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                                    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                    FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION
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DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS, DOCKET NUMBER vs.

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL - VOLUME 7B PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE AMY TOTENBERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT SENIOR JUDGE JANUARY 18, 2024

MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY OF PROCEEDINGS AND COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY:

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Whereupon,
MARIE FRANCES WATSON,
after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Good morning, Ms. Watson.
A. Good morning.
Q. I'm David Cross. I represent some of the plaintiffs in this case, including Donna Curling.

Are you familiar with this lawsuit?
A. A little.
Q. Have you ever heard anyone talk about the Curling litigation when you were working at the Secretary's office in the investigations unit?
A. Just making reference to it. But no specifics.
Q. Okay. And so what is your current occupation?
A. Assistant deputy commissioner for the Georgia Department of Revenue.
Q. And what is your -- just generally, your responsibilities in that role?
A. I have three different divisions. One is the motor vehicle division, local government services and the law enforcement division, which is alcohol, tobacco and office of special investigations.
Q. And are you still doing investigative work, or is it
different work now?
A. I have two law enforcement groups that report to me. I'm still a POST certified law enforcement officer.
Q. Do you do investigations yourself now or you just supervise?
A. I supervise.
Q. When did you begin that position?
A. In November of 2021.
Q. And did you move there directly from the Secretary of State's office?
A. I did.
Q. So you -- was there a downtime or did you go -- well, let me ask you this. When was your last day at the Secretary's office?
A. I believe it was the 15 th of November.
Q. Why did you leave the Secretary's office?
A. I was advised of an open position at the Department of Revenue, which I applied for and interviewed for and was selected.
Q. So was it your decision to leave the Secretary's office?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What was your role at the Secretary's office when you left?
A. Chief Investigator of Investigations Division.
Q. How long were you in that role?
A. I went into the chief investigator role in June of 2019.
Q. Generally, what were your responsibilities in that role?
A. Our division had civilian inspectors which did inspections for various professional licensing boards and also investigators that did investigations for the professional licensing boards and the other boards within Secretary of State's office, including elections, corporations, securities, and charities.
Q. The investigators in -- sorry.

What is the official title of that division within the Secretary's office that you headed up?
A. I believe it is Investigations Division.
Q. The investigators in the Investigations Division that reported to you, did those folks include certified law enforcement personnel like yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. And did that -- do you recall Investigator Josh Blanchard?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he a certified law enforcement official?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you say briefly what is involved to become a certified law enforcement official?
A. Yes.

There is some entry requirements as far as passing physical, backgrounds, age requirements. The things that are
listed in the Georgia code that are -- for the requirements. And psychological evaluations. Polygraph --
Q. Did you say polygraph?
A. Yes -- examination. There could be additional requirements depending on the department. And after you pass those, then you go to a police academy and complete the police academy.
Q. Is there -- to get that certification, is there training required on how to conduct an investigation -- how to conduct a law enforcement investigation?
A. There are various trainings. There are -- in the basic police academy training, there are interviews, interrogations, rules of evidence, collecting evidence, you know, various trainings throughout that. But then there's also additional yearly trainings and further trainings along the way. Q. How long is the police academy attendance that is required for the certification?
A. It depends on when you went and which one that you attend. But -- so I don't know at this particular time how long that is, if it is 12 to 16 weeks. I'm not sure. And again, depending on the department. Some departments have their own, which are longer.
Q. When you were the head of the Investigative Division at the Secretary's office, was there a general period of attendance at the police academy that was expected to be a law
enforcement investigator in that division?
A. The officers that came to us were certified law enforcements prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office.
Q. When you were deciding whether to hire an investigator, was there a minimum of days or weeks of attendance at the police academy that you were looking for to decide whether someone was qualified?
A. We looked for their experience and also the completion of the -- a POST certified training academy in Georgia. So they have a POST certification issued through Georgia.
Q. You mentioned that part of the training is on how to conduct interviews and interrogations; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you give us just a general overview of the training that investigators in the Investigative Division when you were there -- the training that they were required to have on how to conduct an interview or an interrogation?
A. That training would have been provided through a POST certified academy or regional academy or in-service training. The standard training that is put on by -- through the POST officer certification standards and training.
Q. If a law enforcement officer were interviewing or interrogating someone suspected of a crime, would it be consistent with accepted law enforcement principles or
standards if that person says I did not commit a crime to just accept that as true and not conduct any further investigation?
A. It would depend on the circumstances of that situation.
Q. What if it was someone that had shown themselves in the past to be combative and noncooperative with an investigation?
A. It still would depend on that individual circumstance.
Q. So you still might just simply accept they are telling you the truth and move on?
A. Depending on the circumstance.
Q. Ms. Watson, you should have a binder in front of you. If can flip to Tab 18. And you can -- the first page you'll see is just metadata so you see it with the document. You can disregard that.

