 20 BMDs in 20 counties on election day?
A. Those --
Q. Pull those 20 BMDs?
A. Pull those 20 BMDs , and then you would probably have to do a deeper investigation to see if something specific happened or if it was a programming error that was somehow, you know, done repeatedly in multiple counties. I doubt that would happen.

I mean, we have seen situations where votes were not cast properly because programming was done wrong because the same thing can happen with a hand-marked paper ballot.

If something happened like in DeKalb County where they had a cascading set of efforts that were human error on redistricting. Then a person withdrew from the race, and not all the scanners were calibrated properly to look for three votes -- three candidates instead of four candidates.

Same thing happened on an ES\&S machine in Northumberland,

Pennsylvania, where the program was just done incorrectly. And that could be -- and that was, I believe, on -- that was a BMD or the way they had set the ballot positions on the hand-marked as well. I can't remember specifically on that.

But yes, you would take the suspect BMD out of service would be the first and foremost thing you would do, and then you would obviously make sure people review their ballots before they go on to the other ones.
Q. Has the Secretary's office identified a threshold, a tipping point to which enough BMDs are confirmed to be altering votes on election day that you don't proceed with the election, you don't certify the results?
A. What would happen then, if we saw a lot of that happening and all over the place or in a particular county, at that point you may move to other emergency procedures which would be use, unfortunately, hand-marked paper ballots, or you wouldn't do ballot activation codes because that is about encoding the machines to produce the proper ballots. I got my note here. COURT REPORTER: Read it.

THE WITNESS: Trying.
So you would take them out of service. And then, obviously, you would have to look closely at it to make sure nothing happened on the other ballots potentially in that precinct or on the other ones because, again, it just depends if it's early voting or election day voting. Election day
voting, they are programmed on the scanners to only accept the ballots from those -- oh, sorry. The BMDs are programmed to only do the ballots for that particular precinct, so you have to be very specific.

Early voting is a different situation because the BMD is programmed with every county ballot style, and these scanners would be getting every -- could accept every ballot style. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Fair to say the State does not have any written plan for how to deal with this situation except for going to the emergency hand-marked paper ballots as you just mentioned; is that right?
A. If there was multiple situations like that?

Again, these things don't happen --
Q. Or even just one?
A. If it is just one, we have machines that go out, you take them out of service. That is not unheard of. And again, if we saw there is a programming error, that would be a situation. We have seen programming errors on the first of day of an election on early voting and had to go through and, you know, make sure it was done properly. But that has its risks in and of itself too.
Q. Mr. Germany, I'm sorry to interrupt. I'm asking a very specific question.
A. Germany or Sterling?
Q. Oh, sorry. Sorry.
A. We don't look very much alike. My hair is much lighter, and I'm a lot heavier.
Q. I had to interrupt both of you, so it was in my head. Sorry. That is all it is.

Mr. Sterling, my specific question was: There is not a written plan you can direct the Court to that says, step by step, here is what we do if it is detected on election day or an early voting that a BMD is altering votes whether it is a glitch or a hack?

It could be either one. There is no written plan you could walk --
A. I believe we have a written plan saying if you have a situation with a BMD, whether it is flipping votes or non-functionality, remove them from service. That is step one.

After that, it would escalate, and I don't -- I don't think we have a written plan.
Q. It is --
A. I'm trying to go through my head to see if we do have a written document. I don't think we do. We've had discussions around what we would do in those situations, but I don't think it is finalized because it is a hypothetical of several different things.

And the things we've had to address recently, the more
likely scenarios we're worried about are potential shooters at a location. These are things that -- when you -- we're about balancing risks. Okay? And the risks of this from our point of view is technically difficult and hard to do without being detected, so it is pretty low overall.

But the risk of three guys getting together and saying, I'm going to open fire at a minority polling location in Georgia and then Mississippi and then in Texas, a lot higher. How do we deal with those situations?

So we have -- I mean, I'm going to get far afield of your question. I apologize. But there is not a written plan, as \(I\) sit right here today. But do we have our common sense things we do and the basics of if a BMD goes out? Yes.
Q. So you said that if there were a BMD where it was shown to be not recording votes accurately, step one is to pull the BMD out of service?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And so the voters who voted on that BMD in the morning, they are just -- they are just out of luck for that election?
A. Well, again, it would depend. It would depend. I mean, if you said -- your hypothetical was they got detected immediately, so we wouldn't have to worry about that, but we wouldn't know that for certain.
Q. Is there a written plan that would say somehow you're
going to go back, identify all the voters who voted on that BMD, and bring them back to vote?

You're going to alert them, you're going to find them on election day.

Is there a plan that says --
A. On election day? No, there is not one around on election day. Because, again --
Q. And you couldn't do that, could you, sir?
A. No. But the same thing, if there is a scanner that does it, we wouldn't know that until after election day. We would have to go back and get some of those people.

We have had situations before in North Georgia where people voted in the wrong place, so they had wrong ballots. And we've had to rerun an election twice because of that.

And again, it was human error based on programming and redistricting. The biggest problem we have with any of these systems is human error on the front end, regardless of the system.
Q. Thank you.

THE COURT: Before we move on --
MR. CROSS: Sorry, Your Honor. I don't think -- I did not move in Exhibit 494, which is the audio -- or the video of Mr. Sterling in April of 2022 saying the Coffee County breach did not happen. So we move that into evidence.

MR. BELINFANTE: Our only objection would be for
completeness. I think it was like two sentences. If there is a larger video available, I know I've seen part of it originally. We would not object to the larger context, and we can work out how long that would be, if that pleases the court.

MR. CROSS: Yeah, we can -- the rest of it \(I\) don't think is relevant, but we're happy for completeness. You can do that.

THE COURT: Before you sit down, just put your books down for a second. All right? That is fine. You can all agree on what -- the actual clip to be submitted because I don't want to be sort of tag-teaming with all of you, and I wanted to -- about this question, I just -- it is sort of a follow-up from one or two of our preceding witnesses.

Did you -- I understood from prior testimony given here that you had asked for Fortalice to prepare a review of the Dominion system or some portion of it, but maybe it was -and this was early on, and \(I\) think it was in particular related to the Poll Pads.

THE WITNESS: I have a recollection of something related to Poll Pads, but \(I\) can't remember exactly what it was at this point.

THE COURT: Do you have, Counsel, that --
MR. CROSS: I'm pulling it right now, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- from the last --
MR. CROSS: Yes.

Yeah. Can we pull, Tony, Exhibit 590? Go down to the start of it.

We have a hard copy. We're going to hand you a hard copy of this.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Is there a question?
I'm not sure where I'm at right now.
THE COURT: That's quite all right.
EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
Q. I guess the first question is: Did you yourself ask for the review of the Poll Pads or anything else that -- by Fortalice?
A. This is now several years ago, so I'll try to put it in the context of what \(I\) was probably thinking.
Q. I know it was.
A. The Poll Pad was the one part of the system that had some kind of internet connectivity, so I was probably asking them to review that.

Now, the Poll Pad as designed then versus the Poll Pad as deployed now are different.
Q. I understand that.
A. But yeah, I might have went to the -- our IT team. I didn't say Fortalice. I might have said, get some smart people
to look at this and tell us how to make this as secure as possible, something along those lines.
Q. Did anyone tell you -- share with you Fortalice's evaluation of that or the rest -- the rest of the matters covered by Fortalice's review -- initial review?
A. I honestly don't recall. I remember that subsequent to this, we talked about using Merakis, which is a specific single source to load the data, all the voter files onto each one of the ones in each one of the counties. That was how we deployed it at that time. I don't know if that came out of this review as a -- you know, a best practice. I just remember that was the outcome at the time.
Q. Well, I guess what I'm trying to find out is: There was some initial Fortalice review of a number of different matters relating to risks.

Did anyone share that report with you that was done in November of '20, I think it is?
A. And November of '20, which would have been in the middle of the election time, I assume?
Q. November 27, 2019. But it, you know -- it is not like it would die in the next three months, but --
A. Well, Your Honor, I understand because, obviously, this is now come of this, and they may have at the time. I don't recall the specifics of it if they did, and it might have easily been somebody walking me through it rather than me
reading it because me reading it probably wouldn't have been very effective because I am not the most technical human alive, so -- but the main thing we were looking at, I don't recall them looking at BMDs and stuff. We had tried -- we had started a process to work with the Cyber Center in Augusta, and then COVID happened, and that never really got off the ground. We were going to give them pristine set of equipment to go on and that's still an ongoing discussion.

But I don't recall specifically me reviewing it. I might have been briefed on it at the time so I could have a better understanding. But most of my time at that point was otherwise occupied in a great effort to defend the outcome of the 2020 election in Georgia.
Q. Well, did you receive reports from -- yourself from Dominion as to what they were doing on security fronts?
A. I had several discussions on them about what that -- in terms of upgrades, what is going to be moving forward, what does the next thing look like. And again, most of these things -- when we talk about cybersecurity, my biggest concern at the time were things that were front-facing connected to the internet, which would have been the voter registration system and the Poll Pads because those have lots of attack potential vectors.

When it came to the equipment itself, we knew it didn't touch the internet, we knew you had to have physical access.

And again, one of the things that in order to do some of the specific things -- and again, I'm not going to speak to this to Dr. Halderman's or anything else.

When you build a ballot, Georgia has some of the most complicated ballots in America. And building a ballot, we have tens of thousands of them that are built every single time. The most complicated is the primary ballot. The second-most is the general election ballot. And in order to do any kind of -if you gain physical access, you have to have already gotten -the ballot has to have already been built, and most of those are built, at the latest, around 70 days beforehand.

Then you have to know the exact coordinates you're going for because the \(Q R\) code is simply just mirroring the coordinates. And even in a perfect environment, we have mistakes that are made on doing these things.

So it is difficult to do it in an undetectable way because you're having to go for specific precincts and specific polling locations except during the early voting period.
Q. All right. I'm really -- I'm not -- that is really -- I understand.
A. I'm trying to --
Q. I think what I am trying to understand is this, is that we have had testimony in this court on one hand that Mr. Barnes -Michael Barnes is not -- is not responsible for security in the system, and at the same time that Mr. Beaver really said
that -- has testified that it is -- that Dominion was made exclusively responsible for security.

And though we also have -- and then we've also had the situation where it has been made clear by counsel that -- that an initial evaluation done of Fortalice of security risks was protected -- the State has asserted was protected by attorney-client privilege.

So I'm just trying to find out who, first of all, the bottom line would have been responsible for looking at security issues under -- given those circumstances. And I don't have the Secretary here, so I have to -- you are the one I have to ask the question of.
A. I fully understand the rationale for the question, Your Honor.

So again, there are several steps in the process to this. So I'll start out with the fact that when we procured the system, there were several things inside the RFP itself that addressed security, and those were evaluated.

One of the members of our team -- on the evaluation team was the CIO of the Georgia Technology Authority. He was sort of our main person on evaluating those kind of questions.

We also had Merritt Beaver as a subject matter expert on that for the front end for all three of the bidders that came through, so they all had to answer those basic questions of the baseline security. The -- everything we had under HB 316, we
had to procure a system that was EAC-certified. So the EAC looked at all of these things and have baselines across those.

Now, the security, front and foremost for them, not necessarily. It is also accessibility, usability, those kind of things.
Q. I'm basically looking at what happens when it gets implemented not --
A. I'm trying to walk through it all. I apologize if I -I'm not trying to be pedantic. I'm just trying to walk through the whole system, how we view it on our side.

So then we procured the equipment and started distributing it to counties. The first step to almost all cybersecurity -you can ask most experts -- is physical security. By law and by rule, counties have to account for that physical security.

Now, the State backs them up, and actually, in conjunction with the federal government for the last two cycles in a row, we partnered with Department of Homeland Security to go look at the physical access around any of the places where all the State-owned equipment is held in all 159 counties. That is step one.

And we worked with DHS to work with the counties because it is the counties' responsibility to keep that safe. Obviously, Coffee County did not do well on that front.

Beyond that, the cybersecurity side is we work with Dominion. We have some issues around this in terms of the fact
that EAC certification and process takes an extremely long time, but we are also wanting to make sure that our stuff is clean.

So we have gone through -- we use Pro V\&V, which is our
lab. The State pays for them. And they have done post election audits at random locations from random pieces of equipment to do the hash testing and everything.

At the last GAVREO conference, we distributed a new third-party tool to allow for the individuals of the counties to run a hash value test to make sure their EMS has the correct hash value as running what we call the golden record. So the State is working with the county to provide them the tools to do those kind of evaluations.

The L\&A testing is done at the county level, but it is a public process to make sure that --
Q. Are you talking about the logic and accuracy?
A. Logic and accuracy.

And the State builds the ballots. The counties will sign off on the ballots. So the county is kind of holding the State accountable and the State is holding the county accountable for when we build those ballots, which is the first step for keeping these things secure.

So we can't have a bad actor in the State just distributing to the counties and nobody sees how the ballots is actually run. So then the counties have to review those things
and sign off on them. Are there mistakes and errors made? Yes, because there's humans involved in the process. And we do our best to mitigate those, again, given the fact I think we have something close to 18,000 ballot styles on a given day -sorry, 18,000 ballot styles on a given election.

And in the 2020 election, we had 36,000 ballot styles because of the nature of the presidential preference primary and the regular primary. So that is the thing that holds them accountable, the -- on the L\&A side.

Then the cybersecurity overall is State-owned equipment but counties play a vital role throughout. So it is sort of a -- I don't want to call it a partnership necessarily because the legal authority to protect the equipment \(I\) believe lies with the county. I'm not exactly positive how all of that works. I just know that we kind of work together as a team.

We do the training on this. We provide the two-factor authentication to get into our voter registration system. It is not just voting machines. It is the entire ecosystem around that.

We have to make sure that there are APIs where we exchange information with the driver's license bureau comes in properly, the death records coming in, and data management on that. That is a State responsibility. When we push things out into the cellular-based Poll Pad system, we have the voter registration system which goes to another thing called E-Polls which then
runs the Poll Pads statewide.
And one of the advantages -- we chose to make an investment to move to an updated Poll Pad system now because one of the big risks that we can have is people getting the wrong ballots. That is one of the big issues around hand-marked paper, and even around the old BMD system because you checked in on the voter registration system and then you had to go to a separate device to encode the card.

Now you check in on the Poll Pad, and it encodes directly. So the chance of a person picking the wrong ballot style and disenfranchising someone from the bottom part of their ballot is taken away. We can track that through log files all the way through.

That was very advantageous in some municipal elections we just had that were decided by one vote, and there were some people who were concerned they were giving the wrong ballot to people. We were able to verify that every person who voted got the correct ballot.

So that is part of cybersecurity. The machines themselves we train up the State -- unlike in most parts of the United States, we pay for the seals. The State supplies those seals to the counties. We train them on how to use them. We have updated the chain of custody forms.
Q. All right. This is all helpful in stating it, but \(I\) think that my question really ultimately is, is there somebody -- who
is that somebody in the state who -- in your office or in some
other one that is responsible for oversight of security in the
election system to the extent that it is the State's
responsibility?
A. Again, from my point of view, most of this lies in the county level. For the system itself, we have a contract with Dominion. We oversee the contract. But the state -- the Secretary of State's office is consistently making investments trying to make it better.

Is there some individual human being who says, this is your sole position --
Q. Or an office?
A. I don't -- \(I\) can't say for certain on that one. I mean, our office does more than anybody else does, specifically focusing on that up and down the chain, so --
Q. Our office meaning?
A. The Secretary of State's office.
Q. As a whole?
A. As a whole.

And I would say the Elections Division and we -- I have had a budget ask in right now trying to get more cybersecurity people in that -- to pay for, and the Governor's budget, I think, got me one Salesforce person which would oversee the voter registration side. I'm trying to build out with the Secretary's help, and hopefully the Governor and legislators'
help, more individuals to do this right now. But we have right now -- we have systems people, we have Michael, who knows this -- Michael Barnes who knows this -- these up and down better than most, and they build the ballots. That is the entry level section for how you have to deal with security. We have the counties who hold it.
Q. So \(I\) guess the thing is, \(I\) have missed -- I mean, it is just kind of a fundamental question at this point, is that I'm advised that in the last piece of testimony that the State looks to Dominion to be responsible for the security; is --
A. I mean, it depends on how you ask the question, ma'am. For the security of the equipment themselves, that would be the county function; for understanding the threat environment and making updates to software, we don't make updates to software. The vendor would make updates to software. The contracts calls for them to do those things. And we had begun the process of rolling out 5-1-3, which would have addressed many of these items, but we couldn't do that in that period of time.

5-1-7, we did a pilot on. We're moving as quickly as reality allows us to in many ways in a responsible way, because even in the 5-1-7 test, there were issues we have not been able to explain through engineering yet. EMS went out, three of the county ICCs didn't function properly, and that was in five counties on the small number of elections.

So we have to be responsible if we're going to make those
upgrades to understand, how does this system work? Right now, 5.5 works. We had good elections run through it. We have been viewed as one of the best states in the country running elections. Bipartisan Policy Center says we're tied for number one with Colorado.

So we have to live in that actual environment, dealing with the fact that we don't connect to the internet. I mean, as an example, in Florida, all their scanners are connected to the internet, and they view that as a safe risk level. We don't do that. So we know that out of the gate, one of the things we had in our RFP was the -- our voting machines themselves, which is defined under the EAC as those things that create ballots, tabulate ballots, and count ballots and allow for audit of ballots. That is your voting system. And that would be the BMDs, the scanners, and the EMS. The Poll Pads are separate from that verification.

So it is a blended -- it is a blended responsibility under the law and under reality.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any questions in light of mine?

MR. CROSS: Yeah. A couple of things. I do just want to make sure we're not waiving an objection because there was a lot in that very long answer to what seemed like a pretty simple question from the Court about security.

So I would just move to strike the response after he
said the vendor would make updates to software, contracts call them for them to do those things, and then went into 5-1-3, 5-1-7, Florida.

So we believe that is not relevant, hasn't been the subject of discovery, and we would move to strike everything after that to preserve our objections.

MR. BELINFANTE: We would object to the striking, and as the business of government goes on daily, I don't think we can hamstring them from testifying about what is happening today in real ground, and he is providing a full explanation to the question.

THE COURT: Could you get nearer the microphone. Thank you.

MR. BELINFANTE: What --
THE COURT: I understood the first part of your response, but I didn't -- I could not hear the other.

MR. BELINFANTE: Yeah. No. I'm saying in terms of the specific objections, I do think it was responsive in explaining from the witness' perspective the multilevel that goes into security.

In terms of things that were not produced during discovery, discovery ended as to everything but Coffee County effectively last year, and I don't think it is fair for the State to be judged on what it was doing in some cases a year or two ago when we're talking about current threats now. The

State does move on, and these things have to be able to be provided for them to use as a fact-finder.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allow the testimony. I think some of it was not relevant or responsive, but I'm not going to just cut the sentence and that sentence, but -because the question really was, what is the Secretary of State's office in particular doing? Who is in charge of overseeing cybersecurity?

And we got into the relationship with the counties and many other things, and -- of which a substantial number were not relevant, though I understood why from the witness' perspective it described the entire system as a whole and that there is a connection between the counties and the Secretary of State's office.

But since, in fact, the Secretary of State's office is the defendant in this case that -- I'm laser-focused on that, understanding that there may be others involved and clearly are. That is what the challenge is of delivering in such a spread-out system and -- but so is the history of this, who is responsible for what? Who is on first is still an issue in this case. And how is it relayed?

And it sort of goes back to -- you know, you-all had what has been a little -- I don't think that the report done by Fortalice was particularly -- that I previously ruled on after the -- wouldn't have to be disclosed based on attorney-client
privilege. And this was the one done in November 27, 2019, and -- but referenced in the litigation later.

And attorney-client privilege was asserted, and I mean, this is just -- to the extent that the report alerted the Secretary of State's office of particular risks, it might be relevant. And before, \(I\) sort of said, well, since there was a legitimate declaration on the part of Mr. Germany, that as to -- this was -- the purpose of the Fortalice report was internal, basically. Not internal to the department, but to use for outside counsel for defense, that it could properly assert that.

The problem I'm -- the thing I'm worrying about is that the more \(I\) have heard and think that the evidence is a little bit confusing as to what was done -- the sequence of what was done in terms of risk assessment and how to act on it, the more relevant this report, even as thin as it may be, might be greater.

So I'm not going to rule on that, but, you know, I will -- if after today -- because it is 20 after 5:00, or if after we are through with the testimony the plaintiff wants to at some point make an argument for me to reconsider, I would listen to it on the grounds of whether there's substantial -at this point a substantial need for it and substantial and/or some equivalent. So that is under Rule \(26(3)(A)(i i)\) that they would have to show that the party had substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot waive undue -- so whether that is really all the factors have been satisfied, but I'm not going to rule on that.

And it is not -- this is not like it is a -- at this juncture -- and what I was going to say, it is not like this is a big find, frankly. But to the extent it is relevant and you haven't been able -- and it is -- the record has now become kind of foggy about what people knew about risks and how they acted upon it and whether -- and who was responsible for checking on things, I'll let you make any argument you want.

I appreciate the witness', though, perspective of how he believes that they are addressing all the security concerns that you have raised. All right.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, there were two quick things my team just reminded me in my effort to cut stuff, if I could do two quick things.

THE COURT: All right.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Sterling, if you just flip to Tab 21 in the binder real quick.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you can flip through it, but just tell me, do you recognize this as a copy of Dr. Halderman's report prepared on July 1, 2021, with the assistance of Dr. Drew Springall?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recognize this report you reviewed before your October deposition, except this one has some redactions in it would be the difference?
A. I don't remember the Secure the Vote stuff being in the back, but on the front part of it, it does look like the report, yes. That would be the logic and accuracy procedures. I don't recall that being part of the report that I reviewed.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move to introduce Exhibit 425.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, we object on the grounds it is hearsay. Dr. Halderman, as I understand it, will be here to testify Thursday. He can do this. There is no reason for Mr. Sterling to do it, and it doesn't alleviate the hearsay problem.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, the report is not offered for the truth. Mr. Belinfante is exactly right. Dr. Halderman will be here to testify. Why we want to offer it is because it was available to the State in July of 2021; identifies vulnerabilities. We need it in the record to show what they were on notice of.

True or not, they were on notice of what was said there, and that is an important part of the security -- what we would argue shows a lack of an indifference towards security, is how I would put it.

THE COURT: Well, it is admitted for that purpose.
And I trust without any doubt that you're going to verify it, that it is not hearsay.

MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Last thing, Mr. Sterling.

Do you recall in August of 2021 you were at the Sandy Springs Perimeter Chamber of Commerce and you got asked a question about Dr. Halderman's report?
A. From State Representative Roberts, yes.
Q. And your reaction was to say that Dr. Halderman's report was, in your words, and I quote, a load of crap?
A. Correct.
Q. And in August of 2021, you had never read his report; right, sir?
A. That is correct.

MR. CROSS: No further questions at this time.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, since we're changing
counsel real quick, can I run to the restroom?
THE COURT: Yes, you can.
If anyone else needs to go, go now or forever hold your peace until 5:30.
(A brief break was taken at 4:40 PM.)
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we have some logistics questions when you have a moment.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CROSS: I think our thought was that the
Coalition -- well, let me ask you this.
Does Your Honor have flexibility to go a little bit later today? And the reason we ask is we were thinking the Coalition could get their examination done today of Mr. Sterling. And then since Mr. Persinger is here, we could turn to that and try to knock that out briefly and get all that done today. But it may take us a little past 5:30.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: I can't imagine Mr. Persinger is going to be long.

MR. CROSS: That's what I thought. I think it's going to be short.

THE COURT: So if you can end it -- I mean, we have a -- we'll give it our best try without driving the most valuable member of our team crazy.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, just so we're clear, Mr. Mashburn [sic] has been here all day pursuant to the subpoena waiting for that. That is also why we would like to not have him drive all the way back up to North Georgia and then all the way back.

THE COURT: That's fine.
MR. TYSON: I'm sorry. What did I say? I'm sorry. Mr. Persinger. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I figured that is what you meant.
MR. TYSON: Mashburn has been here for the third time this afternoon as well, but he has now left. THE COURT: Good. Well, there's not going to be that much traffic today, given how it started.

MR. OLES: Just for the record, I'm going to have a few questions for Mr. Sterling.

THE COURT: All right.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Sterling. I'm Robert McGuire. I represent the Coalition for Good Governance. I think we've met once by Zoom on deposition.
A. I think it was Zoom, yes, sir.
Q. Briefly, yes.

So I wanted to pick up where Mr. Cross left off on just a couple of things and then turn to what I wanted to ask.

First of all, you mentioned Northumberland.
Did you mean Northampton, Pennsylvania?
A. Yes, I did. I'm sorry.
Q. And you also, I think, mentioned Senate Bill 222 was a law that adopted audits or changed audits?
A. I could have been wrong on the number, but it was passed in the '23 cycle.
Q. Is it possible that was Senate Bill 129?
A. It is possible. That is likely, actually. Now, since you're telling me that, I'm making the assumption that you have looked at it.
Q. You wouldn't be surprised if I told you Senate Bill 222 doesn't have the word audits in it?
A. No, I wouldn't.
Q. Now, you mentioned in that connection with Senate Bill, let's say, 129, you mentioned that that law provides now for an audit in every federal election and every statewide election.
A. I corrected myself, I thought, in realtime. In a federal cycle, it would be a federal race done, and any statewide, there would be like -- as in the PPP, there will be one because it is a federal race. Now, if it is a Senate election, there will be one statewide race, that kind of thing.
Q. And so just to clarify, there is only one contest on the ballot that is going to be audited in each of those elections?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So it is not the whole ballot?
A. No, sir. And as I stated before, I would like to see more audits done on smaller races down on a variable rate. We've argued for that internally for the last three legislatures. Q. You also said -- you know, I'm just going to reconcile this.

You said at the beginning of your testimony with
Mr. Cross, you said that ballot-on-demand printers are prone to
human error unlike the system we have now?
A. Correct.
Q. But then at the end of the testimony, you said the biggest problem we have is human error on the front end.
A. Yes.
Q. So human error is a problem with BMDs one way or the other; right?
A. No, sir. And in the context that \(I\) was explaining that in, is in an early vote environment, you are much more prone to human error on giving a ballot to an individual as they are standing there in front of you to vote. You may have a ballot that looks similar, and especially in a place like Fulton where there are thousands of them, or a ballot code that would be doing from the ballot-on-demand printer for that purpose. And the current configuration with the Poll Pads now, as I was explaining before, you're checked in on the same device that encodes your card and in the record we know --

THE COURT: Go slow, slow, slow.
THE WITNESS: We know 100 percent that you got the correct ballot barring a redistricting error by somebody, but we have used -- we are using GEO coding tools to avoid that, or just a typo of a county clerk somewhere before it gets to that point.

But it is much less likely to get the wrong ballot in early voting under our current configuration of the system so
that they are fully enfranchised from the ballot versus a ballot-on-demand system.

BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. So you are just talking about early voting?
A. Yes, because on election day, you have to be in your polling location to get that, so they only have those ballots available.
Q. So you're not testifying that BMDs get rid of the problem of human error?
A. Well, there is one other thing -- let me recharacterize this. With the -- you still -- in a polling location, you could have multiple ballot styles. Take Rabun County for instance. They have a single polling location for everybody, so you could still have that problem.

With the current configuration of using the Poll Pad to encode the card as you are checked in, that does eliminate human error barring somebody having redistricted improperly, you know, a year or two or ten years before.
Q. So let me ask another thing.

You talked a little bit about -- with Mr. Cross about errors that would occur during -- during an ongoing election and how those would be fixed or spotted.

Do you recall testifying about pulling a BMD out if it is not functioning right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I think you said there were no -- there was no written policy on what level of problem would cause you to start pulling BMDs or to recommend not running the BMD election on BMDs; correct?
A. As I understand it from our guidance to counties, if there is a problem with a BMD and they can't make it seem to function properly, they are to remove it. It is just easier to do that than try to, for lack of a better word, futz around with it to get it going; right? So it is easier to remove the one out of commission.
Q. Are there instructions to poll workers as to what the threshold level is of problems before they take action like that?
A. I believe it is basically poll managers' best judgment if there is an issue to remove, but there may be. I'm not positive.
Q. And what would keep, like, bad actors, people who have malicious intent from just coming in and claiming that the BMDs are flipping votes and causing them to be taken out of service for that reason?
A. Nothing.
Q. So you're COO of the Secretary of State's office; correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And CFO?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And director of licensing?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that there was a flat leadership structure in the office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that the way decisions are made is you would come to a consensus?
A. Generally speaking, yes.
Q. And the Secretary then makes the decision?
A. He is in on the discussions. So very rarely is there a time when there is any level of real disagreement that \(I\) can recall. I know there has been, but I couldn't speak to specifically what they were.
Q. When it comes to election issues, who is in that consensus group?
A. Generally, the general counsel, myself, the deputy, and the Secretary. For specific issues, we would bring in our deputy director over CES and the director of elections.
Q. So when it came to choosing the current Dominion voting system that Georgia uses, is that the way that system was selected, through that consensus process?
A. No, sir.
Q. How did that decision get made?
A. HB 316 was passed and -- well, it passed the House and the Senate in the same version sometime, I believe, in March of
2019. During the same period of time from January 14th up to about that date, our office was working to put together an RFP process in conjunction with the Department of Administrative Services following the Georgia procurement law. In that, we set a 25 percent basis of points on cost and 75 percent basis on technicals. There was a varied team put together of experts in different fields, large county administrators, small county administrators, people from the -- a person from the Department of Behavioral Disabilities -- I can't ever remember the full acronym for them.

I'm trying to think. Several people, the CIO for GTA. Let's see. A local judge. I'm trying to think -- I can't remember the exact number of the team, but that is the way the Georgia procurement law does it. You have to have a team that evaluates them and does technicals, and they score the written responses, but we also had three demonstrations by the active bidders, and it was done through a scoring system based on that.

And in the initial round of procurement, Dominion was ahead overall slightly behind ES\&S, who had been the incumbent provider by a few points. But they were much more expensive. And I'm going to guesstimate around the differences in cost. It was something 122 million to 98 million. It was on that scale. That is not the exact number. I couldn't tell you exactly that.

So then it was decided that we had two bidders that had met the obligations to go to a best and final offer. Smartmatic was nowhere near. They're terrible at technicals, and their prices were well-above anything on that front.

So Ryan Germany and I went to negotiate with the teams from both Dominion and ES\&S. And at that point, technicals cannot change. The technicals are -- that number is set. They can't change those. So we basically told them both, sharpen your pencils, the other side knows the basics of where you are, you know where you are. So basically, we told Dominion, yes, you are better on price right now, but ES\&S knows that, and they're better on technicals, so you better get your cost down.

And we went to ES\&S and said, yes, you are better on technicals, but your price is too high. You better get your price down.

And at the end, Dominion lowered their price, ES\&S lowered their price, so on the points based on the Georgia procurement law following the DOS regulations, Dominion was declared the winner of the bid and there was no -- one of the best parts of that was there was no bid protest following that, which was surprising to us.
Q. Now, HB 316 required Georgia to use BMDs; right?
A. Correct.
Q. But it didn't require Georgia to use BMDs with \(Q R\) codes?
A. Correct.
Q. That was a choice that the Secretary's office made when it looked at the bids?
A. All three bidders had barcodes or \(Q R\) codes. No bidders had other technology.
Q. Now, not all BMD systems use QR codes; right?
A. Correct.
Q. So there's, for example, Hart, which doesn't use \(Q R\) codes?
A. But they did not submit a bid.
Q. Isn't it true that their bid was just like a couple of minutes late after the deadline?
A. No, sir. It was -- they started loading it, I think, at 10:30 the previous night, even though we had pre-bid conference saying please start yourself a couple of weeks early because our system is slow. They knew the rules. They called about two or three hours after the bid had closed to ask if it had made it in. Not even all parts of it had.

So they didn't respond. They -- we can't reopen a bid. They didn't follow the procurement law, so therefore they were not considered a responsive bidder.
Q. You permitted the other bidders to change their bids after they were submitted, though?
A. No, sir.
Q. Well, weren't you just talking about changing the price, altering those kinds of terms?
A. Okay. That is how the system is -- the law is written.

You can -- the technicals are the technicals, and they have deadlines and timelines they have to meet. If you don't meet those deadlines and timelines, you're not considered a responsive bidder. And there is -- I don't know if the video still exists on YouTube, but our procurement officer basically said, if you were late, you will be -- not responsive, you will not be reviewed. And she said something about four or five different things.

So Hart didn't meet that; therefore, they were not an eligible bidder, so therefore they were not reviewed. So the only options available under the law were three different systems, all of which used either a \(Q R\) code or a barcode.
Q. Was that something that the Secretary's office was unhappy about?
A. We always want to have the most qualified bidders available.
Q. Is that -- were you dissatisfied?
A. I would have preferred to have as many bidders available who had any technology. I personally didn't care.
Q. Would you have preferred to have a bidder that did not have a \(Q R\) code as part of their system?
A. As I just stated, I didn't care. Because of the time, I wanted to have as many bidders as possible.
Q. Now, and election director Chris Harvey, was he heavily involved in that process of selecting the winning system?
A. Again, in our office, we intentionally didn't want to have the review committee be \(S O S\) staff heavy. We had Kevin -- I'm totally blanking on his last name right now -- who was our deputy. He was the deputy director of elections and deputy general counsel. Kevin -- \(I\) keep thinking Robertson. That's not right. It is Kevin. He is at the post office now. I'm blanking.

But he was one of them. Jordan Fuchs was one. And Merritt Beaver and \(I\) were in the room, but only as subject matter experts. We could not speak on anything unless it was specific to that. So \(I\) was there for the business stuff, he was there for some of the IT technicals.

But it was those -- I believe it was seven -- I could be wrong -- it was seven people who made that decision based on following Georgia procurement law.
Q. And it wouldn't surprise you to know that Chris Harvey testified last week that he didn't know why this particular system had been chosen?
A. No, it wouldn't because that wasn't really a role he had in the system. He knows we followed Georgia procurement law, I assume.

MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, may I approach, please?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Mr. Sterling, I'm showing you what has been marked as

Coalition Plaintiffs' Exhibit 60.
Do you recognize that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That is your Tweet about Northampton, Pennsylvania; right?
A. Yes, sir.

MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, I move to admit
Plaintiffs' -- Coalition Plaintiffs' Exhibit 60.
MR. BELINFANTE: No objection.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. Now, Mr. Sterling, your Tweet here says, issues that affected ES\&S machines in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, was a human error in programming, should have been caught in two processes prior to election. It was identified, and courts have allowed a process to count all votes correctly.

Everyone's vote will count.
Did I read that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, ES\&S BMDs pretty much operate like Georgia's BMDs; right?
A. I honestly couldn't tell you.
Q. They had a screen?
A. I don't know how ES\&S machines operate. I can remember the version of this one. There is a very fundamental difference in their's is the fact, if I remember correctly,
they take a ballot, they give you a piece of paper with a notch on the side of it, you insert it into their -- I can't remember the name of the particular piece of equipment. You make your selections, it spits it back out, you look at it, and I believe you put it back into the same machine.

So that was a fundamental difference. We would go to a different scanner altogether not contained in the same section.
Q. But in principle, it prints out a ballot based on your touch screen selections; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then that ballot gets scanned and counted?
A. After you review it -- as I understand it, it spits it back out to you, you review it, then you place it back in, yes. Q. And this Northampton system was that the runner-up to the Georgia system that you were just talking about, the ES\&S?
A. I know ES\&S was the runner-up. Whether it is the same BMD system or not, I could not say.
Q. Now, in Northampton, the problem with the ES\&S system was that the BMD printout showed the wrong votes being selected on two judicial retention races; right?
A. Again, it depends. Because of the way they had set up the ballot -- and this is what goes back to their L\&A testing being insufficient to what they were doing -- they essentially inverted both individual judges. So if you chose yes for both judges, it didn't matter. If you chose no for both judges, it
didn't matter. But if you said yes for one judge and no for the other judge, that is when it became apparent.

So they likely did one or over one, two over two, instead of doing -- when I say this, you are touching the screen to get variability during L\&A. That is what you're supposed to be able to do. They obviously didn't do that. They just did yes, yes, no, no, and therefore it wasn't detectable because the outcomes were the same. Only when you had a yes and a no did that -- did it become apparent that that was happening. This should have been caught at the ballot build and in the L\&A section.
Q. So it is definitely an error, a human programming error?
A. Correct.
Q. That error was detected because when people got their ballot summary, the printout, the text version, they saw if they voted differently that the votes were flipped?
A. Correct.
Q. And so anyone observing and paying attention would have seen that?
A. Correct.
Q. On the \(Q R\) code on those ballots, was it flipped?
A. Yes -- or no. This is what I don't know. There are two different things you're programming. You program the \(Q R\) work flow, and you program the work flow for the ballot. They are -- there are two different ways of doing this, and the way
that ES\&S does it, if \(I\) understand correctly -- I'm not going to speculate on this because somebody walked me through this, and it is somehow different from our system, but I don't want to give specifics on it because I'm not a deeply technical person on this. I wanted to understand it because an attack on election equipment anywhere in America is an attack on election equipment everywhere in America. So that is why I did that Tweet, to begin with.
Q. But the bottom line, though, is that isn't it true the \(Q R\) code had the right votes and the text summary in some cases had the wrong votes?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay.
A. The main thing -- I'm sorry.

I was pointing out that the courts intervened to allow the votes to be counted properly, and the election outcome was correct. That was my main point about this.
Q. And isn't it true that the way they dealt with that was they instructed voters just to ignore if the votes were switched on the text summary?
A. I believe that was correct. And also, I was frustrated when learning about this, that they had discovered this days or weeks beforehand that -- and that was their fix was just to tell people to ignore that on election day.
Q. So this a real world example of a barcode and a text
summary not always matching; right?
A. Because of human error, yes.
Q. And this error was caught because voters noticed?
A. Yes.
Q. There was no hacking? It was just a mistake in programming?
A. A human error in programming, yes.
Q. Now, you said earlier you were familiar with Professor Halderman's work on the BMDs here?
A. Yes. Just from reading his report, yes.
Q. Excuse me?
A. Just from reading his report, yes.
Q. And you are familiar from reading his report that he was able to develop a hack in which he was able to alter the \(Q R\) code from what the voter chose but print out on the text summary something that matched what the voter chose?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in that situation, the voters wouldn't know that the QR code was wrong; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Have you given thought to how things might play out here in Georgia if something like the Northampton situation or the Halderman \(Q R\) code hack were to happen in one of the upcoming elections in 2024?
A. We have a real world example of what happened in DeKalb

\section*{County.}
Q. Tell me about that.
A. There was a human programming error, but we were able to use the paper to get to the final outcome being correct. Now, an audit would potentially catch a switch between a \(Q R\) code and the readable section of it, which is why I think we should have more audits. But it depends on the level we get to. You may have to have a revote, potentially. You would have to go through the certification questions around that. We've thought through what would happen in such a situation.

But at the same time, you would have to think through if somebody attacked a scanner and did the same thing because then your ballots wouldn't match the tape that comes out, they wouldn't match the EMS. All of these are true regardless of the systems that you have. There could be things that can happen and can be done to alter the outcomes of elections, but all of them are, from our point of view, highly difficult to actually achieve in an undetectable way, which I said, we have protective, detective, and then recovery. And the biggest recovery of all is, as we saw where there was redirecting errors in North Georgia, is they reran the election twice because they did the same thing -- they had the same human redistricting errors twice in the same location.
Q. So we don't run out of time, I'm just going to ask you questions and ask you to just keep the answers a little
shorter. Okay?
If you can just focus on just the -- I'll give you a chance to -- I'll ask further questions. But if you can just answer what I'm asking, then I'll give you a chance to explain unless it is not something that I want to pursue. Okay?

So let's say that there is a \(Q R\) code that doesn't match the text code on the ballot in Georgia.

The voters won't catch that; right?
A. No.
Q. They can't catch it?
A. No.
Q. So the only way that is going to get caught is if that particular contest gets audited; right?
A. Yes. Of course, if there is a programming error on a hand-marked ballot, they can't catch that either.
Q. Now, in an audit, what text on a BMD ballot card gets counted?
A. Whichever contest is being reviewed.
Q. But -- and I'm sorry, I might have asked that question wrong.

In an audit, what part of the BMD ballot card is getting counted?
A. The human readable section.
Q. So it is different than the part that the machines count on the initial count?
A. Of course. That is the intent.
Q. And given that we're only talking about auditing one contest per ballot, right, doesn't it seem unlikely that a \(Q R\) code problem will be caught at all?
A. Again, it depends.
Q. And if the audit does run and it looks at the contest where there is a \(Q R\) code problem and it catches it, there is no legal consequence to that, is there?

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. Calls for legal
conclusion.
MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, I think he's got to be able to talk about his planning for this stuff to happen in Georgia, and this is one of the contingencies that they obviously would have considered.

THE COURT: I think he can testify about that. I mean, while it is not 100 percent sure what the legal consequence would be, he certainly can state an opinion based on his experience.

THE WITNESS: The legal consequence would be, under the law, you can't -- any losing candidate can demand an election challenge, which if it rose to that level, they could attempt to do to show that enough ballots were potentially affected by that, so you would go to the courts using that. BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. So they would have to bring a contest?
A. Yes.
Q. And contests have super tight time frames, legally speaking; right?
A. It has to be done post certification, but I'm not sure of the timeline after that because, as an example in the North Georgia case, they simply just continued to do re-votes until they got an election where the data was correct.
Q. There is not usually discovery in election contests, is there?
A. I don't have any idea.
Q. And if there was a re-count, let's say, the re-count is going to count what part of the BMD ballot?
A. Under the law, it would be the \(Q R\) code.
Q. So the re-count would produce the same count as the initial count even if the \(Q R\) code is wrong?
A. Again, it depends because 100 percent of our ballots aren't BMD ballots, and invariably, if we have re-counts, there are always slight variations. People lose ballots, things scan differently, adjudication is done differently, hand-marked ballots, so forth and so on.
Q. Now, you're confident that these are sufficient protections against the possibility of a hack that would have attacked the BMD system?
A. Well, we have an additional -- there's a few things that we have done based on the CISA requests or advisory.
Q. Let me just ask you, these are things that are existing in current law today that you're about to tell me?
A. It doesn't have to be law. We can do things without having to make them legal. We can do them by rule, we can do them by practice. Like, again, we now moved to Read Once -- I mean, Write Once, Read Many for election projects. That was one of the things that CISA asked us to do. We are moving to parallel monitoring which will be able to catch --
Q. I'm going to you stop there if I can, please, because that is not in rule or regulation today, is it?
A. It is -- okay. As I'm pointing out, it doesn't have to be in a rule or regulation for the Secretary's office to do it, so we are doing it. We are doing parallel monitoring in the upcoming elections which would be able to identify if there was -- if the BMD was not producing ballots as done based on the test decks that we put out there.
Q. So if you have a BMD that is not working in the middle of a live election and you pull it because it is not working, what happens to all of the voters I think -- let's say this happens in the middle of the day.

What happens to all of the voters who have already cast their ballots on that machine?
A. Well, you said not working. You mean, they are not working, like, at all, or they are flipping votes, or what is your question?
Q. If you decide there is something wrong with it and it has to be taken out of service, what happens to all of the voters who have already voted on that machine that day?
A. Okay. Again, you're supposing something here. We take machines out all the time without there being flipping of votes. That is not an unheard thing. If it is printing slow, it is flashing, it is going offline, we take it out of service, period.

Now, if there is one that does that, that recovery from that would have to be -- we would probably have to review those ballots, but I don't know the exact rule or law that would cover that.
Q. So -- but you would agree there is a difference between taking a machine out of service because it might have a glitch that causes it to not function properly in terms of producing a ballot, for example, on one hand and a machine that you have to take out of service because it might be doing the Northampton thing where it is flipping votes on the other hand?
A. It would be, but, of course, I have not seen that in Georgia in a real world environment before.
Q. So if you did have to take a BMD out of service and you thought that it was because it had been hacked or misprogrammed, how would you know reliably what the voter did on the touch screen with respect to any of the ballots that had already been printed from that BMD?
A. I believe there is a log file that would do that, but it doesn't have a cast vote record, so I couldn't know for certain. The cast vote record is kept on the scanner itself. Q. The log file doesn't keep track of what voter touches what spot on the screen?
A. I don't recall if my question -- answer. I do not know. I cannot recall right now.
Q. Do you recall appearing on the Atlanta Journal

Constitution's Politically Georgia podcast that aired two Fridays ago?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall saying on that podcast -- I'm going to quote you -- think of the ballot-marking device as a really big expensive pen?

Do you remember saying that?
A. Yes.
Q. Doesn't that analogy ignore that with a pen you are the one doing the writing?
A. No, sir.

In that same context, if a hand-marked ballot is done and the program is running, the voter would then again not have any way of knowing that because they don't know how the scanner --

THE COURT: Wait a second. I can't understand
anything you are saying at the moment. Just go slower.
So you started saying, no, sir, in that same context,
```

and then we're off to --

```

THE WITNESS: Same context, a voter cannot read a hand-marked paper ballot to know how the scanner is going to read it. There's two ways that a ballot is read, by the human eye and then by the computer that is programmed to do that. So if the programming is done backward or incorrectly, it would be -- it would not -- the voter does not know for certain how that is done. BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. That is counting the vote; right?
A. Or potentially casting the vote. Human beings are invariably terrible at doing some of those things. Like, A BMD ballot is more reviewable by some academic standards than a hand-marked paper ballot is because there are two very different functions going on, but I don't want to get too in the weeds on that right now.
Q. Reviewing a ballot is just about verifying that what is recorded is what the voter actually intended to vote; right?
A. By what the voter does, yes.
Q. So recording a ballot -- recording a vote is different than counting a vote?
A. Correct.
Q. So you would agree with me that with paper ballots, when the voter is using a pen to fill in an oval, the voter is recording their own vote?
A. As long as they don't put a stray mark somewhere, yes.
Q. Do you recall saying on the podcast that the reason we do it that way -- meaning the reason Georgia uses BMDs -- is, quote, we avoid undervotes, we avoid overvotes, and those are the real big problem with hand-marked paper ballots, end quote?

Do you recall saying that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now undervotes can be deliberate; right?
A. Yes.
Q. I might not want to vote for any of the jokers running for dog catcher, for example?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If I'm a Georgia voter, I might want to skip races?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I'm entitled to do that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So it is fair to say, isn't it, that the State has no interest in making me vote on contests I don't want to cast a vote in?
A. I think you're misinterpreting my statement.
Q. It is fair to say that the State doesn't have any interest in doing that; right?
A. Actually, with the way you phrase your question, no, I think the State, by using a BMD, is giving a voter guidance to make sure they are making that decision, not simply
accidentally making the decision to skip an election.
Q. It is prompting them?
A. Prompting them, yes, sir.
Q. Reminding them, you left this blank, is that a mistake?
A. Correct.
Q. But if \(I\) do want to leave it blank, the State has no interest in making me vote that contest?
A. No, sir.
Q. As far as overvotes, your concern about avoiding those doesn't apply to hand-marked paper ballots that are marked and voted in person at a polling place, does it?
A. Yes, sir, it does.
Q. Well, a voter who completes a hand-marked paper ballot in a polling place won't be able to cast an overvoted ballot into the scanner, will they?
A. They can choose to.
Q. Well, the scanner will kick the ballot back out, though; right?
A. But then they can say, go ahead and scan it.
Q. So isn't that the kind of prompt that the BMD gave you when it was an undervote?
A. Here is the issue again in the real world. And this is going to be anecdotal. I have talked to people from Florida and Virginia who basically say it spits it back out to people and the general reaction is you can go back.
```

    MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I'm sorry. This is all
    hearsay. It is also not responsive to the question that was
    asked.
            THE COURT: Well, it is hearsay. I mean, there is
    probably a way of eliciting it or allowing the witness to
explain his answer without getting into all the hearsay.
So why don't you ask the question again and focus
the -- refocus the witness on providing non-hearsay
information.
BY MR. MCGUIRE:
Q. So when a voter in a polling place casting a hand-marked
paper ballot goes to scan it, it gets kicked out; right?
A. It can, yes.
Q. And that gives the voter a chance to look over and correct
the overvote if they want to?

```
A. If they so choose.
Q. Okay. So any concern that hand-marked paper ballots allow overvotes, meaning overvotes not subject to correction by the voter, only applies to absentee ballots; right?
A. Again, an issue is human beings generally, I'm done, I want to get out of here. And they will often just go ahead and do the overvote and not caring because they don't want to go back and be embarrassed. They don't have time. They have completed their process. And --
Q. And that same motivation might cause a voter not to even
verify their ballot on a BMD; right?
A. Not necessarily. Again, two different styles of voting have two different behavioral patterns to them. Neither one is perfect or best. I just feel like our system is better for protecting against those problems that existed previously in Georgia.
Q. You also told the Politically Georgia podcast in that same appearance that BMDs were more secure than hand-marked paper ballots because it is difficult to change things on BMD ballots. You said, quote, if there's ever a place where you could have potential voter fraud, it is on hand-marked paper ballots because it is very easy to go in and overvote it, end quote.