Flip to the substantive document. At the top it says investigations and then there is ZBB.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you look down at the bottom, you'll see that there -- it says State defendants and there is a number next to that.

## A. Yes.

Q. Do you understand this is a document that was produced to us by the State defendants in this case?
A. I'm not familiar with that. But ...
Q. Okay. Take a moment to just look through this, if you
would, and then tell me whether you recognize it.
A. Not specifically, I do not. It look --
Q. It is not a document you recall seeing before?
A. I could have at one time. It looks like something that would be submitted with a -- to the office of budget for the State is what it appears to be.
Q. Sorry. You said the office of what?
A. Professional budget, OPB.
Q. And a document like this would be submitted to the office of professional budget for what purpose?
A. That was not my role. So I -- if we were requested to provide data, we would provide answers or specific parts of data points for them.
Q. So in your role as the head of the Investigative Division, you had seen documents similar to this?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And if you look at the top, do you see where it refers to ZBB?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know -- is that somebody's initials? Do you know what that refers to?
A. I do not know what that refers to.
Q. Anyone you can think of who had those initials or --
A. Not off the top of my head.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move into evidence Exhibit 597.

THE COURT: Are there objections?
MS. LaROSS: Yes, Your Honor. I'm not sure that this witness has properly authenticated this document. She said she may have seen it but doesn't recall it. So I'm not sure that for purposes of authentication or identification that those requirements are met on this document.

THE COURT: Well, is this --
MS. LaROSS: So it contains hearsay. I mean, she speculated about that. But there is hearsay within it.

THE COURT: Apparently State defendants provided it in response to discovery. I mean, it says State defendants and then the number.

Does -- can the State defendants identify whether or not they did produce this?

MS. LaROSS: Yeah. I believe we have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And just sort of to cut to the quick, was it information the State defendants developed or is it something from a -- is it an interrogatory answer? Is it a document that is used in the -- like as part of a report on what the functions of the agency are?

I mean, let's -- I would rather we just, you know, you actually -- if we could get some information about what it is.

And let me start off just simply asking plaintiffs' counsel, do you -- obviously you took this from the discovery answer. To your knowledge, what is it and what was it in response to? And then I'm going to turn it back to defense counsel.

MR. CROSS: My understanding is when we asked for investigative documents, this is one of the documents that was produced by the State defendants concerning how the Secretary of State conducts investigations.

So I was going to have her -- I was going to walk her through it to -- really just to confirm that what is here, is it or is it not consistent with her experience in how investigations are conducted, to use it as a reference tool for her.

THE COURT: All right.
MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, it is my understanding that the investigative documents would have had a bit of a different Bates number. So this may have just been a general document.

I don't know if it is a draft or where it is from.
THE COURT: Well --
MS. LaROSS: I don't believe it is in the pretrial order either.

MR. CROSS: We have an agreement on that, guys.
MS. LaROSS: Excuse me? I didn't hear.
MR. CROSS: Yeah. That is not a fair objection.

MS. LaROSS: Okay.
MR. CROSS: The authenticity, Your Honor, she says she has seen documents like this. They produced it. They Bates stamped it. It is theirs. I'm not offering it for the truth. I just want to walk her through it for her to tell me whether certain things are consistent with the way things are handled. She can tell us what is true or not.