Do you recall saying that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you talk about people going in and overvoting someone else's ballot, are you talking about that happening before the ballot gets to the election office?
A. It could happen before it gets to the election office, when it gets to the election office. If somebody has access to those ballots, either legally or illegally, they could quickly and easily with no threshold of knowledge be able to overvote certain contests on those ballots. It is much easier to do.
Q. That concern only applies to absentee hand-marked paper ballots; right?
A. No, sir.
Q. Well, how do you get between the voter who has just filled it out and is walking over to the scanner to put it in and change their ballot?
A. Because if it goes to a contest after the fact or when it is held afterwards, the initial count may be correct, but if somebody wants to, again, cause chaos or problems, they could decide to slightly hit those ballots. We wouldn't know which ones were there. We could lose the ballot images, potentially, and -- but yes, the biggest threat is always going to be hand-marked absentee ballots. In person, the risk is lower but still exists.
Q. I mean, that same risk would exist for BMD ballots which could be destroyed, for example, after they are counted; right?
A. We still have the ballot images.

The other thing that could happen is if you use an emergency bin, those would then be scanned centrally and not necessarily scanned on-site. These are, again, all different levels of risk at different times.
Q. And in all of these circumstances, you are really talking about fraud by election workers?
A. It would, generally speaking, have to be an inside actor, which is always your highest level of risk because it is hard to detect until after the fact.
Q. And if you are talking about fraud by election workers,

BMD-printed ballots aren't any safer from mischief in the back office than paper ballots are?
A. The physical ballots themselves are, yes, because there is no real way to alter a BMD ballot or produce them without having some kind of record or trail that exists somewhere on some BMD.
Q. You told Mr. Cross -- I think your quote was, chaos begets people mistrusting the outcome of elections; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So it is a vital state interest that people should trust the outcome of their elections; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Sterling, the Secretary's office has called some of the plaintiffs, if not all of them, election deniers.

I think you confirmed that earlier; right?
A. Or like election deniers or election -- (unintelligible). I'm not exactly sure of all of the different terms that have been used.
Q. If a BMD ballot was to be over-marked by somebody after it had been cast, would that spoil it?
A. I don't know how you over-mark a BMD ballot.
Q. Well, if you fill in an oval on the BMD card after it has been tabulated, it is sitting in there, you go in and fill in the race, I think that was your concern about absentee ballots; right?
A. Sir, I am now lost because there are not ovals on a BMD ballot.
Q. Yeah, fair enough. Fair enough. Sorry. That is a good point.

Could they go and spoil the BMD ballot by making marks on the \(Q R\) code?
A. If such a thing happened, that would be pretty noticeable and we would probably do a duplication of that in the election office from the written human readable portion.
Q. How are you going to identify the particular ballot? Is that stored in the log file, some kind of thing that connects the paper to what is happening on the machine?
A. No. Your example was they have a BMD ballot, a physical ballot. They have then done something to the QR code. It wouldn't scan. The human could look at that and say someone has gotten a Sharpie on this to block out some of these things. If we can see the human readable section of it, we will duplicate that ballot.

It is just the same thing as if a ballot -- an absentee ballot was put through an opening device and was cut in half, we would duplicate that ballot normally on BMD in most counties and then keep the original record of that tied back to that ballot to be counted properly.
Q. Let me jump back just to election denier point, and then I'll wrap up.

What is an election denier?
A. In general, a person who denies the outcome of an election based not necessarily on fact but on theory and not evidence.
Q. Now, Jordan Fuchs works in your office?
A. Jordan Fuchs is the deputy secretary, yes.
Q. Isn't it true that she called your co-defendant, Edward Lindsey, an election denier at some time in the last week?
A. I do not believe that she was referring necessarily to Ed Lindsey, but some of the things being done for that because of the move to investigate the Secretary's office in an unconstitutional manner.
Q. Isn't it true that election deniers is really just a slur that you use to de-legitimize concerns about the voting system?
A. No, sir.

MR. McGUIRE: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: How much time do you need?
MR. OLES: Hopefully, just ten minutes, Judge, if that.

THE COURT: Where is Mr. Persinger?
MR. TYSON: Mr. Persinger is waiting just outside, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have a preference as to -- I mean, I don't know that the court reporter is going to be able to do both of these people ten minutes, plus whatever the five minutes is. So my thought was if Mr. Persinger is not
going to be here -- need to be here tomorrow, maybe we could have him now and we'll see where we are at.

But I'm open to --
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, given that Mr. Persinger has been here all day pursuant to the subpoena -- I know Mr. Sterling has some responsibilities tomorrow as well, but I think he's at least closer physically than Mr. Persinger is.

THE COURT: Very well. It is not very long that is left for you.

MR. BELINFANTE: Yeah, the only thing I would ask Your Honor -- and I haven't talked to the client about it, is I know that the Secretary has a budget presentation tomorrow; is that right?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. BELINFANTE: You need to be there for that?
THE WITNESS: That would be best.
MR. BELINFANTE: So we could coordinate the time, it may be that he doesn't come on if it is first, but we can work that out.

THE COURT: All right. If he would just hold up, though, for a minute so that we can get Mr. Persinger in here, because if it takes two minutes, we could possibly just finish.

MR. BELINFANTE: Yeah, absolutely.
THE COURT: Because I assume you're not going to want to examine the witness yourselves.

MR. BELINFANTE: We're going to reserve our
examination for Mr. Sterling.
THE COURT: Why don't we just hold -- why don't you
step back. Don't talk about your testimony again.
We want to get Mr. Persinger in here. We'll find out if it is a two-minute thing or not. All right.

THE WITNESS: Just go?

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, given the topic of Mr. Persinger's testimony, are we going to need to have this in camera?

THE COURT: Yes.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm terribly sorry. There is not much left. But if you want to be here, stay outside and come on back if we are going to go. I'm not sure what is going to happen. You'll know.

If it is going to take more than five or six minutes, I'm just going to simply stop the proceedings and we'll resume tomorrow so you can -- I guess my suggestion is, if you're interested in staying through the -- Mr. Sterling's testimony, wait for five minutes and you'll see where we're at, even if we're not -- you'll know if we've gone longer than five minutes.

MR. OLES: Judge, if it is possible, I would prefer to wait until the morning if possible.

THE COURT: We'll see what is happening. All right?
That is fine.
Ladies and gentlemen, then anyone who is not counsel
or on counsel's team, would you go ahead and excuse us and just -- you can sit outside if you want to stick around.

What about the people on your side of the room?
MR. TYSON: They are not with us, Your Honor, in the audience.

THE COURT: Folks, you can come back if we are finished with this witness early; otherwise, we're going to resume tomorrow at 9:30 in the morning.

Anyone else? I mean, I just don't know everybody.
MR. TYSON: I think that is Mr. Favorito's wife.
They are not with the State.
THE COURT: All right. Very good.
MR. CROSS: They are not with anyone. That is the problem.

THE COURT: How about the individual over here?
MR. RUSSO: This is all our team --
THE COURT: That's fine --
MR. RUSSO: -- other than, I think, Josh.
THE COURT: No reason that \(I\) would know.
MR. RUSSO: That's fine, Your Honor.
MR. TYSON: Have Mr. Persinger come to the stand,
```

Your Honor?

```

THE COURT: Yes.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: Harry, would you swear in the witness?
(Witness sworn)
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. State your name and spell your complete name, please.

THE WITNESS: Jim Persinger, P-E-R-S-I-N-G-E-R.
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, just to confirm, this portion
of the testimony is going to be sealed; is that correct?
THE COURT: That's right.
MR. TYSON: Thank you.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I did want to flag. Mr. Oles
has left, and we do have an objection to him being here. So I don't know if he is planning to come back in, but we would ask that he not be in for this.

THE COURT: He has not signed the --
MR. CROSS: Correct.
THE COURT: All right. Since he has not signed the confidentiality warning, I think that is correct.

But does he understand that that is what is going to happen?

MR. CROSS: Well, he walked out, so I'm not sure. I guess if he comes back in, we can address it.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I just wanted to flag under the review protocol only Mr. Russo and I have signed the
```

protocol, so I just wanted to flag the other members of our
team have not. So if you would like for them to step out as
well.
THE COURT: They need to step out too.
(The public proceedings were thereby adjourned
at 5:38 PM.)

```
```

    C E R T I F I C A T E
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
    I, SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR, Official Court Reporter of
        the United States District Court, for the Northern District of
        Georgia, Atlanta Division, do hereby certify that the foregoing
        2 6 4 \text { pages constitute a true transcript of proceedings had}
        before the said Court, held in the City of Atlanta, Georgia, in
        the matter therein stated.
    In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand on this, the
        16th day of January, 2024.
    ```
                            Dnankor R. Weicn
                SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR
                OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BY MR. BELINFANTE: [1] 13/4
BY MR. BOYLE: [2] 100/3 113/11
BY MR. BROWN: [6] 93/12 94/25 96/7 97/2 99/20 119/23
BY MR. CROSS: [44] 137/14 140/3 141/21 142/19 147/3 148/4 148/20 151/20 152/5 154/7 155/8 157/2 162/7 164/5 166/14 167/17 167/25 168/7 168/22 169/17 170/20 171/1 173/11 175/6 177/16 178/8 179/10 180/11 182/17 185/15 186/11 187/2 191/7 192/5 193/23 194/16 194/22 197/11 198/23 200/10 201/5 204/9 224/19 226/5
BY MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: [22] 47/18 52/11 53/20 55/8 58/2 60/14 61/20 64/16 65/19 67/24 69/5 74/21 75/12 83/23 87/1 88/16 89/18 90/22 92/7 115/4 133/21 135/14
BY MR. MCGUIRE: [7] 228/10 231/3 238/24 239/10 246/24 251/9 254/10
BY MR. OLES: [18] 15/18 16/6 17/16 21/19 22/20 25/25 27/24 28/24 31/6 32/21 35/23 36/14 105/2 107/1 108/1 108/20 110/23 112/9
BY MS. KAISER: [1] 6/25 BY THE COURT: [6] 102/1 102/15 114/1 125/13 126/17 209/11
COURT REPORTER: [1] 203/19 COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: [8] 6/13 6/16 16/23 38/19 47/6 47/9 137/5 263/5
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER:
[2] 117/24 191/15
MR. BEDARD: [9] 17/3 21/2 23/11 24/18 30/4 30/7 30/16 36/10 38/8
MR. BELINFANTE: [52] 141/9 146/3 146/9 146/13 146/17 146/23 147/2 148/18 149/20 150/17 156/25 158/4 158/23 162/23 163/20 164/3 166/10 168/15 170/24 171/23 172/12 173/4 176/1 176/6 177/3 177/14 178/16 178/18 178/22 179/1 179/7 179/9 181/4 181/8 181/12 181/18 181/21 181/24 186/25 200/23 207/25 221/7 221/14 221/17 225/11 239/8 246/9 260/10 260/15 260/17 260/23 261/1
MR. BOYLE: [24] 51/21 57/23 60/12 61/8 65/13 67/10 68/16 79/25 82/3 82/14 83/5 86/11 89/9 94/9 99/24 101/15 102/14 106/8 107/15 113/7 122/16 122/21 135/4 136/12
MR. BROWN: [30] 15/1 15/5 15/7 34/15 38/14 94/24 96/6 96/23 96/25 99/5 99/8 99/13 99/16 99/18 115/19 115/25 116/4 116/6 116/8 116/25 117/14 119/14 119/21 121/7 121/13 121/15 122/12 123/18 123/24 136/8
MR. CROSS: [126] 6/6 14/20 23/16 25/4 25/23 27/1 34/8 35/9 38/13 39/18 39/21 39/24 40/17 42/17 42/23 42/25 44/9 47/1 80/7 80/16 81/11 83/8 83/12 96/5 107/19 117/7 118/25 133/11 133/17 137/2 142/5 142/10 142/14 146/6 146/11 146/15 148/1 148/16 150/1 150/24 151/6 151/13 152/4

154/19 154/21 154/24 155/2 155/6 157/1 158/2 158/13 159/7 160/1 160/3 160/11 160/13 160/15 160/24 162/4 163/9 163/11 163/16 164/4 166/8 166/12 167/15 168/13 168/19 169/14 170/25 172/2 173/1 173/6 173/9 175/23 176/7 176/10 176/15 176/20 176/23 177/11 177/15 178/6 178/14 178/23 180/8 181/2 181/6 181/10 181/20 181/23 182/3 182/12 182/14 186/2 186/5 186/7 186/10 186/23 191/19 191/24 192/4 193/13 193/16 194/15 194/20 198/15 201/4 207/21 208/5 208/23 208/25 220/21 224/14 225/9 225/16 226/4 226/17 226/24 227/2 227/13 254/1 262/16 263/12 263/17 263/22
MR. MARTINO-WEINHARDT: [38] 47/3 53/18 54/21 54/24 55/2 55/4 58/1 60/11 61/14 64/11 64/13 65/11 65/16 67/14 67/20 67/23 68/14 68/21 69/4 74/15 74/19 75/11 83/17 83/20 86/14 86/18 86/22 89/13 90/20 92/3 93/2 93/9 115/2 115/15 119/8 125/10 126/12 136/5
MR. McGUIRE: [4] 238/22 239/6 246/11 259/15
MR. MILLER: [2] 80/9 80/11
MR. OLES: [37] 16/4 16/17 16/24
17/15 21/11 22/18 23/9 23/15 23/25 24/5 24/14 28/23 30/2 30/9 30/13 32/9 32/12 32/20 34/22 35/4 35/10 36/13 38/5 38/15 38/17 101/18 101/22 104/24 106/21 106/24 110/22 112/6 113/3 136/10 228/6 259/17 261/24
MR. RUSSO: [6] 6/10 80/10 80/15 262/19 262/21 262/23
MR. TYSON: [24] 39/4 43/2 43/5 43/10 45/3 46/12 116/17 117/2 117/9 124/6 124/15 125/1 227/18 227/24 228/2 259/20 260/4 261/9 262/7 262/13
262/24 263/8 263/11 263/24
MS. KAISER: [1] 14/21 THE COURT: [274]
THE WITNESS: [63] 6/19 14/23 15/12 21/15 39/2 47/12 52/5 52/9 61/12 61/19 64/15 94/11 108/17 109/21 109/23 110/1 110/11 110/16 112/7 136/1 136/3 136/18 136/20 136/22 137/8 139/24 141/18 147/23 148/3 153/24 154/25 159/14 159/19 160/14 161/16 169/15 170/15 174/17 174/19 180/9 185/3 186/6 191/6 191/9 191/14 193/15 193/21 194/21 197/4 198/19 199/21 203/20 208/19 209/5 209/7 226/18 230/19 246/19 251/2 260/14 260/16 261/7 263/7
-
'19 [1] 103/7
'20 [5] 102/5 103/19 139/2 210/17 210/18
'21 [6] 102/5 121/22 124/22 182/23 195/22 196/4
'22 [6] 102/5 104/17 104/18 104/19
104/20 114/4
'23 [4] 48/2 102/21 102/22 228/24
...CONT'D [3] 2/25 3/1 5/1
.bat [6] 95/5 95/6 95/9 95/11 95/18 96/9

1
1,700-some [1] 123/1
10 [13] 49/18 62/9 67/25 68/5 116/1 145/13 145/17 175/15 175/16 176/10 176/14 176/15 202/6
100 percent [4] 174/24 230/19 246/16 247/16
100-page [1] 144/15
1000 [1] 33/8
1020 [6] 157/4 157/18 157/19 158/2 160/6 160/16
104 [5] 170/25 171/2 172/17 173/2 173/12
10:30 [1] 236/12
10th [3] 31/9 50/6 51/12
11 [5] 61/12 154/16 155/2 184/19 185/21
11/17/20 [1] 27/20
11/17/2020 [1] 33/11
11/3/2020 [1] 33/5
11/30/2020 [1] 33/16
11th [1] 184/14
12 [4] 75/11 75/13 145/14 145/17
122 million [1] 234/23
127 [6] 97/1 97/3 99/7 99/8 193/13 194/17
129 [2] 228/25 229/8
12:30 [1] 117/19
12th [2] 75/21 155/21
13 [7] 60/15 60/21 61/2 61/16 74/13
74/19 74/20
1383 [1] \(1 / 25\)
14 [7] 69/12 69/17 74/18 138/15 185/25
186/10 186/12
143 [4] 180/8 180/18 181/2 182/12
14th [2] 157/10 234/1
15 [5] 40/20 66/4 66/8 140/19 180/14
15,127 [1] 33/17
15,237 [1] 33/8
15,238 [1] 33/11
15,258 [2] 33/19 33/20
155 [2] 49/16 49/18
159 [2] 174/10 214/19
16 [6] 1/13 6/2 58/6 182/14 186/6 186/7
160 [7] 175/15 175/18 175/20 175/23
176/10 176/15 191/22
16th [1] 265/13
17 [3] 65/3 65/12 65/21
178 [1] 140/19
18 [14] 59/14 60/11 60/20 60/20 61/16 62/19 64/6 84/25 90/21 91/2 91/2 91/3 154/17 155/3
18,000 [2] 216/4 216/5
185 [3] 36/1 36/2 36/5
19 [1] 103/7
1987 [1] 7/10
1988 [2] 8/1 8/3
1:00 [1] 117/22
1:17-CV-2989-AT [1] 1/6
1:20 [2] 117/23 117/25
1st [1] 48/20
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 2 & 3 & 858 [4] 80/1 80/9 80/15 82/6 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{57}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
20 percent [1] 202/6 \\
2000 [1] 127/12 \\
2001 [2] 95/23 96/5 \\
2005 [1] 7/20 \\
2013 [1] 47/23 \\
2016 [1] 20/13 \\
2017 [21] 16/1 56/12 56/24 58/8 59/12 59/20 60/6 62/6 63/4 63/9 64/2 66/16 67/6 71/2 71/7 72/1 84/4 87/22 90/23 91/5 91/15 \\
2018 [25] 56/12 56/24 58/8 65/6 66/7 66/17 67/6 68/9 69/14 71/3 71/8 71/12 71/17 71/21 72/1 72/5 72/16 73/2 73/18 84/4 87/22 88/13 89/19 90/6 90/12 \\
2019 [38] 21/21 57/15 57/16 58/4 72/18 73/18 75/21 77/17 78/1 79/9 79/15 79/23 81/24 82/2 82/9 83/24 84/6 87/22 91/21 92/8 92/12 92/13 92/17 118/24 125/10 125/17 127/12 128/1 132/4 133/24 134/19 134/22 135/16 138/15 138/15 210/20 223/1 234/1 \\
2020 [42] 11/5 14/6 14/8 22/8 22/11 22/17 26/11 28/1 28/4 28/7 31/18 33/1 \(33 / 5\) 33/11 33/16 34/19 36/21 36/24 84/1 85/22 86/1 86/19 87/2 87/3 87/13 87/19 88/10 139/4 149/3 164/6 164/15 170/8 171/3 173/15 177/18 185/11 185/12 185/13 185/16 186/15 211/12 216/6 \\
2021 [46] 48/20 50/20 51/14 87/16 87/17 87/19 88/10 93/15 93/19 94/3 96/6 97/6 98/6 98/14 104/15 119/16 120/10 120/10 121/5 139/10 144/15 144/20 153/10 166/25 167/4 168/11 169/20 170/3 180/19 182/19 182/25 183/16 183/24 183/25 184/14 184/19 185/21 187/5 187/7 188/6 194/1 194/11 224/25 225/19 226/7 226/14 2022 [32] 48/22 49/1 49/3 49/6 49/11 49/16 50/4 50/6 50/12 51/3 51/12 51/18 53/7 53/21 54/2 54/17 84/25 140/6 140/9 140/15 145/5 145/20 147/4 147/7 147/16 148/13 154/9 155/12 155/19 155/22 169/2 207/23 \\
2023 [2] 48/1 103/22 \\
2024 [4] 1/13 6/2 243/24 265/13 \\
21 [1] 224/20 \\
215-1383 [1] 1/25 \\
21st [1] 169/12 \\
22 [3] 54/20 62/1 62/7 \\
222 [3] 165/17 228/21 229/4 \\
23 [1] 62/18 \\
2394 [1] 1/24 \\
24 [5] 54/16 54/21 145/13 145/13 145/17 \\
25 percent [1] 234/5 \\
25th [1] 58/4 \\
26 [9] 93/15 95/23 97/6 98/14 119/16 \\
120/10 194/1 194/11 223/24 \\
264 [1] 265/9 \\
26th [1] 187/7 \\
27 [5] 82/9 128/1 148/13 210/20 223/1 \\
29 [1] 58/6 \\
2nd [9] 48/22 49/1 49/3 49/6 49/16 \\
50/3 54/1 54/16 84/25
\end{tabular}} & 30,000 [1] 201/25 & \\
\hline & 30303 [1] 1/25 & 9 \\
\hline & 309 [6] 28/23 28/23 29/1 30/2 38/15 & 90 \\
\hline & & 95 [4] 68/7 68/15 69/7 71 \\
\hline & 316 [4] 161/22 213/25 233/24 235/22 & 98 million [1] 234/23 \\
\hline & 31st [2] 102/20 139/4 & 9:30 in [1] 262/11 9th [2] 171/3 173/15 \\
\hline & 35 minutes [1] 32/11 & A \\
\hline & 36,000 [1] 216/6 & AA \\
\hline & 38 [1] 191/5 & ability [2] 40/10 197/23 \\
\hline & 39 [2] 33/24 34/5 & able [41] 12/12 15/3 21/16 22/12 44/1 \\
\hline & 3:37 [1] 191/17 & 54/24 79/23 90/3 90/3 91/8 91/15 91/18 \\
\hline & 3 rd [3] 16/1 31/18 33/1 & 102/9 110/20 118/7 132/2 134/5 134/7 \\
\hline & 4 & /16 \\
\hline & 40 [7] 34/1 34/6 72/19 72/23 72/24 & 160/7 165/23 198/6 199/12 \(217 / 17\) \\
\hline & 186/12 186/23 & 243/14 244/3 246/11 248/8 \\
\hline & 403 [2] 68/19 68/2 & 253/14 255/22 259/23 \\
\hline & 404 [1] \(1 / 25\) & about [175] 7/20 9/5 11/18 16/22 \\
\hline & 41 [2] 170/21 170/25 & 23/20 23/23 24/15 24/24 26/10 261 \\
\hline & 42 [2] 90/21 91/3 & 27/10 30/19 31/9 35/19 40/13 41/9 \\
\hline & 425 [1] 225/10 & 42/22 43/15 45/12 45/17 47/23 47/2 \\
\hline & 491 [1] 166/12 & 49/24 52/13 52/20 53/16 53/17 66 \\
\hline & 493 [2] 167/15 168/13 & 67/11 67/13 69/24 72/8 73/17 79/3 \\
\hline & 494 [2] 168/20 207/22 & 79/11 80/7 86/19 89/8 90/15 91 \\
\hline & 495 [2] 178/6 178/14 & 93/1 93/15 94/17 94/19 94/20 9 \\
\hline & 4:40 [1] 226/23 & 95/15 96/2 96/17 96/18 97/23 \\
\hline & 4th [3] 40/22 40/23 41/9 & 98/15 98/18 98/1 \\
\hline & 5 & 8/24 98/25 99/21 100/6 100 \\
\hline & 5-1-3 [2] 219/17 221/2 & \begin{tabular}{l} 
106/19 108/8 \(109 / 24110 / 12\) \\
\(115 / 13\) \\
\(116 / 11\) \\
\hline \(117 / 3118 / 12\)
\end{tabular} \\
\hline & 5-1-7 [2] 219/19 221/3 & 119/9 120/24 121/1 121/5 122/17 \\
\hline & 5-1-7 test [1] 219/21 & 122/23 124/22 125/10 125/14 125/15 \\
\hline & 5.5 [1] 220/2 & 129/2 129/23 131/9 131/19 13 \\
\hline & 50 [2] 69/6 71/1 & 132/10 132/14 133/8 135/15 1 \\
\hline & 50 minutes [1] 117/21 & 退2910 \\
\hline & 590 [3] 75/14 78/4 209/1 & \[
10 \text { 151/1 }
\] \\
\hline & 591 [1] 74/16 & 155/15 164/24 166/23 168/25 170/17 \\
\hline & 5:00 [1] 223/19 & 177/17 183/4 184/2 184/5 184/7 184/21 \\
\hline & 5:30 [2] 226/22 227/9 & 189/20 189/20 189/22 190/21 190/23 \\
\hline & 5:38 [1] 264/6 & 192/18 194/10 194/12 199/6 199/1 \\
\hline & 5A [1] 1/10 & 199/20 199/23 203/17 206/1 206/2 \\
\hline & 6 & 206/23 208/12 210/7 21 \\
\hline & 60 [2] 239/1 239/7 & 215/16 220/24 221/9 221/25 \\
\hline & 61 [3] 116/9 120/1 121/8 & 22418 224/8 226/9 231/4 231/20 231/20 \\
\hline & 65 [1] 10/5 & \\
\hline & 67 [1] 48/6 & 244/2 246/2 \\
\hline & 69 [7] 60/15 60/21 61/16 62/18 64/6 & 251/17 253/9 255/16 255/17 256/21 \\
\hline & & /13 260/11 26 \\
\hline & 7 & 262/6 262/18 \\
\hline & 70 days [1] 212/11 & above [1] 235/4 \\
\hline & 71 [1] 84/25 & absent [1] 82/25 \\
\hline & 72 [3] 54/13 54/16 54/25 & absentee [17] 9/25 10/2 10/13 10/17 \\
\hline & 74 [4] 154/13 154/14 154/15 155/2 & 11/14 11/23 12/2 12/5 13/20 13/20 1 \\
\hline & 75 [1] 1/24 & \\
\hline & 75 percent [1] 234/5 78 [1] 182/16 & absolutely [4] 13/15 34/20 81/4 260/2 \\
\hline & & \\
\hline & 8 & \\
\hline & 80 [1] 86/4 & accepting [1] 161/12 \\
\hline & \begin{tabular}{l}
81 [4] 86/6 86/7 86/7 87/8 838 [1] 82/4 \\
84 [2] 118/18 118/25
\end{tabular} & access [31] 48/13 48/17 63/21 63/25 67/4 67/7 71/22 77/20 89/24 90/4 91/15 134/7 134/14 134/16 167/2 167/6 167/8 167/11 169/1 182/20 183/12 184/18 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{A}
access... [9] 185/14 187/20 196/8
197/5 197/17 211/25 212/9 214/18
255/20
accessed [1] 27/15
accessibility [1] 214/4
accidentally [1] 253/1
accompanying [1] 97/17
according [1] 182/11
account [2] 198/10 214/14
accountable [3] 215/20 215/20 216/9
accuracy [4] 34/19 215/16 215/17
225/7
accurate [3] 31/21 38/1 145/24
accurately [2] 37/25 206/15
achieve [1] 244/18
acknowledges [1] 94/16
acquired [1] 9/8
acronym [1] 234/10
across [5] 135/22 196/15 197/7 200/5 214/2
act [1] 223/15
acted [1] 224/9
action [4] 18/25 19/20 37/25 232/12
actions [2] 194/6 197/24
activation [1] 203/17
active [1] 234/16
activists [1] 9/4
activity [1] 74/2
actor [13] 131/13 132/6 187/12 187/16 187/16 196/24 196/25 196/25 197/5
199/6 201/12 215/23 256/22
actors [9] 48/12 48/15 77/4 77/15
200/5 200/12 200/12 200/12 232/17
actual [10] 63/15 102/12 114/17
121/15 131/1 134/1 170/3 200/24
208/10 220/6
actually [33] 11/16 13/23 30/16 35/6
41/6 56/8 81/20 89/23 90/20 92/2 94/15
103/20 123/10 131/3 141/12 145/1
146/15 150/12 160/4 162/10 176/18
180/2 199/4 199/5 199/24 200/15
201/22 214/15 215/25 229/1 244/18
251/18 252/23
acutely [1] 9/20
ADAM [1] 2/9
add [2] 25/4 34/15
added [1] 198/12
addition [1] 126/10
additional [5] 36/1 36/4 69/14 122/13 247/24
additive [1] 130/9
address [6] 45/8 135/19 149/24 201/3
205/25 263/23
addressed [5] 29/12 29/13 200/9
213/18 219/17
addressing [1] 224/12
adequate [1] 94/14
Adida [2] 176/22 176/24
adjourned [1] 264/5
adjudication [1] 247/19
admin [1] 138/4
administers [1] 14/12
Administrative [1] 234/3
administrator [2] 89/24 91/6
administrators [2] 234/7 234/8
admissibility [1] 121/16
admissible [2] 122/25 162/24 admission [1] 25/16 admit [6] 16/17 30/2 31/1 121/7 122/15 239/6
admitted [24] 25/17 30/22 38/19 38/20
60/13 65/18 68/25 119/25 148/19 158/5 158/24 163/25 168/18 172/17 172/23 177/1 178/17 181/5 181/14 181/15 182/13 187/1 226/1 239/9
admitting [2] 17/13 123/15
admonition [1] 153/23
adopted [1] 228/22
adopting [1] 157/21
adult [1] 7/10
advance [1] 41/16
advantageous [1] 217/14
advantages [2] 46/22 217/2
advice [2] 131/2 146/24
advise [2] 145/25 189/23
advised [1] 219/9
advisement [1] 161/11
advisory [5] 188/10 190/13 190/22

\section*{191/3 247/25}

Affairs [5] 29/13 29/23 31/3 31/8 31/15 affect [8] 20/11 20/13 131/14 132/7
187/13 187/20 198/6 200/15
affected [2] 239/12 246/23
affection [1] 191/21
affidavit [7] 22/8 22/14 22/24 23/3 23/8 27/19 89/17
affidavits [1] 22/16
affirmative [4] 59/18 65/4 71/14 75/19
affirmatively [1] 95/13
afforded [1] 82/18
afield [3] 198/17 200/24 206/10
after [51] \(1 / 6\) 6/23 12/14 12/16 15/15
18/25 19/20 22/13 28/12 47/16 84/6
85/21 93/16 94/6 110/18 113/9 115/8 117/21 128/20 137/12 139/3 144/3 145/5 155/15 156/11 163/22 167/23 174/1 174/21 176/2 194/6 197/14 198/9 205/17 207/10 220/25 221/6 222/24 223/19 223/19 223/20 236/10 236/15 236/20 240/12 247/5 256/5 256/14 256/24 257/19 257/22
after-action [2] 18/25 19/20
after-actions [1] 194/6
afternoon [6] 100/4 100/5 137/15 137/16 228/3 228/11
afterwards [1] 256/6 again [83] 11/5 18/4 18/12 19/8 21/3 21/5 21/18 23/11 24/5 30/20 34/22 40/8 41/15 41/17 44/11 45/14 45/23 47/4 57/21 65/20 65/25 66/11 67/7 69/20 73/3 90/23 92/8 92/13 94/23 107/15 108/6 111/15 121/9 125/14 128/18 130/24 135/19 139/2 142/18 145/16 152/7 155/1 161/24 162/12 163/1 163/2 165/2 165/7 170/2 170/18 174/17 184/20 193/5 195/23 196/21 197/12 198/10 203/24 204/15 204/18 206/21 207/7 207/15 211/18 212/1 212/2 213/15 216/3 218/5 238/1 240/21 246/5 247/16 248/5 249/4 250/21 253/22 254/7 254/20 255/2 256/7 256/18 261/4 against [9] 51/14 51/19 84/18 164/15 164/21 164/25 189/23 247/22 255/5 agency [5] 18/10 103/2 103/4 137/25

138/6
agent [4] 181/17 182/5 182/10 183/5 ago [16] 10/5 13/13 14/4 24/14 49/11 79/14 92/18 92/20 96/4 124/7 142/10 168/17 199/6 209/15 221/25 250/10
agree [47] 13/14 13/15 13/16 13/18 13/19 37/6 48/8 49/9 50/10 50/22 51/3 52/22 56/23 63/1 74/10 79/15 105/20 105/23 106/4 106/17 107/3 107/8 109/3
109/11 118/9 122/18 122/22 139/11 139/13 139/17 141/15 141/23 142/20 142/23 143/5 143/20 143/23 143/23 143/25 146/8 165/14 177/13 187/12 188/6 208/10 249/13 251/23
agreed [2] 38/22 103/12
agreement [2] 30/10 118/8
agrees [2] 106/17 107/22
ahead [14] 24/17 32/19 35/19 54/23
104/25 106/19 110/21 115/23 120/17 169/14 234/20 253/19 254/21 262/4
AIDED [1] 1/21
aired [1] 250/9
AL [2] 1/4 1/6
alert [1] 207/3
alerted [2] 41/17 223/4
Alex [1] 148/25
alike [1] 205/3
alive [1] 211/2
all [189] 6/3 6/8 8/4 9/3 9/23 10/6 14/16
14/24 15/3 15/6 15/10 17/11 17/12
17/14 25/13 27/21 28/15 28/18 30/25 32/14 34/16 35/24 38/6 39/17 43/19 44/19 45/15 46/9 46/24 52/10 53/9 54/4
54/7 55/24 56/17 56/18 57/12 59/8 69/3 70/19 73/3 80/22 81/5 83/5 83/19 86/24 88/12 89/15 100/10 103/15 103/22
104/6 104/25 105/14 105/18 106/25
107/12 109/22 110/14 112/24 113/4
114/9 114/10 114/25 115/16 115/18
115/23 116/20 117/15 117/24 118/4 118/17 119/10 123/23 125/2 126/15 127/10 128/13 128/19 133/19 135/12 135/12 135/15 136/4 136/11 136/13 136/15 138/5 142/16 144/13 146/20 151/5 159/3 159/15 159/16 159/17 160/7 160/9 160/12 160/17 160/20 161/11 163/10 163/12 168/18 170/21 173/5 173/10 174/15 174/18 175/12 177/1 177/12 177/15 178/24 180/8
182/14 190/17 191/12 191/15 192/3 193/12 194/7 196/7 197/2 197/7 201/24 202/23 203/14 205/6 207/1 208/9 208/9 208/11 209/9 210/8 212/19 213/8 213/23 213/24 214/2 214/8 214/12 214/18 214/19 216/14 217/12 217/24 217/24 220/8 220/19 222/22 224/2 224/12 224/13 224/17 227/8 227/19 227/21 227/22 228/8 228/18 236/3 236/5 236/16 237/12 239/15 244/14 244/17 244/20 246/4 248/19 248/21 248/24 249/2 249/5 254/1 254/6 256/18 256/20 257/14 257/17 260/5 260/20 261/6 262/1 262/15 262/19 263/18
allegation [1] 168/25
allegations [2] 16/14 81/16
alleged [2] 16/1 149/1
alleviate [1] 225/14
allow [11] 25/15 42/11 67/17 123/11

\section*{A}
allow... [7] 123/14 197/22 215/9 220/13 222/3 242/15 254/17
allowed [10] 35/13 35/15 39/25 40/4
41/11 44/16 44/25 141/13 188/19 239/15
allowing [3] 31/16 80/11 254/5
allows [2] 188/17 219/20
ALLOY [1] 3/5
almost [1] 214/12
along [5] 8/6 183/14 196/20 201/14

\section*{210/2}
already [23] 38/21 43/14 67/13 82/3 88/11 109/8 127/12 135/9 150/12
150/12 151/19 160/24 164/17 168/15
173/2 173/2 179/3 181/4 212/9 212/10
248/21 249/3 249/25
also [45] 13/16 18/6 23/12 23/16 23/21 46/6 50/6 62/16 65/8 69/1 70/10 78/22 79/1 80/13 81/2 106/4 106/15 118/11 127/3 138/7 138/21 141/16 145/25 158/16 164/13 170/17 172/3 185/18 185/20 189/3 198/17 198/20 199/11 213/3 213/3 213/22 214/4 215/2 227/20 228/21 229/22 234/16 242/21 254/2 255/7
alter [10] 164/8 178/12 196/10 197/14 200/15 200/19 201/13 243/14 244/16
257/4
altering [3] 203/10 205/10 236/24
although [2] 82/19 138/8
altogether [1] 240/7
always [9] 163/13 174/5 174/12 175/4 237/15 243/1 247/18 256/10 256/23
am [25] 7/7 7/17 7/24 9/13 9/23 9/23 11/19 48/21 55/16 84/14 93/18 105/11 105/17 114/22 115/10 123/15 127/17
135/23 137/20 137/25 148/10 182/22
211/2 212/22 258/1
America [5] 199/5 212/5 242/6 242/7 265/3
among [1] 66/24
amount [1] 184/9
AMY [1] 1/11
analogy [1] 250/17
analysis [10] 61/24 66/3 82/10 82/23
93/17 93/21 94/3 96/13 149/22 151/9
analyzed [1] 63/1
Anderson [4] 149/22 151/9 151/12 200/25
Anderson-Burdick [4] 149/22 151/9 151/12 200/25
ANDREU [1] \(2 / 10\)
ANDREU-VON [1] 2/10
anecdotal [1] 253/23
Annie [1] 115/16
annual [4] 53/21 54/3 54/4 55/10 annually [1] 85/2
another [10] 27/22 41/4 70/11 74/9 90/19 148/2 175/8 193/18 216/25 231/19
answer [41] 21/8 41/13 42/7 42/12 49/23 51/24 55/11 55/13 58/9 58/12 72/3 73/5 85/4 85/7 85/12 85/13 87/12 87/14 88/14 98/10 110/18 112/10 124/18 141/2 141/4 141/6 143/7 143/10 144/2 159/19 161/16 165/4 166/11

183/19 184/12 195/3 213/24 220/23 245/4 250/6 254/6
answered [2] 51/22 57/20
answering [2] 143/14 143/14
answers [1] 244/25
anticipation [1] 46/4
any [116] \(1 / 8\) 12/24 13/17 14/1 14/12 15/3 15/4 15/4 18/16 19/2 20/5 20/11 23/19 26/15 28/1 28/6 28/8 30/3 30/20 35/14 36/3 41/25 43/6 44/1 44/5 46/13 51/12 51/17 51/18 52/21 63/7 67/11 72/2 86/9 87/10 87/11 92/14 96/17 97/18 97/18 105/21 108/11 111/9 111/11 111/21 112/2 112/4 112/5 112/5 112/6 114/16 114/25 116/16 120/2 121/4 122/22 123/10 123/11 123/12 124/16 125/5 131/4 131/12 132/5 132/18 133/18 134/3 134/10 134/20 135/8 154/4 154/8 155/10 156/3 156/5 157/5 159/1 164/21 173/25 175/25 182/20 184/17 184/18 184/24 188/14 188/18 190/20 190/24 194/3 194/3 194/9 194/9 194/18 194/24 195/14 199/22 200/15 201/20 204/10 207/16 212/8 214/18 220/19 224/10 226/2 229/11 233/11 237/19 246/20 247/10 249/24 250/21 252/10 252/21 254/17 257/1
anybody [8] 105/25 117/4 129/23
139/25 184/23 187/9 199/4 218/14
anymore [4] 17/7 21/6 92/20 103/24
anyone [25] 38/25 94/15 111/3 112/13 112/17 117/16 125/3 131/15 131/16 132/8 132/15 136/14 150/14 183/23 187/5 188/14 190/12 190/21 210/3 210/16 226/21 241/18 262/3 262/12 262/16
anything [36] 23/17 38/10 44/15 44/18 49/24 79/3 88/1 96/2 98/15 98/19 109/25 110/25 113/5 119/10 120/22 120/24 121/1 123/14 128/9 132/10 132/13 133/14 136/7 151/10 154/4 157/23 159/2 183/14 190/2 196/18 202/4 209/13 212/3 235/4 238/10 250/24
anyway [4] 31/1 46/24 138/24 177/9
anywhere [3] 59/7 199/5 242/6
AP [1] 138/4
apart [2] 23/22 103/14
APIs [1] 216/20
apologies [2] 118/2 173/4
apologize [8] 139/24 143/15 153/24
167/20 173/1 174/17 206/11 214/8
apparent [2] 241/2 241/9
apparently [6] 27/7 31/4 32/17 75/10 85/15 158/11
appear [4] 29/4 29/22 39/8 176/3
appearance [1] 255/8
appearing [1] 250/8
appears [7] 38/24 55/5 81/23 82/17
82/17 107/16 117/2
applicable [2] 18/21 28/19
application [11] 63/15 63/16 63/17
63/20 63/23 66/25 67/3 67/5 100/22 107/9 129/21
applications [4] 69/25 70/1 107/11 130/10
applies [2] 254/19 255/24
apply [2] 18/4 253/10
appreciate [4] 91/25 102/12 137/17 224/11
approach [7] 16/4 22/18 32/9 96/23
150/16 194/15 238/22
approaching [1] 150/10
appropriate [6] 25/2 94/21 118/21
180/25 181/1 182/9
approved [1] 133/25
April [2] 169/2 207/23
AR [1] 138/4
arbiter [1] 154/3
architecture [1] 91/19
are [260] 1/76/3 7/6 7/16 7/23 9/12 9/20 9/21 9/21 11/18 12/12 12/14 13/16 15/10 15/24 17/6 18/7 18/7 19/8 19/8 19/13 23/3 25/10 26/14 26/17 28/20 28/20 30/3 31/7 31/21 34/9 35/7 35/14 35/22 38/7 40/16 41/6 41/7 41/7 41/7 42/2 46/22 49/20 52/20 53/16 54/8 54/24 55/20 56/25 57/10 57/10 57/11 59/6 61/11 63/14 64/23 65/23 68/1 68/20 69/11 69/12 69/22 70/5 70/6 70/14 70/21 70/22 76/9 79/1 80/4 80/7 84/3 85/8 85/13 86/17 87/7 88/5 90/7 92/2 93/15 94/13 95/4 95/14 95/23 99/10 99/14 100/12 100/13 100/20 102/9 102/11 103/23 105/6 105/7 105/13 105/15 106/11 108/8 108/19 108/21 109/13 110/3 110/4 110/5 110/9 110/9 110/11 111/21 114/20 118/13 119/3 119/4 120/2 122/15 127/16 129/1 129/8 129/17 130/10 130/18 130/20 133/4 134/3 134/5 134/7 134/10 134/13 135/12 135/18 135/24 135/25 136/2 136/12 137/23 137/25 140/12 142/8 144/23 145/15 149/24 152/18 155/5 157/17 158/20 159/3 159/4 159/7 159/9 159/23 160/17 160/19 164/13 164/18 164/20 166/6 169/10 169/23 169/24 170/2 170/7 172/13 174/7 174/8 176/3 176/13 176/18 177/4 180/2 182/24 184/6 188/22 190/8 190/24 192/10 195/2 195/8 196/22 197/2 202/2 202/5 202/5 203/10 204/1 204/2 206/1 206/2 206/19 206/19 209/22 212/6 212/11 212/15 213/11 213/15 215/2 215/16 216/1 216/20 220/8 220/16 222/18 223/20 224/12 229/25 230/9 230/10 230/13 230/21 231/1 231/4 231/16 232/7 232/11 232/19 233/6 235/7 235/9 235/10 235/11 235/13 237/1 241/4 241/22 241/25 241/25 243/13 244/14 244/17 247/18 247/21 248/1 248/1 248/7 248/13 248/13 248/23 248/24 250/17 250/24 251/11 251/14 252/4 252/25 253/10 255/17 256/14 256/18 256/20 256/25 257/2 257/3 258/1 258/10 260/2 261/10 261/15 262/7 262/9 262/14 262/16
area [1] 185/23
areas [2] 131/12 132/5
aren't [5] 21/5 41/11 125/6 247/17 257/1
argue [2] 41/25 225/24
argued [1] 229/21
argument [3] 179/2 223/21 224/10 arguments [1] 151/1

\section*{A}
arising [1] 114/17
around [25] 9/21 34/3 39/22 57/15 75/5 83/24 174/23 179/20 183/21 185/11
189/17 189/19 194/11 205/22 207/6
212/11 214/18 214/25 216/18 217/5
217/6 232/8 234/22 244/9 262/5
arrive [1] 39/5
arrows [2] 41/1 43/11
articulated [2] 35/20 198/25
artifact [1] 121/15
as [276]
ascertain [1] 102/9
aside [1] 181/19
ask [68] 16/21 21/7 35/18 42/8 42/20
49/19 53/18 58/21 74/3 86/21 86/22
87/2 89/10 89/15 89/17 90/19 93/6
94/23 101/11 101/20 101/23 104/22
106/14 106/18 107/21 108/6 113/5
118/13 119/11 120/2 124/20 125/5
125/6 131/10 133/16 135/2 141/22
142/18 143/4 144/7 149/2 149/16 160/23 162/5 166/8 177/3 182/18 191/9
191/10 193/24 201/4 209/12 213/12
214/13 218/21 219/11 227/3 227/5
228/17 231/19 236/15 244/24 244/25
245/3 248/1 254/7 260/10 263/14
asked [57] 16/13 40/7 40/8 41/9 41/16
49/18 50/19 51/7 51/21 54/8 57/18 67/12 73/2 74/4 78/15 78/22 79/7 85/1 88/1 98/12 100/6 100/14 106/23 120/13 124/8 125/15 125/17 125/24 126/5 127/23 127/24 140/21 141/4 141/23 143/12 143/19 143/22 145/10 145/18 145/20 150/5 159/8 169/6 170/14 171/19 183/11 183/13 183/24 184/7 184/10 184/11 198/19 208/15 226/8 245/19 248/7 254/3
asking [23] 30/14 34/13 44/11 44/22 58/17 74/4 90/7 91/23 92/2 97/21 118/12 121/4 142/12 143/16 144/23 149/8 165/3 172/19 176/18 184/21 204/24 209/19 245/4
aspect [3] 41/5 79/20 108/11
aspects [2] \(37 / 19\) 108/4
assert [2] 153/14 223/11
asserted [6] 30/21 93/6 158/6 158/24
213/6 223/3
assertion [1] 131/8
assertions [1] 135/12
assess [4] 78/3 78/25 79/16 81/15 assessed [2] 63/12 88/6
assessing [1] 64/1
assessment [55] 54/10 55/10 59/11
59/20 60/6 60/8 62/6 63/4 63/9 65/6 65/9 66/7 66/19 67/6 68/9 68/12 69/19
71/8 71/17 72/5 72/16 73/3 73/19 73/22 73/25 77/17 78/1 79/9 79/20 80/18 80/25 81/3 81/6 81/23 85/1 85/23 86/1 86/2 86/19 87/4 87/13 87/17 125/18 125/24 127/17 127/20 127/22 133/24 134/3 134/19 134/22 135/16 135/21 188/15 223/15
assessments [22] 52/17 52/24 53/1 53/4 53/22 54/3 56/3 56/12 56/24 57/2 58/8 59/11 71/18 77/23 85/9 87/20 87/23 89/21 92/21 113/19 114/6 194/4
assigned [4] 183/4 185/9 185/18 185/21
assist [1] 37/22
assistance [2] 37/20 224/25
assume [8] 72/11 139/2 153/20 185/8
201/24 210/19 238/21 260/24
assuming [7] 11/19 36/11 93/6 94/10 147/24 162/12 187/19
assumption [3] 72/3 77/25 229/2
assured [2] 41/21 44/24
astray [1] 25/14
ATLANTA [8] 1/2 1/25 6/2 76/15 76/21 250/8 265/8 265/10
attached [3] 1/4 117/3 173/20
attaching [1] 1/7
attack [7] 77/4 77/15 164/21 187/24
211/22 242/5 242/6
attacked [2] 244/12 247/23
attempt [4] 78/2 79/20 144/5 246/22
attempting [1] 35/7
attended [1] 157/11
attention [11] 10/8 22/21 28/25 31/12
32/22 75/16 78/5 89/8 98/25 172/19 241/18
attestation [1] 31/23
attorney [8] 81/19 82/18 93/5 131/8 146/4 213/7 222/25 223/3
attorney's [1] 11/3
attorney-client [7] 81/19 93/5 131/8
146/4 213/7 222/25 223/3
attorneys [2] 11/19 21/17
audience [1] 262/8
audio [1] 207/22
audit [7] 37/2 220/14 229/9 244/5 245/16 245/21 246/6
audited [2] 229/16 245/13
auditing [1] 246/2
audits [7] 165/15 215/6 228/22 228/22 229/5 229/20 244/7
August [5] 83/24 84/6 150/5 226/7 226/14
August 2019 [1] 84/6
Augusta [1] 211/5
Austin [3] 136/18 136/19 136/20 authentic [2] 121/18 121/20
authenticate [4] 30/5 30/8 99/13 117/4 authenticated [3] 30/10 68/18 68/22
authentication [4] 30/19 60/22 158/11 216/17
authenticity [3] 160/5 163/2 163/21 author [1] 148/25
authority [4] 82/15 112/18 213/20 216/13
authorization [2] 167/7 193/10
authorize [2] 51/8 169/7
available [11] 20/20 50/16 50/20 51/8
51/9 208/2 225/19 231/7 237/11 237/16 237/18
avoid [3] 230/21 252/4 252/4
avoiding [1] 253/9
aware [55] 9/20 28/20 31/7 43/5 48/19
49/20 50/16 50/19 51/6 51/12 51/18 83/24 84/3 93/15 95/4 95/23 114/22 114/23 120/2 134/3 134/5 134/7 134/10 134/13 144/14 149/6 153/10 154/6 156/18 160/25 164/6 164/10 164/13 166/24 169/23 170/4 170/5 170/5 170/7 170/17 177/17 180/2 180/5 182/22

182/23 182/24 182/24 182/25 183/15 183/16 183/20 188/9 194/7 195/2 195/8 awareness [1] 194/24 awash [1] 170/13
away [2] 46/16 217/12
axis [1] 64/20

\section*{B}

B-E-A-V-E-R [1] 47/13
back [58] 6/7 7/10 21/12 21/13 27/4 38/9 40/18 42/11 46/16 46/20 64/1 70/14 86/25 92/17 95/2 107/21 118/13 129/13 139/9 142/16 143/19 152/1 154/12 157/7 159/13 170/12 171/19 173/12 173/18 174/14 186/5 195/21 198/4 199/24 207/1 207/2 207/11 222/22 225/6 227/21 227/22 240/4 240/5 240/13 240/13 240/22 253/17 253/24 253/25 254/23 257/1 258/22 258/24 261/4 261/15 262/9 263/14 263/23
backdoor [1] 25/9
background [1] 147/12
backs [1] 214/15
backward [1] 251/6
backwards [1] 41/7
bad [12] 44/2 48/12 48/15 77/4 77/15
187/12 187/16 196/25 199/6 201/12
215/23 232/17
balance [1] 103/10
balancing [1] 206/3
Ballance [1] 171/10
Ballance's [2] 171/25 172/14
ballot [94] 10/9 10/11 11/2 11/14 11/22
11/23 12/6 12/8 12/11 12/13 12/22
13/20 13/24 14/6 22/9 34/24 127/3
165/23 166/2 197/17 202/19 203/3 203/17 204/6 204/7 212/4 212/5 212/7 212/8 212/10 216/4 216/5 216/6 217/10 217/11 217/16 217/18 229/16 229/18 229/25 230/10 230/11 230/13 230/14 230/20 230/24 231/1 231/2 231/12 240/1 240/8 240/11 240/22 241/10 241/15 241/24 245/7 245/15 245/16 245/21 246/3 247/12 249/16 250/13 250/20 251/3 251/4 251/13 251/14 251/17 251/20 253/13 253/14 253/17 254/12 255/1 255/17 255/18 256/4 256/9 256/15 257/4 257/19 257/21 258/2 258/5 258/10 258/13 258/14 258/18 258/19 258/20 258/21 258/23 ballot-marking [2] 34/24 250/13 ballot-printing [1] 166/2 ballots [67] 10/6 11/7 22/8 23/24 24/1 24/2 26/18 27/6 27/19 28/15 36/1 36/2 37/4 110/13 127/4 165/11 166/3 202/5 203/7 203/16 203/18 203/23 204/2 204/3 204/12 207/13 212/5 215/18 215/19 215/21 215/24 217/5 219/4 220/13 220/13 220/13 220/14 231/6 241/21 244/13 246/22 247/16 247/17 247/18 247/20 248/15 248/22 249/11 249/24 251/23 252/5 253/10 254/17 254/19 255/9 255/10 255/12 255/21 255/23 255/25 256/8 256/11 256/13 257/1 257/2 257/3 257/24 barcode [2] 237/12 242/25 barcodes [1] 236/3

B
bare [1] 81/25
Barnes [19] 108/2 126/6 126/18 126/20
130/24 131/16 132/23 171/22 172/5
172/6 172/19 172/23 173/12 182/5
183/8 183/11 212/23 212/24 219/3
Barnes' [5] 108/21 172/6 172/12 173/18 175/7
barring [2] 230/20 231/17
based [31] 12/1 22/11 36/7 36/15 45/11 61/24 66/3 78/16 78/23 82/16 83/9 103/10 113/5 118/20 125/5 152/15 152/17 160/21 163/25 179/6 207/15 216/24 222/25 234/17 235/17 238/14 240/8 246/17 247/25 248/15 259/3
baseline [1] 213/25
baselines [1] 214/2
basic [2] 70/8 213/24
basically [17] 48/12 78/25 95/9 103/9
123/17 126/8 130/11 190/9 198/2 198/7
214/6 223/9 232/14 235/8 235/10 237/5 253/24
basics [3] 79/15 206/13 235/9
basis [10] 44/5 50/12 51/17 75/4 75/7
80/1 116/12 121/16 234/5 234/5
Bates [1] 61/9
be [280]
bears [3] 123/11 150/9 150/15
BEAVER [67] 4/10 39/5 47/5 47/12
47/15 47/19 47/20 48/8 48/19 48/25
49/14 50/3 50/24 52/13 54/1 54/13
56/21 57/14 57/25 58/17 58/20 59/24
60/15 60/17 61/3 65/2 67/25 69/6 71/17
71/24 72/4 72/13 73/8 73/10 74/23
75/25 79/15 80/25 81/2 81/22 83/24
87/2 88/12 88/21 89/10 89/19 92/8
93/13 95/2 98/4 100/4 105/3 112/17
113/12 115/5 119/7 119/9 120/2 133/22 135/5 135/15 172/5 182/5 182/11 212/25 213/22 238/9
Beaver's [2] 81/1 126/14
became [1] 241/2
because [154] 8/24 12/5 12/14 17/5
24/21 24/24 25/15 35/15 36/12 41/9 41/20 41/25 42/3 42/6 45/8 46/14 49/10 52/1 70/10 70/16 70/17 80/22 84/9 84/17 84/21 92/24 92/25 94/11 98/3 99/1 99/11 106/12 107/21 111/6 111/15 111/17 111/19 114/25 117/19 119/19 121/18 121/21 122/1 122/9 122/24 124/20 126/7 127/16 127/19 128/5 129/3 129/16 130/8 131/8 133/5 135/8 136/14 139/22 141/11 142/11 143/2 143/7 143/9 143/10 146/18 149/9 150/2 158/25 159/11 159/16 159/21 161/17 161/22 163/2 164/22 165/24 169/24 172/3 175/1 175/10 184/1 185/2 185/22 188/2 190/4 191/21 191/24 197/1 197/4 199/3 199/9 199/24 201/9 202/7 202/18 202/18 203/17 203/24 204/5 205/23 207/7 207/14 208/10 210/22 211/1 211/2 211/22 212/13 212/16 214/21 216/2 216/7 216/12 217/3 217/6 219/20 220/22 222/6 223/19 225/18 229/12 231/5 236/13 237/22 238/19 240/21 241/7 241/14 242/2 242/4 242/5 243/2 243/3 244/12 244/22 247/5 247/16

248/9 248/18 249/14 249/17 249/22 250/22 251/14 254/22 255/9 255/12 256/5 256/23 257/3 258/1 259/9 260/22 260/24
become [3] 67/16 224/7 241/9
becomes [1] 44/20
BEDARD [2] 3/5 26/5
been [112] 6/23 10/13 10/17 11/17 11/23 15/15 16/19 24/12 28/21 28/25 38/2 38/22 42/4 47/16 49/21 49/21 70/6 71/13 80/8 81/25 82/21 82/25 90/13 96/25 98/14 99/3 102/5 104/7 104/13 104/14 104/19 109/5 110/1 111/13 112/10 114/3 114/23 117/3 119/25 120/9 120/18 120/22 122/9 123/9 126/6 127/15 128/10 128/16 128/18 128/23 131/7 131/22 132/10 132/18 132/21 133/25 134/2 137/12 138/13 139/5 139/7 147/25 148/1 149/7 153/19 154/6 154/6 154/11 155/13 158/7 161/23 169/25 170/5 170/7 174/21 181/15 181/16 182/20 183/11 186/3 190/24 197/25 198/16 210/18 210/25 211/1 211/10 211/21 212/10 213/4 213/9 219/21 220/2 221/4 222/23 224/2 224/7 227/19 228/2 228/23 233/12 234/20 238/18 238/25 239/13 241/10 249/22 249/25 257/18 257/20 257/23 260/5 before [60] 1/11 22/14 25/18 31/8 36/18 39/19 45/16 46/3 46/5 50/17 51/6 56/5 80/1 82/17 83/10 92/6 97/9 101/4 101/18 113/23 114/2 114/11 115/6 115/8 115/10 119/5 129/24 132/23 135/23 141/14 143/14 149/12 155/25 157/10 157/12 163/8 163/22 164/1 167/19 169/6 169/11 170/1 173/23 182/3 195/12 203/8 207/12 207/20 208/8 223/6 225/2 229/19 230/16 230/22 231/18 232/12 249/20 255/18 255/19 265/10
beforehand [3] 197/18 212/11 242/23
began [1] 139/9
begets [2] 199/9 257/7
begin [3] 42/1 76/14 242/8
beginning [8] 46/20 49/18 58/6 72/23 73/20 84/25 125/19 229/24
begins [1] 148/22
begun [2] 186/15 219/16
behalf [7] 2/22 31/4 60/8 92/5 149/15 193/8 194/4
behavioral [2] 234/9 255/3
behind [3] 72/10 81/24 234/20
being [40] 18/8 20/19 25/14 27/14 28/13 39/12 41/11 49/25 51/4 54/1 55/16 57/16 64/21 64/21 84/18 84/21 85/16 121/23 123/5 126/4 137/17 138/3 140/6 158/19 158/23 179/14 181/18 190/10 192/19 206/4 218/10 225/5 225/8 240/19 240/22 244/4 245/18 249/5 259/9 263/13
beings [2] 251/11 254/20
belief [3] 152/17 152/17 196/9 believe [62] \(8 / 7\) 8/8 8/9 9/1 14/5 14/15 22/7 23/8 24/7 26/24 27/11 28/4 28/6 28/8 28/9 28/14 29/3 32/18 35/20 35/21 36/8 36/15 43/5 52/6 80/1 82/3 97/20 124/10 126/12 131/3 139/1 147/10 147/20 153/12 155/20 156/17 163/4

165/7 165/18 179/13 181/12 186/22 187/22 188/1 188/17 188/18 189/25 195/13 196/11 196/12 199/2 203/2 205/14 216/13 221/4 232/14 233/25 238/13 240/4 242/21 250/1 259/8
believed [2] 37/25 124/9
believes [1] 224/12
BELINFANTE [9] 3/4 3/5 4/7 13/7 144/7 151/1 176/11 191/21 225/17 bell [1] 188/24
belligerently [1] 38/3
bells [1] 194/18
below [3] 66/16 76/18 77/8
BEN [3] 2/6 176/22 176/24
bench [3] 1/10 68/23 86/14
beneath [1] 29/10
benefit [1] 200/4
besides [1] 147/18
best [20] \(8 / 2\) 10/10 15/9 20/8 21/18 77/11 77/14 97/11 97/13 97/15 140/1 210/11 216/3 220/3 227/16 232/14 235/2 235/19 255/4 260/16
better [13] 110/19 184/22 185/23 211/10 218/9 219/4 232/8 235/11 235/12 235/12 235/13 235/14 255/4 between [10] 46/9 66/16 110/7 150/17 176/21 191/1 222/13 244/5 249/13 256/2
beyond [2] 184/19 214/24
bid [7] 235/19 235/20 236/8 236/9 236/12 236/15 236/17
bidder [4] 236/19 237/4 237/10 237/20
bidders [9] 213/23 234/17 235/1 236/3
236/3 236/20 237/15 237/18 237/23
bids [2] 236/2 236/20
big [9] 88/5 105/13 118/5 133/3 217/4
217/5 224/6 250/13 252/5
bigger [2] 57/22 140/12
biggest [5] 207/16 211/19 230/3 244/19 256/10
Bill [4] 228/21 228/25 229/4 229/7 bin [1] 256/17
binder [19] 49/14 49/15 58/3 59/15 65/2 72/21 74/14 84/24 88/17 88/18 147/21 154/13 156/22 170/23 176/11
176/16 180/9 180/13 224/20
binders [2] 140/8 155/6
Bipartisan [1] 220/4
bit [15] 17/9 27/10 27/20 46/16 56/21
86/15 95/3 106/15 119/20 139/21
166/23 199/6 223/14 227/4 231/20
Blackmon [1] 29/18
Blanchard [7] 180/1 183/5 183/7
183/23 185/18 185/20 186/14
blank [3] 12/17 253/4 253/6
blanking [2] 238/3 238/7
blended [2] 220/17 220/17
block [1] 258/16
blue [3] 60/19 61/21 150/8
BMD [77] 9/5 9/11 9/12 9/14 9/16 9/17 9/19 12/4 12/13 12/14 13/14 14/2 78/2 79/22 79/24 81/15 82/23 125/22 128/3 129/20 134/20 134/24 153/3 153/8 161/20 196/22 197/6 197/14 198/1 198/6 198/7 200/15 200/19 201/25 202/8 203/2 203/5 204/5 205/10 205/15 206/13 206/14 206/15 206/18 207/2 217/6 231/23 232/3 232/6 236/5 240/16

B
BMD... [26] 240/19 245/16 245/21
247/12 247/17 247/23 248/15 248/17 249/21 249/25 251/12 252/24 253/20 255/1 255/9 256/13 257/1 257/4 257/6 257/19 257/21 257/22 258/1 258/5 258/13 258/21
BMD's [1] 171/15
BMD-generated [1] 12/13
BMD-printed [1] 257/1
BMDs [51] 17/6 73/19 73/22 73/25 74/11 75/2 75/9 77/15 77/17 78/1 78/25 79/3 79/4 79/9 79/17 79/21 83/1 110/12 125/19 125/19 125/25 127/4 133/24
134/5 134/11 134/17 135/16 135/24
156/19 157/21 161/3 161/18 202/10
202/12 202/13 203/10 204/2 211/4
220/15 230/6 231/8 232/3 232/4 232/18 235/22 235/24 239/19 239/19 243/9 252/3 255/8
board [15] 23/2 29/6 29/11 29/20 29/23 31/4 31/16 36/16 37/18 37/24 179/13 179/16 196/15 197/8 200/5
bond [2] 138/21 138/24
book [2] 10/24 72/20
books [1] 208/8
booth [3] 34/25 35/2 35/5
both [18] 9/17 40/16 77/20 103/12
105/7 107/12 107/13 122/18 122/22
138/1 141/19 205/5 235/6 235/8 240/24
240/24 240/25 259/24
bothered [1] 11/20
bottle [1] 147/24
bottom [14] 41/3 55/6 61/1 61/13 61/15
64/13 64/20 65/21 75/16 89/2 175/20
213/9 217/11 242/9
bought [3] 109/21 110/2 126/25
box [4] 10/5 40/25 41/2 41/4
BOYLE [3] 3/9 4/14 4/17
BRAD [1] 1/6
Brandau [2] 76/6 77/9
breach [12] 94/7 94/14 94/18 101/4
113/23 114/2 114/12 115/6 115/8 115/8
185/14 207/24
breaches [6] 93/16 98/5 98/24 99/22 166/24 187/4
break [9] 39/19 83/4 83/21 118/1 120/24 191/10 191/13 191/17 226/23 breaks [1] 46/18
brief [8] 6/12 99/17 179/2 191/17
193/20 226/23 227/10 263/2
briefed [1] 211/10
briefly [10] 6/7 43/3 45/3 59/23 83/8
115/2 133/22 158/13 227/8 228/15
brilliant [1] 187/23
bring [7] 54/24 75/11 99/7 146/11
207/2 233/17 246/25
bringing [2] 83/1 161/4
broad [3] 54/10 137/25 143/24
broader [1] 53/14
broken [6] 129/8 130/18 170/1 170/9 170/10 174/2
brought [4] 72/7 127/15 172/19 181/6
BROWN [8] 2/15 2/15 4/13 4/20 93/13
118/12 119/11 136/7
BRUCE [4] 2/15 2/15 93/13 96/5
BRYAN [3] 3/6 3/7 117/8