THE COURT: All right. Well --
MS. LaROSS: To the extent that he is not offering it for the truth and he is going to walk her through the specific details of it, that would be using -- depending upon and relying on the truth of the document. So we would still have our hearsay objection there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't think it relies on the truth of the document. I think just simply you-all produced it. I don't know when you produced it.

But does counsel know that it was produced by the State in response to a particular request, and what was the particular request?

MR. CROSS: I apologize, Your Honor. I don't -- when they produce documents, they don't tie them to requests. I don't know -- we have lots of requests this would be responsive to, because we had lots of requests about conducting investigations, investigations related to election security, which this addresses specifically.

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    I can find a request if that helps the Court. But I
can't --
THE COURT: No. That is all right. I'm going to --
I mean, it clearly -- and I don't know why it was classified by
the State as confidential because it doesn't look very
confidential.
    But in any event, why don't you direct the witness to
the specific information you want her to review and ask her if
that's --
    MR. CROSS: That's what I was going to do.
    THE COURT: -- what was consistent. And let's not
spend too much time on this.
    MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Ms. Watson, you mentioned earlier that in the
Investigative Division when you were there you had inspectors
and you had investigators; right?
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A. Correct.
Q. And investigations are a more in-depth examination of an individual or situation than an inspection; is that fair?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said you had -- your division had responsibility for investigation specifically into election issues; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And that would include election security -- security of the election system?
A. Responding to specific complaints or referrals to us, I would say yes. But not the overall security.
Q. Your office would have been responsible for responding to a complaint that could be submitted to the Elections Division or the Investigations Division from the public, city or state election officials, or others; is that fair?
A. We responded to complaints from numerous sources.
Q. And so if a concern came in that there was a potential security issue with the election system and that came to your office, you were expected to investigate that; right?
A. If it was within -- depending on what that specific complaint was, yes.
Q. When you were the head of the office, was there a written policy or procedure that laid out step by step this is how investigators should investigate any complaint or concern raised relating to the election system?
A. Not to my knowledge, no.
Q. So when you tasked someone like Investigator Blanchard with investigating a complaint or a concern that came in related to the election system, what was your expectation of how he knew what to do, what steps to take?
A. Do you have a specific complaint that we're referring to?
Q. I'm just asking you generally: When you tasked him with
looking into a concern related to the election system -- well, let me ask it this way.

Did you have an expectation that he would know what to do, what steps to take to look into that?
A. It would depend on what the specific allegation is.
Q. So there would be some allegations where you would task him with an investigation and you had no idea -- no expectation as to how he would deal with that?
A. Again, it would depend. If I knew what the specific allegation was, then $I$ would know better how to advise him or direct him.
Q. Isn't a basic principle of law enforcement is that it is important to have standard operating procedures for things like investigations?
A. For general reports and those procedures, yes.
Q. When you were the head of the Investigations Division, you had no written standard operating procedure for how to conduct an investigation related to the election system?
A. There was the general -- general guidance on how to conduct the investigation as far as contacting complainants, witnesses, obtaining statements, and documents if needed depending on the individual complaint and case depending on which -- each case is different. Each case requires different follow-up.
Q. So to come back to my question, Ms. Watson, when you were
the head of the Investigations Division, there is not a written document you could point the court to that says here are standard operating procedures for how to conduct an investigation relating to the election system; is that right?
A. I would say that there is a training document that outlines the -- what is required as far as a specific case that is provided to the new hires and also do on-the-job training between an -- individual investigators.
Q. Okay. So take a look at the -- going back to Exhibit 597, the second page of the document, the top -- just to give you the context, look at the bottom of the first page.

Do you see there is Number 4 heading, how are elections investigations typically handled by the division?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. If you come to the top of the second page, do you see that?

If you go to the end of the second line, do you see the sentence beginning, depending?

Do you see that, Ms. Watson?
A. Yes.
Q. And here it reads, depending on the complexity of the case determines the length of time it may take to complete. Some cases may require one site visit to review documents or gather a statement. Others may require many field interviews and
review of thousands of documents. When the investigators have completed their initial investigations, the case file is submitted to supervision for review.

Once the review process has been completed, the case file is placed in a pending status awaiting presentation to the State Election Board. Depending on the investigative findings, recommendations are made to the state Election Board for action on each case, such as being bound over to the Attorney General's office when code violations are substantiated, issuing a letter of instruction based on a code violation, or even dismissal when there are no substantiated violations found.

The State Election Board can act on the recommendations given or they can move to make their own determination based on the findings. Those actions can include referring the entire investigative file to a county district attorney's office for criminal prosecution depending on the severity of the violation.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. In your time as the head of the Investigative Division, does that generally capture the way investigations were expected to be done with respect to concerns or complaints regarding election investigations?
A. Generally, yes. Although we could receive numerous
complaints that were not -- did not have any specific allegations of a code violation. They could be -- I received numerous emails of the election was stolen or just a general vent that there was nothing specific there.

There were also some that would require just one phone call to be able to answer a voter's concern as to whether their vote counted or any specific thing that would not require a complete investigation.
Q. Are you familiar with Chris Harvey?
A. Yes.
Q. He was the State election director for several years; right?
A. Yes.
Q. He was a State election director while you were the head of the Investigative Division; right?
A. Yes.
Q. He sometimes referred election-related concerns to you for investigation; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. He is -- he was the most senior election official in the State -- well, let me put it this way.

He was the most senior official in the State whose responsibilities were specific to elections across the State; right?
A. I don't know whether he was the most senior or not. He
was certainly very knowledgeable.
Q. And you certainly took seriously any concern that Mr. Harvey passed on to you and asked you to investigate regarding elections; right?
A. He would send me anything that came to his attention that was not something that the -- his election division would follow up on. It could be something as far as an allegation that some person voted twice or something that came from a county official. It could be any number of things that he would send to me, and we would review and process accordingly.
Q. Is the answer to my question yes or no?
A. We would take all -- all of the information that he would provide, yes.
Q. Seriously? You would take it seriously?
A. Of course.
Q. Okay. Now, if you come back to the second page of 597, you see there is a heading of five, when would an investigation be completed?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then if you come down to Subparagraph B, it says, average number of days that election cases remain open.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And it reads, historically we have spanned a range from

115 to 199 days on average closures for elections investigations. Our investigative timeline goal is being established at 180 days on SEB investigations.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have any reason, based on your experience as the head of the Investigative Division, that that data there is inaccurate?

MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, excuse me. I would just interpose an objection. The top of this document indicates that -- the year 2018, which predated when Ms. Watson was chief investigator. So I don't think the questions pertain to her being chief investigator.

MR. CROSS: She can say it is consistent with her time there or it is not.

MS. LaROSS: And we can establish that. I just want to make sure the record is clear.

THE COURT: All right. It says 2018, parens, FY 2020, just to be complete.

MS. LaROSS: Yeah. If they are asking for -- you know, if they were -- if it was a budgetary process, I don't know, or anticipating. This might be based on 2018 data. But just so the record is clear.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, it seems like it is projected for the 2020, and you are all welcome to go back
and look at what you did in order to produce this document, too, if you want.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Ms. Watson, let me give you the question again.

The data that we read there that historically the Investigations Division in the Secretary's office for elections cases spanned a range from 115 to 199 days on average for closures and had a goal of 180 days for SEB investigations, is that generally consistent with your experience as the head of the division?
A. I would say the average, taking the ones that may take a -- either a one trip out compared to the ones that may take over a year, that the average is consistent with what I'm familiar with.
Q. Okay. All right. Flip to -- if you look at the bottom right corner, there is a page that ends in 248 . It is the bottom number. I think it is about four pages in. And it has got a heading of Number 17 on the top.