budget [7] 138/10 138/11 138/20 139/1
218/21 218/22 260/12
budgetary [1] 138/9
build [6] 25/9 212/4 215/21 218/24 219/4 241/10
building [3] 59/2 76/15 212/5 builds [1] 215/18
built [3] 212/6 212/10 212/11
bullet [4] 69/9 69/11 76/18 76/23
bulleted [2] 76/17 77/8
Burdick [4] 149/22 151/9 151/12
200/25
bureau [1] 216/21
business [6] 2/11 172/2 172/11 184/4 221/8 238/11

C
C-U-R-L-I-N-G [1] 6/20
calendar [1] 10/8
calibrated [1] 202/23
California [1] 7/10
call [12] 38/8 47/5 102/16 137/2 140/2 154/9 155/11 163/4 163/5 215/11 216/12 221/1
called [12] 58/7 103/9 115/6 128/23
147/19 150/13 156/6 172/14 216/25 236/14 257/13 259/6
calling [3] 42/10 148/22 148/25
calls [4] 146/3 190/18 219/15 246/9
came [16] \(7 / 1080 / 181 / 1986 / 187 / 25\) 88/2 116/18 127/20 132/16 135/19 157/9 195/22 210/10 211/24 213/23 233/19
camera [2] 80/4 261/11
CAMPBELL [1] 2/6
campuses [3] 59/6 76/22 114/10 can [160] \(7 / 27 / 48 / 2010 / 2112 / 15\) 12/18 15/9 17/17 18/2 19/15 19/18 20/3 20/7 20/12 20/16 21/8 21/12 21/12 22/23 25/20 27/16 28/11 29/5 30/4 30/7 33/15 35/17 39/1 39/19 40/7 40/12 42/8 44/4 44/24 46/7 46/7 46/11 46/15 46/24 49/13 52/20 57/25 59/7 61/5 69/23 72/9 72/11 78/14 79/7 80/5 82/13 83/6 83/15 83/17 85/12 86/4 86/21 86/22 86/25 87/6 89/11 90/19 90/20 90/25 93/6 94/23 95/18 111/18 113/1 116/18 116/24 117/4 117/13 118/14 120/20 122/25 123/12 123/13 123/13 123/23 125/6 133/16 140/2 140/20 143/4 143/19 146/9 148/1 151/8 151/10 154/16 154/24 154/25 157/18 159/13 163/12 163/13 163/24 165/22 166/2 166/10 166/12 167/10 168/2 169/16 172/17 178/12 178/23 180/8 184/13 193/21 194/14 194/23 196/22 199/11 200/2 200/3 201/2 202/19 205/8 208/4 208/5 208/6 208/9 209/1 214/13 217/4 217/12 221/9 224/23 225/13 226/19 226/20 227/15 233/11 237/1 239/23 244/15 244/16 245/2 245/3 246/15 246/17 246/20 248/3 248/4 248/4 248/9 252/8 253/16 253/19 253/25 254/13 258/17 260/18 260/21 261/19 262/5 262/9 263/23
can't [44] 21/25 28/13 29/6 41/25 42/15 46/1 54/20 72/10 86/24 92/20 94/11 99/13 109/8 111/5 111/14 111/18

112/16 115/11 115/13 115/14 117/17
158/5 162/24 164/19 179/24 184/1 189/11 189/16 193/1 203/4 208/20 215/23 218/13 227/11 232/6 234/9 234/12 235/8 236/17 240/2 245/10 245/15 246/20 250/23
candidate [2] 35/5 246/20
candidates [2] 202/24 202/24
cannot [6] 82/22 146/16 224/1 235/7 250/7 251/2
capability [1] 130/7
capacities [1] 102/25
capacity [2] 19/10 19/11
capitol [1] 59/2
capture [1] 41/11
captures [1] 41/12
card [8] 184/4 197/6 217/8 230/17
231/16 245/16 245/21 257/22
care [5] 101/9 136/22 136/23 237/19 237/22
caring [1] 254/22
Carolina [1] 7/9
cartoon [7] 157/22 158/10 159/12 159/12 159/14 159/21 162/15
CARY [1] 2/20
cascading [1] 202/21
case [63] \(4 / 2\) 6/5 9/7 10/18 15/20 16/18 17/6 21/6 23/1 23/18 23/23 24/8 24/11 25/9 27/8 31/22 34/13 34/21 35/22 38/9 42/12 48/20 49/1 51/7 57/15 67/12 72/19 80/21 82/22 83/25 85/18 88/13 94/20 95/5 105/4 105/16 108/2 116/1 119/13 121/17 122/2 122/2 122/25
123/2 123/3 145/3 146/19 151/22 164/7 179/24 181/9 185/9 186/20 192/19 195/2 195/5 195/8 195/11 200/25 222/16 222/21 224/1 247/6
cases [4] 39/13 43/6 221/24 242/10 cast [18] \(8 / 208 / 21\) 9/10 11/15 11/22 12/15 13/24 14/1 14/2 14/6 200/25 202/17 248/21 250/2 250/3 252/18 253/14 257/20
casting [2] 251/11 254/11
catch [6] 174/9 244/5 245/8 245/10 245/15 248/8
catcher [1] 252/11
catches [2] 201/14 246/7
catching [1] 185/2
categorically [1] 20/12
categorized [1] 69/17
category [1] 192/20
caught [7] 118/17 200/16 239/13
241/10 243/3 245/12 246/4
cause [10] 37/22 187/13 187/21 188/2
199/7 200/2 200/3 232/2 254/25 256/7
causes [1] 249/15
causing [4] 61/10 70/17 199/6 232/19
ceased [1] 114/12
cells [2] 116/24 117/13
cellular [1] 216/24
cellular-based [1] 216/24
center [6] 16/15 53/22 73/5 126/7
211/5 220/4
centers [3] 59/3 73/15 114/9
centrally [1] 256/17
certain [16] 37/1 37/4 40/1 56/11 56/23
144/15 164/19 175/12 184/9 199/3 199/15 206/24 218/13 250/3 251/7

\section*{C}
certain... [1] 255/23
certainly [9] 42/18 58/1 89/11 92/3
146/4 163/5 183/20 200/17 246/17
certification [5] 31/19 184/4 215/1 244/9 247/4
certified [4] 31/20 37/23 38/1 214/1 certify [10] 37/23 38/4 179/23 199/12
199/17 199/21 200/22 201/25 203/12 265/8
certifying [1] 31/17
CES [13] 16/2 20/3 53/22 54/3 54/6
54/7 55/10 55/24 56/3 85/1 108/19 126/20 233/18
CFO [4] 139/6 139/6 139/8 232/24
chain [2] 217/23 218/15
chairman [1] 29/18
challenge [3] 83/1 222/18 246/21
Chamber [1] 226/8
chance [4] 217/10 245/3 245/4 254/14 chances [1] 12/5
Chaney [7] 29/8 29/9 31/3 31/7 32/2 179/11 179/15
change [12] 36/3 36/6 69/25 87/15 134/10 134/20 134/23 235/7 235/8 236/20 255/9 256/4
changed [4] 10/4 10/7 70/3 228/22
changes [3] 70/1 70/2 92/19
changing [2] 226/18 236/23
chaos [12] 187/14 187/16 187/21 188/2 199/7 199/8 199/9 199/11 199/14 200/2 256/7 257/7
characterize [1] 195/23
characterizing [1] 192/24
charge [5] 84/14 105/7 133/2 193/6 222/7
charged [1] 84/14
Charlotte [2] 7/9 7/13
chart [1] 35/25
check [3] 99/6 99/6 217/9
checked [4] 10/5 217/7 230/16 231/16
checking [2] 68/4 224/10
checks [1] 166/4
chief [11] 47/20 59/24 98/21 102/25
103/16 137/20 137/20 138/13 139/5
196/2 201/6
child [1] 7/9
choice [2] 127/16 236/1
choose [2] 253/16 254/16
choosing [3] 8/12 146/16 233/19
chose [9] 25/11 37/21 106/13 106/14
217/2 240/24 240/25 243/15 243/16
chosen [2] 156/16 238/18
Chris [2] 237/24 238/16
CHRISTIAN [1] \(2 / 10\)
CIO [17] 47/20 47/23 48/8 50/7 50/14
52/14 98/7 99/2 102/19 105/11 111/20 111/25 120/4 135/20 135/23 213/20 234/11
Circuit [4] 146/13 146/15 146/17 151/3
circumstances [2] 213/10 256/20 circumvention [1] 44/21
CISA [14] 150/5 150/6 153/11 188/9 188/13 188/15 188/17 189/6 190/2
190/13 190/22 191/3 247/25 248/7
cite [2] 1/4 57/24
cites [2] 22/2 22/2
citing [1] 86/20
citizens [3] 8/11 38/1 38/4
City [1] 265/10
claim [3] 22/15 81/20 81/24
claiming [2] 22/8 232/18
claims [15] 21/5 22/11 22/12 24/15
24/15 24/21 25/1 26/7 26/10 26/15
26/17 81/18 82/24 170/10 170/15
clarification [1] 170/14
clarify [3] 11/12 124/6 229/15
clarifying [1] 142/8
clarity [1] 178/23
Clark [2] 76/1 76/4
classified [4] 119/15 119/16 122/9 123/9
clean [1] 215/3
clear [13] 11/18 42/10 51/11 58/17
60/25 67/16 105/5 141/22 159/3 169/6
198/24 213/4 227/18
clearer [2] 139/21 143/2
clearly [8] 30/22 41/8 135/5 137/6
157/23 159/14 162/22 222/18
clerk [1] 230/22
client [8] 81/19 93/5 131/8 146/4 213/7
222/25 223/3 260/11
client's [1] 146/4
Clinch [3] 171/3 171/6 171/10
clip [1] 208/10
clipped [1] 40/24
clock [1] 34/9
close [2] 55/14 216/4
closed [1] 236/15
closely [1] 203/22
closer [2] 155/13 260/7
cloth [1] 192/10
Cloudburst [5] 61/25 66/4 66/17 66/18 91/10
CM [2] 1/2 \(1 / 3\)
CM/ECF [2] 1/2 \(1 / 3\)
co [1] 259/6
co-defendant [1] 259/6
COALITION [10] 2/13 38/14 93/14 116/9 119/25 227/3 227/6 228/12 239/1 239/7
code [35] 12/17 12/19 40/1 40/4 41/8
41/13 42/22 43/12 43/13 43/22 44/7 45/24 164/9 195/4 195/10 195/15 195/21 212/13 230/13 237/12 237/21 241/21 242/10 243/15 243/19 243/23 244/5 245/6 245/7 246/4 246/7 247/13 247/15 258/6 258/14
codes [7] 165/11 189/24 203/17 235/24 236/3 236/5 236/7
coding [2] 41/12 230/21
Coffee [61] 25/7 26/7 27/13 28/1 28/4 28/7 28/18 28/20 29/6 29/10 29/20 29/22 31/4 31/9 31/16 31/23 34/19 35/11 36/9 36/16 37/10 37/18 37/24 38/4 93/16 94/6 97/20 97/23 98/2 98/3 98/5 98/24 99/21 115/8 115/11 128/15 128/18 128/23 129/4 131/19 166/23 166/25 167/3 168/11 168/16 169/1 177/17 178/1 178/11 178/20 179/16 180/2 182/21 183/9 183/17 185/11 187/4 187/6 207/23 214/23 221/22 coincides [1] 173/15 colleague [2] 133/12 133/14
Collection [1] 97/5
collects [1] 63/16
college [1] 7/12
Colorado [1] 220/5
colorful [2] 64/7 64/17
column [1] 33/23
combative [1] 180/6
come [22] 46/16 46/20 70/14 80/4 99/1
125/24 128/23 146/16 148/21 152/1
154/2 173/12 177/6 185/12 199/24
210/23 233/6 260/18 261/15 262/9
262/24 263/14
comes [11] 30/25 123/2 171/2 171/9
179/4 201/12 201/14 216/21 233/14
244/13 263/23
comfort [1] 191/10
comfortable [1] 9/24
coming [13] 34/12 85/23 87/4 87/13
87/17 87/20 120/3 150/20 172/4 173/25
179/22 216/22 232/18
command [1] 103/16
comment [1] 94/11
comments [1] 15/8
Commerce [1] 226/8
commission [18] 103/5 156/7 156/9 156/14 156/19 157/8 157/11 157/15
157/16 157/20 160/20 161/2 161/2
161/10 162/10 162/17 163/15 232/10
committed [1] 28/9
committee [6] 29/14 29/24 31/3 31/9 31/15 238/2
common [2] 100/13 206/12
communicate [2] 99/21 107/8
communicated [2] 19/15 19/19
communication [3] 146/4 190/17 191/1
communications [5] 188/14 189/5
190/20 193/2 193/6
community [1] 8/17
companies [3] 56/5 70/4 102/8
company [6] 53/7 53/10 56/8 58/7
69/19 100/21
compare [2] \(34 / 534 / 5\)
Comparing [1] 34/7
compatibility [2] 70/1 70/3
compensating [1] 71/9
complainant [3] 17/18 17/21 17/23
complete [2] 150/8 263/6
completed [1] 254/24
completely [1] 6/17
completeness [2] 208/1 208/6
completes [1] 253/13
complicated [3] 139/22 212/5 212/7
complies [3] 18/20 23/7 54/15
component [1] 130/21
components [1] 166/25
computer [8] 1/21 43/8 95/18 130/17
147/11 150/14 196/18 251/5
COMPUTER-AIDED [1] 1/21
computer-related [1] 43/8
computers [1] 153/4
concern [14] 27/12 42/3 46/12 68/24 91/25 124/22 146/25 161/9 172/22
211/19 253/9 254/17 255/24 257/24
concerned [4] 41/10 129/2 199/19 217/16
concerning [9] 15/8 15/22 16/1 26/22 109/6 148/13 169/11 169/20 191/2
concerns [10] 27/12 43/15 86/10 87/11

\section*{C}
concerns... [6] 149/25 150/1 160/22
161/13 224/12 259/13
concluded [1] 177/25
conclusion [3] 20/15 20/18 246/10
conditionally [1] 163/25
conduct [7] 24/20 52/17 52/23 56/23
65/8 68/12 73/19
conducted [6] 59/11 66/18 73/22 73/25 89/20 187/4
conducting [6] 19/3 19/16 53/21 56/2 87/23 120/6
conducts [1] 45/12
confer [1] 14/24
conference [3] 199/23 215/8 236/12
confidence [2] 8/20 13/13
confident [2] 127/18 247/21
confidential [2] 49/22 129/5
confidentiality [3] 118/8 118/22
263/19
configuration [3] 230/15 230/25 231/15
configurations [1] 91/19
confirm [2] 41/16 263/8
confirmed [4] 81/2 201/23 203/10 257/15
confirming [1] 188/10
confiscated [1] 121/10
conflated [1] 152/18
conflict [1] 70/11
confused [3] 90/17 140/17 142/7
confusing [2] 68/19 223/14
confusion [1] 192/2
Congress [2] 169/11 169/23
Congressional [1] 169/20
conjunction [3] 22/16 214/15 234/3
connect [3] 123/17 124/4 220/7
connected [3] 202/2 211/20 220/8
connection [4] 38/22 119/11 222/13
229/7
connectivity [1] 209/19
connects [1] 258/11
conscious [1] 160/20
consensus [4] 154/2 233/7 233/14 233/21
consequence [3] 246/8 246/17 246/19 consider [2] 77/4 176/12
considered [3] 236/19 237/3 246/14
considering [1] 82/7
considers [1] 45/10
consistent [2] 32/17 81/8
consistently [1] 218/8
constitute [1] 265/9
Constitution [1] 8/11
Constitution's [1] 250/9
constitutionality [1] 34/23
constraints [1] 138/20
consultant [1] 195/3
contained [3] 20/16 20/19 240/7
content [1] 122/10
contention [1] 21/22
contest [8] 229/15 245/13 245/18
246/3 246/6 246/25 253/7 256/5
contests [4] 247/2 247/8 252/18 255/23
context [25] 24/19 55/16 55/17 55/23 79/8 84/22 85/13 85/17 93/1 94/4 94/6

95/2 118/8 139/16 141/19 143/9 144/5 168/3 170/19 208/3 209/16 230/8 250/20 250/25 251/2
contingencies [1] 246/13
continue [5] 6/3 12/2 12/4 36/25 201/24
continued [4] 4/2 6/5 150/19 247/6
continues [1] 66/20 continuing [1] 178/19
contract [17] 73/23 74/1 74/3 74/6 74/8 74/9 74/11 74/23 75/1 75/8 81/3 82/20 111/7 114/11 114/12 218/6 218/7
contracted [3] 114/23 114/23 118/23
contracting [2] 74/12 75/5
contracts [2] 219/15 221/1
controls [3] 62/9 62/19 71/9
convenient [1] 46/10
conversation [3] 99/1 154/5 174/16
conversations [1] 174/5
converse [1] 46/24
conveyed [1] 133/14
COO [5] 152/12 166/19 168/10 195/19 232/22
cookbook [2] 70/8 70/10
coordinate [1] 260/17
coordinates [3] 197/18 212/12 212/14 coordination [1] 133/23
copies [4] 40/12 45/15 76/6 78/12 copy [10] 21/16 32/7 45/16 154/21 162/20 193/18 194/14 209/3 209/4 224/24
corner [1] 40/25
corporations [4] 56/18 62/16 62/17 114/8
correct [117] 11/24 11/25 12/16 13/25 18/24 26/5 30/18 33/20 34/7 48/9 48/10 48/23 50/4 50/8 50/25 51/4 51/5 51/20 52/3 52/4 52/6 53/5 53/6 53/22 53/24 53/25 55/15 55/21 55/22 56/10 56/15 57/20 58/11 59/12 63/2 66/14 71/15 71/19 72/5 72/13 72/25 73/12 73/20 75/4 76/4 78/8 78/21 79/19 84/7 84/8 84/11 87/4 87/14 87/16 87/21 88/10 88/11 88/24 89/3 89/4 89/6 90/8 91/8 91/16 91/19 92/11 92/16 95/12 95/22 100/9 103/3 108/5 108/10 128/12 133/1 144/12 145/8 145/21 147/10 147/20 151/25 155/20 156/12 156/15 163/16 163/20 165/12 167/9 167/13 169/9 183/6 215/10 217/18 226/13 226/16 230/2 230/20 232/4 232/22 235/23 235/25 236/6 241/13 241/17 241/20 242/17 242/21 243/20 244/4 247/7 251/22 253/5 254/14 256/6 263/9 263/17 263/19
corrected [2] 37/2 229/10
correcting [1] 37/20
correction [1] 254/18
correctly [9] 50/1 73/6 141/7 141/8 144/9 166/15 239/15 239/25 242/1
correspond [1] 160/16
corresponds [1] 62/11
corrupt [1] 130/18
corrupted [1] 130/16
cost [5] 69/12 69/17 234/5 234/22 235/12
could [111] 9/23 12/9 25/11 26/12
31/23 32/6 40/2 40/3 41/21 42/18 42/19

43/2 48/15 54/13 57/24 59/14 60/15 62/17 64/6 65/2 65/20 66/10 67/25 68/5 69/6 71/1 72/18 74/13 74/15 75/11 75/13 84/24 86/2 86/4 88/3 88/17 92/19 96/10 96/14 96/15 98/14 98/15 102/12 103/14 116/23 120/9 120/18 120/20 121/9 124/21 128/22 130/5 136/14 138/22 139/20 141/18 146/21 146/23 150/4 150/4 150/5 156/22 163/6 164/8 172/14 178/19 187/17 187/17 187/18 187/19 188/24 189/19 196/18 197/12 198/19 200/12 200/13 200/13 200/14 203/2 204/7 205/12 205/13 207/8
211/10 221/12 221/16 223/10 224/15 227/6 227/7 228/23 231/12 231/14 238/10 238/13 240/17 244/15 246/21 255/11 255/19 255/21 256/7 256/9 256/14 256/16 258/5 258/15 260/1 260/17 260/22
couldn't [20] 44/3 93/22 96/22 149/9 150/6 160/15 164/22 175/12 182/1 184/24 185/5 196/9 199/3 199/15 207/8 219/18 233/12 234/24 239/21 250/2
counsel [61] \(6 / 9\) 14/5 14/25 15/1 18/13 19/11 24/17 35/20 38/12 38/22 38/24 50/19 52/8 57/23 61/8 67/12 81/14 82/24 89/10 92/1 92/5 100/8 101/18 102/13 104/22 106/9 107/12 107/13 107/13 107/15 107/25 110/18 115/21 117/17 118/7 118/9 122/9 124/3 125/4 125/15 132/8 141/9 145/22 145/25 146/5 146/25 147/9 147/18 151/9 153/10 171/24 177/5 177/13 195/8 208/22 213/4 223/10 226/19 233/16 238/5 262/3
counsel's [3] 124/2 126/3 262/4 count [31] \(9 / 9\) 10/20 10/23 10/25 11/13 13/21 22/9 28/14 28/14 28/15 31/17 31/21 31/22 33/11 33/16 34/1 34/12 37/3 37/23 220/13 239/15 239/16 245/24 245/25 247/11 247/11 247/12 247/14 247/14 247/15 256/6
counted [17] 8/20 10/12 11/2 11/7 13/24 14/2 14/6 35/1 35/6 36/4 200/25 240/11 242/16 245/17 245/22 256/14 258/23
counterparts [1] 184/8
counties [40] 37/1 37/4 110/2 110/7 110/9 120/19 121/4 126/10 126/23
126/24 129/17 129/19 130/1 131/25 136/1 173/25 174/10 180/19 180/23 183/21 201/10 202/10 202/16 210/9 214/12 214/14 214/19 214/21 215/9 215/18 215/24 215/25 216/11 217/22 219/6 219/24 222/9 222/13 232/5 258/21
counties' [1] 214/22
counting [3] 123/1 251/10 251/21 country [2] 174/23 220/3
counts [4] 33/2 34/12 35/12 247/17 county [106] 6/2 14/13 14/15 22/9 25/7 26/7 27/13 28/1 28/4 28/7 28/16 28/18 28/21 29/6 29/10 29/20 29/23 31/4 31/9 31/16 31/23 34/19 35/11 36/9 36/16 37/5 37/10 37/18 37/24 38/4 39/14 80/12 93/16 94/6 97/20 97/23 98/2 98/3 98/5 98/8 98/24 99/22 109/16 109/16 109/24 115/9 115/11 120/15 120/16

\section*{C}
county... [57] 128/16 128/18 128/24 129/4 129/15 129/18 129/19 130/25 131/2 131/2 131/19 166/23 166/25 167/4 168/11 168/16 169/1 171/3 171/6 171/6 171/10 174/4 177/17 178/1 178/11 178/20 179/16 180/2 182/21 183/9 183/17 183/24 185/11 187/4 187/6 199/17 199/21 202/20 203/14 204/6 207/23 214/23 215/12 215/14 215/19 215/20 216/14 218/6 219/13 219/23 221/22 230/22 231/12 234/7 234/7 239/12 244/1
couple [9] 49/19 105/4 117/10 133/17 192/6 220/21 228/17 236/9 236/13 course [11] 21/21 23/13 24/20 28/11 163/14 172/8 174/12 191/12 245/14 246/1 249/19
court [72] 1/3 1/6 1/9 1/1 1/23 4/15 4/18 4/21 5/6 7/2 7/4 21/13 21/20 21/21 22/6 24/6 25/5 25/19 27/25 34/13 39/6 42/16 43/5 43/21 45/20 46/3 46/7 50/20 51/7 51/8 58/5 80/14 82/8 82/17 82/22 83/10 83/25 84/3 84/6 85/17 88/24 89/19 90/6 90/12 92/9 92/14 92/24 111/21 117/24 122/25 149/8 149/9 149/17 150/2 161/4 176/12 177/8 181/14 181/18 182/4 191/15 195/9 205/8 208/4 212/23 220/24 259/23 265/6 265/7 265/10 265/17 265/17
Court's [2] 41/19 45/4
COURTHOUSE [1] 1/24
courtroom [2] 10/16 46/11
courts [3] 239/14 242/15 246/23
cover [7] 22/3 59/19 83/17 88/20 104/6 140/10 249/12
covered [3] 15/2 82/4 210/5
covering [3] 74/11 75/1 75/8
covers [3] 59/2 108/13 108/16
COVID [3] 86/1 86/3 211/6
crap [1] 226/12
crazy [1] 227/17
create [1] 220/13
created [2] 44/22 109/5
credentials [1] \(91 / 10\)
credibility [2] 24/8 67/16
credible [1] 21/24
critical [2] 45/24 130/21
cross [29] \(2 / 44 / 64 / 94 / 114 / 124 / 15\) 5/4 5/5 5/7 5/7 13/3 15/9 15/17 34/20 43/3 47/17 81/22 82/4 93/11 105/1 137/13 141/12 154/25 176/6 228/9 228/16 229/25 231/20 257/7
cross-examination [15] 4/6 4/9 4/11 4/12 4/15 5/4 5/7 13/3 15/17 47/17 81/22 93/11 105/1 137/13 228/9
CRR [3] 1/23 265/6 265/16
crucial [1] 20/10
curious [2] 135/15 135/17
CURLING [35] 1/4 2/2 4/4 6/7 6/19
6/22 7/1 7/5 7/12 7/23 8/19 9/25 11/6 11/12 11/20 12/1 12/13 12/21 12/24 13/5 14/16 30/14 38/13 47/4 61/15 62/18 65/21 69/6 82/15 97/1 97/3
106/12 107/12 107/13 116/3
Curling 127 [1] 97/1
current [15] 9/12 46/4 113/12 137/18

139/12 141/24 144/16 164/8 165/10 221/25 230/15 230/25 231/15 233/19 248/2
currently [4] 7/16 142/21 151/23 165/14
custody [1] 217/23
customer [1] 180/18
cut [4] 192/10 222/5 224/15 258/20 CV [1] 1/6
cyber [10] 59/20 66/18 77/9 89/20 108/3 109/5 114/6 183/14 185/6 211/5 cybersecurity [59] 52/17 52/24 53/1 53/4 53/21 54/3 54/4 55/10 56/3 56/12 56/24 58/7 59/10 59/11 60/6 62/7 65/6 66/8 67/15 68/9 68/22 69/15 70/19 80/25 81/3 81/6 82/21 85/1 85/9 100/24 105/7 107/10 108/3 108/25 109/4 109/14 110/25 111/4 111/9 111/20 111/22 112/3 112/19 112/25 113/12 113/18 114/17 128/22 147/14 156/13 156/18 161/10 211/19 214/12 214/24 216/10 217/19 218/21 222/8
cycle [3] 185/12 228/24 229/11 cycles [1] 214/16

\section*{D}

D-O-N-N-A [1] 6/19
daily [2] 69/25 221/8
dangerous [1] 150/25
DANIEL [1] 3/8
DANIELLE [1] \(3 / 8\)
data [31] 16/2 16/14 20/4 20/10 20/16
20/18 20/23 22/3 27/14 54/6 59/3 63/16 63/21 63/24 73/5 73/15 91/8 91/11 114/9 119/18 \(122 / 8\) 122/8 129/9 129/15 131/14 132/7 171/15 172/25 210/8 216/22 247/7
database [19] 41/24 44/12 62/12 62/21 63/2 63/5 63/11 63/14 63/15 63/15 63/17 63/18 63/22 63/24 63/25 66/25 67/8 100/15 100/19
databases [1] 45/20
date [13] 40/19 40/19 48/24 102/4
102/12 102/18 140/11 161/24 161/24
162/25 163/2 168/3 234/2
dated [3] 15/25 97/6 193/25
dates [2] 170/2 189/16
DAVID [7] 2/4 2/23 2/24 15/19 104/9 104/11 120/11
DAVIS [11] \(2 / 192 / 212 / 22\) 15/20 16/25 22/22 23/9 25/16 25/17 34/18 105/3 Davis' [3] 14/25 15/1 25/19
day [36] 11/3 33/5 33/12 40/16 46/2 46/20 46/22 109/23 153/20 171/22 173/13 187/21 188/3 196/10 197/13 198/11 199/8 200/20 202/10 203/11 203/25 203/25 204/20 205/9 207/4 207/6 207/7 207/10 216/4 227/19 231/5 242/24 248/20 249/3 260/5 265/13
days [4] 1/4 168/17 212/11 242/22
de [1] 259/13
de-legitimize [1] 259/13
deadline [1] 236/10
deadlines [2] 237/2 237/3
deal [11] 38/11 55/25 88/1 112/12 113/8 120/15 170/11 196/13 204/11 206/9 219/5
dealing [8] 17/7 104/14 110/10 138/8

139/22 161/22 201/15 220/6 dealings [1] 166/18 deals [2] \(23 / 23131 / 1\)
dealt [3] 104/11 120/19 242/18
death [1] 216/22
debate [1] 142/11
December [6] 31/9 102/20 136/16
139/4 185/16 186/15
December 10th [1] 31/9
December 31st [2] 102/20 139/4
decide [2] 249/1 256/8
decided [9] 102/7 124/11 150/20 150/24 151/2 151/2 195/17 217/15 235/1
deciding [1] 199/21
decision [28] 48/3 72/16 119/5 131/9 133/9 149/15 150/9 150/15 153/14
153/18 154/9 155/11 155/15 156/10 158/18 161/9 161/18 161/19 161/19 192/23 193/2 193/4 195/15 233/9 233/23 238/14 252/25 253/1
decision-makers [2] 158/18 161/9 decision-making [2] 150/9 150/15 decisions [2] 193/7 233/6
decks [1] 248/16
declaration [15] 44/8 80/20 81/12 81/21 88/13 88/20 89/1 89/7 89/12 90/5 90/11 92/8 92/14 93/1 223/7
declared [2] 89/19 235/18
dedicated [3] 56/16 57/4 100/12
deemed [1] 158/8
deeper [1] 202/14
deeply [1] 242/4
defend [2] 164/21 211/12 defendant [2] 222/16 259/6
defendants [6] \(1 / 73 / 2\) 116/14 121/17 121/18 160/4
defendants' [10] 21/22 74/22 82/7 82/11 115/21 124/3 157/3 157/18 157/19 160/6
defense [4] 6/9 38/24 125/4 223/10
deferred [1] 128/6
define [1] 73/13
defined [2] 73/14 220/12
defines [1] 95/9
definitely [1] 241/12
degree [1] 161/16
DeKalb [2] 202/20 243/25
delegated [1] 110/9
deleted [2] 16/14 20/4
deletion [1] 16/1
deliberate [2] 44/21 252/8
deliberately [2] 40/6 200/16
delivering [2] 126/9 222/18
delta [1] \(33 / 23\)
demand [5] 166/3 229/25 230/14 231/2
246/20
Democracy [1] 109/6
demonstrate [1] 178/12
demonstrated [1] 164/7
demonstration [1] 164/14
demonstrations [1] 234/16
denier [3] 258/24 259/1 259/7
deniers [5] 192/9 192/25 257/14
257/16 259/12
denies [1] 259/2
department [7] 114/7 120/14 120/19 214/17 223/9 234/3 234/8

\section*{D}
depend [2] 206/21 206/21
dependent [1] 42/24
depends [13] 187/15 195/23 196/6
199/14 199/14 199/15 201/9 203/24
219/11 240/21 244/7 246/5 247/16
deploy [1] 77/10
deployed [3] 170/17 209/22 210/9
deposed [3] 54/1 140/6 155/21
deposition [38] 13/8 42/15 44/22 45/5 45/13 48/25 49/3 49/10 49/12 49/13 49/16 50/3 54/2 54/13 54/17 84/25 86/4 139/25 140/9 142/9 142/17 143/5
143/17 143/22 144/9 145/12 146/7
154/12 154/13 154/19 154/22 155/7
155/25 159/6 159/24 187/22 225/3 228/13
depositions [2] 94/20 129/24
deputy [7] 139/7 233/16 233/18 238/4 238/4 238/4 259/5
derived [1] 106/22
described [4] 21/22 121/23 158/7
222/12
describing [1] 23/23
description [6] 62/20 95/11 113/1
120/3 122/7 123/12
design [2] 105/22 140/23
designated [1] 124/1
designed [3] 41/20 151/24 209/21
desktop [1] 56/19
despite [1] 37/24
destroyed [2] 21/23 256/14
detailing [1] 144/15
details [7] 27/18 72/10 96/4 96/17
165/1 165/5 194/12
detect [1] 256/24
detectable [2] 198/4 241/7
detected [7] 198/20 199/1 200/20
205/9 206/5 206/22 241/14
detecting [1] 202/4
detective [2] 196/14 244/19
determine [4] 77/15 127/7 145/23
151/8
determined [1] 71/12
develop [2] 25/7 243/14
developed [1] 105/22
device [9] 34/24 77/11 77/14 129/20
129/21 217/8 230/16 250/13 258/20
devices [1] 130/1
DHS [3] 188/25 189/3 214/21
DIANE [1] 3/7
did [137] 7/12 7/14 7/25 10/20 10/23
10/25 11/13 11/19 13/9 14/24 16/13
19/1 20/13 22/14 26/2 26/14 26/20 28/1
28/16 32/23 34/18 36/24 40/8 40/9 42/13 42/14 44/17 44/22 44/24 48/5 50/1 50/2 52/25 55/24 55/24 56/16 60/10 67/2 68/13 71/18 71/21 72/7 73/3 73/6 73/16 73/17 73/21 74/2 74/18 77/20 77/20 77/23 84/12 85/5 85/5 89/22 90/16 92/18 94/14 94/16 96/20 97/11 97/21 97/24 98/2 98/18 99/21 102/2 103/6 103/22 104/3 104/12 108/10 109/20 110/24 111/2 111/3 112/11 114/11 114/11 114/14 114/16 120/24 127/21 128/4 131/15 131/17 131/17 132/8 132/15 132/23 136/7

141/7 144/10 150/8 154/8 155/10 159/5 160/19 161/14 161/15 167/7 169/7 183/7 184/17 188/13 189/12 190/16 191/8 195/9 207/22 207/24 208/14 209/12 210/3 210/16 210/24 211/14 214/23 219/19 227/24 228/19 228/20 233/23 236/8 237/20 239/17 241/3 241/6 241/8 241/9 242/7 244/12 244/22 249/21 249/23 263/12
didn't [57] 16/24 25/17 26/6 26/8 26/9 35/3 44/20 58/19 63/7 72/8 72/9 72/11 73/13 74/8 83/7 86/2 88/3 91/13 92/25 93/24 94/16 107/16 107/20 111/21 121/1 121/12 125/4 141/12 141/22 142/10 142/16 144/19 151/3 156/3 161/18 166/8 169/2 173/6 173/7 179/5 181/7 184/10 209/25 211/24 219/23 221/16 235/24 236/17 236/18 237/9 237/19 237/22 238/1 238/17 240/25 241/1 241/6
die [1] 210/21
died [2] 130/17 130/17
difference [5] 106/17 225/4 239/25 240/6 249/13
differences [2] 15/4 234/22
different [40] 17/25 27/15 41/2 44/1 56/5 61/9 61/17 73/5 88/12 90/16 94/17 103/2 107/19 110/16 130/4 138/6 138/14 164/23 165/8 189/17 200/12 204/5 205/24 209/22 210/14 234/7 237/8 237/11 240/7 241/23 241/25 242/3 245/24 251/15 251/20 255/2 255/3 256/18 256/19 257/17
differently [7] 58/22 70/16 87/2 201/4 241/16 247/19 247/19
difficult [12] 12/3 106/6 107/4 165/3
196/15 197/19 198/5 199/3 206/4
212/16 244/17 255/9
difficulty [1] 15/8
DIGGES [4] 2/13 2/13 2/18 2/18
dilemma [1] 31/17
direct [17] 4/5 4/13 6/24 22/21 28/25 31/12 32/22 49/16 54/16 76/17 84/12 86/18 100/2 138/8 138/22 188/18 205/8 directed [4] 81/14 81/17 84/9 84/20
directing [3] 75/16 78/4 89/8
direction [3] 80/19 81/1 82/24
directions [2] 41/2 193/7
directly [9] 81/22 138/4 149/25 150/1
150/9 150/15 172/4 193/6 217/9
director [7] 137/21 138/3 233/1 233/18 233/18 237/24 238/4
Disabilities [1] 234/9
disagree [18] 50/12 50/15 51/17 75/4 75/7 90/11 107/7 139/17 139/18 141/5 141/6 141/24 142/1 142/20 142/23 143/6 144/2 144/10
disagreed [1] 142/1
disagreement [2] 177/10 233/11
disagrees [1] 107/22
disclose [1] 43/18
disclosed [3] 16/19 198/17 222/25
disclosure [2] 43/17 151/10
discovered [3] 171/15 185/14 242/22
discovery [11] 21/5 25/7 80/10 117/3
117/3 120/7 198/17 221/5 221/22 221/22 247/8
Discrepancies [1] 33/1
discrete [1] 39/24
discuss [7] 38/25 46/9 80/4 117/15 131/16 132/8 136/14
discussed [8] 19/20 45/10 79/8 84/3 131/22 132/10 184/3 190/13
discussing [6] 27/18 38/18 159/16 164/19 190/2 199/25
discussion [5] 90/15 125/21 131/18 193/3 211/8
discussions [10] 153/19 154/1 154/8 155/10 163/15 190/16 190/19 205/21 211/16 233/10
disenfranchised [4] 10/17 10/22 10/23 11/5
disenfranchising [1] 217/11
disinformation [1] 170/13
disingenuous [1] 45/2
disposition [1] 120/25
dispute [3] 56/2 117/3 197/12
dissatisfied [1] 237/17
distance [1] 46/16
distortion [1] 35/21
distributed [1] 215/8
distributing [2] 214/11 215/24
distribution [4] 126/22 127/2 129/5
133/2
DISTRICT [7] \(1 / 1\) 1/1 \(1 / 12\) 265/4 265/7 265/7 265/17
divide [1] 104/2
division [12] \(1 / 2\) 18/1 18/9 18/13 19/9 19/14 19/23 26/20 138/4 139/9 218/20 265/8
divisions [1] 138/6 do [349]
docket [9] \(1 / 5\) 1/5 80/9 81/12 82/4
117/13 121/17 122/24 123/2
Docket 838 [1] 82/4
Docket 858 [1] 80/9
Docket Number 838-5 [1] 81/12 doctrine [1] 82/19
document [55] 1/8 16/7 16/9 18/23
22/23 22/24 29/2 29/5 30/5 30/8 30/25
36/12 49/23 49/24 50/25 51/1 68/18
79/10 97/4 97/9 97/16 97/17 97/18
97/22 115/20 115/25 116/13 116/18
116/23 117/1 117/2 118/11 119/24
121/19 122/1 122/2 122/8 122/14
122/17 122/18 122/21 123/19 124/13
124/21 135/13 140/18 159/5 159/5
159/8 159/18 173/19 174/12 174/13 193/24 205/21
Document Number 1229-3 [1] 115/25 documents [11] 18/16 18/21 19/2 19/7 22/2 44/7 91/23 124/9 124/17 155/5 155/7
does [55] 10/2 11/6 16/20 19/20 29/4 29/22 42/13 52/16 52/23 54/3 54/4 63/3 81/22 98/7 99/2 100/10 101/2 101/5 101/9 101/12 108/24 112/8 113/12 122/12 123/20 131/4 145/19 146/17 154/21 155/13 162/25 165/10 165/14 178/10 195/19 204/10 207/9 211/18 218/14 218/14 220/1 222/1 225/6 227/4 231/16 234/14 234/15 242/1 246/6 249/9 251/7 251/19 253/11 253/12 263/20
doesn't [43] 18/4 23/17 46/13 69/19 70/9 71/20 72/2 77/22 79/3 79/5 80/22

\section*{D}
doesn't... [32] 86/13 87/25 89/11 90/9 93/24 99/11 106/17 114/22 117/16
120/15 122/24 133/9 150/21 172/20
175/13 177/10 191/25 197/1 197/3
225/14 229/5 236/7 245/6 246/3 248/3
248/11 250/2 250/4 250/17 252/21
253/10 260/18
dog [1] 252/11
doing [31] 41/15 56/9 69/22 70/21 105/25 113/19 129/15 138/19 146/24 152/18 159/24 165/24 171/14 174/4 188/15 202/3 202/4 211/15 212/15 221/24 222/7 230/14 240/23 241/4 241/25 248/13 248/13 249/17 250/18 251/12 252/22
domain [3] 91/5 135/24 135/25 domestic [2] 200/5 200/12
Dominion [71] 31/25 101/3 101/6 101/7 101/10 101/13 101/14 104/8 106/5 107/3 109/6 109/8 109/9 109/10 109/14 109/16 109/19 110/24 110/24 111/2 111/7 111/12 111/22 112/4 112/8 114/20 125/19 127/9 127/13 127/14 127/18 128/7 128/10 128/25 129/1 129/22 131/15 131/16 131/21 139/11 140/22 141/24 142/21 149/1 150/7 153/3 153/8 165/10 166/2 180/19 180/21 181/16 181/25 182/4 182/6 188/18 190/14 190/21 191/2 208/16 211/15 213/1 214/25 218/7 219/10 233/19 234/19 235/6 235/10 235/16 235/18
Dominion's [1] 143/20
don't [248] 9/18 10/18 11/16 12/24 17/19 19/4 19/17 20/2 20/5 20/6 20/6 20/7 20/25 23/19 24/1 24/23 25/2 25/20 26/6 27/16 27/21 28/8 28/17 29/3 30/4 30/7 30/16 30/18 32/7 34/4 34/9 35/16 38/25 39/11 42/3 42/3 43/25 44/5 46/5 46/9 46/22 48/24 50/15 51/17 53/13 55/23 56/2 57/11 60/18 69/20 70/19 72/9 72/17 74/12 75/5 79/4 79/14 80/3 80/5 81/20 83/6 84/5 84/23 84/23 85/4 85/19 85/25 85/25 86/3 90/2 90/9 90/11 90/15 91/9 91/14 92/12 92/17 92/21 93/18 93/19 93/24 93/25 94/11 94/15 94/20 96/2 96/4 96/10 96/10 96/14 96/16 97/15 97/18 98/1 98/14 98/15 98/17 102/4 107/21 111/6 111/7 111/15 111/16 112/12 115/10 115/14 117/11 117/15 119/4 121/12 121/15 122/10 122/22 123/10 123/12 123/19 123/21 123/25 124/17 125/2 132/24 133/7 133/13 135/7 136/14 139/19 141/6 144/2 144/21 144/25 145/1 145/4 145/11 146/9 149/13 149/22 151/4 151/16 151/18 152/16 153/5 154/5 154/23 156/5 158/9 159/15 159/17 160/16 162/2 162/14 163/2 163/23 164/11 164/18 164/22 164/25 165/5 169/22 170/19 172/16 174/14 174/21 175/10 175/10 175/11 175/19 176/2 179/4 179/21 183/13 183/19 185/8 185/8 186/20 187/8 187/9 187/11 188/17 188/19 189/9 189/10 189/11 189/16 189/19 189/21 190/23 192/19

194/9 194/13 194/23 195/6 195/13 195/14 195/16 197/12 197/15 201/1 203/11 203/12 204/15 205/3 205/17 205/17 205/21 205/22 207/21 208/5 208/11 210/6 210/10 210/23 211/3 211/9 213/10 216/12 218/13 219/14 220/7 220/10 221/8 221/23 222/23 225/5 225/8 237/2 237/4 239/23 241/22 242/3 242/12 244/24 247/10 249/11 250/6 250/22 251/15 252/1 252/18 254/7 254/22 254/23 257/21 259/23 261/3 261/3 261/4 262/12 263/14 DONALD [1] 3/9
done [58] 10/24 18/1 19/10 19/14 38/2 38/2 55/10 55/12 80/18 80/19 80/24 80/25 81/2 85/2 86/19 93/8 130/20 130/22 135/13 136/12 145/15 149/24 165/22 174/21 174/24 183/14 187/17 194/4 195/7 202/8 202/15 202/18 203/1 204/22 210/16 213/5 215/5 215/14 222/23 223/1 223/14 223/15 227/6 227/9 229/11 229/20 234/17 244/16 247/4 247/19 247/25 248/15 250/20 251/6 251/8 254/20 258/14 259/9
DONNA [8] \(1 / 42 / 22 / 24 / 46 / 196 / 22\) 7/5 7/21
door [3] 27/4 42/11 107/21
doors [1] 198/4
DOS [1] 235/18
dot [1] 95/12
dots [1] 123/17
double [2] 37/4 103/6
double-scanned [1] 37/4
doubt [3] 148/8 202/16 226/2
doubted [1] 27/6
Doug [1] 177/7
down [26] 25/1 27/17 33/4 33/15 35/25 40/3 40/4 40/11 41/21 44/15 76/18 116/11 129/16 140/2 143/13 148/21 177/7 198/1 208/8 208/9 209/1 218/15 219/3 229/20 235/12 235/15
downhill [1] 129/9
Dr. [57] 40/1 41/10 41/10 44/12 44/14 45/19 46/4 48/19 49/4 49/7 49/20 50/4 50/7 50/13 105/15 106/12 144/14 147/5 147/8 147/17 148/14 149/7 151/22 153/11 155/12 155/18 155/24 156/14 156/18 157/20 158/4 158/21 160/25 162/9 162/16 163/3 163/7 163/9 164/7 188/5 188/16 189/7 190/13 190/21 191/2 192/24 195/5 195/10 195/16 196/4 212/3 224/24 224/25 225/12 225/17 226/9 226/11
Dr. Drew [1] 224/25
Dr. Halderman [16] 41/10 44/12 44/14 45/19 46/4 48/19 106/12 144/14 149/7 153/11 158/21 164/7 188/5 196/4 225/12 225/17
Dr. Halderman's [29] 40/1 49/4 49/7 49/20 50/4 50/7 50/13 105/15 147/5 147/8 147/17 148/14 151/22 155/12 155/18 155/24 188/16 189/7 190/13 190/21 191/2 192/24 195/5 195/10 195/16 212/3 224/24 226/9 226/11
Dr. Lee [5] 156/18 158/4 162/16 163/3 163/9
Dr. Springall [1] 41/10
Dr. Wenke [5] 156/14 157/20 160/25


E
E-Polls [1] 216/25
EAC [4] 214/1 214/1 215/1 220/12 EAC-certified [1] 214/1
each [9] 87/24 103/10 129/8 130/2 143/16 202/2 210/8 210/9 229/16
earlier [5] 71/13 147/16 193/19 243/8 257/15
early [15] 46/8 128/2 198/12 199/24 203/25 204/5 204/21 205/10 208/17 212/18 230/9 230/25 231/4 236/13 262/10
easier [4] 180/15 232/7 232/9 255/23
easily [3] 128/23 210/25 255/22
easy [4] 42/25 108/9 173/2 255/12
ECF [2] \(1 / 21 / 3\)
ecosystem [1] 216/18
Ed [1] 259/8
educate [1] 131/4
EDWARD [2] \(3 / 5\) 259/6
effect [1] 44/8
effective [2] 198/6 211/2
effectively [1] 221/23
efficiently [1] 32/15
effort [4] 9/22 25/9 211/12 224/15 efforts [1] 202/21
either [15] 46/19 76/9 110/15 112/12
130/19 163/24 164/1 173/7 173/7 177/4
181/15 205/12 237/12 245/15 255/21
elected [1] 154/3
election [173] 7/19 8/3 9/3 11/20 13/14 14/8 16/15 20/11 20/13 22/12 22/17 23/2 26/11 27/13 28/1 28/5 28/7 28/12 28/21 31/9 31/18 31/19 31/22 33/2 33/5 33/12 34/19 36/8 36/23 37/8 37/23 37/24 48/8 48/11 48/15 48/17 52/15 52/18 52/21 53/1 53/8 53/9 53/11 53/14 53/22 54/6 54/9 56/15 57/3 57/8 58/20 58/23 77/5 77/6 98/5 100/7 100/11 100/13 104/1 105/8 105/13 105/21 106/5 108/4 108/7 108/8 108/11 108/17 114/18 123/8 126/7 126/23 129/8 131/14 132/7 149/3 149/3 150/10 150/16 151/23 152/8 164/15 165/19

\section*{E}
election... [90] 165/20 167/4 169/11 169/20 170/8 170/18 171/10 171/15 172/4 174/2 174/6 174/10 177/18 179/16 179/23 182/21 183/8 185/12 187/21 188/2 192/9 192/25 195/20 196/10 197/13 198/11 198/13 198/13 199/7 199/8 199/12 199/22 200/20 200/22 201/21 201/25 202/10 203/11 203/11 203/25 203/25 204/21 205/9 206/20 207/4 207/6 207/6 207/10 207/14 210/19 211/13 212/8 215/6 216/5 216/6 218/3 229/9 229/9 229/13 231/5 231/21 232/3 233/14 237/24 239/14 242/6 242/6 242/16 242/24 244/21 246/21 247/7 247/8 248/6 248/18 253/1 255/18 255/19 255/20 256/21 256/25 257/14 257/16 257/16 258/8 258/24 259/1 259/2 259/7 259/12 election-related [3] 56/15 57/3 58/20 election-specific [1] 100/11 elections [63] 8/5 8/6 8/13 8/15 12/2 20/3 20/5 20/10 20/11 29/6 29/16 29/21 29/23 29/24 31/16 36/16 37/18 37/25 56/16 56/17 57/4 57/6 57/7 57/10 57/12 57/19 58/11 58/15 58/16 58/25 104/6 105/9 105/14 114/8 120/13 120/18 129/13 129/17 152/15 165/15 174/1 174/2 174/7 174/23 177/20 183/17 187/13 199/10 201/8 201/10 217/14 218/20 219/24 220/2 220/4 229/16 233/18 238/4 243/24 244/16 248/14 257/8 257/11
elections-related [2] 57/19 58/11 electronic [6] 31/17 31/24 33/16 111/1 112/19 116/22
electronics [1] 46/15
Eleventh [4] 146/13 146/15 146/17 151/3
elicit [1] 32/16
eliciting [1] 254/5
eligible [1] 237/10
eliminate [1] 231/16
else [23] 27/23 35/15 38/10 38/25
53/17 101/10 112/13 112/17 118/19
118/21 123/9 130/3 131/16 132/8
151/10 183/23 188/14 190/2 209/13
212/3 218/14 226/21 262/12
else's [1] 255/17
email [14] 15/2 75/20 75/25 78/5 78/8 79/10 79/12 79/13 171/2 171/25 172/13 184/13 190/17 190/21
emailed [1] 41/15
emails [2] 190/18 190/24
embarrassed [1] 254/23
emergency [3] 203/15 204/12 256/17
employed [2] 7/16 7/17
employee [1] 138/22
employment [2] 39/12 102/18
empty [1] 46/11
EMS [11] 178/1 196/23 197/5 197/6 197/6 197/6 197/7 215/10 219/22 220/15 244/14
encode [2] 217/8 231/16
encoded [2] 40/6 41/17
encodes [2] 217/9 230/17
encoding [3] 41/5 41/11 203/17
end [18] 20/15 46/8 46/20 47/23 48/1 48/2 139/25 152/2 153/20 174/19 207/17 213/23 227/15 230/3 230/4 235/16 252/5 255/12
ended [2] 80/11 221/22
endless [1] 94/19
eNet [2] 11/4 62/20
enforcement [5] 18/10 19/10 19/12 184/8 184/11
enforcement-type [1] 19/12
enfranchised [1] 231/1
engage [2] 81/14 81/17
engaged [2] 73/19 125/18
engagement [2] 61/25 66/3
engineering [2] 105/23 219/22
ENGLISH [2] \(3 / 981 / 13\)
enjoined [1] 85/18
enjoy [1] 8/16
enlarge [1] 116/24
enlarged [2] 118/11 119/13
enough [16] 9/9 44/10 48/7 72/12
121/3 123/3 123/18 149/24 165/15 188/20 196/19 202/7 203/10 246/22 258/3 258/3
ensure [2] 44/17 200/16
entered [1] 80/17
enterprise [1] 91/18
entire [5] 21/21 151/15 200/14 216/18 222/12
entitled [7] 22/24 44/19 81/25 82/9
97/4 193/25 252/15
entries [1] 123/1
entry [2] 1/5 219/5
environment [13] 59/1 72/6 108/18 108/19 111/25 112/8 112/22 195/25 212/14 219/13 220/6 230/9 249/20 equipment [44] 28/8 36/22 36/23 37/7 37/7 46/14 46/23 51/15 51/20 78/15 80/12 81/15 81/17 98/5 109/16 109/17 109/24 110/3 110/4 111/10 118/24 126/8 126/23 127/1 149/1 164/8 167/6 173/19 174/3 180/23 182/21 183/12
184/19 211/7 211/24 214/11 214/19
215/7 216/10 216/13 219/12 240/3 242/6 242/7
equivalent [1] 223/24
Eric [3] 29/8 179/11 179/15
erroneously [1] 38/2
error [24] 36/22 37/9 166/6 202/15
202/21 204/19 207/15 207/17 230/1 230/4 230/6 230/10 230/20 231/9 231/17 239/13 241/12 241/12 241/14 243/2 243/3 243/7 244/3 245/14
errors [5] 204/20 216/1 231/21 244/21 244/23
ES [13] 202/25 234/20 235/6 235/11 235/13 235/16 239/12 239/19 239/23 240/15 240/16 240/18 242/1
escalate [1] 205/17
especially [9] 36/24 39/13 44/2 103/13
118/7 197/20 198/11 198/12 230/12
essential [3] 118/6 133/10 146/19
essentially [6] 77/18 129/3 184/21
190/3 190/5 240/23
establish [2] 150/8 162/25
established [1] 122/14
ET [2] 1/4 1/6
EUW [1] 2/10
evaded [1] 25/6
evaluate [2] 37/22 128/23
evaluated [1] 213/18
evaluates [1] 234/15
evaluating [2] 189/7 213/21
evaluation [5] 25/19 132/3 210/4 213/5 213/19
evaluations [1] 215/13
even [30] 10/24 36/4 49/6 81/20 87/22
98/15 123/19 124/20 135/10 145/2
145/6 145/10 150/5 150/6 150/7 157/10 159/15 161/25 185/8 202/6 204/16 212/14 217/6 219/21 223/16 236/12 236/16 247/15 254/25 261/21
evening [1] \(42 / 16\)
event [5] 74/2 98/17 98/18 98/19 98/20
events [2] 21/22 112/3
eventually [1] 186/20
ever [20] 7/11 9/14 10/19 70/19 93/20
96/12 98/18 98/24 99/21 123/21 124/16 173/23 173/25 174/6 190/13 190/20 194/3 195/11 234/9 255/10
every [27] 8/2 28/15 45/5 69/16 70/1
70/2 72/7 74/2 74/2 74/8 100/10 165/18 165/19 165/19 165/20 165/24 179/4
186/20 197/17 198/8 204/6 204/7 204/7 212/6 217/17 229/9 229/9
everybody [4] 8/17 43/12 231/13 262/12
Everyone [1] 117/12
Everyone's [1] 239/16
everything [11] 10/24 30/24 123/2
123/5 125/14 165/23 198/25 213/25 215/7 221/5 221/22
everywhere [2] 9/22 242/7
evidence [33] 16/18 18/16 21/1 23/10 26/13 34/16 35/10 35/16 74/16 75/14 81/5 82/22 94/10 97/5 106/9 115/20 116/13 122/4 122/5 123/3 148/17 158/3 168/14 173/3 175/24 178/15 181/3 181/5 184/24 186/24 207/24 223/13 259/3
evidentiary [1] 185/6
ex [1] 118/10
exact [7] 102/4 154/5 179/21 212/12 234/13 234/24 249/11
exactly [15] 25/8 34/4 58/14 58/17 127/14 139/19 153/5 179/24 189/16 195/6 208/20 216/14 225/17 234/25 257/17
examination [39] \(4 / 54 / 64 / 94 / 114 / 12\) 4/13 4/14 4/15 4/16 4/18 4/19 4/21 5/4 5/5 5/6 5/7 6/24 13/3 15/17 46/2 47/17 81/22 93/5 93/11 100/2 101/25 105/1 113/10 115/3 115/21 119/3 119/22
133/20 137/13 209/10 224/18 227/6 228/9 261/2
examine [5] 78/22 79/2 133/8 195/10 260/25
examined [6] 56/14 57/2 57/19 58/10 67/7 80/24
examining [3] 110/15 195/15 202/5
example [12] 40/4 162/15 180/1 220/8 236/7 242/25 243/25 247/5 249/16 252/11 256/14 258/13
except [3] 204/11 212/18 225/3
exchange [2] 184/14 216/20
excited [1] 76/14
expand [1] 117/13
expect [4] 45/21 70/4 176/4 177/5 expectation [1] 45/18
expensive [2] 234/21 250/14 experience [7] 9/16 9/17 10/13 12/1 108/24 160/21 246/18 expert [14] 43/6 77/11 77/14 106/13 107/20 107/22 147/14 156/13 156/19 158/7 158/14 161/10 195/6 213/22 experts [8] 9/4 41/21 44/24 192/9 192/19 214/13 234/6 238/10
explain [8] 10/21 12/9 69/23 144/8
166/11 219/22 245/4 254/6
explained [2] 43/12 190/5
explaining [4] 24/20 221/19 230/8 230/16
explanation [3] 40/7 172/24 221/10
explicitly [1] 107/16
exploit [1] 200/14
exploiting [1] 196/3
exploits [1] 201/12
explore [3] 25/18 27/9 32/10
exposed [1] 9/22
express [1] 31/16
expressed [1] 190/10
expressing [1] 157/21
extent [10] 21/8 23/12 30/20 36/11
106/13 110/5 146/3 218/3 223/4 224/6 extra [1] 117/19
extremely [4] 106/6 107/4 196/5 215/1 eye [2] 116/20 251/5

F
face [3] 26/9 26/13 178/4
facility [1] 45/17
facing [1] 211/20
fact [28] 19/2 51/6 89/23 90/13 90/13 92/10 92/10 94/14 117/5 122/1 122/4 128/20 144/19 145/22 161/15 170/7 174/21 187/18 213/16 214/25 216/3 220/7 222/2 222/15 239/25 256/5 256/24 259/3
fact-finder [1] 222/2
factor [2] 60/22 216/16
factors [2] 190/6 224/2
facts [1] 94/10
fail [1] \(17 / 5\)
failed [1] 11/11
failure [1] 179/22
fair [23] 42/17 48/7 63/5 111/8 112/1 121/3 123/18 149/14 152/20 153/8 153/9 175/13 180/6 180/7 180/24 193/8 193/11 204/10 221/23 252/17 252/21 258/3 258/3
fall [4] 99/3 112/8 114/6 127/12
falls [3] 82/18 101/13 105/9
false [4] 22/7 26/10 159/1 170/15 familiar [14] 9/12 15/24 22/10 29/2 105/15 105/17 108/21 115/10 133/5 156/6 159/9 188/22 243/8 243/13 far [12] 25/13 46/23 56/25 67/18 109/3 133/8 147/6 194/24 198/17 200/24 206/10 253/9
fashion [1] 45/21
fast [1] 151/16
faster [3] 101/21 174/15 174/16
favor [1] 93/7
Favorito [1] 25/10

Favorito's [1] 262/13
FBI [2] 20/19 21/16
February [38] 48/22 49/1 49/3 49/6 49/16 50/3 51/3 54/1 54/16 65/6 66/7 66/17 67/6 72/1 84/25 93/15 94/3 95/23
97/6 98/14 119/16 120/10 121/5 121/22
139/3 140/15 145/5 145/12 145/18
145/19 147/4 147/7 154/12 154/15
154/19 187/7 194/1 194/11
February '21 [1] 121/22
February 1 [2] 139/3 154/15
February 2018 [5] 65/6 66/7 66/17 67/6 72/1
February 2021 [2] 94/3 121/5
February 2022 [1] 51/3
February 26 [8] 93/15 95/23 97/6 98/14 119/16 120/10 194/1 194/11
February 26th [1] 187/7
February 2nd [9] 48/22 49/1 49/3 49/6 49/16 50/3 54/1 54/16 84/25
federal [9] 43/7 165/18 165/19 188/20
214/16 229/9 229/10 229/11 229/13
feed [2] 99/2 129/16
feel [8] 8/19 9/9 9/18 9/22 11/6 51/1
140/1 255/4
fell [1] \(74 / 6\)
felt [1] 56/8
fessed [1] 184/22
few [15] 13/12 15/22 16/21 24/14 99/24
101/24 104/22 119/4 133/12 168/17
196/10 197/13 228/7 234/21 247/24
fields [1] 234/7
figure [6] 10/10 40/10 46/17 46/19 116/18 143/5
figured [1] 228/1
file [16] 44/8 95/5 95/6 95/9 95/9 95/11 95/11 95/16 95/17 95/19 96/9 119/17 132/22 250/1 250/4 258/11
filed [9] 1/2 1/6 1/8 22/7 88/23 116/14 121/17 121/19 122/5
files [8] 129/21 130/1 130/2 130/18 134/8 134/11 210/8 217/12
filing [1] 74/23
filings [1] 186/21
fill [4] 129/12 251/24 257/22 257/23
filled [3] 129/17 157/12 256/2
final [7] 133/9 154/3 157/13 157/15
186/18 235/2 244/4
finalized [1] 205/23
finally [1] 48/24
financial [3] 137/20 138/1 138/5
find [18] 32/23 63/8 69/19 70/4 70/22
82/23 84/16 111/19 131/13 132/6 160/8
160/15 184/24 207/3 210/13 213/8
224/6 261/5
finder [1] 222/2
findings [15] 37/24 69/2 84/13 84/21
85/22 87/11 88/10 149/2 151/22 188/16
189/7 190/13 190/22 191/3 192/24
fine [19] 6/10 17/3 46/17 67/19 106/25
116/7 142/13 160/12 176/7 177/11
177/12 193/22 195/1 201/24 208/9
227/23 262/2 262/20 262/23
finish [2] 110/21 260/22
finished [1] 262/10
fire [1] 206/7
FIRM [2] 2/17 81/13
firms [6] 52/17 52/23 52/25 52/25 53/3
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline F \\
\hline fir \\
\hline first [34] 6/23 9/5 10/17 31/12 36/23 \\
\hline 40/17 40/18 47/16 56/8 59/10 69/11 \\
\hline 89/17 97/4 98/4 101/24 117/9 137/12 \\
\hline 141/10 145/1 145/13 155/18 155/24 \\
\hline 160/20 172/2 203/6 204/20 209/12 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{213/8 214/12 215/21 221/15 222/20} \\
\hline \\
\hline FISHER [1] \(2 / 5\) \\
\hline fits [1] 120/3 \\
\hline Fitts [3] 103/21 104/4 104/7 \\
\hline five [9] 55/14 117/19 191/13 219/23 \\
\hline \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
five minutes [4] 117/19 259/25 261/21 261/23
five years [1] 55/14
five-minute [1] 191/13
fix [1] 242/23
fixed [2] 92/20 231/22
flag [5] 161/15 174/25 263/12 263/24 264/1
flagged [6] 118/25 132/17 132/19
135/18 161/13 173/23
flashing [1] 249/7
flat [4] 143/25 153/21 153/25 233/3
flat-out [1] 143/25
flatly [1] 21/24
flawless [1] 13/14
flew [1] 187/6
flexibility [1] 227/4
flip [19] 59/23 62/18 89/1 140/10
140/19 145/12 147/21 154/12 156/22
157/17 157/18 159/8 170/21 182/14
185/25 194/14 194/17 224/20 224/23
flipped [2] 241/16 241/21
flipping [6] 201/23 205/15 232/19
248/24 249/5 249/18
floor [1] 103/14
Florida [3] 220/8 221/3 253/23
flow [3] 94/22 241/24 241/24
focus [3] 70/22 245/2 254/7
focused [6] 54/10 57/12 57/12 154/17 155/3 222/16
focusing [1] 218/15
FOERSTER [1] \(2 / 7\)
foggy [1] 224/8
FOIA [1] 172/3
folks [7] 128/7 161/7 167/6 176/3
181/25 197/14 262/9
follow [10] 27/22 27/23 44/9 49/19
110/20 113/7 125/5 125/16 208/13 236/18
follow-up [5] 44/9 49/19 113/7 125/5 208/13
followed [4] 10/24 27/11 28/18 238/20
following [12] 1/1 22/11 22/17 62/1
66/4 79/12 121/8 121/16 234/4 235/18 235/20 238/15
follows [4] 6/23 15/16 47/16 137/12
footage [1] 168/9
foregoing [1] 265/8
foreign [2] 200/5 200/12
foremost [2] 203/6 214/3
forever [1] 226/21
forget [1] 174/8
forgot [2] 37/1 49/19
form [1] 82/25
former [3] 48/8 189/12 194/7
forming [1] \(7 / 21\)
forms [1] 217/23
Fortalice [136] 53/5 53/7 53/10 53/21
54/2 54/4 54/9 54/18 54/18 55/9 55/9 55/12 55/24 56/2 56/5 56/8 56/11 56/16 56/23 57/19 58/7 59/10 59/11 60/5 62/6 63/8 63/12 64/1 65/5 65/8 66/7 66/17 68/8 68/11 69/14 70/23 71/12 71/18 71/21 72/6 73/3 73/19 73/23 74/1 74/7 74/23 75/5 75/23 76/10 76/14 77/14 78/10 78/22 79/1 79/16 79/23 80/13 81/14 81/18 82/9 82/12 82/17 82/20 84/4 84/7 84/9 84/12 84/20 85/16 85/21 86/19 87/17 87/22 89/23 90/23 91/5 91/15 91/18 92/10 92/15 93/16 93/20 94/2 95/24 96/8 96/13 96/20 97/4 97/11 99/9 99/21 100/24 102/2 114/12 115/5 116/10 117/4 118/12 118/23 119/17 120/3 121/22 121/23 122/8 122/17 122/21 124/1 124/3 124/8 125/16 125/18 127/15 127/20 128/1 128/22 131/17 132/16 134/1 134/5 134/7 134/10 134/13 134/19 134/22 135/2 135/16 193/25 194/4 194/10 208/15 209/14 209/25 210/14 213/5 222/24 223/8
Fortalice's [14] 74/11 75/1 75/8 77/17
78/1 85/23 87/4 87/20 88/9 117/5
124/17 128/16 210/3 210/5
FortaliceSolutions.com [1] 76/6
FortaliceTriage.bat [1] 119/17
forth [1] 247/20
fortunately [1] 37/2
forward [1] 211/17
found [7] 11/2 11/4 11/13 21/21 24/15 135/16 160/10
foundation [2] 81/4 172/10
founded [1] 24/16
four [5] 55/7 64/21 79/14 202/24 237/7
four years [1] 79/14
fourth [1] 76/18
fractional [2] 103/9 103/9
fragmented [1] 113/4
frame [2] 127/23 139/15
framed [1] 149/23
frames [1] 247/2
Frances [1] 180/1
frankly [3] 80/3 117/6 224/6
fraud [3] 255/11 256/21 256/25
free [2] 140/2 146/16
frequently [1] 192/8
Friday [6] 15/8 22/7 27/25 126/13 199/23 199/24
Fridays [1] 250/10
front [15] 30/17 49/15 139/24 140/9
154/13 174/19 207/17 211/20 213/23
214/3 214/23 225/6 230/4 230/11 235/4
front-facing [1] 211/20
fronts [2] 195/24 211/15
frustrated [1] 242/21
frustrating [1] 150/25
frustration [1] 190/10
Fuchs [3] 238/8 259/4 259/5
fulfills [1] 100/21
full [12] 1/8 9/18 47/10 89/24 132/4
137/6 138/17 159/4 159/5 159/8 221/10

234/9
fully [6] 139/16 166/11 172/18 188/19 213/13 231/1
Fulton [6] 6/2 22/9 37/5 39/14 80/12 230/12
function [5] 100/21 219/13 219/23 232/6 249/15
functionality [2] 20/11 205/16
functioning [2] 181/16 231/24
functions [1] 251/15
fundamental [3] 219/8 239/24 240/6
further [27] 4/20 4/21 12/24 13/19
25/18 26/13 26/15 34/16 34/16 35/17
38/5 43/17 43/18 67/11 83/25 93/2 99/5 113/3 115/15 125/12 133/20 136/5
136/10 184/17 226/17 245/3 259/15 future [4] 8/13 8/15 12/2 101/21
futz [1] 232/8

G-A-B-R-I-E-L [1] 137/9
GA [4] 25/10 76/15 76/19 91/6
Gabe [4] 78/15 78/19 78/19 112/20
GABRIEL[4] 5/3 137/2 137/8 137/11
gain [3] 63/21 91/15 212/9
gate [1] 220/10
gave [6] 15/23 16/7 16/21 48/25 129/22
253/20
GAVREO [1] 215/8
GEMS [3] 41/24 44/12 45/20
general [23] 14/10 14/11 18/12 19/11 28/1 28/4 31/18 33/2 36/25 52/18 85/19 105/25 137/23 153/7 158/9 164/21 165/5 165/7 212/8 233/16 238/5 253/25 259/2
generalized [4] 153/4 154/2 170/16 174/5
generally [13] 10/2 16/3 19/11 67/14 96/18 105/20 138/1 185/22 199/9 233/8 233/16 254/20 256/22
generated [4] 12/13 31/25 162/1 162/2
generation [1] 127/4
gentlemen [2] 261/13 262/3
GEO [1] 230/21
Geoff [1] 188/23
GEORGIA [66] 1/1 1/25 3/2 6/2 7/7 7/8 7/10 7/11 7/23 8/13 8/19 9/9 9/25 10/3 10/13 12/2 12/4 28/9 59/1 59/5 59/19
59/25 111/24 128/3 135/22 143/20
156/11 165/14 169/24 171/3 171/6
174/3 180/19 187/13 197/13 201/3
202/8 206/8 207/12 211/13 212/4
213/20 227/21 233/20 234/4 234/14
235/17 235/22 235/24 238/15 238/20
240/15 243/22 244/21 245/7 246/12
247/6 249/20 250/9 252/3 252/13 255/6 255/7 265/4 265/8 265/10
Georgia's [18] 8/24 9/1 9/12 58/23
58/24 62/21 63/25 100/7 108/4 109/4 139/12 142/22 144/16 149/2 151/23
152/8 165/10 239/19
Georgians [1] 7/21
GERMANY [39] 4/8 6/7 15/14 15/19 16/7 16/21 17/17 19/5 21/20 22/1 22/5 22/21 24/7 24/19 25/3 26/2 27/25 28/25 30/4 30/7 31/7 32/23 35/24 36/7 36/15 37/11 80/17 81/7 118/16 147/9 147/11 147/17 150/15 172/6 182/6 204/24

\section*{G}

GERMANY... [3] 205/1 223/7 235/5 Germany's [5] 6/4 24/8 24/24 126/13 179/2
get [69] 8/17 27/5 32/20 34/13 40/14
48/12 48/15 48/16 59/7 67/18 70/19 78/14 89/11 102/12 102/16 105/5 110/13 115/19 121/25 123/17 127/4 127/24 129/13 142/10 148/1 148/5 150/4 150/4 150/5 150/6 152/16 154/24 157/6 157/15 158/21 160/17 160/19 165/22 178/23 181/25 186/5 186/21 187/19 196/22 200/4 206/10 207/11 209/25 216/17 218/21 221/12 227/6 227/8 230/24 231/6 231/8 232/9 233/23 235/12 235/14 241/4 244/4 244/7 245/12 251/15 254/21 256/2 260/21 261/5
gets [13] 130/16 174/14 186/19 200/16 214/6 230/22 240/11 245/13 245/16 254/12 255/18 255/19 255/20
getting [13] 89/13 122/1 142/6 143/13 161/5 174/15 198/16 200/24 204/7 206/6 217/4 245/21 254/6
give [13] 40/15 46/14 116/18 143/25
154/25 161/4 177/8 211/7 227/16 240/1 242/4 245/2 245/4
given [26] 21/3 21/21 24/9 24/9 24/11
26/9 31/23 36/22 39/8 42/21 124/7
133/8 162/12 162/20 162/24 177/4
208/14 213/10 216/3 216/4 216/5 228/5
243/21 246/2 260/4 261/9
gives [2] 168/3 254/14
giving [5] 48/12 77/20 217/16 230/10 252/24
glitch [2] 205/11 249/14
go [82] 6/7 7/12 11/21 17/8 24/17 32/19 35/14 35/17 35/19 36/17 39/1 40/24 41/3 41/4 45/18 47/13 49/13 49/14 54/23 62/13 65/20 72/18 76/13 86/25 90/20 92/17 102/7 102/16 104/21 104/25 106/19 110/21 115/23 118/13 120/17 139/2 143/19 145/13 148/11 159/13 164/20 167/6 169/14 180/14 184/25 185/1 191/5 196/9 197/7 197/19 199/17 201/21 203/8 204/17 204/21 205/20 207/1 207/11 209/1 211/7 212/17 214/17 217/8 226/21 226/21 227/4 230/18 235/2 240/6 244/8 246/23 250/24 253/19 253/25 254/21 254/22 255/12 257/23 258/5 261/7 261/15 262/4
goal [2] 38/3 187/17
goes [17] 12/17 15/6 67/14 84/18 131/4 150/1 170/12 196/23 198/3 206/13 216/25 221/8 221/20 222/22 240/22 254/12 256/5
going [132] 6/3 6/6 15/2 17/8 17/9 17/12 17/12 17/13 21/7 24/18 24/25 25/1 25/15 27/4 31/1 32/14 32/15 35/14 39/18 39/22 40/6 40/14 42/11 45/5 45/6 45/7 46/19 51/23 53/14 57/23 67/17 77/23 79/1 83/14 89/2 93/4 94/19 99/14 101/20 102/7 104/11 106/11 106/19 108/6 110/14 111/18 115/17 116/20 117/18 117/19 122/19 125/4 129/7 129/12 129/16 130/4 130/4 138/23

142/24 143/25 148/5 148/10 150/7 150/11 150/21 157/3 157/6 160/7 165/19 166/1 167/21 167/21 174/8 174/8 174/16 174/20 191/9 191/20 191/22 193/16 198/15 204/11 206/7 206/10 207/1 207/3 207/3 209/3 211/7 211/17 212/2 212/12 219/25 222/3 222/5 223/18 224/3 224/5 226/2 227/11 227/14 228/4 228/6 229/16 229/22 232/9 234/22 242/1 244/24 245/12 247/12 248/9 249/7 250/12 251/3 251/15 253/23 255/16 256/10 258/10 259/23 260/1 260/24 261/1 261/10 261/15 261/15 261/17 261/18 262/10 263/9 263/20
golden [1] 215/11
gone [6] 96/19 104/18 129/1 136/16 215/4 261/22
good [25] 2/13 7/1 7/5 10/14 13/5 13/6 13/10 15/19 15/21 47/3 47/19 56/9 100/4 100/5 105/3 136/23 137/15 137/16 153/16 220/2 228/4 228/11 228/12 258/3 262/15
got [25] 42/2 64/9 81/23 90/15 101/18 101/21 113/4 129/10 130/7 135/18 165/17 175/20 175/20 185/1 203/18 206/22 211/6 217/17 218/23 222/9 226/8 230/19 241/14 246/11 247/7
gotten [4] 111/11 142/15 212/9 258/16
GOVERNANCE [2] 2/13 228/12
government [5] 8/12 31/3 31/8 214/16 221/8
Governmental [3] 29/13 29/23 31/15
governments [1] 14/14
Governor [2] 161/1 218/25
Governor's [1] 218/22
Graham [1] 22/24
grandkids [2] 136/22 136/23
grant [1] 167/10
granted [3] 8/11 8/11 167/2
great [2] 136/25 211/12
greater [3] 79/8 112/18 223/17
grid [2] 64/7 64/17
ground [4] 77/22 182/2 211/6 221/10 grounds [9] 21/3 119/18 121/8 123/6
162/24 163/1 200/23 223/22 225/11
group [7] 2/11 76/11 104/3 120/15
126/20 167/12 233/15
GTA [1] 234/11
guess [9] 55/13 110/17 162/5 178/18 209/12 210/13 219/7 261/19 263/23
guessing [1] 55/16
guesstimate [1] 234/22
guidance [3] 88/8 232/5 252/24
guidelines [1] 84/19
guys [1] 206/6
H
hack [11] 78/2 79/20 79/23 134/5 164/15 196/10 197/13 205/11 243/14
243/23 247/22
hacked [3] 82/1 164/8 249/22
hacker [1] 77/18
hacking [1] 243/5
had [179] 9/18 10/16 10/24 11/1 11/17 11/21 11/23 19/20 22/11 22/12 24/3 26/9 27/11 28/4 28/8 28/15 28/21 36/23 38/21 44/2 44/15 45/19 45/20 46/14

48/22 49/3 49/6 50/6 50/13 50/19 50/22 50/24 51/4 51/7 51/11 51/13 51/19 59/2 69/19 71/13 72/6 74/1 74/6 74/8 78/22 79/16 80/23 84/19 85/19 86/15 89/23 90/13 92/10 92/14 92/15 101/18 103/21 108/2 109/13 118/4 118/11 119/24 120/19 124/9 124/20 125/3 126/9 127/1 127/18 127/23 127/24 131/6 131/18 133/12 135/20 138/19 138/20 139/6 144/16 145/6 145/8 145/11 145/18 145/20 146/21 147/5 147/8 147/17 149/7 153/15 160/9 160/21 163/8 164/17 174/24 177/22 179/2 181/12 181/14 181/15 181/16 181/18 182/20 183/11 183/14 183/17 183/25 184/3 184/4 185/8 185/12 185/20 185/20 188/25 189/3 190/20 193/18 194/3 196/19 197/16 197/16 199/24 200/8 202/20 203/3 204/21 205/5 205/21 205/25 207/12 207/13 207/14 208/15 209/18 211/4 211/4 211/16 211/25 212/23 213/3 213/22 213/24 213/25 214/1 216/6 217/8 217/15 218/21 219/16 220/2 220/11 222/22 223/25 226/14 234/16 234/20 235/1 235/1 236/3 236/4 236/12 236/15 236/15 236/16 237/19 238/2 238/18 238/19 239/22 240/21 241/8 242/10 242/10 242/22 244/22 249/22 249/24 257/20 265/9
hadn't [5] 11/20 50/4 145/10 159/22 161/22
hair [1] 205/3
Halderman [23] 41/10 44/12 44/14 45/19 46/4 48/19 50/16 106/8 106/12 107/17 144/14 148/25 149/7 153/11 158/21 164/7 188/5 196/4 196/21 197/9 225/12 225/17 243/23
Halderman's [30] 40/1 49/4 49/7 49/20 50/4 50/7 50/13 105/15 147/5 147/8 147/17 148/14 151/22 155/12 155/18 155/24 188/16 189/7 190/13 190/21 191/2 192/24 195/5 195/10 195/16 212/3 224/24 226/9 226/11 243/9
Hale [3] 188/23 189/6 189/21
half [5] 99/18 103/8 103/8 145/1 258/20
Hall [10] 22/7 22/11 22/24 23/21 24/21 24/25 25/5 25/11 26/3 27/5
Hall's [5] 22/14 24/20 25/1 26/6 27/12 HALSEY [1] \(2 / 8\)
Hamilton [4] 104/9 104/12 104/14 120/11
hammer [1] 198/7
Hampton [5] 28/12 177/19 178/11 180/3 180/5
hamstring [1] 221/9
hand [39] 6/14 22/9 27/6 27/19 33/11 34/1 34/11 40/6 40/12 40/25 47/7 96/25 129/17 194/14 197/6 202/19 203/3 203/16 204/12 209/3 212/23 217/6 245/15 247/19 249/16 249/18 250/20 251/3 251/14 252/5 253/10 253/13
254/11 254/17 255/8 255/11 255/24 256/11 265/12
hand-filled [1] 129/17
hand-marked [22] 27/6 27/19 197/6 202/19 203/3 203/16 204/12 217/6

\section*{H}
hand-marked... [14] 245/15 247/19
250/20 251/3 251/14 252/5 253/10 253/13 254/11 254/17 255/8 255/11 255/24 256/11
handed [1] 40/19
handle [2] 128/17 138/7
handled [2] 128/10 175/12
handles [1] 88/6
handling [2] 129/6 139/8
hands [4] 46/7 48/15 77/2 125/8
hands-on [1] 77/2
handwriting [1] 44/2
happen [19] 93/24 142/17 169/2
190/16 198/3 200/19 202/16 202/19
203/13 204/15 207/24 243/23 244/10
244/16 246/12 255/19 256/16 261/16 263/21
happened [23] 25/7 90/2 93/19 96/3 96/4 96/10 96/16 115/12 115/12 128/20 144/23 151/15 151/16 168/10 198/2 201/20 202/14 202/20 202/25 203/23 211/6 243/25 258/7
happening [12] 93/23 96/22 129/4 168/4 173/16 199/5 203/13 221/9 241/9 255/17 258/12 262/1
happens [7] 174/20 202/9 214/6
248/19 248/19 248/21 249/2
happy [6] 42/25 44/7 144/1 144/7
146/12 208/6
hard [11] 95/10 119/20 130/17 162/20
164/25 193/18 198/1 206/4 209/3 209/3 256/23
harder [1] 165/6
hardware [2] 77/1 111/12
Harry [1] 263/3
Hart [2] 236/7 237/9
Harvey [2] 237/24 238/16
has [124] \(1 / 6\) 9/1 9/9 10/13 16/18 24/6 24/9 24/9 24/12 25/9 28/25 34/11 34/20 37/8 37/18 38/2 38/2 39/12 40/5 40/11 40/11 41/4 43/6 43/14 43/22 45/8 45/8 49/21 55/12 59/1 67/12 70/3 78/15 80/8 81/2 81/25 82/8 82/19 82/21 92/1 92/1 92/5 94/15 96/25 104/7 104/13 110/1 112/18 119/25 122/4 122/9 122/16 123/10 125/8 129/21 129/24 130/7 130/8 131/7 132/10 133/8 133/18 135/5 135/6 138/10 139/7 139/25 140/22 142/15 142/17 143/6 147/11 147/25 148/1 149/24 153/7 158/7 163/9 163/9 166/2 168/15 179/3 190/12 190/24
190/25 195/7 196/4 197/5 197/22 198/2 198/16 201/3 202/3 203/9 204/22 212/4 212/10 213/1 213/4 213/6 215/10 222/23 224/7 225/3 227/19 228/2 228/3 233/12 238/25 247/4 249/1 252/17 253/6 255/20 256/2 257/13 257/22 258/16 260/4 260/6 260/12 263/13 263/16 263/18
hash [3] 215/7 215/10 215/11
hasn't [3] 133/13 195/7 221/4
Hassinger [2] 192/11 192/15
hat [6] 77/18 77/19 77/20 77/21 77/25 137/22
hate [1] 45/4
have [506]
haven't [8] 23/14 64/9 114/22 159/15 170/18 199/4 224/7 260/11 having [17] 6/23 15/15 28/17 43/15 47/16 103/6 123/4 134/1 137/12 138/11 150/14 158/25 199/17 212/17 231/17 248/4 257/5
HB [4] 161/22 213/25 233/24 235/22
he [203] 17/9 17/11 22/8 22/11 22/12
24/9 24/9 24/12 24/14 24/15 24/15
24/25 25/11 25/12 26/9 26/15 27/6
27/10 27/11 29/10 39/9 39/9 39/12 39/15 39/22 39/23 40/9 40/9 40/10 40/11 41/13 41/16 42/4 42/13 42/14 \(43 / 743 / 2343 / 2344 / 144 / 344 / 344 / 15\) 44/15 44/17 44/19 45/8 45/10 45/11 45/12 45/21 46/13 46/14 46/16 46/20 46/23 76/4 77/11 77/23 80/18 80/22 80/22 80/22 80/23 80/23 80/24 81/8 81/12 81/18 81/23 83/9 86/13 86/24 89/10 89/11 92/1 99/11 99/11 99/13 99/13 104/18 104/18 104/19 106/17 107/16 107/16 107/22 108/2 108/24 108/25 119/13 120/13 122/17 126/22 127/1 127/2 127/3 127/8 131/1 131/3 131/4 132/24 133/1 133/2 133/8 133/12 133/13 133/16 133/18 135/6 141/10 141/12 141/13 142/17 144/16 146/1 146/6 146/9 146/15 146/16 146/16 146/17 146/23 146/24 147/14 148/7 149/6 149/16 150/13 150/20 150/24 150/24 151/2 151/11 152/20 152/20 152/21 152/24 153/7 153/19 154/2 154/5 156/16 157/9 157/10 159/9 159/11 159/12 160/19 160/25 161/2 162/18 163/6 163/9 163/14 163/18 166/10 166/18 166/19 166/20 166/22 170/6 172/8 173/6 173/7 173/18 174/14 175/11 183/11 183/13 183/14 185/20 188/25 192/18 195/6 201/1 213/20 220/25 221/10 224/12 225/13 228/3 233/10 237/24 238/4 238/6 238/8 238/11 238/17 238/19 238/20 243/13 243/14 246/15 246/17 260/18 260/20 263/14 263/15 263/16 263/18 263/20 263/22 263/23
he's [7] 154/3 164/23 192/15 198/16 198/17 246/11 260/7
head [7] 72/12 95/13 103/16 111/20 111/20 205/5 205/20
header [2] 60/16 61/21
hear [4] 35/3 128/19 150/12 221/16
heard [21] 43/2 49/7 49/23 50/4 50/24 80/21 98/1 98/13 132/18 145/1 149/12 150/12 150/12 170/1 170/10 170/11 172/5 182/5 194/6 195/11 223/13 hearing [14] 29/16 29/24 51/7 57/14 57/16 57/18 58/4 72/19 118/10 138/11 151/1 164/7 169/20 170/17
hearings [2] 69/2 163/14
hearsay [20] 25/5 30/20 36/12 38/21
68/20 158/4 158/15 171/24 171/25
172/15 177/10 181/13 181/25 225/12 225/14 226/3 254/2 254/4 254/6 254/8
Heat [2] 64/7 64/17
heavier [1] 205/4
heavily [1] 237/24
heavy [1] 238/2
held [6] 20/19 138/15 138/25 214/19

256/6 265/10
help [12] 37/22 53/8 53/11 96/20 128/23 128/23 129/19 132/22 156/10 165/8 218/25 219/1
helped [2] 131/23 131/24
helpful [1] 217/24
helping [1] 70/22
helps [2] 120/20 140/8
her [4] 189/13 189/15 189/15 189/19
here [101] 7/23 13/10 18/24 20/7 20/12 21/4 21/22 22/1 23/15 25/10 26/14 27/3 32/15 32/16 34/22 35/6 35/7 35/22 39/9 39/11 39/12 39/15 39/23 42/2 44/24 46/13 55/20 64/7 64/17 64/23 65/25 68/24 69/24 70/15 71/2 73/2 74/22 77/22 79/3 80/5 81/21 87/5 88/14 90/10 104/11 105/16 117/5 121/1 123/7 124/16 124/18 137/17 138/12 142/3 148/24 158/5 159/23 159/25 160/3 163/8 164/19 167/23 170/12 171/6 171/9 172/22 174/4 174/13 177/4 179/3 184/13 184/13 193/25 194/9 195/14 200/6 201/14 203/18 205/9 206/12 208/15 213/11 225/12 225/18 227/7 227/19 228/2 239/11 243/9 243/21 249/4 253/22 254/21 260/1 260/1 260/5 260/21 261/5 261/14 262/18 263/13
hereby [1] 265/8
hereunto [1] 265/12
HERNANDEZ [1] 3/8
Hi [1] 47/2
hid [1] 81/24
high [5] 72/12 123/21 151/17 196/5 235/14
higher [2] 196/6 206/8
highest [1] 256/23
highlight [3] 131/12 132/5 151/18 highly [3] 121/21 197/19 244/17 him [50] 16/21 21/7 24/25 38/8 39/11 39/12 42/4 42/8 42/8 42/10 42/12 42/12 42/14 42/20 44/6 44/7 44/16 44/18
44/19 45/9 45/10 45/21 46/14 46/15 46/15 46/23 80/24 81/14 81/21 86/21 86/21 104/9 106/18 119/11 133/1 133/8 133/14 146/1 146/12 152/24 159/8 159/11 166/18 179/14 183/13 185/21 192/24 227/21 260/2 263/13
himself [8] 145/25 147/18 148/24
149/16 152/7 153/17 172/6 192/7
hire [2] 52/16 138/19
hired [4] 114/2 115/5 115/8 139/7 his [56] 24/20 24/21 26/17 27/19 29/10 39/12 40/6 43/13 43/13 46/13 46/14 46/15 46/23 80/19 80/20 81/11 81/21 86/18 89/11 118/7 118/17 118/20 127/5 141/11 146/6 146/21 149/2 149/3 151/10 152/17 152/22 152/24 153/11 157/21 160/21 160/21 161/2 161/5 163/15 166/11 166/16 170/4 172/8 175/13 185/23 188/5 193/9 195/21 226/14 238/3 243/10 243/12 243/13 246/12 246/18 254/6
history [4] 92/18 92/21 92/24 222/19 hit [2] 198/1 256/8
hitting [1] 198/7
hold [7] 39/11 141/4 184/8 219/6 226/21 260/20 261/3
holding [3] 140/12 215/19 215/20
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline \(\mathbf{H}\) \\
\hline holds [1] 216/8 \\
hole [2] 25/1 27/20 \\
Holland [4] 75/17 75/20 75/23 78/10 \\
Homeland [1] 214/17 \\
homework [1] 118/2 \\
honestly [9] 31/23 38/3 79/14 96/22 \\
144/21 159/19 169/22 210/6 239/21
\end{tabular}

Honor [177] 6/6 6/10 14/20 14/21 15/1 15/7 16/4 17/4 21/3 23/16 25/4 27/1 30/17 34/8 34/15 38/8 39/2 39/4 39/18 39/24 39/25 40/7 40/12 40/23 41/2 41/18 41/23 42/2 42/7 42/17 42/19 43/1 43/2 44/6 44/9 45/3 46/12 47/1 47/3 51/21 54/21 55/2 60/12 65/13 65/16 67/10 67/14 67/20 67/23 68/16 68/21 69/4 79/25 80/15 80/16 80/16 81/8 82/3 83/8 83/12 83/20 86/11 86/15 86/23 89/9 89/14 92/3 93/9 94/9 94/24 96/23 99/6 99/8 99/16 99/25 102/14 106/8 107/20 115/2 115/15 115/19 116/10 116/15 116/17 116/25 117/2 117/14 118/25 119/8 119/14 119/21 121/7 121/16 122/3 122/12 122/16 123/24 124/5 124/6 124/15 125/1 126/12 133/11 135/4 136/6 136/8 139/24 141/9 147/2 147/23 148/16 151/13 154/21 158/2 158/13 158/22 158/23 160/1 160/24 162/23 163/20 164/4 168/13 168/15 168/19 171/23 172/2 173/1 173/4 173/9 175/23 176/1 176/7 177/3 177/14 178/14 178/19 178/22 179/3 181/2 181/12 182/3 182/12 186/23 191/6 191/9 191/19 194/15 194/20 198/15 207/21 208/23 210/22 213/14 224/14 225/9 225/11 225/16 226/4 226/18 226/24 227/4 227/18 238/22 239/6 246/11 254/1 259/21 260/4 260/11 261/9 262/7 262/23 262/25 263/8 263/12 263/24
Honor's [1] 45/7
HONORABLE [1] 1/11
hook [3] 123/14 151/10 163/12
hopefully [2] 218/25 259/17
hoping [1] 148/5
horizontal [1] 64/20
HORST [1] 2/9
hour [2] 103/14 103/15
hours [1] 236/15
house [7] 29/13 29/23 31/2 31/8 56/19 129/11 233/24
housed [1] 16/14
how [81] 9/16 9/23 10/2 10/13 11/6 11/18 15/5 15/6 16/24 17/5 17/13 24/2 41/13 45/11 46/6 46/23 48/12 48/16 49/24 51/4 55/12 70/9 70/12 72/10 77/4 77/15 96/18 103/12 106/11 131/3 131/4 133/7 138/13 143/11 150/16 150/18 151/16 153/5 175/11 178/12 185/10 186/22 188/20 190/4 190/16 191/10 195/21 195/23 201/9 204/11 206/9 208/4 210/1 210/9 214/10 215/24 216/14 217/22 219/5 219/11 220/1 222/21 223/15 224/8 224/11 225/25 228/5 231/22 233/23 236/25 239/23 243/21 249/23 250/22 251/3 251/7 256/2 257/21 258/10 259/16 262/18
however [1] 1/7
huh [5] 55/3 59/18 65/4 71/14 75/19 human [28] 12/15 12/18 37/9 166/6 202/21 207/15 207/17 211/2 218/10 230/1 230/4 230/6 230/10 231/9 231/17 239/13 241/12 243/2 243/7 244/3 244/22 245/23 251/4 251/11 254/20 258/9 258/15 258/17
humans [1] 216/2
humbly [1] 38/3
hypothetical [3] 201/3 205/23 206/22
I
l'd [1] 135/4
I'II [29] 18/18 21/2 23/5 30/2 32/12 32/20 36/13 46/3 49/16 53/18 83/21 101/23 117/12 119/4 144/1 150/11 150/22 162/5 166/8 192/4 195/25 198/15 209/15 213/16 224/10 245/2 245/3 245/4 258/25
I'm [197] 7/3 11/17 13/7 17/12 17/13 17/13 17/14 21/7 25/15 28/22 30/6 30/12 30/14 31/1 32/8 32/10 32/13 32/14 32/15 33/19 33/20 34/8 35/14 39/6 40/6 40/14 42/24 45/9 48/6 51/23 57/16 58/14 60/25 61/2 61/4 61/14 61/19 65/14 67/17 68/6 74/17 78/4 82/7 83/14 86/17 88/6 88/15 89/13 90/17 93/4 93/4 94/22 101/16 106/16 108/6 110/14 110/17 111/18 111/25 116/17 116/20 117/4 117/19 120/22 122/20 123/11 123/16 125/8 126/6 131/9 131/20 133/10 136/24 138/11 138/12 139/15 139/20 140/10 140/18 142/4 142/6 142/24 142/24 143/7 143/7 143/9 143/13 143/14 143/14 143/16 143/24 144/7 144/23 147/24 148/22 148/25 149/13 149/19 154/17 155/3 156/25 159/3 159/7 160/5 160/7 160/11 161/11 161/16 162/12 164/11 169/6 169/15 170/5 170/6 170/17 176/8 176/17 177/8 180/12 180/17 181/18 185/2 190/18 191/9 191/10 191/20 192/13 193/6 194/6 194/7 198/15 199/16 204/24 204/24 205/4 205/20 206/7 206/10 208/23 209/8 209/8 210/13 212/2 212/19 212/19 212/21 213/8 214/6 214/8 214/9 214/9 216/14 218/24 219/8 221/17 222/3 222/4 222/16 223/12 223/12 223/18 224/3 227/24 227/24 227/25 228/6 228/11 228/20 229/2 229/22 232/15 234/11 234/12 234/22 238/2 238/6 238/25 242/1 242/4 242/14 244/24 245/4 245/19 247/4 248/9 248/11 250/12 252/13 252/15 254/1 254/20 257/17 260/3 261/13 261/15 261/18 263/22
I've [6] 9/18 35/13 118/11 133/6 143/10 208/2
ICCs [1] 219/23
ICHTER [2] 2/20 2/21
idea [3] 12/19 42/17 247/10
ideally [1] 42/13
identifiable [1] 129/25
identification [1] 29/1
identified [19] 24/6 27/12 28/10 62/6
63/7 66/8 71/13 71/25 87/23 116/4
124/9 124/13 144/16 171/10 176/12

188/5 196/4 203/9 239/14
identifies [1] 225/19
identify [10] 22/23 70/23 84/15 91/8 91/11 131/17 132/15 207/1 248/14 258/10
identifying [1] 130/21
ignore [4] 160/18 242/19 242/24 250/17
ii [1] 223/24
III [3] \(2 / 13\) 2/16 2/18
illegally [1] 255/21
illuminating [1] 139/23
images [2] 256/9 256/15
imagine [2] 129/10 227/11
imaging [1] 28/5
immediately [2] 200/20 206/23
impacted [2] 20/3 20/5
impeach [3] 24/25 141/10 144/5 impeaching [2] 24/8 24/23
impeachment [3] 25/2 86/12 143/17 implementation [3] 132/4 138/17 138/18
implemented [7] 51/14 51/19 111/23 135/22 136/2 151/24 214/7
implies [1] 57/6
important [11] 8/7 8/8 8/9 11/8 12/21
12/23 39/25 70/18 107/8 109/3 225/23
imposed [1] 40/1
improper [3] 106/9 135/11 163/2
improperly [1] 231/17
inadequate [1] 165/24
inappropriate [1] 175/9
inauthentic [1] 121/20
Inc [4] 62/9 62/20 62/23 66/19
incident [9] 18/8 93/17 93/21 94/3 95/25 96/12 97/5 193/25 194/10
incidents [2] 111/9 184/2
include [4] 19/6 54/5 73/16 73/17
included [6] 36/11 56/14 57/3 57/19
58/11 72/11
includes [5] 56/17 57/21 58/15 58/16 114/9
including [6] 34/18 140/23 150/20
170/8 192/7 192/8
incompatibilities [1] 70/5
inconsistencies [1] 31/24
incorrect [1] 71/23
incorrectly [2] 203/1 251/6
increase [3] 33/12 33/24 34/1
incredible [1] 24/22
incumbent [1] 234/20
indicate [1] 88/23
indicated [3] 126/3 131/11 182/3
indicates [1] 71/24
indictment [1] 25/12
indifference [1] 225/24
indirect [1] 138/5
individual [4] 218/10 230/10 240/24 262/18
individuals [7] 19/18 22/2 50/21 51/9
76/9 215/9 219/1
infect [1] 129/15
infection [2] 129/3 129/12
infectious [1] 129/11
inference [1] 123/7
inferences [1] 123/12
information [17] 11/21 47/20 59/24
72/7 82/16 83/10 98/21 102/10 103/1
information... [8] 103/17 122/13
150/18 152/24 187/20 198/16 216/21

\section*{254/9}
informed [2] 98/21 153/22
infrastructure [2] 98/8 114/9
inherent [1] 31/24
initial [10] 128/2 132/3 184/3 210/5
210/14 213/5 234/19 245/25 247/15

\section*{256/6}
initially [2] 106/7 107/5
input [4] 131/14 132/7 188/18 188/19
inputs [1] 152/16
inquired [1] 111/8
inquiry [1] 168/10
insert [1] 240/2
inside [7] 95/17 177/20 196/24 196/25
197/5 213/17 256/22
insider [1] 197/7
insiders [1] 200/13
insight [3] 133/18 194/23 195/14
insignificant [1] 64/21
insist [1] 149/17
insisted [1] 40/9
inspect [2] 40/1 44/12
inspected [1] 195/4
inspection [3] 40/9 45/17 127/17
instance [3] 11/1 169/25 231/13
instant [1] 31/22
instead [2] 202/24 241/3
instruct [2] 51/24 92/4
instructed [2] 85/21 242/19
instructions [2] 10/25 232/11
instrument [1] 121/12
insufficient [1] 240/23
Insurance [1] 103/5
integrating [1] 107/10
integrity [1] 114/18
intend [1] 8/13
intended [1] 251/18
intent [2] 232/18 246/1
intention [2] 105/22 200/14
intentionally [2] 21/23 238/1
intentions [1] 187/16
interact [5] 58/21 58/23 58/24 100/7 100/11
interaction [2] 108/3 176/21
interest [4] 252/18 252/21 253/7 257/10
interested [3] 43/19 176/23 261/20
interesting [1] 98/9
interface [1] 110/6
interject [1] 34/8
interjected [1] 141/1
internal [6] 19/12 33/23 153/21 193/1
223/9 223/9
internally [3] 154/1 185/4 229/21
internals [1] 159/20
internet [5] 209/19 211/21 211/25
220/7 220/9
interpret [1] 201/9
interrupt [3] 125/2 204/24 205/5
interrupted [1] 94/22
intervened [1] 242/15
intervention [2] 45/7 151/15
introduce [8] 7/2 7/4 99/10 116/13
122/7 159/5 159/7 225/9
introduced [3] 122/4 160/22 163/14
intrusions [1] 112/3
invariably [2] 247/17 251/12
inventory [1] 127/2
inverted [1] 240/24
investigate [2] 36/20 259/10 investigated [1] 18/8
investigation [25] 16/12 16/13 19/3
19/10 19/16 22/13 26/13 26/15 26/21
26/23 27/18 28/10 37/21 179/19 180/6 182/19 182/25 183/4 184/18 185/7 185/16 186/15 186/18 187/3 202/14 investigations [14] 17/24 18/1 18/1 18/4 18/9 18/9 18/12 19/6 19/8 19/9 19/14 19/14 26/20 186/17
investigative [11] 15/24 16/17 17/18 17/20 17/21 18/7 18/17 29/16 29/24 186/14 186/21
investigator [7] 19/7 178/3 180/1 183/5 185/18 185/20 186/14
investigators [3] 26/20 179/25 185/22
investment [1] 217/3
investments [1] 218/8
invite [1] 37/11
invoke [1] 123/20
involve [1] 16/20
involved [26] 10/18 18/22 80/23 99/4
100/18 111/11 121/1 126/4 126/5 126/7
126/18 127/3 127/17 128/11 132/21
133/23 153/17 154/6 157/14 177/19
179/14 193/3 193/5 216/2 222/17
237/25
involvement [4] 127/5 157/8 194/3
201/10
involves [1] 138/4
involving [2] 43/7 166/25
iPad [2] 78/16 78/23
iPad-based [2] 78/16 78/23
irrelevant [1] 158/25
is [1098]
isn't [21] 13/24 17/20 18/6 18/15 \(19 / 5\)
20/23 21/20 22/1 26/2 68/24 79/24
90/10 103/23 129/16 236/9 242/9
242/18 252/17 253/20 259/6 259/12
isolated [1] 129/9
issue [22] 23/17 23/22 27/3 27/7 34/18 39/6 39/25 45/25 67/12 70/6 70/6 70/16 80/13 83/7 93/5 94/17 149/25 201/11 222/20 232/15 253/22 254/20
issued [6] 49/22 83/25 84/6 105/16 127/25 188/10
issues [38] 17/6 19/12 21/5 23/21 24/6
28/13 28/17 36/21 37/1 37/3 37/6 37/7
37/9 88/2 88/2 92/22 104/8 109/5
114/17 120/16 123/8 124/9 128/15
128/17 138/9 138/9 139/22 149/24
149/25 151/16 169/21 213/10 214/25
217/5 219/21 233/14 233/17 239/11
it [1069]
it's [9] 30/15 47/25 49/21 130/5 146/24 157/18 184/25 203/25 227/13
items [3] 43/8 118/5 219/18
its [19] 21/21 31/16 38/1 60/6 65/6 66/7 72/12 84/6 110/25 121/16 122/10 123/8 128/1 129/16 135/16 140/23 165/15 204/22 224/1
itself [11] 63/16 63/18 101/9 123/20 190/7 190/11 204/23 211/24 213/17

218/6 250/3

\section*{J}

JACOUTOT [1] 3/7
James [1] 183/8
JANUARY [24] 1/13 6/2 40/15 40/20 40/22 40/23 41/9 98/5 138/15 139/2
139/4 139/10 147/16 148/13 154/9
155/12 157/10 166/25 167/4 168/11
183/25 187/4 234/1 265/13
January 1 [1] 139/10
January 14 [1] 138/15
January 14th [2] 157/10 234/1
January 2022 [1] 147/16
January 27 [1] 148/13
January 4th [3] 40/22 40/23 41/9
Jason [3] 103/20 103/23 104/3
JAVIER [1] 3/4
JEFFREY [1] \(2 / 2\)
Jenna [1] 193/18
Jim [1] 263/7
job [7] 50/7 56/9 69/22 70/22 70/23
113/1 172/6
John [1] 196/21
joint [1] 138/10
jokers [1] 252/10
Jordan [3] 238/8 259/4 259/5
JOSH [6] 3/4 13/7 157/1 167/21 173/6
262/21
Journal [1] 250/8
JR [2] 3/9 23/1
judge [26] 1/12 16/17 17/15 21/11
22/18 23/9 23/25 24/5 25/23 30/2 32/9
32/12 32/20 34/22 36/13 38/5 38/15
101/18 104/24 113/3 149/2 234/12
241/1 241/2 259/17 261/24
judged [1] 221/24
judges [3] 240/24 240/25 240/25
judgment [1] 232/14
judicial [1] 240/20
July [18] 48/20 49/22 51/14 57/15 58/4
72/18 91/21 92/8 144/15 144/20 171/3
171/22 173/15 188/6 195/22 196/4
224/25 225/19
July 1 [2] 49/22 224/25
July 1st [1] 48/20
July 2019 [3] 72/18 91/21 92/8
July 2021 [2] 144/20 188/6
July 25th [1] 58/4
July 9th [2] 171/3 173/15
jump [2] 88/5 258/24
juncture [5] 35/17 67/18 124/25 131/6 224/5
just [242] 7/17 8/24 9/8 10/21 10/23
11/12 13/12 17/5 20/8 21/2 22/21 23/11
24/14 24/18 25/4 25/5 25/20 27/10
30/12 30/14 31/1 32/11 32/14 34/15
36/10 39/5 39/11 40/12 43/2 44/22 45/3
45/8 46/1 46/6 46/9 46/11 46/17 46/19
51/24 56/16 57/12 59/23 62/17 68/1
68/4 68/21 69/2 73/14 74/8 79/3 81/11 83/8 83/14 89/11 90/15 90/25 92/2
93/15 93/25 98/3 99/11 99/18 99/24 100/12 104/6 105/4 105/5 106/24 113/7
115/14 115/22 116/18 117/19 119/19
120/2 121/11 122/19 122/24 123/11
123/15 123/23 123/24 124/6 124/22
125/7 125/19 125/25 130/18 130/25

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline & & \\
\hline lift [1] 119/6 & loading [1] 236/11 lobbied [1] 165/17 & 69/14 69/25 92/1 92/6 108/12 120/20 124/10 133/9 149/6 149/15 149/16 \\
\hline light [3] 122/4 150/19 220/20 & local [2] 165/21 234/12 & 13154 \\
\hline lighter [1] 205/3 & located [1] 76/15 & 17 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 8 / 16 \text { 9/9 9/18 16/12 16/21 23/9 } \\
& 0 \text { 28/15 34/15 50/5 56/20 }
\end{aligned}
\] & location [8] 197/21 197/25 206/2 206/7 & 17 \\
\hline 17 & 231/6 231/11 231/13 244/23 & /23 193/4 195/15 212/15 \\
\hline 5/19 115/22 116/8 120/14 122/5 & locations [2] 212/18 215/6 lodge [1] \(17 / 4\) & 213/4 216/1 233/6 233/23 236/1 236 \\
\hline 13/21 129/14 130/11 132/13 135/4 & \(\log [9] 117 / 5\) 118/11 124/17 134/8 & mail [4] 22/9 24/1 24/2 56/19 \\
\hline (37/22 138/9 141/16 141/18 153/21 & \[
134 / 11217 / 12 \text { 250/1 250/4 258/11 }
\] & \[
\text { mail-in [3] } 22 / 924 / 124 / 2
\] \\
\hline 159/22 165/16 171/9 174/19 178/10 & logic [3] 215/16 215/17 225/7 & main [6] 108/19 187/12 211/3 213/21 \\
\hline 180/16 186/18 190/5 192/19 201/3 201/20 202/20 204/14 208/1 210/20 & logistics [1] 226/24 & 242/14 242/17 \\
\hline 211/18 220/23 224/4 224/5 225/6 & long [11] 46/6 55/12 96/3 138/13 & mainain [1] 367 \\
\hline 227/20 229/12 229/19 230/12 232/12 & 177/12 208/4 215/1 220/23 227/12 & maintained [2] \\
\hline 243/22 2 & 252/1 260/8 & maintaining \\
\hline 251/12 255/4 257/16 264/2 & longer [2] 102/11 261/22 & major [1] 76/18 \\
\hline likely [11] 10/11 12/3 12/5 38/8 131/2 & look[59] 16/14 37/11 40/7 40/18 40/21 & majority [3] 100/13 170/15 202/7
make [44] 10/8 10/11 11/6 12/15 31/23 \\
\hline 162/2 193/5 206/1 229/1 230/24 241/3 & 42/18 43/25 49/13 55/13 57/25 58/3 62/13 70/2 70/12 71/18 71/20 72/6 73/3 & make [44] 10/8 10/11 11/6 12/15 34/18 45/15 50/20 51/8 54/9 70/8 \\
\hline likewise [1] 10/10 & 78/14 78/15 79/7 83/3 83/13 83/22 & 119/5 128/5 129/21 139/21 150/1 \\
\hline limitation [1] 177/2 & 85/25 86/5 87/6 90/9 104/21 115/17 & 156/10 161/18 189/25 192/4 193/9 \\
\hline limited [2] 158/8 196/8 & 116/24 117/11 117/12 117/12 117/20 & 198/7 203/7 203/22 204/22 210/1 215/2 \\
\hline Lin [1] 23/1 & 118/20 125/25 129/20 130/1 130/11 & 215/10 215/15 216/20 217/2 218/9 \\
\hline Linda [1] 171/25 & 140/8 159/13 159/17 168/2 174/13 & 219/14 219/15 219/25 220/22 221/1 \\
\hline Lindell [1] 187/6 & 178/10 184/13 190/7 193/17 202/23 & 23/21 224/10 232/6 240/3 248/4 \\
\hline Lindsey [2] 259/7 259/9 & 203/22 205/3 210/1 211/18 214/17 & \[
252 / 25
\] \\
\hline e[26] 1/6 29/15 29/17 33/4 33/10 & 225/6 240/4 254/14 258/ & makers [2] 158/18 161 \\
\hline (e) & looked [13] 24/3 52/2 52/5 70/12 71/18 & makes [3] 106/17 120/17 233/9 \\
\hline (2) 4 145/16 145/17 154/16 154/17 & 105/19 117/9 159/15 187/5 187/10 & making [20] 22/15 26/16 44/14 72 \\
\hline 3/9 & 214/2 229/3 236/2 & 77/25 88/5 131/9 150/9 150/15 \\
\hline Line 10 [2] 49/18 145 & looking [23] 11/4 17/14 33/19 43/19 & 仿21 193/7 218/8 219/14 229 \\
\hline Line 11 [1] 154/16 & 61/2 61/4 68/1 70/21 79/22 82/8 84/4 & 252/18 252/25 253/1 253/7 258/5 \\
\hline Line 15 [1] 140/19 & 87/7 92/22 129/1 141/2 183/24 186/3 190/8 191/11 \(211 / 3\) 211/4 213/9 214/6 & malicious [3] 131/13 132/6 232/18 malware [5] 129/18 129/23 129/24 \\
\hline Line 16 [1] 58/6 & looks [7] 16/12 50/5 63/3 171/9 219/10 & \begin{tabular}{l}
malware [5] 129/18 129/23 129/24 \\
130/8 130/8
\end{tabular} \\
\hline Line 18 [2] 84/25 154/17 & 230/12 246/6 & \[
\text { man [1] } 156 / 14
\] \\
\hline Line 2 [4] 72/23 73/1 86/9 87/8 Line 22 [1] 54/20 & lose [2] 247/1 & manage [9] 46/7 59/8 63/24 98/ \\
\hline Line 22 [1] \(54 / 20\) & losing [2] 143/16 246/2 & 105/14 112/7 127/1 131/3 172/7 \\
\hline Line 24 [1] 54/16 Line 4 [1] 144/3 & loss [1] 22/3 & managed [6] 49/25 51/4 53/2 54/5 \\
\hline Line 4 [1] 144/3 & lost [1] 258/1 & 54/12 56/1 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { lines [7] 40/4 55/7 } \\
& \text { 196/20 210/2 }
\end{aligned}
\] & lot [9] 9/5 61/17 143/10 151/1 161/23 & management [3] 103/15 138/23 21 \\
\hline Lines 10 [1] & 203/13 205/4 206/8 220/23 & manager [3] 138/18 197/23 201/18 \\
\hline Lines 11 [1] 155/2 & lots [7] 90/16 135/17 198/10 200/2 & managers' [1] 232/14 \\
\hline link [1] 150/17 & 200/3 200/3 211/22 & manages [2] 57/13 63/15 managing [2] 15/9 126/22 \\