MR. CROSS: One more, Tony. Actually, they all have 248. Go to the one that ends in 252. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you see the heading 17, why is the Investigations Division missing from the SOS website?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, was the Investigations Division missing from the Secretary of State's website at some point during your experience or to your knowledge?
A. I don't know that it was missing. I don't think that the Investigations Division had a separate tab for people to open.
Q. If you come down to heading 19, you see where it reads, how many investigators are employed?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It says, number of allotted positions.

And then it reads, including director, deputy director and supervisors, there are 23 criminal investigators.

And then parenthesis, one director, one deputy director, two supervisors, and 19 criminal investigators.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. In your time as the director of the Investigative Division, how many positions did you have for criminal investigators?

Was it roughly about this?
A. It was roughly that, yes, depending on vacancies.
Q. Okay.

All right. You can put that aside. Thank you.
All right. So you mentioned earlier one of the things your division did was investigate concerns or complaints that
came in. Could be voters. It could be Mr. Harvey or others related to the election system.

Right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Can you flip to Tab 13, please? And this is Exhibit 254.

If you turn to the last page of Exhibit 254 , you see there is an email here that you sent to Ryan Germany and some others on October 29 of 2020?
A. Yes.
Q. And you included Jordan Fuchs on this; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you send this to Mr. Germany and Ms. Fuchs?
A. Because Ryan Germany is -- was our general counsel and Jordan Fuchs was my direct supervisor.
Q. Do you know at this time who Ms. Fuchs reported to -- who her direct supervisor was?
A. The Secretary, Brad Raffensperger.
Q. So there was only one -- you were senior enough in the Secretary's office, there was only one supervisor between you and the Secretary himself; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. So fair to say this concern that came in in October of 2020 was serious enough to you that you raised it with the general counsel and one of the second most senior officials in

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the Secretary's office; right?
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A. Of course.
Q. What is reported here is that a poll worker at the North Fulton Government Service Center provided an account of an activity that occurred and states, on October 10 -- I'm sorry. On October 23rd, 2020, one of the poll worker's computers was accessed remotely somewhere else by taking control of the computer and deleting information from the computer.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. What is the exhibit number?
MR. CROSS: Oh, I'm sorry. It is Exhibit 254, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: And it is in Tab --
MR. CROSS: It is Tab 13.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So then if you come to the preceding page, you see there is an email from Adrick Hall on October 29, 2020, copying you and sent to James Callaway?
A. Yes.
Q. Who are Mr. Hall and Mr. Callaway?
A. James Callaway was the deputy chief investigator, and Adrick Hall was the supervisor for the north -- Atlanta north

Georgia office of investigations.
Q. Are you familiar with someone named Mr. Braun that appears to have been in the Investigations Division at that time?
A. Yes. He was an investigator in the Atlanta office.
Q. And did you or someone else in your office, to your knowledge, task Mr. Braun with investigating this concern?
A. Yes.
Q. And we see here that Mr. Braun went out and obtained written statements from the poll manager, the poll worker, and IT personnel concerning this laptop; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall that the laptop was actually taken in by the Secretary's office for examination?
A. Yes.
Q. And the laptop was provided to a company called Fortalice; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Fortalice is -- well, how would you characterize Fortalice's role with respect to assisting the Investigations Division while you were there?
A. I'm not familiar with any other involvement with them other than that -- this -- they were -- in asking specifically who we should forward the laptop to for evaluation, that was the company that was provided.
Q. And who told you to provide it to Fortalice?
A. I cannot recall if it was Michael Barnes. That would be the general person that I would go.
Q. Fair to say you took this concern seriously enough that you alerted senior officials at the Secretary's office, made sure your investigator conducted interviews with several folks, collected a laptop, and had Fortalice examine the laptop; right?
A. Correct.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 254 into evidence.

MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, I would object on the basis of relevance. I would also object on the basis of hearsay that the exhibit contains hearsay.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, the report -- I'm sorry.
THE COURT: I'm going to allow the admission of the document. It is clearly relevant, Number 1, to the issues in this case. And the witness has already testified regarding it and her having forwarded the complaint. Whether it is -- it was forwarded for investigation, we don't know what that means, what ultimately resulted, but $I$ don't think there is any question that that is not hearsay itself and -- so it is a complaint and it is properly presented.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Ms. Watson, will you flip to Tab 11, please. This is going to be Exhibit 598.
If you look at Exhibit 598 behind Tab 11, you'll see it
has got the Secretary of State seal on it; right?
A. Yes.
Q. The heading is Investigations Division Report of Investigation.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Case name, Spalding County Board of Elections Supplies Issues.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. There is a case number; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the investigator again here is Paul Braun?
A. Correct.
Q. The date of the report is June 17, 2021; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can take a moment to flip through and just tell me: Do you recognize this report? Is this something you recall seeing while you were the head of the unit -- of the division?

MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, I'm not sure what question is presented to the witness at this time. He asked are you familiar with this report and then he also asked if it is something she is used to seeing, if $I$ heard him correctly.

time. So I don't really know what -- what -- what was -- is -is this in the materials that you provided?

MR. CROSS: This is in the binder at Tab 11.

THE COURT: Tab 11.

All right. Thank you very much.
Take a look at it while we're taking a break.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: All right. Have you had an opportunity
to review the report of investigation?
THE WITNESS: It is fairly lengthy. But I do
recognize it as something I'm familiar with.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So, Ms. Watson, if you flip to -- well, let me take us back.

What we have here is a fairly standard report prepared by an investigator who reported to you at the time that you were the head of the Investigations Division on an investigation that he had conducted concerning election issues; is that fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, if we turn to Page 5 of the document, you'll see the little page numbers in the middle of the bottom.

Do you see there is a number Paragraph 23? Sorry, go to 24. Sorry.

Do you see the number Paragraph 24?
A. Yes.
Q. Here Mr. Braun reports that, Poll Manager Sue Summerlin reported in a statement that Poll Pads were not charged, printers had not been filled with paper, and that three of the six voting machines were missing security seals.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So if you flip to Page 13, do you see there is an investigative summary?
A. Yes.
Q. And the investigative summary spans, it looks like, maybe another 20 or 30 pages.

Do I understand correctly the investigative summary in these standard reports is meant to capture the steps taken by the investigator -- information provided to the investigator that is meant to be captured?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: All right. Your Honor, we move
Exhibit 598 into evidence.
MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, I just simply raise an objection as to hearsay and --

MR. CROSS: I can help with that, Diane. I was just going to help you. We're not offering anything in the report for the truth. It is just meant to be an example of how these reports are done and how the investigations are conducted. So nothing is offered for the truth.

MS. LaROSS: Sure.
And also that we have an objection as to relevance. There is a lot of matters that are covered in this report that have nothing to do whatsoever with this case. I'm not sure what he is talking about even as related to the claims. But we have a general relevance objection as well.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to admit it solely for the purpose of demonstrating what an investigative report could look like in the Elections Division when there would have been a complaint.

MS. LaROSS: Thank you, Your Honor. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Ms. Watson, flip to Tab 10 in the binder, if you would, please.

THE COURT: It looked like -- and also have the contents of it rather than just -- not for the purpose of showing its actual findings, but that these are -- these are the sorts of issues addressed in an investigative report. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So, Ms. Watson, do you have Tab 10 in front of you?
A. I do.
Q. And this is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 100.

And if you look at the bottom of Page 1, do you see that there is an email that you forwarded on or sent to Ryan Germany, Blake Evans, and Chris Harvey in November of 2020?

Middle of the first page.
A. Yes.
Q. And this is -- you sent this email to them on November 5th of 2020; right?
A. That is what it says. I don't --
(Unintelligible cross-talk)
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You don't have any reason --
A. -- this one specifically.
Q. Yeah. I'm sorry.

You don't have any reason to believe that date is wrong; right?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And if we come down, what you are passing on to them is a report of a potential election violation; right?
A. Yes. Making him aware.
Q. And again, you thought this complaint was serious enough to raise with the general counsel, the State election director, and Mr. Evans -- at the time, what was his role?