\hline \(\begin{array}{ll}\text { list [8] } 39 / 10 \\ 163 / 3 & 763 / 412 \\ 163 / 5\end{array}\) & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { loud [2] 31/14 137/6 } \\
& \text { louder [1] 82/13 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { managing [2] } 15 / 9126 / 22 \\
& \text { manifests [1] } 165 / 23
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 163/3 163/4 163/5
listed [4] 18/23 35/16 64/23 64/25 & low [3] 69/12 69/17 206 & manner [2] 190/17 259/11 \\
\hline listed [4] 18/23 35/16 64/23 64/25
listen [1]
\(223 / 22\) & lower [2] 200/6 256/11 & many [18] 30/25 37/18 57/8 63/6 69/2 \\
\hline listen [1] 223/22 & lowered [2] 235/16 235/16 & 108/12 139/13 140/25 141/25 142/23 \\
\hline listing [2] 18/16 19/6 & luck [2] 136/24 206/19 & 143/21 143/24 219/17 219/20 222/10 \\
\hline lists [4] 62/4 64/20 70/21 \(71 / 2\) & lunch [6] 83/21 110/18 113/9 117/11 & 237/18 237/23 248/6 \\
\hline  & 117/17 118/1 & Map [2] 64/7 64/17 \\
\hline litigation [14] 2/11 14/5 20/20 20/24 21/17 81/16 83/2 84/17 145/22 147/9 & Lysinger [2] 103/20 104/4 & March [5] 50/6 50/12 5 \\
\hline 18 153/10 195 & & \\
\hline little [28] 17/9 27/10 27/20 40/25 41/2 & &  \\
\hline \(1588 / 18\) & \[
\text { ma'am [3] 82/14 152/4 } 21
\] & marginally [1] 124/2 \\
\hline 95/3 106/15 118/5 118/5 119/20 139/21 & machine [14] 12/18 130/16 175 & 115/22 11 \\
\hline 6/5 166/23 177/17 185/1 199/6 & 196/10 201/14 201/19 201/22 202/2 & marked [31] 22/21 27/6 27/19 29/1 \\
\hline 222/23 223/14 227/4 227/9 231/20 & 5 248/22 249/3 249/14 249/1 & /25 115/23 119/24 157/3 197/6 \\
\hline 244/25 & 258/12 & 202/19 203/3 203/16 204/12 217 \\
\hline LITTLEFIELD [1] 3/5 & machines [18] 11/11 76/15 77/2 77/10 & 238/25 245/15 247/19 250/20 \\
\hline live [4] 70/17 81/21 220/6 248/18 & 1/3 101/6 101/10 169/24 170/8 & 251/14 252/5 \\
\hline lived [2] 7/87/11 & (18 204/17 216/18 217/19 220 & 255/8 255/11 255/2 \\
\hline lives [2] 46/16 46/23 & 239/12 239/23 245/24 249/5 & 256/11 257/19 \\
\hline C [1] 3/5 & Macon [4] 59/3 59/5 59/5 157/11 & marking [2] 34/24 250/13 \\
\hline LLP [1] \(2 / 7\) & Madam [1] 21/12 & marks [2] 176/2 258/5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{M}

Marks' [1] 177/6
Martin [1] 116/23
MARTINO [5] 2/6 4/12 4/19 4/22 47/4
MARTINO-WEINHARDT [5] 2/6 4/12
4/19 4/22 47/4
MARY [1] 2/5
Mashburn [2] 227/19 228/2
match [3] 244/13 244/14 245/6
matched [1] 243/16
matching [1] 243/1
material [1] 159/1
materials [1] 224/1
Matt [2] 77/8 77/9
matter [16] 23/13 30/21 30/24 113/9
151/3 158/6 158/24 172/20 197/1 197/3
199/8 213/22 238/10 240/25 241/1 265/11
matters [6] 83/15 83/18 178/20 179/20 210/4 210/14
MATTHAEUS [2] 2/6 47/4
Matthews [3] 103/20 103/23 104/3
may [60] \(1 / 21 / 4\) 14/19 16/4 19/18 22/18 32/9 38/15 38/24 41/12 41/23 42/7 42/20 70/6 70/10 70/14 70/17 96/16 96/23 99/1 104/18 111/16 112/3 115/19 120/14 122/3 125/3 131/13 132/6 133/11 133/14 148/5 151/14 154/11 162/19 163/5 180/19 182/19 182/23 182/25 183/16 183/24 184/14 184/19 185/21 187/12 189/21 191/18 194/15 203/15 210/23 222/17 223/16 227/9 230/11 232/15 238/22 244/7 256/6 260/18
May 11 [2] 184/19 185/21
May 11th [1] 184/14
May 6 [1] 180/19
maybe[3] 61/9 208/16 260/1
McGUIRE [4] 2/16 \(2 / 175 / 8\) 228/11 me [120] 11/9 11/11 13/16 13/19 17/17 18/2 19/15 19/18 20/16 21/12 30/17 32/10 40/12 40/15 49/9 50/10 52/22
56/25 58/19 58/21 63/1 64/10 70/21
70/22 74/10 79/15 81/11 83/3 87/2
87/14 87/18 88/1 88/1 88/3 88/4 88/7 88/7 95/2 96/24 96/25 97/14 98/7 99/5 99/6 101/23 103/13 106/15 107/2 109/11 111/2 117/18 118/21 119/9 120/2 123/15 123/20 123/22 123/22 125/7 126/15 126/15 128/5 132/10 135/18 138/2 138/4 139/23 139/25 140/2 140/5 143/25 144/23 145/15 147/23 148/7 154/25 155/9 157/7 160/2 160/18 162/5 163/7 165/3 165/3 167/22 173/8 174/25 175/16 176/18 182/18 184/24 186/5 190/5 193/24 194/14 194/18 195/24 198/19 201/4 210/25 210/25 211/1 211/9 218/23 223/21 224/15 224/23 227/3 229/2 231/10 231/19 242/2 243/11 244/2 248/1 248/2 251/23 252/18 253/7 258/24
mean [61] 6/8 10/21 11/14 11/16 12/9 12/10 23/20 23/20 23/23 23/23 24/12 27/3 34/3 42/13 46/17 46/18 46/21 52/1 69/23 70/9 87/25 93/24 106/14 106/16 114/22 117/16 122/24 122/25 133/9 136/2 139/16 139/18 142/3 145/8

150/22 151/14 157/22 162/5 163/12
164/22 190/18 190/19 197/18 199/16 202/17 206/10 206/21 218/13 219/7 219/11 220/7 223/4 227/15 228/19 246/16 248/6 248/23 254/4 256/13 259/22 262/12
meaning [5] 49/21 130/16 218/16 252/3 254/18
means [8] 8/12 10/23 42/3 42/9 44/23 126/25 139/19 142/11
meant [5] 96/6 141/12 141/13 141/22 228/1
measures [3] 51/13 51/18 52/13
MECHANICAL [1] 1/21
medium [1] 64/25
meet [4] 130/10 237/2 237/2 237/9
meeting [2] 157/11 162/18
meetings [3] 103/14 162/11 189/17
MEGAN [2] \(2 / 13\) 2/18
member [4] 29/11 179/13 179/15 227/17
members [5] 19/15 23/2 31/4 213/19 264/1
memorable [1] 159/21
memory [6] 25/12 74/12 145/3 155/13 165/22 188/17
mentioned [9] 9/11 54/18 55/9 200/11 204/12 228/18 228/21 229/7 229/8 Merakis [1] 210/7
merely [1] 22/3
MERRITT [10] 4/10 47/5 47/12 47/13 47/15 59/24 75/25 88/20 213/22 238/9 messages [1] 190/17
messed [1] 191/25
met [4] 13/7 180/2 228/12 235/2
method [6] 43/13 43/25 44/3 45/8 45/11 164/7
methods [1] 43/18
Michael [6] 126/6 130/24 174/13
212/24 219/2 219/3
Michigan [1] 43/11
microphone [1] 221/12
middle [4] 89/8 210/18 248/17 248/20 midterms [1] 8/4
might [49] 36/19 41/11 46/8 77/4 77/15
94/1 96/3 96/19 102/5 104/19 110/19 118/17 120/7 120/7 120/13 124/22 124/23 124/24 128/19 130/16 136/24 142/7 149/13 154/4 160/10 170/5 172/24 174/21 175/11 189/22 190/10 194/13 195/20 198/5 199/6 199/11 209/24 209/25 210/24 211/9 223/5 223/16 243/21 245/19 249/14 249/17 252/10 252/13 254/25
Mike [7] 75/17 75/20 75/23 78/10 187/6 192/11 192/15
milling [1] \(9 / 21\)
million [2] 234/23 234/23
mind [7] 15/7 85/20 105/5 108/5 152/17 152/19 162/16
mine [6] 60/22 66/15 115/1 133/4 147/24 220/20
minority [1] 206/7
minus [1] 201/25
minute [4] 116/19 191/13 260/21 261/6 minutes [13] 32/11 117/19 117/21 196/11 197/13 236/10 259/17 259/24 259/25 260/22 261/17 261/21 261/23
mirroring [1] 212/13
mischaracterize [1] 123/25
mischief [1] 257/1
misinformation [1] 170/13
misinterpreting [1] 252/20
misprogrammed [1] 249/23 misread [1] 79/5
missed [4] 8/5 73/24 125/4 219/7
MISSETT [2] 2/13 2/19
missing [4] 171/16 172/21 172/25 174/2
Mississippi [1] 206/8
mistake [2] 243/5 253/4
mistaken [1] 169/4
mistakes [2] 212/15 216/1
mistrusting [2] 199/9 257/8
Misty [2] 28/12 177/18
misunderstood [1] 57/11
mitigate [6] 70/13 84/16 84/19 164/25
165/8 216/3
mitigated [2] 70/15 188/7
mitigating [1] 70/19
mitigation [2] 70/11 190/6
mobile [1] 166/2
modern [1] 140/22
modify [1] 119/6
moment [16] 13/13 14/4 83/7 106/18 122/11 123/13 123/16 142/10 142/15 142/24 143/15 145/14 151/4 160/8 226/25 250/24
moments [1] 24/14
Monday [2] 40/9 76/24
money [1] 138/21
monitor [2] 109/5 112/2
monitored [1] 112/2
monitoring [3] 198/14 248/8 248/13 month [3] 50/6 50/12 147/16
months [10] 25/6 37/18 50/17 51/6 145/5 149/8 149/18 150/3 150/25 210/21
more [52] 12/4 17/24 19/11 32/15 34/24 35/24 53/15 53/18 56/21 99/18 99/19 106/19 119/4 119/10 124/23 131/2 136/7 139/16 139/23 140/22 140/23 142/15 143/12 144/1 151/18 153/4 157/23 162/22 165/16 165/17 165/17 165/21 166/11 177/17 189/5 192/6 194/12 200/8 200/9 205/25 218/14 218/21 219/1 223/13 223/16 229/19 230/9 234/21 244/7 251/13 255/8 261/17
morning [14] 7/1 7/5 13/5 13/6 15/19 15/21 39/9 46/3 47/3 47/19 105/3
206/19 261/25 262/11
MORRISON [1] \(2 / 7\)
most [30] 7/20 8/4 10/11 12/3 17/20 18/6 46/10 128/19 129/9 138/6 150/22 196/21 197/25 199/2 199/16 199/19 211/2 211/11 211/18 212/4 212/7 212/7 212/10 214/13 217/20 218/5 219/4 227/16 237/15 258/21
Motion [1] 22/25
motivation [1] 254/25
move [25] 16/17 27/22 30/2 83/15
106/20 107/25 121/7 148/16 166/8 168/13 174/8 178/14 181/2 186/23 203/15 207/20 207/22 207/24 217/3 220/25 221/5 222/1 225/9 239/6 259/10

\section*{M}
moved [2] 7/9 248/5
moving [6] 73/18 122/15 159/7 211/17 219/19 248/7
Mr [16] 4/7 4/9 4/12 4/13 4/14 4/16 4/17 4/19 4/20 4/22 5/5 5/7 5/8 104/5 104/7 132/23
Mr. [240] 6/4 6/7 14/25 15/1 15/19 16/7
16/21 17/8 17/17 19/5 21/3 21/20 22/1
22/5 22/11 22/14 22/21 23/12 23/19
23/21 23/21 24/7 24/8 24/19 24/19 24/20 24/21 24/24 24/25 25/1 25/3 25/10 25/11 26/2 26/3 26/5 26/6 27/4 27/5 27/12 27/25 28/25 29/9 30/4 30/7 30/18 31/3 31/7 31/7 32/2 32/23 34/18 34/20 35/24 36/7 36/15 37/11 39/5 39/6 39/7 39/7 39/8 40/5 43/3 43/6 43/12 43/18 43/22 43/25 45/8 46/2 46/13 47/19 47/20 48/8 48/19 48/25 49/14 50/3 50/24 52/13 54/1 54/13 56/21 57/14 57/25 58/17 58/20 60/15 60/17 61/3 65/2 67/25 69/6 71/17 71/24 72/4 72/13 73/8 73/10 74/23 78/22 79/15 80/17 80/25 81/1 81/2 81/7 81/22 82/4 83/24 87/2 88/12 89/10 89/19 92/8 93/13 95/2 98/4 100/4 104/7 104/12 104/14 105/3 108/2 108/21 110/19 112/17 112/24 113/5 113/12 115/5 116/23 118/5 118/12 118/16 119/7 119/9 119/11 120/2 123/25 126/13 126/14 126/18 126/20 131/16 132/8 132/23 133/22 135/5 135/15 136/7 136/9 137/15 137/18 139/11 140/4 141/12 143/4 144/7 151/1 151/21 154/25 156/6 158/9 160/20 160/24 164/6 168/8 171/22 172/5 172/5 172/6 172/6 172/6 172/12 172/19 172/23 173/12 173/18 175/7 176/6 176/11 176/24 179/2 182/5 182/5 182/6 182/7 182/11 182/18 183/7 183/11 183/23 186/13 187/3 189/6 191/8 191/21 192/6 201/1 204/24 205/7 207/23 212/23 212/25 223/7 224/20 225/14 225/17 226/6 227/7 227/7 227/11 227/19 227/25 228/7 228/11 228/16 229/25 231/20 238/25 239/11 257/7 257/13 259/19 259/20 259/25 260/4 260/6 260/7 260/21 261/2 261/5 261/10 261/20 262/13 262/24 263/12 263/25
Mr. Barnes [14] 108/2 126/18 126/20 131/16 132/23 171/22 172/5 172/6 172/19 172/23 173/12 182/5 183/11 212/23
Mr. Barnes' [5] 108/21 172/6 172/12 173/18 175/7
Mr. Beaver [58] 39/5 47/19 47/20 48/8 48/19 48/25 49/14 50/3 50/24 52/13 54/1 54/13 56/21 57/14 57/25 58/17 58/20 60/15 60/17 61/3 65/2 67/25 69/6 71/17 71/24 72/4 72/13 73/8 73/10 74/23 79/15 80/25 81/2 81/22 83/24 87/2 88/12 89/10 89/19 92/8 93/13 95/2 98/4 100/4 105/3 112/17 113/12 115/5 119/7 119/9 120/2 133/22 135/5 135/15 172/5 182/5 182/11 212/25
Mr. Beaver's [2] 81/1 126/14
Mr. Bedard [1] 26/5

Mr. Belinfante [5] 144/7 151/1 176/11 191/21 225/17
Mr. Blanchard [2] 183/7 183/23
Mr. Brown [3] 118/12 119/11 136/7
Mr. Chaney [4] 29/9 31/3 31/7 32/2
Mr. Cross [10] 34/20 43/3 82/4 141/12 154/25 176/6 228/16 229/25 231/20 257/7
Mr. Davis [1] 34/18
Mr. Davis' [2] 14/25 15/1
Mr. Favorito [1] 25/10
Mr. Favorito's [1] 262/13
Mr. Fitts [1] 104/7
Mr. Germany [31] 6/7 15/19 16/7 16/21 17/17 19/5 21/20 22/1 22/5 22/21 24/7 24/19 25/3 26/2 27/25 28/25 30/4 30/7 31/7 32/23 35/24 36/7 36/15 37/11 80/17 81/7 118/16 172/6 182/6 204/24 223/7
Mr. Germany's [5] 6/4 24/8 24/24 126/13 179/2
Mr. Hale [1] 189/6
Mr. Hall [7] 22/11 23/21 24/21 24/25 25/11 26/3 27/5
Mr. Hall's [5] 22/14 24/20 25/1 26/6 27/12
Mr. Hamilton [2] 104/12 104/14
Mr. Knapp [1] 39/6
Mr. Knapp's [1] 39/7
Mr. Martin [1] 116/23
Mr. Mashburn [1] 227/19
Mr. Oles [10] 17/8 21/3 23/12 23/19 24/19 27/4 30/18 110/19 136/9 263/12
Mr. Oles' [1] 113/5
Mr. Persinger [21] 39/7 39/8 40/5 43/6 43/12 43/22 45/8 46/2 46/13 118/5 227/7 227/11 227/25 259/19 259/20 259/25 260/4 260/7 260/21 261/5 262/24
Mr. Persinger's [3] 43/18 43/25 261/10 Mr. Russo [1] 263/25
Mr. Sterling [33] 78/22 112/24 132/8 137/15 137/18 139/11 140/4 143/4 151/21 156/6 160/24 164/6 168/8 182/7 182/18 186/13 187/3 191/8 192/6 201/1 205/7 207/23 224/20 225/14 226/6 227/7 228/7 228/11 238/25 239/11 257/13 260/6 261/2
Mr. Sterling's [3] 158/9 176/24 261/20
Mr. Tyson [1] 123/25
Mr. Wenke [1] 160/20
Mr. Wood [1] 23/21
Ms [1] 4/6
Ms. [25] 6/7 7/1 7/12 7/23 8/19 9/25 11/6 11/12 11/20 12/1 12/13 12/21 12/24 13/5 14/16 172/14 176/2 177/6 178/11 180/3 180/5 189/6 189/12 189/22 189/23
Ms. Ballance's [1] 172/14 Ms. Curling [15] 6/7 7/1 7/12 7/23 8/19 9/25 11/6 11/12 11/20 12/1 12/13 12/21 12/24 13/5 14/16
Ms. Hampton [3] 178/11 180/3 180/5
Ms. Marks [1] 176/2
Ms. Marks' [1] 177/6
Ms. Weiman [4] 189/6 189/12 189/22 189/23
MTX [1] 100/22
much [29] 14/22 15/11 42/23 46/7 53/14 103/12 104/11 106/11 127/2 129/14 136/13 136/15 151/18 152/16 177/9 191/21 200/6 200/7 200/9 205/3 205/3 228/5 230/9 230/24 234/21
239/19 255/23 259/16 261/14
muddled [1] 142/15
multilevel [1] 221/19
multipage [1] \(97 / 3\)
multiple [5] 40/21 182/4 202/16 204/14 231/12
municipal [2] \(8 / 6\) 217/14
municipals [1] \(8 / 5\)
muscle [1] 165/22
must [5] 45/5 45/15 140/15 151/11 151/11
my [110] 9/3 9/9 9/10 9/17 10/20 10/23
10/25 11/3 11/8 11/17 12/5 12/6 12/10 15/19 16/19 17/10 18/12 19/10 20/8 21/15 21/18 26/9 30/9 42/21 45/18 46/12 47/12 53/2 55/4 56/21 69/19 70/4 84/16 87/12 88/7 93/13 97/13 97/15 98/10 98/25 99/3 99/6 99/23 99/24 103/10 104/2 105/5 105/6 106/21 107/15 108/12 109/11 112/10 113/1 114/23 115/20 118/2 118/2 124/1 124/6 124/11 124/22 129/24 132/23 133/11 133/14 134/2 135/7 135/18 135/24 137/8 138/20 140/1 141/4 142/20 143/11 144/4 147/13 152/19 155/13 162/4 162/21 163/13 165/24 171/14 173/4 175/19 180/9 184/20 185/9 187/22 190/8 190/10 203/18 205/3 205/5 205/7 205/20 211/11 211/19 217/25 218/5 224/15 224/15 242/17 250/6 252/20 259/25 261/19 265/12 myself [4] 41/10 151/8 229/10 233/16

\section*{N}
nakedly [1] 190/9
name [16] 6/17 6/17 15/19 47/10 47/10 47/12 93/13 137/6 137/7 137/8 156/14 188/24 238/3 240/3 263/6 263/6
named [1] 188/22
narrow [1] 144/3
NASED [1] 189/14
nature [6] 23/24 154/5 162/12 162/17 179/21 216/7
near [1] 235/3
nearer [1] 221/12
nearly [1] 144/14
necessarily [10] 54/7 70/9 76/22 77/19 214/4 216/12 255/2 256/18 259/3 259/8 necessary [1] 122/3
need [29] 38/10 39/23 42/12 42/16 46/5 52/1 52/2 70/22 72/9 83/13 86/13 86/20 88/3 104/2 118/6 139/16 140/20 143/5 161/6 171/19 195/10 223/23 223/25 225/20 259/16 260/1 260/15 261/10 264/4
needed [9] 72/8 88/7 94/4 96/19
103/11 103/12 128/24 131/23 135/19
needs [5] 43/23 119/13 130/7 165/13 226/21
nefariously [1] 38/2
negotiate [1] 235/5
neither [2] 158/25 255/3
network [11] 57/6 57/22 58/15 59/1

\section*{N}
network... [7] 59/8 72/6 91/6 91/16 92/11 100/10 100/13
networks [27] 56/14 56/15 56/20 57/2
57/3 57/4 57/5 57/5 57/7 57/7 57/10 57/18 57/20 58/10 58/11 58/20 58/21 58/23 58/23 58/24 58/25 59/6 59/7 100/6 100/7 100/11 100/12
never [24] 20/23 49/6 49/23 49/24 50/24 63/18 92/23 98/25 103/11 111/8 111/11 121/19 130/13 130/14 131/6 131/18 132/10 135/19 149/12 163/9 169/25 198/16 211/6 226/14
new [4] 130/19 135/21 156/20 215/8 news [1] 99/2
next [22] 29/15 29/17 33/10 33/23
35/25 40/21 47/5 59/23 70/14 76/13 103/15 116/8 137/1 141/16 151/15 156/10 186/9 186/10 200/21 201/13 210/21 211/18
night [3] 108/17 187/6 236/12
Ninja [1] 185/6
Ninjas [1] 183/14
no [184] 9/22 11/3 11/14 12/18 12/19 13/14 13/23 14/1 14/3 18/15 18/16 20/9 22/2 22/2 22/4 28/3 30/11 31/11 34/13 35/9 36/3 36/6 36/8 37/20 40/10 43/12 44/6 50/12 50/15 51/4 51/11 53/23 56/4 60/12 60/18 65/13 67/2 69/12 69/17 71/20 72/3 75/4 75/7 81/4 84/5 85/8 87/15 88/9 92/25 93/2 93/24 96/1 96/16 96/21 97/10 97/13 97/15 97/23 98/13 98/21 99/5 99/23 100/12 100/20 101/1 101/11 102/11 108/3 109/2 109/13 112/10 113/3 116/4 117/23 117/23 119/8 120/5 121/6 121/12 121/13 125/8 127/23 128/5 129/12 131/18 131/20 132/10 132/18 134/4 134/6 134/9 134/12 134/15 134/18 134/21 134/25 135/6 136/5 136/8 140/11 140/15 141/6 141/23 145/8 145/18 146/14 146/23 147/11 147/15 148/18 150/17 153/4 156/5 159/20 163/18 164/14 167/15 169/22 173/18 173/24 174/5 174/6 175/14 178/16 183/2 184/23 185/5 186/25 187/5 190/6 191/4 193/1 194/2 194/12 194/21 194/23 195/3 195/13 195/18 195/19 199/4 202/5 205/12 207/6 207/9 221/17 225/13 226/17 229/6 229/19 230/8 232/1 232/1 233/22 235/19 235/20 236/3 236/11 236/22 238/19 239/8 240/25 241/1 241/7 241/7 241/8 241/22 243/5 245/9 245/11 246/7 250/19 250/25 252/17 252/23 253/6 253/8 255/22 256/1 257/4 258/13 259/14 259/15 262/22
nobody [4] 98/11 184/22 202/4 215/24 nods [1] 95/13
non [2] 205/16 254/8
non-functionality [1] 205/16
non-hearsay [1] 254/8
nonetheless [1] 122/6
nonrecoverable [1] 196/17
nonresponsive [1] 166/9
noogies [1] 192/20
normal [6] 80/24 81/3 81/3 81/5 201/17 201/21
normally [2] 201/19 258/21
North [5] 7/9 207/12 227/21 244/21 247/6
North Georgia [3] 207/12 244/21 247/6 Northampton [7] 228/19 239/4 239/12 240/14 240/18 243/22 249/17
NORTHERN [3] 1/1 265/4 265/7
Northumberland [2] 202/25 228/18
not [440]
notably [1] 7/20
notch [1] 240/1
note [5] 35/19 69/1 118/7 177/22 203/18
note-taking [1] 118/7
notes [21] 40/3 40/6 41/14 41/17 41/22 43/11 43/13 43/13 43/16 43/18 43/22 44/1 44/1 44/3 44/20 45/6 45/15 45/16 45/21 45/24 118/9
nothing [26] 25/9 34/20 38/5 41/21 45/17 71/24 80/23 85/22 87/3 87/14 87/16 87/18 87/18 87/19 88/5 88/7 115/15 122/17 135/18 136/10 143/22 184/22 194/23 202/3 203/23 232/21
notice [10] 74/22 82/15 122/25 158/18 158/25 159/1 161/9 163/1 225/21 225/22
noticeable [2] 198/11 258/7
noticed [2] 202/7 243/3
notices [1] 181/17
notification [1] 180/18
notifications [1] 180/23
notify [1] 201/17
November [30] 31/18 33/1 50/20 66/16 67/6 68/9 69/14 71/12 71/17 71/21 72/5 72/16 73/2 80/12 82/9 103/7 128/1 138/15 138/25 164/15 169/12 169/20 170/3 170/8 177/18 179/22 210/17 210/18 210/20 223/1
November 2017 [2] 66/16 67/6
November 2018 [6] 68/9 71/12 71/17 72/5 72/16 73/2
November 2020 [2] 164/15 170/8
November 2021 [1] 50/20
November 21st [1] 169/12
November 27 [4] 82/9 128/1 210/20 223/1
November 3rd [2] 31/18 33/1
now [117] 9/5 10/7 17/14 18/15 20/7 20/15 21/4 32/2 33/4 33/15 39/19 39/20 44/18 45/1 46/10 46/13 55/17 57/21 59/14 73/18 73/22 76/15 80/21 81/2 81/25 85/4 85/5 85/21 94/15 95/14 100/21 101/2 101/5 107/12 111/21 114/3 121/4 124/23 125/7 127/6 129/7 130/16 132/23 141/16 142/9 143/2 143/14 144/14 144/22 147/16 148/10 149/12 149/13 155/18 163/1 164/11 165/18 166/7 168/2 181/10 181/11 182/22 182/24 185/10 189/2 189/20 194/13 196/1 198/12 200/8 208/23 209/8 209/15 209/21 209/22 210/23 214/3 214/15 217/3 217/9 218/21 219/1 219/2 220/1 221/25 224/7 226/21 228/3 229/1 229/7 229/8 229/13 230/1 230/15 235/11 235/22 236/5 237/24 238/3 238/6 239/11 239/19 240/18 243/8 243/18 244/4 245/16 247/21 248/5 249/9 250/7 251/16 252/8 255/16 258/1

259/4 260/2
nowhere [1] 235/3
number [44] \(1 / 5\) 1/6 \(1 / 5\) 16/23 16/24 34/17 43/6 54/9 56/5 61/9 61/9 61/15 62/9 69/9 78/12 81/12 115/24 115/25 118/4 120/1 154/18 158/9 159/23 159/25 160/3 160/10 160/15 170/24 173/20 174/13 176/9 185/9 186/1 186/2 186/4 200/11 210/14 219/24 220/4
222/10 228/23 234/13 234/24 235/7
Number 10 [1] 62/9
Number 3 [1] 158/9
Number 61 [1] 120/1
numbering [1] 17/3
numbers [11] 34/17 41/3 41/4 60/25 61/17 65/21 70/21 89/2 115/17 155/1 187/19
numerous [2] 22/16 105/13

\section*{0}
oath [12] 15/11 22/6 25/11 31/20 42/8 43/23 44/6 55/20 80/22 81/7 89/19 144/10
object [24] 21/2 23/11 23/16 30/20 36/10 45/1 67/10 68/18 79/25 89/9 94/9 106/8 107/18 122/16 163/1 166/10 167/21 171/24 182/1 198/15 198/16 208/3 221/7 225/11
objected [3] 153/11 156/19 161/3
objecting [4] 92/5 149/10 172/12 172/13
objection [44] 17/4 17/10 30/19 51/21 79/25 80/2 80/8 82/5 82/7 82/11 85/11 86/11 92/1 92/6 107/15 107/19 107/23 141/1 141/9 146/3 146/24 148/18 149/20 151/7 153/14 158/4 160/5 160/25 163/21 168/16 171/23 176/1 178/16 178/19 181/13 181/15 181/24 186/25 200/23 207/25 220/22 239/8 246/9 263/13
objections [13] 30/3 30/11 38/21 60/12 65/13 68/16 107/14 107/24 116/16 161/5 175/25 221/6 221/18
obligations [1] 235/2
observed [1] 27/5
observing [1] 241/18
obtain [5] 21/8 21/16 121/5 134/7 134/13
obtained [3] 89/24 91/5 91/10 obviously [20] \(17 / 7\) 23/20 32/17 39/12 46/14 106/12 125/6 138/3 153/19 154/3 155/13 172/17 182/10 185/13 203/7
203/22 210/22 214/23 241/6 246/13
occasion [1] 201/11
occasioned [1] 133/4
occasions [1] \(11 / 7\)
occupied [1] 211/12
occur [3] 94/14 109/20 231/21
occurred [8] 37/10 112/4 144/22
182/25 193/3 194/10 199/1 199/8
October [18] 16/1 59/12 59/20 60/6 62/6 63/4 63/9 64/2 71/25 76/24 90/23 91/5 91/15 140/6 140/9 155/19 155/21 225/3
October 12th [1] 155/21
October 2017 [9] 59/20 60/6 62/6 63/4 63/9 64/2 90/23 91/5 91/15
October 2022 [1] 140/9

\section*{0}

October 3rd [1] 16/1
off [8] 49/12 140/24 198/3 211/6
215/19 216/1 228/16 251/1
offensive [1] 77/9
offer [9] 60/11 65/11 68/14 158/2
167/21 175/23 194/23 225/18 235/2
offered [1] 225/16
offering [11] 23/12 24/7 152/13 158/13 158/16 158/16 166/18 166/20 176/11 176/12 176/25
office [113] 2/24 11/3 15/25 17/22 18/14 19/24 36/19 39/7 47/21 48/1 50/17 50/21 51/10 51/13 51/19 52/14 52/16 52/23 53/2 53/3 53/8 53/11 59/19 60/9 67/15 68/23 73/18 76/11 76/21 78/20 79/16 85/9 89/20 93/20 94/16 96/12 97/12 100/7 100/11 100/25 102/12 102/19 103/1 103/17 105/8 107/10 108/22 112/14 112/18 120/7 125/18 128/21 137/19 137/24 139/7 150/2 152/18 153/13 156/10 158/18 161/8 161/17 164/14 166/16 167/4 177/20 177/25 179/18 179/18 180/1 182/19 183/16 183/17 183/20 184/17 185/4 187/4 188/14 190/12 191/2 192/7 194/5 195/9 195/19 195/20 196/3 203/9 218/1 218/8 218/12 218/14 218/16 218/17 222/7 222/14 222/15 223/5 232/22 233/4 234/2 236/1 237/13 238/1 238/6 248/12 255/18 255/19 255/20 257/2 257/13 258/9 259/4 259/10
officer [12] 47/20 59/24 98/21 103/1 103/17 137/20 137/20 138/13 139/5 196/2 201/6 237/5
official [11] 1/1 1/2 1/3 1/7 1/23 154/3
172/8 186/13 188/25 265/6 265/17
officially [2] 138/16 139/8
officials [2] 37/8 161/14
offline [1] 249/7
often [1] 254/21
oh [12] 32/8 60/20 70/14 95/13 98/1 103/23 148/9 154/20 169/14 181/6 204/2 205/2
okay [102] 6/8 6/11 6/19 12/1 12/24 13/16 16/16 17/20 18/2 18/23 21/20 22/5 26/22 28/4 29/8 30/1 32/25 33/3 33/10 33/15 36/7 49/2 49/5 49/8 49/17 50/9 56/22 57/16 58/19 59/16 61/7 63/6 64/15 68/4 69/24 73/9 74/20 75/3 81/10 83/3 85/1 85/15 86/8 86/9 87/9 88/14 89/17 94/8 95/14 98/4 100/24 101/9 103/13 104/10 105/10 105/12 105/20 106/2 106/4 108/14 110/22 111/15 111/17 111/17 112/10 112/13 113/2 113/24 120/12 121/14 122/21 124/13 125/8 125/24 126/15 127/25 129/7 132/1 132/20 144/7 144/19 157/17 167/14 170/22 175/20 175/20 177/12 178/5 178/22 183/3 193/12 198/24 206/3 206/18 209/6 236/25 242/13 245/1 245/5 248/11 249/4 254/17 old [6] 10/6 91/13 91/13 92/21 92/24 217/6
older [1] 10/6
OLES [15] 2/23 2/24 4/9 4/16 15/19
17/8 21/3 23/12 23/19 24/19 27/4 30/18

110/19 136/9 263/12
Oles' [1] 113/5
omitted [2] 89/23 92/10
once [12] 57/21 108/6 123/23 125/6 128/18 130/24 163/24 165/24 166/3 228/13 248/5 248/6
one [196] 9/3 9/18 10/17 11/3 17/19 21/25 26/5 28/11 33/5 33/12 33/19 34/5 34/13 34/17 35/24 38/3 39/6 40/13 40/15 40/17 40/18 40/21 40/23 41/5 48/14 48/18 52/16 52/22 53/3 54/3 54/19 55/5 55/9 57/8 59/4 59/8 63/6 63/6 64/21 73/17 74/6 74/8 76/22 79/20 80/5 83/8 85/20 88/14 90/1 90/2 95/11 98/21 99/18 99/18 102/25 103/1 103/8 103/12 103/14 103/14 103/25 104/7 104/14 105/5 106/18 106/23 106/24 109/23 110/14 110/15 113/7 118/5 118/14 118/15 119/12 119/15 123/24 125/8 129/8 129/24 132/3 134/2 138/17 140/8 140/11 140/11 140/12 140/12 140/13 140/16 145/13 148/2 148/5 152/6 154/12 154/24 155/6 155/7 156/23 157/12 158/4 158/10 159/4 159/22 162/10 162/13 162/14 164/7 164/23 165/19 170/11 170/22 183/3 184/1 184/3 184/7 184/11 185/10 185/13 186/1 186/3 186/9 186/10 187/9 187/11 187/18 189/10 189/11 191/1 191/20 191/23 192/18 195/2 195/20 196/22 196/23 196/24 197/9 198/3 199/16 199/19 199/22 200/23 201/24 201/25 202/2 202/3 202/3 204/16 204/17 205/12 205/16 206/15 207/6 208/13 209/18 210/8 210/9 212/1 212/23 213/11 213/19 214/20 217/2 217/4 217/5 217/15 218/2 218/13 218/23 220/3 220/5 220/10 223/1 225/3 229/12 229/14 229/15 230/6 231/10 232/9 235/19 238/8 238/8 239/24 241/1 241/3 241/3 243/23 246/2 246/13 248/7 249/9 249/16 250/18 255/3
one-pager [1] 40/13
ones [11] 39/14 53/2 108/15 108/19 127/19 176/11 196/6 203/8 203/24 210/9 256/9
ongoing [4] 20/20 20/24 211/8 231/21 only [53] \(1 / 2\) 1/6 9/18 11/1 25/5 42/19 43/21 46/7 46/12 55/5 55/6 72/11 106/21 111/17 111/18 111/19 112/7 113/1 120/20 125/10 130/2 132/21 147/7 147/17 156/13 156/18 157/22 159/4 159/12 161/10 167/10 176/1 176/23 176/25 184/9 191/20 195/16 197/9 202/6 204/1 204/3 207/25 229/15 231/6 237/11 238/9 241/8 245/12 246/2 254/19 255/24 260/10 263/25
open [9] 46/3 84/17 148/3 148/5 186/20 198/3 198/13 206/7 260/3
opened [6] 28/10 147/25 148/1 179/19 182/19 185/16
opening [1] 258/20
operate [3] 67/2 239/19 239/23
operated [3] 62/21 66/24 67/1 operating [7] 97/6 134/16 137/20 138/13 139/5 196/2 201/6
operation [6] 27/13 28/7 100/18 114/17 123/8 134/20
operational [2] 138/5 165/13
operations [3] 133/1 133/2 138/1 operator [1] 36/22
opine [1] 188/20
opinion [5] 152/13 152/15 166/20
192/10 246/17
opinions [1] 24/24
opportunity [2] 14/24 101/19
opposition [1] 157/21
opt [1] 12/5
options [1] 237/11
order [17] 21/21 23/1 30/16 38/23 41/20 68/17 80/11 80/13 82/6 82/8 83/9 83/25 84/3 84/6 164/20 212/1 212/8
ordered [1] 45/20
organization [1] 104/2
organizations [1] 7/19
original [2] 33/24 258/22
originally [3] 138/14 163/4 208/3 ORR [1] 172/4
other [89] 18/16 19/1 \(19 / 2\) 19/18 21/25 27/12 28/5 28/5 28/16 30/24 34/3 38/12 39/13 41/13 43/8 45/18 66/24 72/8 78/12 79/10 79/13 80/6 81/17 83/15 83/17 84/17 102/7 103/8 103/12 103/15 106/23 109/6 112/4 112/5 112/5 112/6 112/12 113/9 115/11 119/8 119/9 121/2 123/24 125/5 129/3 133/6 135/8 135/17 140/11 143/16 144/4 147/21 150/14 150/19 156/23 161/6 172/21 172/24 176/3 178/18 178/18 178/25 184/23 187/9 187/11 189/10 189/11 196/23 201/20 201/25 202/2 202/3 203/8 203/15 203/23 203/24 218/2 221/16 222/10 230/7 231/10 235/9 236/4 236/20 241/2 249/18 256/16 262/21 264/1
others [9] 42/24 68/11 110/19 158/21 176/3 177/4 180/3 196/7 222/17
otherwise [3] 39/1 211/11 262/10 our [93] \(8 / 118 / 128 / 12\) 18/1 18/9 19/14 21/17 26/20 28/15 35/11 36/18 37/24 38/9 41/21 42/7 42/10 42/12 43/14 43/17 44/23 47/5 56/19 57/5 72/6 73/15 76/14 76/22 77/9 77/11 82/5 84/17 84/19 90/4 92/22 114/6 114/9 114/10 118/16 120/15 126/20 127/16 128/22 130/10 138/17 152/15 161/21 163/3 165/7 168/16 171/15 176/1 177/3 178/18 181/24 185/4 185/22 192/10 192/18 206/3 206/12 207/25 208/13 209/24 213/19 213/21 214/10 215/2 215/4 216/3 216/17 218/14 218/16 220/11 220/11 221/6 227/2 227/16 227/17 230/25 232/5 233/17 234/2 236/14 237/5 238/1 238/3 242/3 244/17 247/16 255/4 261/1 262/19 264/1 ours [1] 194/8
ourselves [1] 117/13
out [98] 10/10 11/2 11/13 26/10 27/10 28/12 31/14 34/12 34/18 40/10 44/14 46/18 46/19 46/25 55/17 73/13 73/14 73/20 81/19 84/22 85/13 85/17 85/23 86/1 87/4 87/13 87/17 87/20 92/14 101/13 116/18 125/20 127/20 128/25 129/15 130/19 138/23 143/5 143/25 148/13 150/8 162/15 163/17 180/19 180/22 183/8 200/4 201/19 201/24

\section*{0}
out... [49] 203/5 203/21 204/17 204/18 206/13 206/16 206/19 208/4 210/10 210/13 213/8 213/16 216/23 218/24 219/17 219/22 220/10 222/19 227/8 231/23 232/9 232/19 240/4 240/8 240/13 242/15 243/15 243/21 244/13 244/24 248/11 248/16 249/2 249/5 249/7 249/14 249/17 249/21 253/17 253/24 254/12 254/21 256/3 258/16 260/19 261/5 263/22 264/2 264/4 outcome [8] 200/22 210/12 211/12 242/16 244/4 257/8 257/11 259/2 outcomes [3] 199/9 241/8 244/16 outlined [1] 196/21 outlining [2] 15/2 160/22 output [2] 131/14 132/7 outside [18] 52/17 52/23 52/25 52/25 \(72 / 4\) 72/15 73/4 73/12 81/13 114/23 147/8 152/16 163/13 167/12 223/10 259/20 261/14 262/5
outsource [1] 109/9
outsourced [2] 109/15 109/18
outstanding [2] 118/4 125/3
oval [2] 251/24 257/22
ovals [1] 258/1
over [21] 9/8 33/16 33/23 53/4 84/14 87/23 110/1 110/2 111/22 114/11 117/11 155/25 203/14 233/18 241/3 241/3 254/14 256/3 257/19 257/21 262/18
over-mark [1] 257/21
over-marked [1] 257/19
overall [4] 198/22 206/5 216/10 234/20
overruled [1] 151/7
oversee [4] 138/1 172/7 218/7 218/23
overseeing [3] 126/8 201/7 222/8
oversight [1] 218/2
overvote [4] 254/15 254/22 255/12 255/22
overvoted [1] 253/14
overvotes [4] 252/4 253/9 254/18 254/18
overvoting [1] 255/16
own [3] 112/22 173/19 251/25
owned [3] 62/21 214/19 216/10
P
P-E-R-S-I-N-G-E-R [1] 263/7
packaging [1] 131/24
Pad [7] 209/18 209/21 209/21 216/24
217/3 217/9 231/15
Pads [12] 79/2 79/4 79/7 79/11 81/15 208/18 208/20 209/13 211/22 217/1 220/15 230/15
page [96] \(1 / 5\) 4/3 5/2 11/17 15/24 16/7 20/16 32/2 37/11 37/15 40/23 40/24 41/3 41/4 49/16 49/18 54/13 54/16 54/25 57/24 58/6 59/23 60/15 60/20 60/21 60/25 61/1 61/2 61/4 61/9 61/12 61/15 61/16 61/17 62/18 64/6 64/10 64/11 64/14 65/20 65/20 65/22 66/10 66/10 66/13 69/6 69/9 71/1 72/19 72/23 72/24 72/24 74/13 74/25 75/16 76/13 76/13 78/4 78/6 82/8 84/25 86/4 86/6 86/7 86/7 87/7 87/8 89/1 89/2 89/2 89/7 89/7 89/8 90/21 91/3 97/4 116/1 116/11

140/14 140/18 140/19 144/15 145/13 145/13 145/17 154/13 154/15 155/2 157/5 158/10 159/4 162/21 175/19 176/2 176/21 177/7
Page 1 [4] 78/4 78/6 140/18 176/21
Page 11 [1] 61/12
Page 13 [4] 60/15 60/21 61/2 61/16
Page 155 [2] 49/16 49/18
Page 178 [1] 140/19
Page 18 [1] 60/20
Page 2 [6] 20/16 32/2 40/23 40/24 41/4 75/16
Page 23 [1] 62/18
Page 24 [3] 145/13 145/13 145/17
Page 29 [1] 58/6
Page 3 [6] 66/10 66/10 66/13 76/13
82/8 89/7
Page 4 [3] 89/2 116/1 116/11
Page 40 [3] 72/19 72/23 72/24
Page 42 [2] 90/21 91/3
Page 5 [3] 64/6 64/11 69/6
Page 71 [1] 84/25
Page 72 [3] 54/13 54/16 54/25
Page 74 [3] 154/13 154/15 155/2
Page 8 [3] 65/20 65/22 71/1
Page 80 [1] 86/4
Page 81 [4] 86/6 86/7 86/7 87/8 pager [1] 40/13
pages [9] 40/21 68/2 118/11 118/17 118/18 118/25 158/12 176/18 265/9
Pages 84 [1] 118/18
paper [24] 40/24 127/24 127/25 180/16 197/6 202/19 203/16 204/12 217/6 240/1 244/4 251/3 251/14 251/23 252/5 253/10 253/13 254/12 254/17 255/8 255/11 255/24 257/2 258/12
paragraph [13] 31/13 31/14 37/12 37/13 37/14 37/15 37/16 71/6 74/25 148/21 152/2 152/3 152/4
Paragraph 3 [1] 74/25
parallel [3] 198/14 248/8 248/13
parameters [1] 40/2
Pardon [1] 97/14
part [39] 35/3 40/2 50/7 52/20 52/21
57/22 58/16 63/4 70/18 77/17 77/24 78/1 103/10 108/7 128/14 135/24 138/19 151/22 153/15 153/16 176/13 177/8 177/9 180/21 187/3 198/20 208/2 209/18 217/11 217/19 221/15 223/7 225/6 225/8 225/23 237/21 245/21 245/24 247/12
part-time [1] 103/10
parte [1] 118/10
partial [1] 1/8
participate [2] 154/8 155/10
particular [20] 25/21 29/19 103/25
132/3 132/17 157/5 162/21 164/15 184/20 185/10 196/24 203/14 204/3 208/17 222/7 223/5 238/17 240/3 245/13 258/10
particularly [3] 37/4 162/16 222/24
parties [4] 18/22 103/12 176/4 177/5
partnered [2] 7/21 214/17
partnership [1] 216/12
parts [7] 55/24 56/3 105/19 129/3
217/20 235/19 236/16
party [6] 62/22 172/1 181/13 181/25 215/9 223/25
passed [3] 228/23 233/24 233/24
password [2] 177/24 178/1
past [4] 71/8 131/7 163/14 227/9
patterns [1] 255/3
Patterson [1] 177/7
Paul [2] 76/6 77/9
pause [5] 6/12 99/17 193/20 227/10 263/2
pay [4] 10/8 138/22 217/21 218/22
paying [3] 138/21 138/23 241/18
pays [1] 215/5
PCC [23] 62/9 62/14 62/17 62/20 62/22 63/17 63/20 63/23 66/11 66/19 66/23
67/3 71/19 71/25 72/4 72/8 72/11 72/15 73/3 73/16 73/17 100/14 100/18
PDF [1] 1/1
peace [1] 226/22
pedantic [1] 214/9
pen [3] 250/14 250/17 251/24
penalty [2] 31/20 89/5
pencils [1] 235/9
penetrated [2] 92/11 92/15
penetration [9] 89/21 89/25 90/3 90/12 90/13 90/16 92/9 92/13 92/23
Pennsylvania [4] 203/1 228/19 239/4 239/12
people [41] 9/21 28/18 37/8 76/9 78/12 127/18 128/21 134/2 150/22 174/11 174/23 175/4 190/6 193/8 199/9 200/4 202/5 203/7 207/11 207/13 209/25 217/4 217/16 217/17 218/22 219/2 224/8 232/17 234/8 234/11 238/14 241/14 242/24 247/18 253/23 253/24 255/16 257/8 257/10 259/24 262/6
per [1] 246/3
percent [7] 174/24 202/6 230/19 234/5 234/5 246/16 247/16
perfect [6] 174/6 174/25 175/4 197/16 212/14 255/4
perform [1] 53/4
performance [1] 82/20
performed [1] 31/17
perhaps [2] 61/5 181/14
Perimeter [1] 226/8
period [11] 1/4 102/25 103/18 139/1
139/1 155/14 195/9 212/18 219/18 234/1 249/8
perjury [2] 31/20 89/5
permanent [2] 12/6 12/8
permitted [3] 111/6 141/10 236/20
Persinger [22] 39/7 39/8 40/5 43/6
43/12 43/22 45/8 46/2 46/13 118/5
227/7 227/11 227/25 259/19 259/20
259/25 260/4 260/7 260/21 261/5 262/24 263/7
Persinger's [3] 43/18 43/25 261/10 person [20] 8/15 8/16 20/1 77/10
132/24 133/25 147/8 147/17 190/19 202/8 202/22 213/21 217/10 217/17 218/23 234/8 242/5 253/11 256/11 259/2
person's [1] 129/10
personal [9] 11/9 14/1 24/21 24/24
45/11 56/19 152/13 152/17 166/20
personally [6] 22/14 26/3 105/18
152/21 190/20 237/19
personnel [1] 196/13
perspective [5] 43/14 175/7 221/19

\section*{\(\mathbf{P}\)}
perspective... [2] 222/12 224/11
pertain [1] 23/17
Ph.Ds [1] 192/19
Phone [1] 190/18
phrase [1] 252/23
physical [9] 77/1 196/8 211/25 212/9
214/13 214/14 214/18 257/3 258/13
physically [2] 185/24 260/7
pick [1] 228/16
picked [2] 72/10 139/9
picking [1] 217/10
PICO [1] 3/4
PICO-PRATS [1] 3/4
piece [6] 48/14 48/17 48/18 219/9 240/1 240/3
pieces [6] 43/20 45/18 108/12 127/1 129/8 215/6
pillow [1] 192/20
pilot [1] 219/19
pin [1] 93/4
place [11] 164/17 196/13 197/24
203/14 207/13 230/12 240/13 253/11
253/14 254/11 255/10
placed [1] 79/1
places [1] 214/18
plaintiff [3] 15/20 23/21 223/20
plaintiffs [23] 1/5 2/2 2/13 2/18 30/14
32/18 34/18 43/16 44/2 47/4 51/7 93/14
123/13 125/15 137/2 149/7 149/23
151/11 151/21 151/25 192/8 192/25
257/14
plaintiffs' [38] 4/2 6/5 22/25 35/20 38/12 39/9 39/16 45/16 50/19 52/8 61/16 62/18 65/3 65/11 65/21 68/7 68/14 69/7 75/13 82/15 82/24 83/1 100/8 106/13 116/3 118/6 119/25 137/1 150/20 163/4 170/25 175/15 175/18 186/12 193/13 239/1 239/7 239/7 plan [15] 12/1 201/15 201/15 201/17 201/23 202/1 202/9 204/10 205/8 205/12 205/14 205/18 206/11 206/25 207/5
planning [3] 78/14 246/12 263/14
plate [1] 135/18
platform [1] 100/23
play [6] 77/5 166/12 167/22 168/20
216/11 243/21
played [1] 178/9
Playing [5] 166/13 167/24 168/6 168/21 178/7
please [36] 6/13 6/16 6/18 7/2 7/4
18/19 20/17 23/6 31/12 31/14 32/6
37/11 37/13 38/15 38/25 47/6 47/9
47/11 57/24 101/8 117/15 123/22
136/13 137/5 155/1 160/2 168/20
170/21 173/19 185/25 191/5 236/13
238/22 248/9 263/5 263/6
pleases [1] 208/4
plenty [1] 10/9
plus [4] 34/5 34/6 179/22 259/24
PM [3] 191/17 226/23 264/6
podcast [4] 250/9 250/12 252/2 255/7
podium [1] 55/4
point [42] 17/5 19/4 19/17 20/2 25/21 38/11 42/6 45/23 50/13 67/10 69/11 92/14 131/9 133/10 139/19 143/11
\(144 / 4\) 145/6 165/25 172/22 184/25
\(185 / 3\) 197/1 197/8 198/10 199/11 200/4 \(185 / 3197 / 1197 / 8\) 198/10 199/11 \(200 / 4\) 208/21 211/11
\(203 / 10203 / 14206 / 3\) 208/2 218/5 219/8 223/21 223/23 230/23 235/6 242/17 244/17 258/4 258/24 pointed [1] 133/6 pointing [3] 41/1 242/15 248/11 pointless [1] 44/20
points [5] 45/3 69/9 234/5 234/21 235/17
policy [3] 161/19 220/4 232/2
Politically [2] 250/9 255/7
poll [27] 79/2 79/4 79/7 79/11 81/15
174/7 187/21 197/23 197/23 197/25
201/17 208/18 208/20 209/13 209/18
209/21 209/21 211/22 216/24 217/1
217/3 217/9 220/15 230/15 231/15 232/11 232/14
pollbooks [2] 78/16 78/23
polling [10] 166/3 197/21 206/7 212/17
231/6 231/11 231/13 253/11 253/14 254/11
Polls [1] 216/25
pontificating [1] 152/22
poorly [1] 81/24
portion [10] \(1 / 4\) 12/15 58/4 171/25 172/13 178/9 178/10 208/16 258/9 263/8
portions [1] 68/20
posed [1] 141/12
position [8] 83/11 131/13 132/7 135/13
139/6 151/23 161/18 218/11
positions [1] 203/3
positive [2] 216/14 232/16
possession [1] 110/5
possibility [3] 200/17 200/18 247/22
possible [15] 28/23 35/14 128/24
129/2 188/8 196/11 196/12 199/2
199/13 210/2 228/25 229/1 237/23
261/24 261/25
possibly [1] 260/22
post [8] 136/16 175/11 177/22 185/12 185/12 215/5 238/6 247/4
Post-it [1] 177/22
posted [1] 175/21
posture [2] 124/25 161/21
potential [5] 165/8 183/11 206/1
211/22 255/11
potentially [10] 48/12 182/20 196/12
196/19 203/23 244/5 244/8 246/22 251/11 256/9
PowerPoint [1] 157/19
PPP [1] 229/12
practice [3] 128/9 210/11 248/5
practices [3] 67/15 68/23 165/7
PRATS [1] 3/4
pre [3] 149/3 175/11 236/12
pre-2020 [1] 149/3
pre-bid [1] 236/12
preceding [1] 208/13
precinct [3] 8/18 203/24 204/3
precincts [2] 37/2 212/17
predated [1] 161/23
predicted [1] 25/8
prefer [1] 261/24
preference [2] 216/7 259/22
preferred [2] 237/18 237/20
preparation [1] 138/11
prepare [3] 186/18 208/15 224/1
prepared [12] 15/25 17/22 22/3 65/5 68/8 82/9 82/21 82/25 116/14 117/7 186/14 224/24
preparing [4] 18/17 19/2 19/19 174/1 present [2] 35/13 35/22
presentation [8] 157/20 157/25 159/9 162/5 162/9 162/16 162/19 260/12
presented [4] 109/6 163/22 186/19 186/20
preserve [1] 221/6
presidential [2] 8/4 216/7
press [4] 148/12 148/25 150/4 150/19
presume [1] 131/18
pretend [2] 142/16 190/5
pretrial [3] 30/16 38/23 68/17
pretty [10] 39/24 42/2 105/25 127/18
128/2 200/24 206/5 220/23 239/19 258/7
prevent [1] 164/18
preventing [1] 83/25
previous [4] 89/7 143/11 162/14 236/12
previously [10] 15/15 16/19 26/10
38/22 82/22 93/6 108/2 200/8 222/24 255/5
price [8] 2/2 7/21 235/11 235/14 235/15 235/16 235/17 236/23
prices [1] 235/4
primarily [1] 104/7
primary [8] 14/9 14/10 14/11 36/24
173/16 212/7 216/7 216/8
principle [1] 240/8
print [6] 12/16 119/12 119/20 166/3
191/25 243/15
printed [2] 249/25 257/1
printer [1] 230/14
printers [2] 110/12 229/25
printing [2] 166/2 249/6
printout [2] 240/19 241/15
prints [1] 240/8
prior [7] 69/1 71/18 104/9 118/22 132/4 208/14 239/14
pristine [3] 22/8 26/17 211/7
privacy [1] 197/22
privilege [13] 8/10 81/19 81/25 93/6 116/12 117/5 119/16 124/8 124/17 131/8 213/7 223/1 223/3
privileged [4] 81/4 81/6 81/7 124/10 Pro [1] 215/4
probably [23] 8/5 41/17 114/3 118/21 135/2 139/3 139/23 154/23 157/12 162/12 164/11 170/16 174/12 175/1
189/15 201/18 202/13 209/16 209/19 211/1 249/10 254/5 258/8
problem [23] 35/7 35/11 40/5 61/10
84/16 130/13 130/14 142/6 172/18
207/16 223/12 225/15 230/4 230/6
231/8 231/14 232/2 232/6 240/18 246/4
246/7 252/5 262/17
problems [15] 28/2 28/5 28/6 28/8
28/21 31/10 35/12 36/8 37/19 37/20
70/20 200/3 232/12 255/5 256/7
procedural [1] 191/20
procedure [3] 86/15 131/12 132/6
procedures [6] 28/19 164/20 165/7
190/6 203/15 225/7
proceed [3] 67/17 191/18 203/11

\section*{P}
proceeding [3] 27/17 32/15 125/9 proceedings [10] 1/10 1/21 6/12 99/17 193/20 227/10 261/18 263/2 264/5 265/9
process [28] 14/13 31/19 45/19 77/1 77/4 82/10 97/5 106/7 107/6 131/12 132/5 188/13 188/17 188/20 189/1 189/7 190/11 211/5 213/15 215/1 215/15 216/2 219/16 233/21 234/3 237/25 239/15 254/24
processed [2] 10/9 11/24
processes [7] 190/6 196/13 196/14 196/14 196/15 198/21 239/14
procure [1] 214/1
procured [2] 213/16 214/11
procurement [8] 234/4 234/14 234/19 235/17 236/18 237/5 238/15 238/20 produce [4] 95/5 203/18 247/14 257/4 produced [7] 1/22 82/22 99/8 106/7 107/5 191/1 221/21
producing [2] 248/15 249/15
product [10] 43/15 80/1 80/8 80/14 81/20 82/7 82/16 82/19 135/9 157/16
production [2] 82/11 190/24
professional [3] 56/18 114/8 160/21
Professor [2] 161/13 243/8
proffer [1] 150/11
program [4] 203/1 241/23 241/24
250/21
programmed [4] 204/1 204/2 204/6 251/5
programming [13] 202/15 202/18
204/19 204/20 207/15 239/13 241/12
241/23 243/6 243/7 244/3 245/14 251/6
prohibited [1] 1/7
project [8] 77/18 79/8 80/23 126/19
134/1 134/2 138/22 138/23
projects [2] 104/3 248/6
prompt [1] 253/20
prompted [1] 94/1
prompting [2] 253/2 253/3
prone [3] 166/6 229/25 230/9
proper [3] 24/3 25/20 203/18
properly [15] 11/24 28/18 92/5 135/13 179/23 202/18 202/23 204/22 216/21
219/23 223/10 232/7 242/16 249/15
258/23
proposed [1] 41/24
proprietary [9] 139/13 139/18 140/25
141/2 141/13 141/22 142/11 142/22
143/21
prosecution [1] 94/19
prosecutions [2] 43/7 43/7
protect [5] 51/14 51/19 164/14 198/21 216/13
protected [2] 213/6 213/6
protecting [1] 255/5
protection [4] 7/19 9/4 82/16 82/18
protections [2] 164/17 247/22
protective [2] 196/14 244/19
protest [1] 235/20
protocol [14] 40/2 41/20 41/23 41/24
42/1 44/11 44/13 44/18 44/21 45/1
45/14 118/8 263/25 264/1
protocols [1] 164/20
prove [1] 161/6
provide [5] 22/3 102/9 127/21 215/12 216/16
provided [15] 20/23 21/1 21/9 21/16 48/19 60/5 67/3 88/13 92/8 109/25 122/2 123/22 145/6 152/24 222/2
providence [1] 120/25
provider [2] 62/22 234/21
provides [2] 180/21 229/8
providing [6] 58/13 84/7 84/10 153/11 221/10 254/8
Psychology [1] 7/15
PTO [1] 30/19
public [16] 48/9 48/11 84/18 84/22
85/14 85/17 138/8 147/19 149/24 150/4 154/9 155/11 161/14 172/3 215/15 264/5
publicly [2] 149/2 149/8
published [1] 149/21
pull [10] 167/15 175/15 180/8 182/16
193/13 202/12 202/13 206/15 209/1 248/18
pulled [2] 79/4 128/19
pulling [3] 208/23 231/23 232/3
punch [1] 197/6
purely [1] 143/17
purports [1] 178/11
purpose [12] 24/7 25/14 31/2 81/16
81/18 131/11 132/5 172/18 182/7 223/8 226/1 230/14
purposed [1] 21/23
purposes [8] 17/1 17/3 32/14 95/25
143/18 168/17 182/10 195/21
pursuant [2] 227/19 260/5
pursue [6] 26/14 27/5 106/11 106/15
110/18 245/5
purview [2] 108/12 108/15
push [1] 216/23
put [33] 28/12 28/23 32/16 42/8 42/11
63/17 72/4 72/15 73/4 73/12 73/13
110/13 127/4 129/11 129/23 148/6
148/13 160/4 162/16 173/19 175/8
181/19 192/19 208/8 209/15 225/25
234/2 234/6 240/5 248/16 252/1 256/3 258/20
puts [1] 130/3
putting [5] 84/12 84/21 85/21 93/4 202/6
PX [3] 28/23 29/1 30/2

\section*{Q}

QR [26] 12/17 12/19 164/9 165/11 189/24 212/13 235/24 236/3 236/5 236/7 237/12 237/21 241/21 241/23 242/9 243/14 243/19 243/23 244/5 245/6 246/3 246/7 247/13 247/15 258/6 258/14
qualified [1] 237/15
question [98] 12/3 21/8 21/10 27/5
35/18 35/24 36/10 43/10 43/21 49/19 52/18 53/19 54/18 55/9 55/12 55/16
56/21 58/6 58/10 58/18 68/1 73/2 73/24 85/5 85/8 85/12 86/9 86/21 86/22 87/10 89/13 89/15 89/17 90/18 90/19 91/22 92/2 94/21 94/23 95/2 98/10 101/8 106/21 109/11 112/10 113/7 118/13 120/15 122/23 139/16 140/5 140/21 141/5 141/11 141/12 141/23 142/8 142/14 142/18 142/20 143/3 143/8

143/12 143/24 144/3 144/3 146/12 149/23 160/18 160/23 161/17 162/6 165/3 169/16 172/20 198/18 201/9 204/25 205/7 206/11 208/12 209/7 209/12 213/12 213/13 217/25 219/8 219/11 220/24 221/11 222/6 226/9 245/19 248/25 250/6 252/23 254/2 254/7
questioning [1] 89/10
questions [58] 12/25 13/12 14/16
15/22 16/22 24/2 42/7 42/20 49/19 67/11 67/12 68/3 89/10 91/24 93/2 93/7 94/9 94/13 99/5 99/19 99/24 100/8
100/16 101/21 101/24 104/23 105/4 107/21 110/21 113/3 113/6 114/25 119/4 119/9 125/3 125/5 125/5 125/6 125/15 126/3 133/4 133/6 133/12
133/17 135/8 135/11 136/5 144/4 213/21 213/24 220/19 226/17 226/25 228/7 244/9 244/25 245/3 259/15 quick [7] 32/12 44/9 118/16 224/14 224/16 224/21 226/19
quickly [2] 219/19 255/21
quite [3] 131/9 191/10 209/9
quote [7] 226/12 250/12 252/4 252/5 255/10 255/13 257/7
quoting [2] 107/16 107/17

\section*{R}

R-O-B-E-R-T [1] 137/9
rabbit [2] 25/1 27/20
Rabun [1] 231/12
race [7] 9/18 165/18 202/22 229/11 229/13 229/14 257/24
races [3] 229/20 240/20 252/13
RAFFENSPERGER [10] \(1 / 6\) 23/1 147/4
148/24 152/7 152/12 152/13 153/2 166/15 169/11
Rainer [2] 76/1 76/4
raise [6] 6/13 39/6 41/18 47/6 72/12 174/25
raised [17] 43/15 72/8 72/9 85/23 87/3 87/14 87/16 87/18 87/20 88/1 88/3 98/25 115/21 125/8 135/20 172/23 224/13
RAMSEY [1] \(2 / 5\)
ran [2] 62/15 62/16
random [2] 215/6 215/6
randomly [1] 165/22
rarely [1] 233/10
rate [1] 229/20
rather [2] 91/23 210/25
rationale [3] 138/19 190/3 213/13 re [19] 21/23 22/9 28/14 28/14 28/15 31/17 31/22 33/2 33/11 33/16 34/1 34/12 37/3 37/23 247/6 247/11 247/11 247/14 247/17
re-count [15] 22/9 28/14 28/14 28/15 31/17 31/22 33/11 33/16 34/1 34/12 37/3 37/23 247/11 247/11 247/14
re-counts [2] 33/2 247/17
re-purposed [1] 21/23
re-votes [1] 247/6
reach [4] 20/15 20/18 183/8 199/11
reached [1] 88/7
reaction [2] 226/11 253/25
read [55] 12/15 12/18 18/18 21/12
21/13 31/14 37/13 41/6 44/3 48/22

\section*{R}
read... [45] 48/24 49/4 49/12 50/1 50/13 73/6 84/2 86/13 89/11 131/7 140/20 141/7 141/8 141/14 141/18 143/5 143/19 144/9 145/7 145/8 145/10 145/14 145/20 145/23 146/1 146/22 147/5 147/8 147/17 150/14 154/16 155/4 155/18 155/24 156/3 170/6 194/12 203/19 226/14 239/17 248/5 248/6 251/2 251/4 251/4
readable [5] 12/15 244/6 245/23 258/9 258/17
reading [11] 83/9 86/20 91/23 106/10 152/6 171/24 211/1 211/1 243/10 243/12 243/13
reads [2] 62/9 71/6
ready [1] 118/13
real [15] 11/18 13/17 35/10 51/11
154/4 221/10 224/21 226/19 233/11
242/25 243/25 249/20 252/5 253/22 257/4
reality [5] 94/18 174/10 175/3 219/20 220/18
realize [5] 61/17 102/11 128/2 162/23 191/24
really [29] 9/23 12/10 18/4 24/2 24/23 27/7 41/25 44/1 81/23 115/13 131/20 157/14 157/14 163/19 172/20 175/14
185/5 188/20 211/6 212/19 212/19
212/25 217/25 222/6 224/2 238/19
250/13 256/20 259/12
realm [1] 108/25
realtime [1] 229/10
reason [17] 10/25 39/12 44/10 44/10
53/10 87/15 102/6 107/18 143/4 162/21
163/3 225/13 227/5 232/20 252/2 252/3
262/22
reasons [1] 35/15
rebuttal [1] 101/17
recall [107] 13/10 14/8 16/3 19/4 19/17
20/1 20/2 27/25 28/3 28/13 28/13 28/17
38/24 41/23 44/11 48/25 54/1 57/14 57/18 58/13 62/14 72/15 72/17 75/5 80/5 84/20 84/23 86/3 86/9 86/24 87/10 88/12 91/14 93/18 93/19 93/20 93/23 93/24 93/25 94/12 95/25 96/2 96/8 96/11 96/12 96/14 97/17 98/17 98/19 99/12 100/8 100/16 116/23 117/1 121/4 125/17 126/4 136/25 140/6 140/21
144/25 145/1 145/4 149/13 154/5
155/21 156/1 156/5 157/7 157/22
157/24 157/25 159/9 162/9 162/13
164/11 169/10 169/19 169/22 173/15
179/11 179/13 179/24 182/18 185/17
187/25 188/25 189/3 189/11 190/2
194/13 197/10 210/6 210/24 211/3
211/9 225/8 226/7 231/23 233/12 250/6
250/7 250/8 250/12 252/2 252/6 255/14
recalled [1] 136/15
receive [1] 211/14
received [2] 96/13 121/22
receiving [1] 37/20
recent [1] 55/11
recently [2] 195/5 205/25
recess [2] 117/25 191/16
recharacterize [1] 231/10
recognize [17] 16/9 60/5 65/5 68/8

97/21 148/12 157/19 167/18 167/22 168/8 175/18 180/18 186/13 193/24 224/24 225/2 239/2
recognized [1] 162/8
recollection [18] 20/8 21/15 21/18 86/12 86/13 96/16 96/21 98/13 99/23 124/7 124/12 141/11 145/19 155/9 158/10 159/20 194/10 208/19
recommend [1] 232/3
recommendations [9] 60/16 61/6 61/22 66/1 69/12 69/15 70/8 87/13 124/8
recommended [1] 11/10
reconcile [1] 229/22
reconciled [1] 34/17
reconsider [1] 223/21
record [37] 6/18 11/14 11/23 12/6 12/8
12/22 16/18 17/2 17/12 21/13 38/21
40/14 47/10 69/2 81/5 86/13 97/3 119/19 122/5 135/5 135/13 137/7 139/21 141/14 171/24 172/3 172/3 172/11 215/11 224/7 225/20 228/6 230/17 250/2 250/3 257/5 258/22 record's [1] 168/17
recorded [2] 11/18 251/18 recording [4] 206/15 251/20 251/20 251/25
records [2] 84/17 216/22
recovery [5] 196/14 199/14 244/19 244/20 249/9
Recross [8] 4/18 4/19 4/21 5/6 115/3 119/22 133/20 224/18
Recross-Examination [8] 4/18 4/19
4/21 5/6 115/3 119/22 133/20 224/18
red [1] 77/20
redactions [2] 156/3 225/3
Redirect [2] 4/16 113/10
redirecting [1] 244/20
redistricted [1] 231/17
redistricting [4] 202/22 207/16 230/20 244/23
Reexamination [4] 4/17 4/20 113/25 125/12
reexamine [1] 71/21
refer [4] 57/23 61/5 85/16 92/9
reference [9] 34/16 62/16 72/2 89/16 92/25 116/1 116/10 119/24 132/15
referenced [6] 27/19 90/5 90/12 92/13 92/23 223/2
references [1] 18/25
referencing [2] 1/5 92/17
referred [4] 58/24 82/4 160/9 192/8
referring [13] 19/8 23/3 23/8 24/19
26/17 60/25 61/8 61/14 85/17 115/20
126/13 170/16 259/8
refers [4] 32/2 66/11 76/20 78/19
reflect [1] 88/9
reflected [1] 37/25
reflection [1] 31/21
reflects [1] 12/19
reflexively [1] 83/14
refocus [1] 254/8
refresh [3] 141/11 142/24 145/19
refreshes [1] 155/9
refreshing [2] 86/12 86/12
refusal [1] 37/22
refused [1] 95/5
refusing [1] 199/17
refutes [1] 81/22
regard [6] 86/16 108/10 110/25 111/4 111/10 112/4
regarding [15] 16/13 24/3 24/9 24/12
24/12 26/7 27/13 31/17 36/21 43/11
82/16 93/5 110/25 118/12 128/1
regardless [4] 158/20 197/8 207/17 244/14
regards [3] 19/13 107/10 108/3
regime [3] 200/21 201/2 201/2
register [1] 7/25
registered [2] 7/23 8/1
registration [27] 29/6 29/21 36/17 54/6
62/12 62/15 62/21 63/2 63/5 63/11
63/22 63/25 66/25 67/4 67/7 67/11
71/22 100/14 100/19 108/17 187/19
200/7 211/21 216/17 216/24 217/7
218/24
regular [2] 89/20 216/8
regularly [1] 43/8
regulation [2] 248/10 248/12
regulations [1] 235/18
reiterate [1] 80/2
related [14] 21/5 27/14 43/8 56/15 57/3
57/19 58/11 58/20 123/7 124/8 179/19
185/17 208/17 208/20
relates [2] 63/2 158/15
relating [2] 125/16 210/15
relationship [1] 222/9
relayed [1] 222/21
release [10] 147/19 148/12 148/25
149/2 149/9 150/21 150/24 150/25
154/10 155/11
released [3] 48/9 48/11 84/18
relevance [11] 17/4 21/2 23/11 23/17
23/19 34/9 67/21 149/20 151/17 178/24
179/7
relevant [28] 24/4 32/13 32/18 43/21 68/19 68/22 121/21 121/24 122/11
122/13 124/19 124/21 124/22 124/23
124/23 132/13 149/22 151/8 151/15
162/25 163/19 208/6 221/4 222/4
222/11 223/6 223/16 224/6
reliability [1] 114/18
reliably [1] 249/23
reliance [1] 146/4
relied [7] 53/8 53/11 80/17 81/9 118/20
145/22 145/25
relies [1] 196/18
reluctant [1] 123/11
rely [10] 101/2 101/5 101/10 101/12
151/22 151/25 158/21 176/13 176/18 182/6
relying [1] 152/24
remain [2] 71/9 149/17
remaining [1] 17/6
remarkable [1] 111/19
remediated [3] 71/8 71/13 72/1
remember [37] 15/10 22/6 28/11 57/16
73/4 80/22 85/25 97/15 97/19 124/16
125/21 130/8 144/21 157/22 159/14
159/19 159/21 162/21 173/6 173/7
179/5 179/21 189/16 189/21 190/3
194/13 203/4 208/20 210/6 210/11 225/5 234/9 234/13 239/23 239/25 240/2 250/15
remembered [2] 159/11 159/12
Remind [1] 64/10

\section*{R}
reminded [1] 224/15
Reminding [1] 253/4
remotely [1] 98/9
remove [4] 205/16 232/7 232/9 232/15 renew [2] 107/15 168/16
reopen [1] 236/17
repeat [3] 21/10 107/2 140/5
repeatedly [2] 135/5 202/16
repetitive [1] 95/20
rephrase [2] 36/13 109/12
replace [2] 115/5 130/19
replaced [1] 156/11
report [121] 11/4 15/24 16/12 16/18
17/17 17/18 18/3 18/15 18/17 18/21
18/25 18/25 19/1 19/19 19/20 20/8
20/15 20/18 22/1 26/22 26/25 31/25
48/20 48/22 49/4 49/7 49/20 49/21 50/4
50/8 50/13 50/16 50/20 51/4 51/8 60/5
63/2 65/5 66/10 68/8 71/7 71/24 80/13
81/18 82/9 82/12 82/18 85/2 90/23
91/12 91/13 92/21 105/15 106/9 106/14 106/19 107/17 110/24 111/2 111/3 112/20 119/5 119/9 125/10 127/25
131/7 131/11 133/6 133/9 133/13 135/6
135/9 144/15 145/2 145/6 145/7 145/9
145/20 145/23 146/1 147/5 147/8
147/17 147/19 148/14 149/1 149/9
149/17 150/3 150/14 153/11 154/10
155/12 155/18 155/24 157/13 171/9
186/14 186/18 188/6 195/11 195/22
197/10 198/2 198/13 210/16 222/23
223/4 223/8 223/16 224/24 225/2 225/7
225/8 225/16 226/9 226/11 226/14
243/10 243/12 243/13
reported [3] 35/11 36/15 37/19
reporter [11] 1/3 1/6 1/23 21/12 21/14 46/7 153/23 170/14 259/23 265/6 265/17
reporting [2] 28/21 108/18
reports [21] 17/21 17/21 18/7 19/6 82/21 84/4 84/7 84/10 84/18 85/4 85/8 85/16 88/9 127/24 138/2 138/4 150/19 170/7 173/25 199/4 211/14
represent [4] 15/20 93/13 105/3
228/12
representation [1] 44/15
representative [4] 8/12 45/16 131/15 226/10
represented [4] 81/8 150/2 169/23 182/4
Republican [1] 189/13
request [7] 10/7 10/8 82/5 94/2 120/20 124/2 124/3
requested [3] 60/8 65/8 68/11
requests [1] 247/25
require [7] 45/7 196/4 196/6 196/7
196/22 196/24 235/24
required [4] 110/24 165/11 198/25 235/22
requires [1] 31/19
requiring [1] 43/17
requisitioned [1] 120/8
reran [1] 244/21
rerun [1] 207/14
resealed [1] 171/19
reserve [1] 261/1
reserving [1] 38/7
resolve [3] 15/3 15/4 123/23
respect [6] 71/25 106/5 107/3 172/9 180/22 249/24
respective [1] 38/12
respects [6] 139/13 140/25 141/25 142/23 143/21 143/24
respond [4] 43/3 127/19 192/23 236/17 respondent [1] 18/2
respondents [1] 18/7
responds [3] 171/22 172/8 173/13
response [14] 82/24 97/5 124/2 126/3
127/21 164/13 173/18 175/7 175/13
193/25 194/10 199/15 220/25 221/16
responses [1] 234/16
responsibilities [4] 137/23 172/8 201/7 260/6
responsibility [17] 84/16 99/3 108/24
109/13 109/16 110/10 111/22 114/5
114/14 114/16 128/14 128/16 201/7
214/22 216/23 218/4 220/17
responsible [20] 18/7 54/10 104/8 110/3 110/8 112/25 126/22 127/3 127/8 128/6 132/25 212/24 213/2 213/9 218/2 219/10 219/20 219/25 222/20 224/9 responsive [7] 98/9 221/18 222/4 236/19 237/4 237/6 254/2
rest [5] 32/18 201/24 208/5 210/4
210/4
restate [3] 68/17 101/7 169/16
restore [1] 27/16
Restraining [1] 22/25
restricted [1] \(1 / 3\)
restroom [1] 226/19
result [2] 26/25 129/5
results [13] 20/13 33/12 34/19 36/3
36/16 37/24 77/5 128/25 129/17 132/9
134/3 135/21 203/12
resume [2] 261/18 262/11
resumed [1] 139/3
retained [4] 53/3 56/11 56/23 58/7
retention [1] 240/20
retrofit [2] 106/6 107/5
return [2] 10/11 118/14
returned [1] 11/17
reversal [1] 150/9
review [39] 19/2 22/14 23/5 40/20 44/17 45/15 45/18 45/19 74/11 75/1 75/8 76/14 77/10 81/14 91/18 102/2 118/16 118/23 118/23 128/2 128/4 128/5 132/9 141/14 141/16 203/7 208/15 209/13 209/20 210/5 210/5 210/10 210/14 215/25 238/2 240/12 240/13 249/10 263/25
reviewable [1] 251/13
reviewed [18] 18/16 18/21 19/7 20/9
22/16 22/17 23/4 50/7 80/12 82/8
105/18 125/14 188/9 225/2 225/8 237/7 237/10 245/18
reviewer [1] 45/14
reviewing [5] 43/8 44/20 190/4 211/9 251/17
reviews [1] 45/12
revisit [1] 118/22
revote [1] 244/8
RFP [3] 213/17 220/11 234/2
RICARDO [4] 2/19 2/22 15/20 105/3
Richard [2] 103/20 104/4
rid [3] 34/13 70/19 231/8
right [290]
right-hand [1] 40/25
rights [1] 91/6
rings [2] 188/24 194/18
rise [2] 117/24 191/15
risk [12] 59/20 63/1 64/7 64/17 66/18 206/6 220/9 223/15 256/11 256/13 256/19 256/23
risks [25] 13/17 60/16 61/5 61/21 62/1 62/7 62/11 64/23 64/25 65/25 66/4 66/8 67/22 71/2 71/7 71/13 79/22 204/22
206/3 206/3 210/15 213/5 217/4 223/5 224/8
RMR [3] 1/23 265/6 265/16
roadmap [3] 48/12 48/16 48/18
ROBBINS [2] 3/5 81/13
ROBERT [6] 2/16 2/17 5/3 137/8 137/11 228/11
Roberts [1] 226/10
Robertson [1] 238/5
rogue [2] 199/17 199/21
role [20] 18/12 50/14 103/6 108/21
137/18 138/6 138/16 138/16 138/21
138/25 146/21 152/25 161/2 166/19
168/9 188/25 189/3 189/5 216/11
238/19
roles [1] 137/23
roll [2] 73/20 125/19
rolling [1] 219/17
room [3] 39/5 238/9 262/6
rooms [1] 9/21
root [1] 37/22
rose [1] 246/21
ROSS [1] 3/5
Roswell [1] 7/11
round [1] 234/19
routes [1] 185/23
routinely [1] 122/20
row [1] 214/16
rule [14] 68/19 68/24 83/14 93/7
163/13 167/12 214/14 223/18 223/24
224/3 248/4 248/10 248/12 249/11
Rule 26 [1] 223/24
Rule 403 [2] 68/19 68/24
ruled [5] 135/9 162/24 168/15 179/3 222/24
rules [2] 77/22 236/14
ruling [3] 80/17 118/22 124/4
rumor [1] 128/19
rumors [2] 115/11 115/12
run [17] 13/20 40/5 57/5 57/8 57/9
95/18 95/18 103/14 130/13 130/14
201/10 215/10 215/25 220/2 226/19 244/24 246/6
runner [2] 240/14 240/16
runner-up [2] 240/14 240/16
running [6] 174/10 215/11 220/3 232/3 250/21 252/10
runs [4] 100/22 126/20 129/9 217/1
RUSSO [2] 3/3 263/25
RYAN [8] 4/8 15/14 147/9 147/11
147/16 150/15 153/15 235/5

\section*{S}

S-A-N-F-O-R-D [1] 47/13
S-T-E-R-L-I-N-G [1] 137/9
safe [16] 151/24 152/8 156/7 156/9

\section*{S}
safe... [12] 156/13 156/19 157/8 157/11 157/15 157/16 157/20 162/10 162/17 163/15 214/22 220/9
safer [1] 257/1
said [93] 11/20 17/25 22/10 24/14 25/3 26/5 34/4 34/20 43/22 49/11 49/23 50/18 50/22 50/24 52/18 52/18 55/24 60/20 75/5 79/10 80/22 80/23 80/24 83/13 85/15 87/18 87/21 90/16 92/17 96/3 96/5 96/10 97/20 98/3 98/19 109/8 111/16 115/10 118/16 122/17 125/22 125/22 126/5 132/21 135/23 141/2 141/5 142/1 143/10 143/23 146/15 146/17 150/6 150/24 154/14 159/8 159/10 161/20 162/8 169/1 170/6 174/19 178/3 184/8 187/22 187/23 189/2 192/18 198/2 198/20 206/14 206/22 209/25 212/25 221/1 223/6 225/22 229/22 229/24 229/25 230/3 232/1 233/3 233/6 235/13 237/6 237/7 241/1 243/8 244/18 248/23 255/10 265/10
Salesforce [2] 100/23 218/23
salesman [1] 192/20
same [45] 20/9 27/1 35/25 40/16 44/18 55/20 58/18 87/16 107/17 114/14 118/25 124/24 130/5 140/16 152/6 158/15 171/22 173/13 182/7 192/10 192/20 202/18 202/25 207/9 212/25 230/16 233/25 234/1 240/5 240/7 240/16 241/8 244/11 244/12 244/22 244/22 244/23 247/14 250/20 250/25 251/2 254/25 255/7 256/13 258/19
Sandy [1] 226/7
SANFORD [3] 4/10 47/12 47/15
sat [2] 139/25 157/10
satisfied [2] 44/13 224/2
saw [16] 22/8 36/21 36/21 36/24 37/1 37/3 37/4 37/6 37/7 37/9 169/1 169/7 203/13 204/19 241/15 244/20
say [92] 11/13 12/8 12/10 19/20 20/7 21/25 24/18 26/8 41/13 43/23 43/24 44/6 44/19 51/24 52/3 57/5 57/22 63/14 70/14 72/3 72/14 73/13 74/18 77/19 79/3 79/5 79/7 85/5 90/9 96/14 96/15 97/24 98/1 101/7 103/19 106/1 107/16 108/7 109/2 110/11 111/8 111/17 111/18 111/19 112/1 113/15 123/15 129/7 129/20 130/5 131/6 135/17 139/18 152/20 159/11 163/7 164/19 164/22 166/6 166/22 175/12 175/13 177/4 177/6 177/9 179/18 185/5 190/1 193/1 193/8 193/11 199/3 199/15 204/10 206/25 209/25 218/13 218/20 224/5 226/11 227/24 229/8 240/17 241/4 245/6 247/11 248/19 252/17 252/21 253/19 253/24 258/15
saying [32] 10/5 19/13 26/14 28/3 53/24 58/15 72/17 77/25 84/23 88/5 109/13 110/9 118/20 123/5 144/24 149/13 153/16 174/13 176/14 192/21 205/14 206/6 207/23 221/17 236/13 250/12 250/15 250/24 250/25 252/2 252/6 255/14
says [64] 16/13 18/21 29/10 30/23 33/4 33/10 33/15 33/17 33/19 33/23 34/5

36/1 36/6 45/14 50/11 51/1 51/16 51/25 59/19 59/24 60/16 60/22 61/15 61/24 62/19 65/25 66/3 66/15 66/16 69/11 71/16 75/17 76/18 76/23 77/8 77/16 78/24 79/3 80/14 81/12 87/5 87/10 87/15 88/20 90/1 91/9 91/12 91/17 91/20 99/11 99/13 106/4 107/4 119/15 119/17 152/8 163/18 175/19 175/20 205/8 207/5 218/10 220/4 239/11
SB [1] 165/17
scalable [2] 196/23 197/9
scale [1] 234/24
scan [9] 130/1 130/10 130/18 130/20
165/11 247/18 253/19 254/12 258/15
scanned [4] 37/4 240/11 256/17 256/18
scanner [11] 13/20 13/23 207/9 240/7
244/12 250/3 250/22 251/3 253/15 253/17 256/3
scanners [6] 34/14 202/23 204/1 204/7 220/8 220/15
scanning [1] 131/24
Scantron [1] 197/6
scenarios [1] 206/1
SCHEINMAN [1] 2/7
SCHOENBERG [1] \(2 / 3\)
science [2] 147/11 150/14
scope [16] 15/9 24/5 42/21 45/5 45/17 63/4 63/11 64/1 72/4 72/15 73/4 73/12 73/13 73/14 114/5 114/14
score [1] 234/15
scoring [1] 234/17
Scott [3] 22/7 22/24 25/5
scrambling [1] 42/18
screen [14] 12/17 55/4 61/3 61/5
141/17 175/16 180/14 193/17 193/21
239/22 240/9 241/4 249/24 250/5
screens [1] 9/20
script [1] 95/18
seal [9] 119/6 149/17 170/1 172/25
173/19 173/19 174/9 174/13 175/8
sealed [4] 49/21 124/21 131/7 263/9 seals [8] 169/25 170/9 170/10 171/15 174/2 174/24 217/21 217/21
seat [6] 6/16 47/9 118/3 137/5 191/18 263/5
SEB [3] 167/10 186/19 186/21
second [15] 36/1 36/2 37/12 37/15 37/16 40/15 74/25 76/23 103/16 176/2 177/7 185/11 208/9 212/7 250/23 second-most [1] 212/7
secret [11] 45/11 115/22 116/12 119/16 119/18 122/9 123/6 123/9 123/20 124/2 124/24
secretary [128] 15/25 17/22 18/6 19/5 19/23 36/19 37/19 37/21 47/21 50/17 50/21 51/9 54/5 54/11 55/25 56/17 57/7 57/10 57/13 59/1 59/7 59/19 59/25 63/19 70/10 76/20 78/19 79/16 82/19 84/14 89/20 92/11 92/15 93/17 94/1 94/2 94/16 95/4 95/24 96/8 98/7 98/22 99/2 100/6 100/10 102/11 102/18 103/1 103/17 104/6 105/7 105/9 105/11 107/9 107/11 108/22 109/4 111/3 111/25 112/7 112/14 112/18 112/22 113/16 113/17 114/7 121/4 128/21 135/23 137/18 137/24 138/10 145/25 146/10 146/11 146/21 147/4 147/18 148/13

148/24 149/6 149/16 149/21 150/8 150/13 150/18 150/18 151/2 152/7 152/12 152/12 152/21 152/25 153/2 153/17 153/22 154/1 156/12 156/16 157/9 161/1 161/17 166/15 166/21 166/22 168/10 169/10 169/10 169/19 169/23 177/25 189/12 192/7 192/11 192/15 193/9 213/11 218/8 218/17 222/6 222/13 222/15 223/5 232/22 233/9 233/17 259/5 260/12
Secretary's [45] 48/1 51/13 51/19 52/14 52/16 52/23 53/3 53/7 53/11 60/9 67/15 68/23 73/18 76/11 85/9 100/25 125/17 150/2 153/13 156/9 158/18 161/8 164/14 179/18 182/19 183/16 183/20 184/17 187/3 188/14 190/12 191/2 192/7 194/4 195/9 196/3 201/15 202/9 203/9 218/25 236/1 237/13 248/12 257/13 259/10
section [6] 219/5 240/7 241/11 244/6 245/23 258/17
sections [1] 138/14
secure [18] 8/25 9/2 9/9 52/15 139/12 140/25 141/25 142/22 143/12 143/21 151/24 152/8 169/24 200/9 210/1 215/22 225/5 255/8
securing [3] 53/8 53/11 53/13 securities [2] 56/18 114/8 security [86] 51/13 51/18 60/16 61/5 61/21 61/25 62/9 62/11 62/19 63/5 65/25 66/4 66/17 66/18 67/7 67/22 69/24 70/4 73/19 73/22 73/25 78/25 79/17 79/22 84/14 84/15 84/19 88/2 91/10 91/16 93/17 93/21 94/3 95/25 96/12 101/2 101/5 101/9 102/3 104/4 104/8 105/22 106/6 107/5 109/9 114/19 123/8 125/18 127/6 127/8 127/16 128/6 128/10 128/17 130/21 132/25 149/25 150/1 150/10 150/16 150/22 169/12 169/21 182/10 194/3 195/21 211/15 212/24 213/2 213/5 213/9 213/18 213/25 214/3 214/13 214/14 214/17 218/2 219/5 219/10 219/12 220/24 221/20 224/12 225/23 225/24
see [108] \(9 / 2311 / 1913 / 1015 / 515 / 6\) 17/5 17/9 17/11 17/13 20/21 23/19 29/5 29/6 32/4 33/6 33/8 33/10 33/13 33/18 33/21 33/25 34/2 34/4 34/5 35/25 36/25 40/12 40/19 40/24 40/25 41/1 41/4 54/20 59/21 60/1 60/15 60/17 61/3 61/21 62/2 62/24 64/7 64/8 66/5 66/12 66/21 69/9 69/13 70/2 70/12 71/4 71/10 74/22 74/23 75/18 76/2 76/7 77/12 78/17 79/5 81/20 86/1 87/10 88/20 91/13 97/7 117/12 117/18 117/21 119/13 121/9 124/19 128/8 133/12 133/17 148/21 149/4 149/22 152/7 152/8 154/23 156/3 165/16 167/23 168/2 171/2 171/4 171/12 171/17 171/20 173/12 173/21 175/4 175/21 181/21 184/13 184/15 189/15 197/24 200/6 202/14 205/20 229/19 234/12 258/17 260/2 261/21 262/1
see -- well [1] 11/19
seek [2] 146/18 199/7
seem [8] 27/4 91/23 123/20 123/20 162/25 177/10 232/6 246/3
seemed [1] 220/23
seems [4] 23/20 29/8 106/15 201/11 seen [23] 23/14 49/24 51/11 97/9 124/16 133/13 159/22 162/19 167/6
167/18 168/9 170/18 173/23 173/25
178/11 189/15 199/4 199/4 202/17
204/20 208/2 241/19 249/19
sees [1] 215/24
select [1] 35/5
selected [3] 161/1 233/21 240/19
selecting [1] 237/25
selection [2] 12/16 12/19
selections [4] 12/11 12/12 240/4 240/9
Senate [6] 228/21 228/25 229/4 229/7 229/13 233/25
send [7] 46/15 94/2 97/11 116/7
116/23 171/19 180/22
sending [3] 77/14 93/20 96/8
SENIOR [1] \(1 / 12\)
sense [5] 8/17 128/5 153/4 170/16 206/12
sensitive [4] 91/8 91/11 150/3 150/6
sent [8] 10/6 10/9 15/1 75/20 75/25
93/17 95/24 180/19
sentence [3] 71/6 222/5 222/5
sentences [1] 208/1
separate [10] 23/22 74/2 74/3 74/10
75/1 75/8 184/2 184/6 217/8 220/16
separately [1] 74/4
September [2] 75/21 164/6
September 12th [1] 75/21
September 2020 [1] 164/6
sequence [1] 223/14
series [2] 144/3 166/24
serious [1] 42/3
seriously [2] 24/21 26/7
serve [1] 161/2
served [4] 43/6 47/23 144/14 156/13
server [4] 16/2 20/4 20/10 178/1
servers [3] 16/14 20/19 21/23
serves [3] 25/12 145/3 188/17
service [14] 25/6 180/21 201/19 203/5
203/21 204/18 205/16 206/16 232/19
249/2 249/7 249/14 249/17 249/21
services [3] 53/22 82/21 234/4
session [4] 162/2 163/22 164/2 165/18
set [12] 103/11 156/9 166/7 183/21
197/21 202/21 203/3 211/7 234/5 235/7
240/21 265/12
setting [1] 133/23
seven [5] 64/23 145/5 149/18 238/13
238/14
seven months [1] 149/18
several [14] 51/6 67/12 68/16 93/16
124/7 164/23 165/8 197/18 205/23
209/15 211/16 213/15 213/17 234/11
severity [2] 64/20 64/25
SHANNON [3] 1/23 265/6 265/16
share [4] 42/5 150/7 210/3 210/16
sharpen [1] 235/8
Sharpie [1] 258/16
Shaw [1] 29/18
she [11] 166/1 171/14 171/19 172/14
172/17 172/23 189/12 189/18 237/7
259/6 259/8
she's [1] 172/19
sheet [1] 167/18
shelf [1] 140/24
Shirley [1] 77/8
shooters [1] 206/1
short [3] 46/18 138/25 227/14
shorter [1] 245/1
shorthand [1] 44/2
shortly [1] 28/12
should [22] 16/24 41/22 48/9 105/21 119/6 130/2 130/3 130/11 141/10 141/13 145/23 146/1 165/21 173/1 177/6 179/18 188/6 192/21 239/13 241/10 244/6 257/10
show [6] 35/7 158/17 161/8 223/25 225/20 246/22
showed [5] 11/17 11/23 143/17 170/12 240/19
showing [4] 35/6 151/12 159/4 238/25
shown [1] 206/14
shows [4] 34/16 81/5 121/21 225/24 shut [1] 198/1
sic [4] 33/17 95/23 171/25 227/19
side [13] 138/2 138/5 150/20 184/11
184/20 193/6 214/10 214/24 216/9
218/24 235/9 240/2 262/6
sides [3] 122/18 122/22 141/19
sign [2] 215/18 216/1
signatory [1] 31/7
signature [2] 29/10 89/3
signed [6] 29/7 29/8 31/3 263/16
263/18 263/25
significant [5] 64/21 64/23 86/9 87/11 87/11
silence [1] 135/7
similar [6] 45/19 82/25 152/19 162/17 192/21 230/12
simple [3] 141/23 192/4 220/24
simply [14] 21/23 31/1 34/24 44/14
51/24 143/19 158/17 161/12 187/13
201/23 212/13 247/6 252/25 261/18
since [31] 7/11 7/19 8/3 16/20 27/21
30/15 41/15 46/18 49/22 51/14 72/9 82/1 103/13 117/13 117/18 120/14 121/25 131/6 139/5 159/22 170/4 182/9 183/3 196/4 202/2 222/15 223/6 226/18 227/7 229/1 263/18
single [9] 18/23 19/1 45/6 150/13 179/24 191/1 210/7 212/6 231/13 sir [141] 13/22 15/11 16/16 17/20 18/24 20/21 26/14 26/19 26/23 28/20 29/4 29/12 29/19 31/12 32/1 32/4 32/8 33/3 33/6 33/13 33/18 33/25 34/2 36/20 37/17 38/24 55/15 55/18 56/2 57/20 58/11 62/14 79/23 84/6 84/20 85/16 109/11 113/20 117/15 125/16 139/14 139/20 140/7 140/18 143/7 144/17 145/7 145/8 145/10 147/6 147/15 147/19 147/20 148/8 148/10 148/15 148/23 149/5 154/14 154/15 155/23 156/2 156/5 156/8 156/21 156/24 166/4 166/17 167/1 167/5 167/18 168/5 168/23 171/8 171/13 171/18 171/21 173/14 173/17 173/22 173/24 177/21 178/13 179/17 180/4 180/7 180/20 182/15 183/2 183/10 184/16 185/19 185/22 185/25 186/16 187/11 188/4 188/12 191/5 192/14 192/17 192/22 193/1 193/15 194/2 194/21 194/25 195/18 207/8 224/22 226/15 228/14

229/17 229/19 230/8 231/25 232/23
232/25 233/2 233/5 233/22 236/11
236/22 239/3 239/5 239/18 240/10 250/19 250/25 252/12 252/14 252/16 253/3 253/8 253/12 256/1 257/9 257/12 258/1 259/14 260/14
sit [7] 20/12 194/9 195/14 201/14 206/12 208/8 262/5
site [4] 76/18 76/20 76/23 256/18
sites [2] 166/3 187/21
sitting [6] 10/16 20/7 124/15 124/18 166/16 257/23
situation [15] 152/19 161/22 184/5
201/3 201/12 201/20 201/22 204/5 204/11 204/19 205/15 213/4 243/18 243/22 244/10
situations [7] 170/11 199/2 202/17
204/14 205/22 206/9 207/12
six [4] 149/8 149/18 150/3 261/17
six minutes [1] 261/17
six months [2] 149/8 150/3
size [6] 129/24 130/3 130/4 130/6
130/9 130/20
sizes [2] 130/14 132/22
skip [2] 252/13 253/1
slides [1] 160/22
slight [1] 247/18
slightly [2] 234/20 256/8
slip [1] 167/18
slow [6] 118/2 230/18 230/18 230/18 236/14 249/6
slower [3] 139/21 185/1 250/24
slur [1] 259/12
small [6] 9/21 59/15 72/21 137/25 219/24 234/7
smaller [2] 58/3 229/20
smart [1] 209/25
Smartmatic [1] 235/3
snap [1] 174/9
so [382]
software [33] 43/8 48/9 48/11 48/16 105/23 106/1 110/6 110/7 110/11 110/12 110/12 111/12 114/18 128/25 129/5 131/21 139/11 139/13 140/22 140/24 140/25 141/3 141/25 142/21 142/23 143/20 143/21 166/2 190/7 219/14 219/14 219/15 221/1
sole [1] 218/11
solution [2] 43/1 70/9
Solutions [5] 66/17 78/10 97/4 128/1 193/25
solve [2] 70/9 88/3
some [86] 8/6 11/21 21/3 25/9 27/6 28/9 31/4 35/18 36/21 36/25 37/1 37/3 39/13 41/5 43/11 46/22 52/13 53/1 53/9 68/3 70/3 70/5 70/16 72/7 90/4 99/2 100/12 102/25 108/13 108/24 123/1 123/7 125/15 138/7 139/8 140/23 140/23 143/25 160/22 162/24 163/19 168/3 172/21 172/24 178/24 179/19 179/25 179/25 182/22 185/17 188/19 190/18 193/5 194/6 196/6 201/7 207/11 208/16 209/18 209/25 210/14 212/1 212/4 214/25 217/14 217/15 218/1 218/10 221/24 222/4 223/21 223/24 225/3 226/24 238/12 242/10 251/12 251/13 257/5 257/6 257/13 258/11 258/16 259/7 259/9 260/6
somebody [19] 9/23 120/13 120/18 130/3 138/20 175/1 196/19 198/1 198/19 210/25 217/25 218/1 230/20 231/17 242/2 244/12 255/20 256/7 257/19
somehow [4] 17/9 202/15 206/25 242/3
someone [9] 36/18 76/10 101/10 130/5 188/22 200/19 217/11 255/17 258/15
someone's [1] 129/11
something [61] 26/12 27/15 27/23 32/16 44/24 45/7 46/8 53/17 63/19 63/20 69/20 70/1 70/17 92/19 95/18 96/19 98/25 118/19 118/21 121/22 128/20 129/15 129/18 130/3 130/17 131/1 145/3 148/6 150/24 156/6 158/25 162/14 162/17 164/25 165/6 174/9 175/3 177/23 177/24 185/11 187/16 190/1 193/6 196/19 196/20 198/2 198/3 202/14 202/20 208/19 210/2 216/4 234/23 237/7 237/13 243/16 243/22 245/5 249/1 249/4 258/14
sometime [6] 102/4 104/18 104/20 114/4 138/15 233/25
sometimes [4] 41/6 41/7 95/20 174/8 somewhat [1] 110/17
somewhere [4] 179/14 230/22 252/1 257/5
sophistication [3] 196/5 196/7 196/20 sorry [58] 7/3 30/6 32/8 33/20 34/8 39/7 54/22 58/21 65/14 74/13 74/17 86/17 88/15 94/22 101/16 116/17 119/8 120/17 122/20 136/24 139/20 140/17 142/4 142/5 146/13 152/1 156/25 160/1 160/11 160/13 167/16 169/6 169/15 171/23 173/3 173/9 176/8 176/17 180/12 192/1 192/13 193/17 204/2 204/24 205/2 205/2 205/6 207/21 216/5 227/24 227/24 227/25 228/20 242/14 245/19 254/1 258/3 261/13
sort [17] 128/1 141/18 153/20 153/21 153/25 157/15 162/20 174/22 178/3 184/25 187/19 208/11 208/12 213/20 216/11 222/22 223/6
sorts [1] 114/16
SOS [10] 19/21 19/22 19/23 21/15 76/15 76/19 76/23 81/17 91/6 238/2
SOS IT [3] 19/21 19/22 19/23
sound [1] 58/19
sounds [3] 120/14 132/13 137/22 source [11] 40/1 41/12 43/12 43/22
44/7 45/24 195/4 195/10 195/15 195/21 210/8
SOUTHWEST [1] 1/24
space [2] 21/4 129/25
span [2] 149/8 197/13
SPARKS [1] 2/9
speak [14] 72/10 82/13 96/22 109/8 111/5 111/14 112/16 113/1 115/11
150/21 184/1 212/2 233/12 238/10
speaking [10] 10/2 63/14 138/1 138/7 166/20 166/22 193/8 233/8 247/3 256/22
speaks [1] 58/14
special [1] \(8 / 5\)
specially [1] 118/23
specific [34] 18/23 21/1 22/2 51/13 51/18 52/20 53/15 53/18 54/8 56/21 57/6 78/15 85/20 90/25 100/11 108/6 132/16 143/12 164/18 165/2 174/4 174/4 185/6 202/14 204/4 204/25 205/7 210/7 212/2 212/17 212/17 221/18 233/17 238/11
specifically [22] 20/2 41/20 49/11 56/11 74/4 96/21 158/10 164/12 164/22 167/10 170/4 182/6 183/13 184/1 184/7 188/2 193/1 194/12 203/4 211/9 218/14 233/13
specifics [6] 40/14 143/25 161/5 170/6 210/24 242/4
speculate [3] 111/18 120/21 242/2
speculating [1] 126/10
spell [4] 6/17 47/10 137/6 263/6
spits [3] 240/4 240/12 253/24
spoil [2] 257/20 258/5
spoke [3] 20/2 189/6 199/6
spoken [2] 18/22 26/3
spokesperson [2] 192/11 192/15
spot [2] 172/21 250/5
spotted [1] 231/22
spread [1] 222/19
spread-out [1] 222/19
Springall [2] 41/10 224/25
Springs [1] 226/8
spur [1] 83/6
SR [1] 2/23
staff [5] 19/15 81/17 88/1 88/6 238/2
stages [1] 197/18
stakeholders [1] 107/9
stamps [2] 88/23 168/3
stand [6] 22/5 24/12 42/8 45/13 137/3 262/24
standalone [1] 190/9
standard [4] 73/23 74/1 74/6 123/21
standards [1] 251/13
standing [3] 69/19 190/9 230/11
stands [1] 162/15
start [15] 6/6 40/22 85/6 103/6 108/9 109/22 117/18 130/19 145/16 154/16 174/20 209/2 213/16 232/2 236/13
started [6] 141/1 211/4 214/11 228/5 236/11 250/25
starting [1] 177/7
starts [1] 62/20
state [130] \(3 / 2\) 6/17 14/13 18/6 20/12
23/2 35/11 37/20 37/21 39/25 43/7 47/10 54/5 54/11 56/17 57/7 57/11 57/13 59/1 59/20 59/25 63/19 70/10 74/22 77/22 82/11 82/19 84/15 93/17 94/2 94/2 95/24 96/8 98/22 101/2 101/5 101/9 101/12 102/13 103/2 104/6 105/9 105/11 107/11 107/14 109/4 109/25 110/2 110/6 110/7 111/3 111/23 112/4 112/5 112/6 113/12 113/15 113/16 113/17 115/22 116/12 117/6 119/16 119/18 121/5 121/22 122/4 122/9 123/5 123/9 123/20 124/2 124/24 125/20 126/25 129/2 137/6 138/22 147/18 149/10 149/23 152/21 152/25 161/1 166/21 166/22 167/7 167/10 169/7 173/16 180/21 181/17 183/21 189/13 190/25 192/12 192/16 199/11 200/21 201/8 201/10 204/10 213/6 214/15 214/19 215/5 215/12 215/18 215/19

215/20 215/23 216/10 216/23 217/20 217/21 218/1 218/7 219/9 221/24 222/1 225/19 226/10 246/17 252/17 252/21 252/24 253/6 257/10 262/14 263/5
State's [54] 15/25 17/22 19/5 19/23 36/19 47/21 50/17 50/21 51/9 55/25 59/8 76/21 78/20 79/16 89/20 92/11 92/15 94/16 95/4 98/7 99/2 100/6 100/10 102/11 102/13 102/19 103/1 103/17 105/8 107/9 107/13 108/22 110/10 111/25 112/7 112/14 112/18 112/22 114/7 128/21 135/24 137/19 137/24 161/17 168/10 177/25 218/3 218/8 218/17 222/7 222/14 222/15 223/5 232/22
State's counsel [1] 107/13
State-owned [2] 214/19 216/10
stated [7] 49/6 88/11 133/8 144/10 229/19 237/22 265/11
statement [23] 24/24 55/23 79/5 85/19 105/21 105/24 105/25 106/4 107/4 108/5 108/10 111/19 139/17 141/24 142/21 144/11 149/7 151/10 152/14 152/20 153/9 180/7 252/20
statements [5] 149/24 158/17 158/19 161/12 193/9
states [15] \(1 / 11 / 121 / 24\) 58/6 74/25 76/13 109/6 112/12 148/24 199/22 217/21 220/3 265/3 265/7 265/17
statewide [7] 37/23 138/18 165/20 217/1 229/9 229/11 229/14
stating [2] 84/20 217/24
status [1] 71/2
statutory [2] 200/21 201/2
stay [3] 103/22 129/18 261/14
staying [1] 261/20
STENOGRAPHY [1] 1/21
step [12] 142/16 157/7 205/8 205/9 205/16 206/15 214/12 214/20 215/21 261/4 264/2 264/4
steps [2] 164/14 213/15
STERLING [40] 5/3 78/19 78/22 112/20
112/24 132/8 137/2 137/8 137/11
137/15 137/18 139/11 140/4 143/4
151/21 156/6 160/24 164/6 168/8 182/7
182/18 186/13 187/3 191/8 192/6 201/1
205/1 205/7 207/23 224/20 225/14
226/6 227/7 228/7 228/11 238/25
239/11 257/13 260/6 261/2
Sterling's [3] 158/9 176/24 261/20
stick [1] 262/5
still [30] 11/11 15/10 27/1 36/7 50/22
51/1 70/15 71/2 100/18 100/24 102/16
103/23 107/16 107/17 110/1 128/16 131/7 136/15 136/24 139/22 142/1
147/5 183/25 211/8 222/20 231/11
231/14 237/5 256/12 256/15
stood [1] 107/13
stop [10] 84/9 84/12 84/21 85/21 102/2 126/16 192/21 198/7 248/9 261/18
stopped [3] 36/19 84/7 114/12
storage [1] 56/19
store [1] 63/18
stored [2] 63/19 258/11
straightforwardly [1] 89/16
strange [1] 106/15
stray [1] 252/1
strictly [2] 115/12 133/1

\section*{S}
strike [3] 166/9 220/25 221/5
striking [2] 166/10 221/7
strong [1] 159/20
structure [3] 95/9 153/25 233/3
struggle [1] 140/1
study [2] 7/14 160/22
stuff [8] 129/11 184/8 211/4 215/2
224/15 225/5 238/11 246/12
style [4] 197/17 204/6 204/8 217/10
styles [5] 216/4 216/5 216/6 231/12
255/2
sub [1] 76/23
subentries [1] 123/1
subject [15] 17/8 27/22 38/11 38/20
69/1 88/13 122/15 136/24 172/3 181/14
181/14 213/22 221/5 238/9 254/18
submit [1] 236/8
submitted [2] 208/10 236/21
subpoena [6] 25/6 39/8 39/16 42/6
227/20 260/5
subsequent [6] 162/14 182/23 184/21
198/9 198/12 210/6
subsequently [3] 139/7 184/5 185/5
substance [2] 41/6 41/12
substantial [5] 222/10 223/22 223/23
223/23 223/25
substantially [1] 82/25
substantiate [1] 22/13
substantively [1] 117/16
successful [3] 90/14 92/12 92/23
successfully [5] 79/23 89/24 91/5
92/10 92/15
such [12] 31/23 56/19 106/7 107/6 129/4 158/8 174/6 190/20 196/16 222/19 244/10 258/7
sufficient [3] 105/22 158/11 247/21
sufficiently [3] 8/24 9/2 151/24
suggested [2] 20/9 70/16
suggesting [1] 120/22
suggestion [1] 261/19
suggestions [1] 124/10
Suite [1] 109/7
suited [1] 110/19
SullivanStrickler [2] 184/5 184/7
summarized [1] 52/7
summary [8] 31/25 66/15 186/21
241/15 242/10 242/20 243/1 243/16
super [2] 134/14 247/2
super-user [1] 134/14
supervisor [6] 31/19 31/22 171/11
172/4 177/18 183/8
supplied [2] 110/6 117/6
supplies [1] 217/21
Support [1] 22/25
supposed [3] 188/21 197/21 241/5
supposedly [1] 30/23
supposing [1] 249/4
sure [43] 10/8 10/11 12/16 20/6 32/13 39/21 42/24 55/13 92/2 106/16 117/4 122/21 126/6 133/10 140/10 143/1 144/7 152/23 155/2 158/8 163/23 163/24 164/11 177/8 178/21 190/18 191/10 194/7 203/7 203/22 204/22 209/8 215/2 215/10 215/15 216/20 220/22 246/16 247/4 252/25 257/17 261/15 263/22

Surely [1] 123/2
surgery [1] 116/21
surprise [3] 190/25 195/19 238/16 surprised [5] 93/18 110/17 160/5
175/4 229/4
surprising [2] 195/24 235/21
surveillance [6] 167/3 168/9 169/8
183/17 183/21 183/25
suspect [2] 37/9 203/5
sustain [2] 107/23 107/23
sustained [1] 80/2
swear [3] 31/19 93/22 263/3
switch [2] 198/8 244/5
switched [1] 242/20
sworn [10] 6/15 6/23 15/15 42/13 47/8 47/16 137/4 137/12 157/9 263/4
system [137] 8/24 9/1 9/5 9/6 9/9 9/11 9/12 11/9 11/11 12/4 13/14 27/13 27/14 28/6 28/21 31/25 34/23 34/24 34/25 48/13 48/17 52/15 52/21 53/8 53/12 53/14 54/6 54/7 54/9 62/15 62/16 63/7 70/11 70/18 71/22 72/6 79/1 81/15 82/1 82/23 91/19 92/16 104/1 104/8 105/8 105/13 105/21 106/5 106/6 107/3 107/5 108/4 108/7 108/8 108/11 108/12 109/7 109/8 109/9 109/14 111/23 112/4 114/18 114/20 123/8 128/3 129/3 129/13 130/21 131/20 131/21 131/21 132/4 132/19 134/16 135/21 138/18 139/12 142/22 143/6 144/17 149/3 151/23 152/8 156/10 156/20 165/10 166/7 167/1 178/12 180/22 197/1 197/4 197/8 198/21 200/7 200/8 207/18 208/16 209/18 211/21 212/25 213/17 214/1 214/10 216/17 216/24 216/25 217/3 217/6 217/7 218/3 218/6 220/1 220/14 222/12 222/19 230/1 230/25 231/2 233/20 233/20 234/17 236/14 236/25 237/21 237/25 238/18 238/20 240/14 240/15 240/17 240/18 242/3 247/23 255/4 259/13
systems [43] 16/15 28/7 36/9 52/19 53/1 53/9 54/5 54/7 54/9 54/11 55/25 56/17 56/19 57/5 57/8 57/8 57/11 57/12 77/5 90/4 91/16 97/6 102/3 105/13 108/25 109/5 111/1 111/4 112/19 114/6 126/7 129/7 129/8 129/20 131/3 135/24 196/12 198/21 207/17 219/2 236/5 237/12 244/15

\section*{\(T\)}
tab [48] 49/14 58/3 59/14 60/23 60/24 65/2 65/16 67/25 68/5 72/18 72/21 72/22 74/13 75/11 75/13 84/24 88/17 90/24 90/25 116/2 147/22 148/10 148/11 156/22 156/25 157/1 157/17 160/9 160/14 160/15 170/21 170/25 175/15 175/16 176/10 176/15 180/14 182/14 185/25 186/4 186/10 186/12 191/5 193/15 193/16 194/19 194/20 224/20
Tab 1 [4] 49/14 84/24 147/22 148/11 Tab 10 [6] 67/25 68/5 175/15 175/16 176/10 176/15
Tab 12 [2] 75/11 75/13
Tab 13 [1] 74/13
Tab 14 [3] 185/25 186/10 186/12
Tab 15 [1] 180/14

Tab 16 [1] 182/14
Tab 21 [1] 224/20
Tab 3 [8] 58/3 72/18 72/21 72/22
156/22 157/1 157/17 160/14
Tab 38 [1] 191/5
Tab 4 [1] 88/17
Tab 41 [2] 170/21 170/25
Tab 8 [4] 59/14 60/23 60/24 90/25
Tab 9 [2] 65/2 65/16
table [1] 198/1
tabulate [2] 165/11 220/13
tabulated [2] 134/23 257/23
tabulation [1] 77/5
tabulators [2] 34/12 34/14
tag [1] 208/11
tag-teaming [1] 208/11
take [55] 12/5 15/7 26/6 26/8 26/9
26/12 33/4 33/15 39/18 39/20 40/3 40/7 42/14 42/15 44/16 44/17 44/20 44/23 44/24 44/25 45/4 45/21 45/22 46/6 49/13 83/4 83/21 86/5 87/6 101/9 114/11 117/19 122/25 124/11 136/22 136/23 140/8 142/24 147/21 157/7 191/12 201/19 201/23 203/5 203/21 204/17 227/9 231/12 232/12 240/1 249/4 249/7 249/17 249/21 261/17 taken [15] 40/11 41/21 41/22 45/15 55/16 84/22 85/13 85/16 118/1 135/7 191/17 217/12 226/23 232/19 249/2 takes [5] 41/14 44/3 129/24 215/1 260/22
taking [11] 24/20 43/13 43/18 43/25 118/7 118/9 143/15 197/24 198/6 198/10 249/14
talk [14] 45/12 52/13 92/18 115/13 121/1 122/19 139/20 166/23 184/2 184/23 211/19 246/12 255/16 261/4 talked [14] 9/4 129/23 174/23 189/12 189/13 189/19 189/20 189/21 189/22 190/23 210/7 231/20 253/23 260/11
talking [36] 21/4 22/6 40/13 52/20
53/16 53/16 66/23 69/24 73/17 80/7 91/1 95/14 95/15 98/20 108/8 110/11 114/20 131/19 131/20 132/13 143/11 164/23 168/25 177/17 189/21 192/18
199/23 215/16 221/25 231/4 236/23
240/15 246/2 255/17 256/20 256/25
talks [1] 79/10
tangential [1] 25/21
tape [1] 244/13
target [1] 63/7
tasks [1] 95/20
TAYLOR [2] 3/9 81/13
team [19] 61/25 66/4 66/18 76/14 77/9 91/10 152/15 209/24 213/19 213/19 216/15 224/15 227/17 234/6 234/13 234/14 262/4 262/19 264/2
teaming [1] 208/11
teams [1] 235/5
tech [1] 171/14
technical [3] 108/18 211/2 242/4
technically [2] 122/3 206/4
technicals [10] 234/6 234/15 235/3
235/6 235/7 235/12 235/14 237/1 237/1 238/12
technology [12] 62/14 62/22 66/11 66/19 66/23 67/3 92/19 104/3 108/18 213/20 236/4 237/19

\section*{T}

TED [1] 1/24
tell [23] 17/17 18/2 19/15 19/18 20/3 32/11 45/5 70/8 98/15 121/18 125/7
155/9 167/22 188/24 194/17 210/1
210/3 224/23 234/24 239/21 242/24 244/2 248/2
telling [5] 27/25 88/6 111/21 175/1 229/2
tells [1] 70/21
Temporary [1] 22/25
ten [12] 71/2 71/7 71/13 72/10 72/12
87/23 129/21 130/1 130/2 231/18
259/17 259/24
ten minutes [2] 259/17 259/24
ten years [1] 231/18
tend [1] 200/6
tender [3] 23/9 38/15 \(122 / 5\)
tendered [1] 25/15
tens [1] 212/6
term [2] 53/14 105/13
termination [1] 102/6
terms [13] 25/14 121/25 138/7 150/21 151/11 211/17 214/25 221/17 221/21
223/15 236/24 249/15 257/17
terrible [2] 235/3 251/12
terribly [1] 261/13
terrorists [1] 200/5
test [6] 57/7 201/18 201/18 215/10 219/21 248/16
tested [4] 71/7 130/13 130/14 130/14 testified [23] 6/23 13/13 14/4 15/15 24/15 25/11 31/8 47/16 80/18 81/7 108/2 135/5 137/12 146/6 160/25 163/8 163/9 169/11 169/19 182/7 198/24 213/1 238/17
testify [16] 36/18 44/4 46/5 132/23 146/21 146/23 158/5 163/6 172/14
176/4 177/5 182/1 201/2 225/13 225/18 246/15
testifying [8] 45/9 54/2 57/14 105/6 199/25 221/9 231/8 231/23
testimony [50] 6/4 15/22 16/20 24/9 24/9 24/11 25/19 38/25 52/2 52/5 52/7 55/15 55/18 55/20 58/13 73/8 80/17 81/21 85/22 86/19 87/3 87/19 107/22 112/24 117/16 118/17 118/20 126/13 126/14 136/14 144/9 146/18 149/3 158/7 158/14 170/4 170/19 179/2 208/14 212/23 219/9 222/3 223/20 229/24 230/3 261/4 261/10 261/20 263/9 265/12
testing [18] 53/16 89/21 89/25 90/3 90/12 90/13 90/16 90/17 92/9 92/13
105/23 131/23 171/14 173/6 173/8 215/7 215/14 240/22
Texas [2] 136/20 206/8
text [10] 95/17 119/18 190/17 241/15
242/10 242/20 242/25 243/15 245/7 245/16
text-type [1] 95/17
than [39] 12/4 19/1 28/5 28/5 34/24 35/17 41/13 44/1 53/15 56/21 70/16 91/23 110/20 112/18 115/11 119/9 121/2 131/2 133/6 150/14 151/19 153/4 157/23 178/18 196/7 196/23 210/25 218/14 219/4 232/8 245/24 251/13

251/21 255/8 257/2 260/7 261/17 261/22 262/21
thank [67] 6/10 12/24 13/1 13/11 14/17 14/18 14/22 14/23 15/11 15/12 16/16 17/15 25/23 25/24 31/15 32/1 33/3 38/6 39/2 39/3 47/1 52/12 64/12 65/17 67/20 69/4 83/12 83/19 83/20 93/10 94/24 99/16 101/15 113/24 116/15 117/14 119/2 119/21 121/10 124/5 125/1 136/8 136/12 136/13 136/15 144/13 147/1 147/2 148/9 151/13 151/19 164/3 164/4 168/19 177/14 178/22 179/8 179/9 186/8 191/14 191/19 207/19 209/5 221/13 226/4 261/8 263/11
that [1638]
that's [54] \(6 / 10\) 11/25 13/25 14/16 17/3 46/17 53/2 55/5 58/14 61/2 67/23 71/16 83/13 84/9 84/11 91/3 103/3 106/25 114/7 114/21 117/23 128/14 142/13 144/4 144/12 149/14 156/15 160/12 160/12 165/12 167/9 168/23 169/9 173/10 174/18 175/9 176/7 176/24 177/9 177/11 177/12 179/7 181/20 193/21 195/1 202/1 209/9 211/8 227/13 227/23 238/5 262/20 262/23 263/10 their [70] 8/18 8/18 19/9 28/8 28/21 30/15 35/21 42/1 44/12 45/1 48/15 69/22 70/8 70/22 77/14 81/13 83/1 84/12 84/21 85/21 89/24 107/10 111/4 111/10 114/5 118/23 125/8 128/14 129/5 129/20 130/1 131/3 134/19 134/22 151/22 157/13 160/4 162/10 165/23 179/22 179/23 182/5 184/8 188/15 192/9 199/22 200/4 200/14 202/5 203/7 215/10 217/11 220/8 227/6 235/4 235/16 235/17 236/9 236/20 237/21 240/2 240/22 241/14 242/23 248/22 251/25 254/24 255/1 256/4 257/11
their's [1] 239/25
them [84] 26/9 28/11 28/17 40/8 41/16 41/17 44/15 45/22 62/4 69/20 70/13 70/15 73/14 74/4 77/20 78/3 79/7 81/24 103/25 105/14 108/13 109/15 110/2 110/13 114/24 116/24 125/24 127/18 130/2 130/19 131/4 131/24 132/22 134/2 135/2 157/12 169/25 170/17 189/20 194/6 194/7 194/7 196/7 203/21 204/18 205/16 207/2 207/3 207/3 209/19 211/4 211/7 211/16 212/6 214/3 214/15 215/5 215/12 216/1 216/8 217/22 217/22 219/16 221/2 221/2 221/9 222/2 230/13 232/19 234/10 234/15 235/8 238/8 244/17 248/4 248/4 248/5 253/2 253/3 253/4 255/3 257/4 257/14 264/2
themselves [8] 44/16 131/13 132/6 160/4 217/19 219/12 220/12 257/3 then [123] 6/7 10/10 12/6 23/2 24/25 28/10 35/24 37/2 37/3 41/3 44/20 46/5 46/10 46/15 50/11 51/16 52/1 52/3 62/4 64/25 66/20 78/12 81/17 81/18 82/6 83/21 86/24 86/24 88/12 88/14 89/16 90/10 93/7 94/14 96/4 102/13 104/14 105/21 106/19 107/14 110/24 111/8 111/13 112/1 112/17 112/24 113/8 116/7 122/10 123/22 124/11 126/5 126/9 126/11 128/9 128/17 130/2 130/7

135/25 139/3 139/5 139/5 141/4 143/12 146/11 150/18 155/4 158/24 159/22 160/18 161/1 171/22 173/4 176/24 177/18 183/8 184/4 184/4 185/13 187/20 190/7 200/16 200/21 201/18 201/20 202/4 202/13 202/22 203/6 203/13 203/21 206/8 206/8 209/21 211/5 212/12 213/3 214/11 215/25 216/10 216/25 217/7 221/2 227/7 227/22 228/17 230/3 233/9 235/1 240/11 240/13 244/12 244/19 245/4 250/21 251/1 251/5 253/19 256/17 258/14 258/22 258/24 262/3
then-election [2] 177/18 183/8 theory [1] 259/3
there [253] 6/12 7/14 9/21 11/14 11/16 12/5 12/6 13/16 15/4 16/8 17/19 17/21 17/22 18/7 18/15 18/15 23/20 25/17 26/22 26/22 26/24 28/6 28/13 30/3 30/11 33/8 35/7 35/9 35/14 35/18 36/3 36/4 36/8 38/10 39/11 40/25 41/1 41/6 41/7 43/10 43/12 43/22 43/23 43/23 44/5 44/6 44/14 45/17 45/24 46/6 46/21 46/22 54/8 55/19 64/9 64/23 65/23 67/21 68/1 68/6 69/11 74/10 75/1 75/7 76/23 80/8 81/4 85/2 85/8 85/11 87/25 88/5 88/9 88/14 90/17 91/13 91/22 94/18 94/18 94/19 99/17 102/6 102/16 103/11 103/23 103/24 105/13 106/18 110/5 110/6 111/9 112/13 112/17 113/5 115/12 118/6 118/19 119/10 120/11 120/22 122/22 123/6 123/6 126/16 127/18 127/25 128/15 129/12 130/4 130/25 133/4 135/10 136/2 140/11 141/1 142/8 143/4 143/10 146/24 148/6 150/17 152/20 154/1 154/4 154/4 155/13 157/6 157/15 157/17 159/4 161/24 164/19 164/24 165/19 165/22 166/20 166/24 167/2 168/2 169/13 170/7 172/22 172/24 174/5 174/6 175/21 176/9 177/10 177/22 182/20 183/11 184/2 184/18 184/22 184/23 185/3 185/5 190/2 190/5 190/9 190/23 193/20 194/23 197/22 198/2 200/2 202/4 202/6 204/14 204/19 205/7 205/12 206/11 206/14 206/25 207/5 207/6 207/9 208/1 209/7 210/13 213/15 213/17 216/1 216/20 217/15 217/25 218/10 219/21 220/22 222/13 222/17 223/6 224/14 225/13 225/23 227/10 229/12 229/12 229/13 229/15 230/11 230/13 231/10 232/1 232/1 232/5 232/11 232/15 232/15 233/3 233/10 233/11 233/12 234/6 235/19 235/20 237/4 238/11 238/12 239/24 241/22 241/25 243/5 244/3 244/15 244/20 245/6 245/14 246/7 246/7 246/8 247/8 247/9 247/11 247/17 248/9 248/14 248/16 249/1 249/5 249/9 249/13 250/1 251/14 254/4 256/9 257/3 257/23 258/1 260/15 261/13 263/2
there's [20] 41/1 41/3 61/17 130/1 138/14 141/2 153/20 169/25 189/17 195/6 197/18 200/3 200/3 216/2 223/22 228/4 236/7 247/24 251/4 255/10 thereby [1] 264/5
therefore [8] 121/18 121/23 124/24 163/18 236/18 237/9 237/10 241/7

\section*{T}
therein [2] 30/21 265/11
these [45] 24/15 24/15 35/12 36/15 37/19 37/20 40/16 43/22 44/7 45/12 45/24 68/1 70/14 72/10 94/9 107/21 124/16 135/8 135/16 149/24 153/22 155/5 171/19 176/3 180/22 181/17 190/4 204/6 204/15 206/2 207/16 211/18 212/15 214/2 215/22 219/3 219/17 222/1 244/14 247/21 248/1 256/18 256/20 258/16 259/24
they [261] 10/4 10/7 24/3 24/3 26/12 28/9 28/14 28/15 35/20 35/21 35/22 36/17 36/23 40/2 40/3 40/4 40/8 40/9 40/10 41/13 41/16 41/24 41/24 42/4 42/6 44/13 44/16 44/21 48/16 48/18 54/10 55/25 56/14 56/16 57/2 57/7 57/10 57/10 57/11 57/12 58/10 62/16 63/6 63/14 63/16 63/18 66/25 67/2 67/5 69/22 70/8 70/14 70/16 70/21 70/22 72/7 72/8 72/10 77/20 77/20 79/1 79/22 81/6 81/24 82/1 84/21 85/13 88/3 90/3 91/8 92/12 96/20 100/20 102/7 102/7 103/13 103/13 103/22 103/23 104/6 106/13 106/14 110/3 110/4 110/5 111/3 114/6 114/11 114/14 114/16 114/22 117/7 118/17 121/19 124/9 124/9 124/10 124/10 124/11 126/8 127/16 127/19 127/21 128/22 128/24 128/25 130/11 130/25 131/17 134/16 135/25 136/2 137/25 150/5 150/7 150/10 150/16 151/2 151/25 152/18 153/5 157/12 158/20 160/16 165/22 166/5 166/6 167/7 169/24 172/21 174/1 174/7 174/8 176/13 179/23 180/2 182/4 182/6 182/9 183/24 184/7 184/10 184/11 184/23 184/23 186/17 186/18 186/21 187/18 187/19 188/15 189/7 190/4 192/10 192/20 196/19 196/22 197/1 197/16 198/20 201/17 201/18 201/18 201/19 202/2 202/5 202/20 203/3 203/8 204/1 206/19 206/19 206/22 207/13 210/23 210/24 211/15 213/24 215/5 217/16 219/4 220/9 223/24 224/8 224/12 225/20 225/22 230/10 231/1 231/6 231/13 232/6 232/7 232/12 233/13 234/15 234/21 235/7 236/8 236/11 236/14 236/14 236/17 236/17 236/18 236/18 236/21 237/1 237/2 237/9 237/10 239/22 240/1 240/1 240/21 240/23 240/23 241/3 241/6 241/6 241/15 241/16 241/24 242/18 242/19 242/22 244/13 244/21 244/22 244/22 245/10 245/15 246/13 246/21 246/25 247/6 247/7 248/23 248/24 250/22 252/1 252/25 253/15 253/16 253/19 254/15 254/16 254/21 254/22 254/23 254/23 255/21 256/7 256/14 258/5 258/13 258/14 262/7 262/14 262/16 264/4
they're [2] 235/3 235/12
thin [1] 223/16
thing [48] 20/9 26/5 42/19 45/6 45/24 83/8 105/5 106/18 130/25 132/21 138/8 146/20 157/5 158/15 172/7 174/6 176/23 176/25 177/6 187/12 190/9 191/20 202/3 202/19 202/25 203/6

207/9 211/3 211/18 216/8 216/25 219/7 223/12 226/6 229/14 231/10 231/19 242/14 244/12 244/22 249/6 249/18 256/16 258/7 258/11 258/19 260/10 261/6
things [87] \(9 / 7\) 11/18 39/13 41/6 41/7 41/11 52/16 52/22 54/11 56/20 63/6 63/8 66/24 70/5 87/25 88/2 88/6 117/20 131/22 133/3 135/18 139/8 143/10 150/19 151/16 153/22 170/10 170/18 174/8 183/3 184/6 185/17 189/15 190/4 192/6 192/18 192/21 193/7 196/21 197/25 198/10 199/16 199/19 200/1 200/2 200/3 204/15 205/24 205/25 206/2 206/12 211/19 211/20 212/1 212/2 212/15 213/17 214/2 214/5 215/22 215/25 216/23 219/16 220/11 220/12 220/21 221/2 221/21 222/1 222/10 224/10 224/14 224/16 228/17 237/8 241/23 243/21 244/15 247/18 247/24 248/1 248/3 248/7 251/12 255/9 258/16 259/9
think [160] 8/5 8/10 10/18 11/16 14/9 17/1 17/4 18/11 19/13 20/5 20/6 20/7 20/25 21/3 22/10 24/18 24/23 25/2 25/13 25/20 26/6 26/7 26/8 27/3 27/16 27/22 28/17 30/4 30/7 30/19 34/3 34/4 35/13 35/17 37/7 38/20 40/22 42/19 43/14 43/21 44/5 45/4 45/6 45/14 45/23 45/23 50/18 50/22 51/11 52/3 52/3 53/13 61/8 66/25 83/6 88/11 90/15 91/25 92/12 94/13 94/15 94/20 98/2 102/4 103/7 104/18 110/19 114/3 118/6 119/19 120/11 122/10 122/22 123/12 123/21 124/21 124/21 126/6 127/23 133/1 135/8 143/2 143/16 146/9 146/20 150/22 153/9 157/10 157/12 157/17 158/9 162/3 164/17 165/21 167/12 169/6 169/13 172/10 175/1 178/3 179/21 179/22 179/23 181/16 181/19 182/5 182/9 183/13 184/25 187/23 189/20 189/21 190/10 196/15 198/25 199/1 200/24 201/1 205/18 205/21 205/22 207/21 208/1 208/6 208/17 210/17 212/22 216/3 217/24 218/23 221/8 221/18 221/23 222/4 222/23 223/13 227/2 227/13 228/12 228/14 228/21 232/1 234/11 234/12 236/11 244/6 244/11 246/11 246/15 248/19 250/13 252/20 252/24 257/7 257/15 257/24 260/7 262/13 262/21 263/19 thinking [4] 189/20 209/16 227/5 238/5 third [13] 37/11 37/15 62/22 146/14 148/21 152/3 152/4 172/1 181/13 181/25 185/13 215/9 228/2
third-party [2] 62/22 215/9
thirds [1] 116/11
this [432]
those [81] 11/18 17/24 22/12 43/19 45/3 45/16 53/4 57/2 57/5 57/8 59/6 59/7 59/8 69/17 70/4 87/24 88/7 88/10 100/8 100/16 108/19 124/11 127/4 131/24 133/2 139/2 139/8 170/18 176/12 183/14 184/6 188/6 188/9 190/16 193/7 193/9 196/20 197/17 199/25 202/11 202/12 202/13 204/2 205/22 206/9 207/11 210/2 211/22 212/10 213/10 213/18 213/21 213/24

214/2 214/4 215/13 215/21 215/25 216/3 217/21 219/16 219/25 220/12 221/2 229/16 231/6 231/22 235/8 236/24 237/3 238/13 241/21 249/10 251/12 252/4 253/9 255/5 255/21 255/23 256/8 256/17
though [16] 10/24 36/4 39/10 87/22 116/2 117/1 117/17 132/25 213/3 222/11 224/11 236/12 236/21 242/9 253/17 260/21
thought [25] 11/1 26/12 42/7 98/1 98/3 101/11 102/23 117/6 117/7 118/21 133/14 159/21 163/7 181/13 181/20 195/20 199/25 200/7 227/2 227/13 229/10 243/21 244/9 249/22 259/25 thousands [6] 126/25 127/1 174/7 174/11 212/6 230/13
thread [4] 76/9 79/12 176/13 191/24 threat [2] 219/13 256/10
threats [2] 197/7 221/25
three [28] 10/4 10/5 16/7 34/5 34/5
64/25 71/7 71/8 71/9 71/12 84/4 92/20
94/6 103/21 144/25 184/2 184/6 202/23
202/24 206/6 210/21 213/23 219/22
229/21 234/16 236/3 236/15 237/11
three hours [1] 236/15
three months [1] 210/21
three weeks [1] 94/6
three years [2] 10/5 92/20
three-page [1] 16/7
threshold [3] 203/9 232/12 255/22
through [47] 11/4 13/20 14/4 14/5 27/4 35/14 41/6 44/23 63/20 63/23 67/3 89/24 99/11 118/18 119/3 125/7 139/25 154/17 157/18 159/8 159/16 164/20 188/13 194/14 194/17 197/19 204/21 205/20 210/25 213/24 214/8 214/9 215/4 217/12 217/13 219/22 220/2 223/20 224/23 233/21 234/17 242/2 244/9 244/10 244/11 258/20 261/20 throughout [2] 111/23 216/11 Thursday [4] 46/5 75/20 199/25 225/13 tie [2] 17/9 21/4
tied [3] 17/14 220/4 258/22
ties [2] 17/5 17/11
tight [1] 247/2
time [88] 6/4 10/9 10/20 13/2 27/21 34/25 35/5 36/17 44/13 45/4 46/10 46/18 46/19 48/6 50/8 51/3 52/14 62/14 68/20 70/1 76/4 93/3 94/17 94/18 94/19 102/6 102/25 103/8 103/8 103/10 103/11 103/15 117/9 127/23 128/2 128/15 138/14 139/1 145/10 146/14 151/18 155/14 155/24 161/22 170/5 173/16 174/24 179/4 179/15 179/20 180/23 180/24 182/22 182/23 183/1 184/9 184/24 185/11 189/1 189/4 196/8 196/22 197/16 198/14 210/10 210/12 210/19 210/23 211/10 211/11 211/20 212/6 212/25 215/2 219/18 226/17 228/2 233/11 234/1 237/22 244/11 244/24 247/2 249/5 254/23 259/7 259/16 260/17
timeline [2] 163/1 247/5
timelines [2] 237/2 237/3
times [5] 9/17 10/17 182/4 202/7 256/19
timestamps [1] 168/3

\section*{T}
tiny [2] 119/11 119/19
tipping [1] 203/10
title [3] 32/25 33/1 138/17
titled [2] 64/7 64/17
today [18] 13/10 13/12 20/12 26/14 46/22 55/21 92/22 92/22 105/16 206/12 221/10 223/19 227/5 227/6 227/9 228/5 248/2 248/10
together [5] 21/4 206/6 216/15 234/2 234/6
told [13] 146/13 151/2 181/18 182/1
184/24 185/3 185/4 195/8 229/4 235/8 235/10 255/7 257/7
tomorrow [7] 46/3 138/11 260/1 260/6 260/12 261/19 262/11
Tony [9] 54/24 74/15 90/20 166/12 167/15 178/6 182/16 193/14 209/1
too [14] 25/13 25/21 46/11 67/18
139/23 148/7 151/18 152/16 173/8
198/1 204/23 235/14 251/15 264/4
took [8] 36/17 37/25 41/23 42/4 44/1 52/14 164/14 178/3
tool [16] 93/17 93/21 94/3 95/24 96/9
96/13 115/21 116/10 120/3 120/8
120/25 121/5 121/23 130/25 132/22 215/9
tools [7] 129/19 129/25 130/10 131/22 131/24 215/12 230/21
top [16] 32/2 41/1 59/24 61/21 62/19
65/25 66/11 71/2 71/6 71/13 76/14 78/5
88/23 100/23 168/2 175/21
topic [2] 27/2 261/9
topics [1] 15/2
tossing [1] 27/10
total [5] 33/8 33/11 33/16 36/4 54/10
totally [1] 238/3
TOTENBERG [1] 1/11
touch [3] 211/25 240/9 249/24
touches [1] 250/4
touching [1] 241/4
tough [1] 192/20
towards [3] 59/23 75/16 225/24
tower [3] 59/2 129/10 129/13
track [4] 173/17 185/6 217/12 250/4
trade [1] 45/11
traffic [2] 46/21 228/5
trail [3] 184/24 185/6 257/5
train [2] 217/20 217/22
training [4] 133/2 147/11 196/20 216/16
transcript [15] 1/1 1/5 1/7 1/8 1/10 1/22 49/15 54/14 57/24 57/25 58/4
72/18 140/9 141/8 265/9
transcription [1] 54/17
transcripts [1] \(1 / 2\)
translated [1] 12/17
treat [1] 81/4
treatment [1] 9/18
triage [4] 95/25 118/12 119/18 122/8
trial [11] 1/10 24/6 42/11 42/12 68/23
80/21 86/14 157/3 160/6 195/11 195/16
trick [1] 137/22
tried [4] 25/6 56/5 181/25 211/4
trouble [2] 36/17 175/13
true [40] 17/20 17/25 18/6 18/11 18/15 19/5 19/13 20/23 20/25 21/20 22/1 26/2

26/6 26/7 26/8 30/24 31/21 38/4 51/2 51/15 51/16 57/3 58/14 63/22 87/16 92/25 106/1 158/20 159/1 161/14 172/16 172/18 225/22 236/9 242/9 242/18 244/14 259/6 259/12 265/9
trust [3] 7/20 226/2 257/10 truth [13] 23/12 30/20 36/11 46/21 158/6 158/16 158/21 158/24 161/6 161/6 161/12 175/2 225/17 try [10] \(27 / 5\) 32/16 52/14 109/11 123/17 185/6 209/15 227/8 227/16 232/8
trying [34] 35/22 86/17 99/7 99/10 101/11 116/17 124/16 127/7 141/10 143/7 143/7 143/9 144/4 160/17 160/19 160/23 161/16 190/3 191/25 198/3 203/20 205/20 210/13 212/21 212/22
213/8 214/8 214/9 214/9 218/9 218/21 218/24 234/11 234/12
tub [1] 129/11
Tuesday [1] 76/24
turn [25] 20/16 32/6 40/23 54/13 59/14 60/15 64/6 65/2 66/10 67/25 68/5 69/6 71/1 74/13 74/25 75/13 78/4 84/24 86/4 88/17 99/25 128/15 140/14 227/8 228/17
turned [3] 26/10 110/1 110/2
TURNER [1] 1/24
Turning [1] 59/10
turns [1] 163/17
Tweet [7] 175/21 176/24 177/6 191/24 239/4 239/11 242/8
Tweets [3] 150/19 176/2 176/24
twice [3] 207/14 244/21 244/23
Twin [1] 59/2
two [54] 11/7 15/24 16/7 34/6 49/11
55/7 59/2 60/22 70/14 71/18 85/7 85/10
88/7 92/19 99/18 102/25 103/20 104/13 113/7 114/3 114/9 116/11 138/14 139/2 141/2 155/6 158/7 165/24 171/15 200/23 201/1 208/1 208/13 214/16 216/16 221/25 224/14 224/16 231/18 235/1 236/15 239/13 240/20 241/3 241/3 241/22 241/25 250/9 251/4 251/14 255/2 255/3 260/22 261/6
two minutes [1] 260/22
two weeks [1] 139/2
two years [7] 49/11 85/7 85/10 88/7
104/13 114/3 165/24
two-factor [2] 60/22 216/16
two-minute [1] 261/6
two-page [1] 15/24
two-thirds [1] 116/11
type [6] 19/12 95/16 95/17 169/1 172/7 182/7
typed [1] 55/19
types [3] 84/17 165/8 180/22
typical [1] 196/9
typically [3] 19/6 95/17 120/15
typo [1] 230/22
TYSON [2] 3/6 123/25
U
U.S [1] 8/11

Uh [5] 55/3 59/18 65/4 71/14 75/19 Uh-huh [5] 55/3 59/18 65/4 71/14 75/19
ultimately [1] 217/25
umbrella [1] 59/9 unauthorized [2] 167/2 185/14 UNC [1] 7/13
unconstitutional [1] 259/11 uncooperative [1] 180/5 uncovered [3] 9/7 61/25 66/4 under [42] 15/11 18/13 22/6 25/11 25/12 31/20 31/20 39/15 42/8 43/23 44/6 55/20 59/8 62/20 73/23 74/1 80/21 81/3 81/7 81/21 89/5 89/19 99/3 105/9 114/6 135/25 144/10 149/17 156/12 165/13 165/13 213/10 213/25 220/12 220/17 220/18 223/24 230/25 237/11 246/19 247/13 263/24
underlying [2] 195/4 195/10 underneath [1] 61/24
understand [39] 19/25 24/2 34/9 34/11
34/23 67/21 77/1 83/11 102/24 106/16
110/4 118/7 119/20 124/4 143/9 143/13
144/5 151/21 166/15 179/15 183/3
183/7 183/10 190/3 195/21 200/11
209/23 210/22 212/20 212/22 213/13
220/1 225/12 232/5 240/12 242/1 242/5 250/23 263/20
understandable [1] 36/22
understanding [25] 11/22 14/12 30/9
105/6 111/13 124/1 126/18 132/24
133/13 139/15 143/2 152/11 153/7
162/4 163/13 164/1 166/19 172/24
184/20 185/10 190/8 196/2 211/11
219/13 222/17
understands [1] 153/2
understood [9] 27/9 93/9 151/6 159/11
181/4 197/17 208/14 221/15 222/11
undertaken [3] 19/9 82/23 112/2
undervote [1] 253/21
undervotes [2] 252/4 252/8
undetectable [4] 196/16 198/8 212/16 244/18
undue [1] 224/1
unexpected [1] 174/11
unfair [1] 41/25
unfortunately [2] 11/3 203/16
unhappy [1] 237/13
unheard [2] 204/18 249/6
unintelligible [1] 257/16
union [1] 199/22
unit [1] 186/17
UNITED [7] \(1 / 1\) 1/12 1/24 217/20 265/3
265/7 265/17
unless [5] 79/5 121/9 190/24 238/10 245/5
unlike [4] 71/17 166/6 217/20 230/1
unlikely [1] 246/3
unreadable [1] 118/15
unresolved [1] 71/9
until [11] 47/23 103/22 117/25 138/15
139/4 195/11 207/10 226/22 247/7
256/24 261/25
unwilling [1] 42/4
up [80] 27/11 27/22 27/23 28/23 35/18 39/19 39/20 40/6 44/9 46/14 49/19 54/9 54/25 55/1 55/23 63/7 69/25 75/11 80/1 80/5 80/11 87/25 88/2 95/2 99/1 101/18 102/16 103/22 104/2 108/12 110/20 113/7 116/7 122/19 123/1 123/14 124/5 125/5 125/16 129/12 129/13 129/17 129/21 129/25 133/23 135/19 139/9

\section*{U}
up... [33] 141/19 143/9 151/10 156/9 160/15 166/7 167/15 175/15 177/6 177/19 179/4 180/8 181/6 182/16 183/21 184/23 185/12 191/25 193/13 197/21 208/13 214/15 217/20 218/15 219/3 227/21 228/16 234/1 240/14 240/16 240/21 258/25 260/20 upcoming [2] 243/23 248/14 updated [2] 217/3 217/23 updates [4] 219/14 219/14 219/15 221/1
upgrades [2] 211/17 220/1
upload [1] 37/1
uploaded [3] 36/1 36/1 36/2
upon [4] 36/7 36/15 38/22 224/9
upsetting [1] 11/8
upstream [1] 129/16
urged [1] 189/23
us [25] \(8 / 11\) 15/2 20/3 27/17 37/22
44/23 45/5 70/8 77/10 96/20 96/20
116/19 116/24 118/19 120/20 125/25
188/18 199/17 210/1 219/20 227/9
235/21 248/7 262/4 262/7
USA [1] 7/20
usability [1] 214/4
use [28] 12/4 20/20 20/23 52/25 52/25 63/23 69/20 70/10 83/25 85/18 100/13
130/25 161/20 175/8 180/23 189/23
203/15 215/4 217/22 222/2 223/10
235/22 235/24 236/5 236/7 244/4
256/16 259/13
used [15] 8/16 36/23 45/9 63/21 91/10 95/24 119/17 122/13 139/12 142/22
143/20 166/3 230/21 237/12 257/18
useful [2] 195/16 195/20
user [1] 134/14
uses [3] 54/6 233/20 252/3
using [14] 11/9 14/2 57/21 65/20 96/12 102/2 121/25 156/19 210/7 230/21
231/15 246/23 251/24 252/24
usually [3] 141/3 190/16 247/8
utilized [2] 37/8 45/19
V
valid [1] 27/7
valuable [1] 227/17
value [5] 26/9 26/13 178/4 215/10
215/11
variability [1] 241/5
variable [1] 229/20
variations [1] 247/18
varied [1] 234/6
variety [1] 39/13
various [5] 18/22 37/19 43/19 107/11 152/16
vast [3] 100/13 170/15 202/7
vectors [1] 211/23
vended [3] 101/13 127/8 127/13
vendor [16] 62/15 66/18 66/24 100/24
101/2 101/5 101/7 113/13 113/17 115/5
120/20 127/16 128/22 194/8 219/15
221/1
verification [1] 220/16
verified [4] 7/21 12/10 12/22 198/9
verify [6] 12/12 130/10 132/22 217/17
226/2 255/1
verifying [1] 251/17
version [5] 116/22 156/3 233/25
239/24 241/15
versus [2] 209/21 231/1
very [49] 8/8 8/9 9/20 9/22 10/16 11/8
11/8 12/3 12/23 14/22 15/11 45/11 46/21 52/18 56/9 61/15 64/13 65/21 108/23 110/16 115/2 118/2 122/10 123/21 126/4 127/2 128/24 136/13 136/15 137/25 143/12 143/24 165/3 198/5 199/3 200/9 204/4 204/24 205/3 211/2 217/14 220/23 233/10 239/24 251/14 255/12 260/8 260/8 262/15 via [2] 13/7 109/25
viable [1] \(27 / 17\)
video [23] 28/11 167/3 167/16 167/18 168/9 169/7 170/12 177/19 177/22 178/10 179/11 179/14 179/19 180/10 183/17 183/21 183/25 184/3 184/7 185/17 207/22 208/2 237/4
videotape [5] 166/13 167/24 168/6
168/21 178/7
view [13] 24/21 26/10 41/19 43/17 139/19 143/11 165/25 200/4 206/4 214/10 218/5 220/9 244/17
viewed [2] 150/18 220/3
views [1] 152/22
VINCENT [1] 3/3
violate [1] 68/19
violation [1] 41/19
violations [1] 28/9
Virginia [1] 253/24
visible [1] 179/11
visit [1] 151/4
vital [3] 123/7 216/11 257/10
vocally [2] 156/19 161/3
VOLUME [1] \(1 / 10\)
volunteer [2] 7/17 7/18
VON [1] 2/10
vote [48] 7/20 7/25 8/7 8/13 8/15 8/18 8/20 9/10 10/20 10/23 10/25 11/8 11/10 11/13 11/20 12/5 12/7 12/8 12/14 12/15 12/17 13/17 13/19 14/1 35/5 38/1 38/1 38/4 198/9 200/25 207/2 217/15 225/5 230/9 230/11 239/16 250/2 250/3 251/10 251/11 251/18 251/20 251/21 251/25 252/10 252/18 252/19 253/7 voted [14] 8/2 8/4 9/14 9/17 9/25 10/17 11/2 206/18 207/1 207/13 217/17 241/16 249/3 253/11
voter [56] 7/23 8/19 11/17 25/10 62/11 62/15 62/21 63/2 63/5 63/11 63/22 63/25 66/24 67/4 67/7 67/11 71/22 100/14 100/18 108/17 166/3 187/19 196/9 197/12 197/15 197/22 198/9 200/7 200/21 201/13 210/8 211/21 216/17 216/24 217/7 218/24 243/15 243/16 249/23 250/4 250/21 251/2 251/7 251/18 251/19 251/24 251/24 252/13 252/24 253/13 254/11 254/14 254/19 254/25 255/11 256/2
voters [10] 200/13 206/18 207/1 242/19 243/3 243/18 245/8 248/19 248/21 249/2
votes [36] 13/21 31/21 33/8 33/11 33/17 33/24 34/1 36/4 36/5 44/17 134/23 178/12 196/10 197/14 198/8 200/15 201/13 201/23 202/17 202/24

203/11 205/10 205/15 206/15 232/19 239/15 240/19 241/16 242/10 242/11 242/16 242/19 247/6 248/24 249/6 249/18
voting [64] 7/22 8/9 8/10 8/16 8/24 9/1 9/12 9/16 9/19 9/23 10/2 10/13 12/2 31/25 34/25 35/2 35/4 51/15 51/20 76/15 77/1 78/15 82/9 101/3 101/6 101/10 109/4 109/14 111/1 111/4 111/23 112/19 118/24 134/23 135/21 138/18 139/11 139/12 142/22 144/17 156/10 164/8 167/1 180/22 184/19 197/14 198/12 201/21 202/8 203/25 203/25 204/1 204/5 204/21 205/10 212/18 216/18 220/11 220/14 230/25 231/4 233/19 255/2 259/13
vs [1] \(1 / 5\)
vulnerabilities [17] 51/15 51/20 70/23 71/25 81/16 87/23 140/23 144/16 149/1 165/9 188/5 188/6 188/9 188/10 196/3 200/6 225/20
vulnerability [2] 200/14 201/13
vulnerable [2] 197/2 200/8

\section*{w}
wait [4] 54/20 250/23 261/21 261/25
waiting [4] 39/4 181/21 227/20 259/20
waive [2] 146/9 224/1
waived [1] 146/7
waiver [1] 135/7
waiving [1] 220/22
walk [9] 33/16 34/25 35/2 35/4 44/23
197/12 205/13 214/8 214/9
walked [2] 242/2 263/22
walking [3] 44/14 210/25 256/3
want [63] 11/10 21/10 25/18 26/5
31/15 32/16 33/4 35/18 39/11 42/7 42/10 42/20 46/1 57/11 80/4 83/15 101/20 105/5 106/16 106/18 107/21 115/14 118/9 118/13 122/7 123/25 125/2 131/10 132/24 135/7 142/10 142/18 145/12 151/4 152/16 158/8 174/12 175/4 182/16 184/2 187/12 208/11 216/12 220/22 224/10 225/18 237/15 238/1 242/3 245/5 251/15 252/10 252/13 252/18 253/6 254/15 254/21 254/22 260/24 261/5 261/14 262/5 263/12
wanted [21] 11/12 27/9 27/23 39/5 44/16 104/22 113/5 119/11 124/11 125/16 143/13 149/21 163/5 192/1
208/12 228/16 228/17 237/23 242/5 263/24 264/1
wanting [3] 80/4 118/19 215/2
wants [5] 44/6 46/20 89/10 223/20 256/7
warning [1] 263/19
warrant [1] 124/24
was [533]
Washington [1] 189/13
wasn't [16] 20/10 55/18 80/22 90/5 90/7 90/9 93/1 128/6 135/17 135/20 152/21 154/4 157/14 181/9 238/19 241/7
waste [2] 68/20 151/18
watch [1] 193/21
watched [3] 167/3 167/23 168/8
water [5] 129/10 129/12 129/13 147/24

\section*{W}
water... [1] 169/13
Watson [1] 180/1
way [60] 8/6 10/11 13/17 13/23 21/25 25/20 27/6 27/17 34/3 41/25 46/15 80/5 84/16 103/22 116/11 123/7 129/12 129/16 134/20 134/23 139/15 150/9 153/3 153/6 159/15 163/19 174/4 181/15 186/17 187/9 187/11 187/18 189/10 189/11 196/16 197/20 197/21 198/8 200/9 200/9 203/3 212/16 217/12 219/20 227/21 227/22 230/6 233/6 233/20 234/13 240/21 241/25 242/18 244/18 245/12 250/22 252/3 252/23 254/5 257/4
ways [4] 141/2 219/20 241/25 251/4 we [470]
we'll [17] 38/8 46/24 110/18 113/8 113/8 117/12 124/4 158/20 163/17 163/24 174/13 192/1 227/16 260/2 261/5 261/18 262/1
we're [69] 17/6 17/12 21/4 24/5 24/7 25/1 27/1 32/11 34/12 34/22 35/6 39/4 40/13 42/10 42/11 42/25 44/7 44/19 45/23 46/19 69/24 81/25 90/25 92/22 106/19 115/17 116/17 117/18 121/25 122/1 123/1 123/4 129/7 137/25 139/22 143/16 146/11 150/7 151/1 157/6 158/13 158/16 158/16 172/12 176/7 176/11 176/12 176/25 178/20 191/21 198/24 200/24 206/1 206/2 208/6 209/3 219/19 219/25 220/4 220/22 221/25 226/18 227/18 246/2 251/1 261/1 261/21 261/22 262/10
we've [16] 21/3 27/12 40/5 46/18 80/21 154/2 182/3 200/8 205/21 205/25
207/14 213/3 228/12 229/20 244/9 261/22
weakness [2] 131/12 132/5
weaknesses [5] 112/3 131/17 132/17
132/17 132/18
weather [1] 121/2
weeds [2] 67/18 251/16
week [8] 15/23 16/21 22/5 24/20
138/10 138/10 238/17 259/7
weekend [1] 155/25
weeks [5] 93/16 94/6 139/2 236/13
242/23
WEIGEL [1] \(3 / 8\)
weight [2] 123/11 177/9
Weiman [5] 189/3 189/6 189/12 189/22 189/23
WEINHARDT [5] 2/6 4/12 4/19 4/22 47/4
WELCH [3] 1/23 265/6 265/16 well [99] \(8 / 109 / 3\) 9/17 10/4 10/16
11/19 12/3 17/1 20/16 21/7 23/25 24/11 24/14 25/13 30/11 30/18 30/22 34/22 37/10 39/20 42/21 46/1 48/25 50/24 51/23 56/6 67/16 67/17 69/2 71/24 72/4 74/10 75/25 76/10 83/3 94/13 99/5 100/22 101/7 101/20 103/19 103/20 103/23 104/17 106/21 108/9 123/4 129/2 130/5 130/8 132/3 136/23 141/4 146/6 146/11 148/7 150/12 150/22 157/7 159/17 162/5 165/2 172/16 177/1 180/13 181/9 182/2 183/20 188/20

196/6 198/12 202/2 203/4 206/21 210/13 210/22 211/14 214/23 222/3 223/6 226/1 227/3 228/3 228/4 231/10 233/24 235/4 236/23 247/24 248/23 253/13 253/17 254/4 256/2 257/22 260/6 260/8 263/22 264/3
well-above [1] 235/4
Wenke [6] 156/14 157/20 160/20 160/25 162/9 163/7
Wenke's [1] 161/13
went [14] 7/13 81/23 136/17 150/10 160/15 162/21 177/19 180/2 185/10 209/24 219/22 221/2 235/5 235/13 were [190] 6/6 10/5 10/18 10/22 11/7 15/2 15/3 15/4 17/24 19/7 20/3 20/5 21/15 21/23 22/5 22/10 22/12 23/21 23/22 24/3 24/16 26/12 27/6 27/7 28/6 28/10 28/15 30/11 34/17 36/4 36/8 37/9 38/18 39/6 39/7 39/18 40/4 41/10 41/15 42/18 43/10 43/19 44/11 44/13 47/20 49/18 57/12 66/23 69/17 71/7 71/8 72/1 73/2 73/20 77/19 77/22 79/22 82/6 84/4 84/18 84/21 85/1 85/17 88/2 90/3 90/3 91/8 92/12 92/17 99/7 100/6 100/14 101/11 102/7 102/16 102/24 103/13 103/14 105/6 108/15 111/9 118/18 118/19 119/7 120/4 120/6 124/9 125/3 125/4 125/15 125/17 126/5 128/15 130/14 131/22 131/23 132/9 132/12 133/23 134/16 134/20 135/10 135/22 138/23 148/5 152/6 153/10 154/1 155/21 156/11 158/17 158/18 159/16 161/5 161/9 164/10 166/24 167/7 168/25 169/4 169/24 170/13 170/15 171/15 172/21 173/8 174/1 174/2 181/17 181/21 182/1 182/10 182/25 185/3 188/15 189/7 189/17 190/4 197/17 200/19 200/19 200/20 202/17 202/21 202/23 206/14 211/3 211/7 211/15 211/20 211/20 213/17 213/18 217/15 217/15 217/16 217/16 217/17 219/21 221/21 222/11 224/14 225/21 225/22 226/7 227/5 232/1 233/13 234/21 235/4 236/18 236/21 237/6 237/9 237/10 237/11 237/17 238/9 240/15 240/23 241/8 241/16 242/19 243/8 243/23 244/3 246/22 255/8 256/9 264/5
weren't [12] 18/13 18/13 44/25 50/16 51/6 51/12 51/18 87/25 135/15 157/14 193/3 236/23
what [290]
What's [1] 92/22
whatever [11] 10/25 35/15 45/21 52/4 98/20 127/19 128/24 129/4 162/21 193/3 259/24
when [109] \(7 / 25\) 11/13 12/8 12/14 13/19 22/5 34/25 35/2 35/4 39/23 39/23 39/25 40/8 41/5 43/10 43/10 44/11 48/24 57/5 57/18 63/14 73/13 77/23 80/16 83/3 83/21 85/5 85/5 85/5 85/16 90/9 92/21 98/4 98/12 98/13 101/7 102/2 103/6 103/19 104/12 108/7 109/20 109/21 110/11 114/2 114/12 115/11 118/13 118/20 119/3 126/25 127/15 130/18 130/20 130/22 134/23 136/2 139/18 141/3 144/10 144/21 144/22 144/25 145/1 145/4 145/15

147/16 149/6 157/9 157/9 162/1 168/4 174/1 174/14 174/20 180/25 181/1 184/10 185/5 186/17 189/16 189/16 193/4 195/22 206/2 211/19 211/24 212/4 213/16 214/6 215/21 216/23 221/25 226/25 233/11 233/14 233/19 236/1 241/2 241/4 241/8 241/14 242/22 251/23 253/21 254/11 255/16 255/20 256/5
whenever [2] 84/15 118/9 where [60] 7/6 28/14 28/17 33/10 35/25 37/1 37/3 37/3 45/23 46/23 55/25 59/6 61/15 65/15 70/4 70/22 75/17 80/18 80/20 82/6 115/21 116/18 119/7 136/16 142/24 143/19 154/4 154/8 155/10 162/18 174/2 178/11 179/2 188/8 189/18 197/25 199/11 201/12 201/22 202/17 202/20 203/1 206/14 207/12 209/8 213/4 214/18 216/20 228/16 230/12 235/9 235/10 244/20 246/7 247/7 249/18 255/10 259/19 260/2 261/21
whereof [1] 265/12
Whereupon [4] 6/21 15/13 47/14 137/10
whether [63] 12/19 14/13 24/3 28/20 30/23 94/15 106/17 107/22 111/9 117/12 119/6 125/4 127/21 131/15 134/5 134/7 134/10 134/13 134/16 134/19 134/22 141/23 143/6 145/23 146/1 146/21 146/24 149/6 149/16 149/21 149/23 151/8 151/9 151/15 152/17 153/2 153/17 155/9 158/20 161/14 162/13 163/21 166/19 172/16 172/18 172/20 182/20 183/11 183/23 183/24 184/11 184/18 187/5 187/9 190/12 197/5 200/25 205/10 205/15 223/22 224/2 224/9 240/16
which [95] 11/1 12/18 14/8 17/6 22/1 22/2 23/3 24/19 33/11 35/11 36/17 36/22 37/2 37/14 37/25 40/15 40/21 42/22 44/3 49/20 54/5 56/17 57/21 67/3 67/11 68/17 69/12 72/20 73/15 73/20 79/1 84/18 92/9 103/4 104/3 104/4 104/4 107/20 114/9 116/9 117/21 122/10 129/9 130/20 131/13 132/6 138/4 138/21 140/10 140/10 143/13 144/2 145/12 146/18 156/25 158/15 164/8 164/23 170/12 170/24 174/12 185/10 185/13 191/23 193/15 196/6 197/1 198/20 200/7 203/10 203/15 207/22 210/7 210/18 211/21 215/4 215/21 216/25 216/25 218/23 219/17 220/12 222/10 235/20 236/7 237/12 243/14 244/6 244/18 246/21 248/8 248/14 256/8 256/13 256/23
Whichever [1] 245/18
while [11] 22/6 24/12 25/6 39/4 83/9 120/4 123/15 139/6 188/15 189/7 246/16
white [4] 77/18 77/19 77/20 77/25 who [76] 11/19 14/12 17/17 18/2 18/7 19/22 20/2 29/7 29/9 29/12 30/23 92/5 103/16 109/18 110/7 111/13 113/22 120/6 120/7 122/12 125/3 126/5 132/25 133/25 135/1 135/2 137/1 139/7 139/25 147/8 147/17 149/15 153/13 156/13 161/20 171/10 176/3 176/4 183/8 184/8
who... [36] 192/23 193/1 195/14
195/17 196/25 197/5 200/4 201/13
206/18 207/1 213/8 217/16 217/17
217/25 218/1 218/10 219/2 219/3 219/6 222/7 222/20 222/20 224/9 232/17 233/14 234/20 237/19 238/3 238/14 248/21 249/3 253/13 253/24 256/2 259/2 262/3
whole [15] 7/8 25/1 30/24 67/22 131/20 131/21 157/5 159/18 174/24 177/6 214/10 218/18 218/19 222/12 229/18
whom [1] 101/12
Whose [1] 135/25
why [42] 8/9 8/23 10/15 24/4 25/10
25/18 27/10 27/10 34/17 42/6 42/13
42/15 46/9 48/5 54/8 69/21 70/2 72/10
72/14 83/13 84/12 85/8 85/12 98/2
117/11 130/9 143/4 151/1 159/17 187/6
188/24 199/8 200/7 222/11 225/18
227/20 238/17 242/7 244/6 254/7 261/3 261/3
wife [1] 262/13
will [42] \(1 / 38 / 2012 / 415 / 515 / 615 / 7\) 20/19 43/23 46/4 46/6 46/10 67/16 68/17 69/1 70/10 98/10 118/10 121/18 131/4 139/21 139/22 140/1 144/7
159/19 161/7 163/4 166/6 215/18
223/19 225/12 225/18 229/12 229/14
237/6 237/6 239/16 246/4 248/8 253/15
253/17 254/21 258/17
willful [1] 41/19
WILLIAM [2] 2/13 2/18
willing [1] 170/6
window [2] 102/5 197/16
windows [2] 97/5 196/8
wing [1] 18/10
winner [1] 235/19
winning [1] 237/25
wipe [1] 130/19
wiped [1] 21/24
wish [1] \(8 / 15\)
withdraw [2] 191/22 192/1
withdrawn [1] 58/21
withdrew [1] 202/22
withheld [4] 81/6 116/12 119/18 123/5
within [14] 19/23 24/5 31/24 34/17
63/11 64/1 74/6 82/18 107/9 107/10
108/21 108/25 111/3 172/7
without [18] 10/7 26/13 70/18 89/15
131/6 132/15 150/13 160/25 161/5
165/2 193/9 206/4 226/2 227/16 248/3
249/5 254/6 257/4
witness [43] 4/3 5/2 6/15 14/19 18/20
23/7 27/11 38/7 38/11 39/5 39/10 47/5
47/8 51/23 51/24 54/15 68/21 86/18
92/4 95/13 99/11 106/10 106/14 107/20
119/5 121/25 122/16 133/5 135/8 135/10 135/11 137/1 137/4 141/10 142/7 146/21 160/19 254/5 254/8 260/25 262/10 263/3 263/4
witness' [4] 25/19 221/19 222/11 224/11
witnesses [3] 176/4 177/5 208/13 won't [4] 42/7 70/18 245/8 253/14 wondered [1] 121/11

Wood [2] 23/1 23/21
word [6] 57/21 184/22 185/23 191/10 229/5 232/8
words [2] 91/14 226/12
work [45] 7/17 7/18 10/2 43/15 46/24 52/23 70/5 70/18 73/14 76/20 76/23 80/1 80/8 80/14 81/20 82/7 82/16 82/18 96/20 102/7 103/9 129/16 135/9 138/11 152/11 152/15 153/5 153/5 157/15 174/22 186/22 188/21 195/5 195/16 201/24 208/4 211/5 214/21 214/24 216/15 220/1 241/23 241/24 243/9 260/18
worked [6] 7/19 75/23 76/4 135/2 195/21 214/21
workers [6] 174/7 174/7 197/24 232/11 256/21 256/25
working [14] 9/3 55/5 76/10 102/24 103/13 103/25 126/23 134/1 215/12 234/2 248/17 248/18 248/23 248/24
workings [2] 153/3 153/7
works [8] 77/8 108/25 153/3 186/17 195/3 216/15 220/2 259/4
world [5] 27/21 242/25 243/25 249/20 253/22
worried [2] 199/16 206/1
worry [1] 206/23
worrying [1] 223/12
worthwhile [1] 133/7
would [306]
wouldn't [30] 20/11 37/6 49/24 77/19 88/3 93/18 123/9 128/5 128/18 135/17 150/7 172/15 177/8 184/23 198/11 203/16 206/23 206/24 207/10 211/1 222/25 229/4 229/6 238/16 238/19 243/18 244/13 244/14 256/8 258/15
Wow [1] 136/21
wrap [2] 35/18 258/25
wrap-up [1] 35/18
write [5] 40/3 40/4 63/16 74/9 248/6
writes [3] 63/18 171/14 173/18
writing [5] 84/7 84/13 84/21 85/22 250/18
written [24] 31/2 40/11 41/7 41/8 44/15 84/10 85/2 85/4 85/8 88/9 161/23 177/23 204/10 205/8 205/12 205/14 205/18 205/21 206/11 206/25 232/1 234/15 236/25 258/9
wrong [18] 120/23 130/15 163/17 202/18 207/13 207/13 217/5 217/10 217/16 228/23 230/24 238/14 240/19 242/11 243/19 245/20 247/15 249/1 wrote [5] 63/23 67/5 78/14 100/22 172/23

\section*{Y}
y'all [1] 46/17
yeah [29] 61/4 83/17 94/11 95/14 107/19 130/18 140/6 148/1 155/6 157/1 160/11 162/4 162/19 163/11 169/14 170/23 180/14 181/8 181/18 190/18 196/1 208/5 209/1 209/24 220/21 221/17 258/3 260/10 260/23
year [19] 47/24 69/16 70/2 70/6 70/7 70/14 71/8 71/13 72/7 74/8 85/24 86/2 86/3 90/2 90/2 120/9 221/23 221/24 231/18
years [29] 9/3 9/8 10/4 10/5 10/6 49/11

53/4 55/11 55/14 72/7 72/8 79/14 85/7 85/10 87/24 88/7 88/10 92/18 92/18 92/20 104/13 114/3 117/10 124/7 145/1 165/24 195/9 209/15 231/18
yell [1] 166/1
Yep [5] 60/4 65/24 96/24 126/2 140/14 yes [321]
yesterday [6] 39/8 40/13 40/17 40/19 41/15 42/18
yet [5] 17/13 64/9 159/16 161/23 219/22
you [1195]
you'll [9] 40/19 40/24 40/25 41/4 171/2
173/12 261/16 261/21 261/22
you're [59] 48/19 50/19 53/14 53/16
53/24 57/21 61/8 72/2 73/17 74/4 83/24 93/7 95/14 98/20 101/20 102/17 105/16 111/6 122/19 131/18 132/13 144/14 150/11 156/6 156/18 160/23 164/6 165/3 165/4 166/24 174/15 176/14 177/17 180/5 182/24 187/15 188/9 193/16 198/10 199/19 206/25 207/3 207/3 212/12 212/17 226/2 229/2 230/16 231/8 232/22 237/3 241/5 241/23 247/21 248/2 249/4 252/20 260/24 261/19
you've [6] 101/21 129/10 141/8 162/23 167/3 185/1
you-all [6] 14/24 15/3 46/9 46/24
159/16 222/22
young [1] \(7 / 10\)
your [379]
yourself [14] 7/2 7/4 124/14 128/4
140/20 145/14 154/8 154/16 155/4 155/18 192/8 209/12 211/14 236/13 yourselves [2] 46/9 260/25 YouTube [4] 28/11 177/19 185/17 237/5
Z
Zoom [3] 13/7 228/13 228/14```