Did he report to Mr. Harvey at that time? Do you recall?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you recall who Laura Jones was? She worked with the county.
A. I do not know specifically who she is.
Q. And if we come down to what is reported, do you see where

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it reads, description of violation? And it goes on to state,
when we opened the large cabinets containing the voting
machines, we discovered that most of the machines, quote,
election database, doors were wide open and not secured with a
zip tie with serial numbers. Seals were already broken or a
zip tie was put on but was not put through the door. We also
found two paper ballots on the printer.
    Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. It goes on, also, all of the machines are supposed to show
zero ballots cast upon opening. One of our machines did show
one ballot had been cast on it.
    Do you see that?
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A. Yes.
Q. Then it goes on, we did not use this machine, but we did
use all the other machines that had the election database door
open.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then last but not least -- those are the complainant's
words -- we did not follow the protocol for opening the large
cabinets and starting up the machines. In training I was
instructed that all serial numbers on zip ties on doors were to
be compared with the serial numbers written down on the form.
We did not do this.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Harvey responds to you on November 6th, 10-4, I assume you're investigating; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And having thought that this was serious enough to raise with general counsel and the State election director, fair to say you did investigate this or had someone do it for you?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know if a report was prepared?
A. Specifically, I do not know which case number or investigation that it would be assigned in.
Q. But you expected a report would be prepared on an investigation of this type; is that fair?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: All right. Your Honor, we move Exhibit 100 into evidence.

And again, just -- we're not offering any of the complainant for the truth. Again, what we want to show is how the Secretary's office generally approaches concerns regarding the election system.

Oh, this is already in. I'm sorry.
MS. LaROSS: It was already admitted.
MR. CROSS: Thank you.
MS. LaROSS: Okay.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Let's flip to Tab 6, if you would, please. And this is Exhibit 522.

Do you have Tab 6, Exhibit 522 in front of you?
A. I do.
Q. And you'll see that this is an email that you received along with others at the Secretary's office from Ryan Germany on December 10 of 2020.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Germany writes in this email, see below regarding what a witness said about Coffee County today. I guess he is a board member. What he is saying about us not helping when asked is -- this is Mr. Germany's words -- completely false. Frances, it may be good to try to talk to this guy while y'all are down there tomorrow.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then Mr. Germany identifies the individual on the Coffee board that he characterized as completely false as Eric Chaney; right?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you, yourself, went down to Coffee County in December of 2020 to conduct an investigation into election-related
concerns; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so as of December 10, 2020, the general counsel of the Secretary's office had put you on notice that Mr. Chaney had made statements that were completely false; right, sir -right, ma'am?
A. Can you ask me that again?
Q. Sure.

As of December 10 of 2020, the Secretary's general counsel had put you on notice that Eric Chaney, a member of the Coffee County election board, had made statements that were completely false? You were on notice of that; right?
A. He had sent me this information. So yes.
Q. And did you have any reason to believe that the information that general counsel provided you was inaccurate?
A. No.
Q. Did you have any reason to believe that Eric Chaney was more trustworthy than the Secretary's own general counsel?
A. No.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 522 into evidence.

MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, I would object as to
hearsay. The exhibit contains statements by other people. I mean, Ryan Germany was here and testified, and I'm not sure that this was presented to him.

And I'm not sure either -- I don't believe that this witness has identified the specific email as well. But the primary -- my primary concern is with hearsay. And also -- and relevance too.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, she authenticated it. She said she's on it. She received it.

What is attributed to Eric Chaney here we're absolutely not offering for the truth of the matter. The portions that we're concerned about for the truth are the statements by Mr. Germany, who would be a party opponent in this case as the general counsel of the Secretary himself.

MS. LaROSS: Sounds to me like it is being offered for the truth of the matter, Your Honor. We would object.

MR. CROSS: Mr. Germany's statements, yes.
THE COURT: Well --
MR. CROSS: It is also a business record, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- it is a business record. It is -- I don't think -- I am not aware that it has been objected to in the -- and if it has been what the objection has been on the pretrial order.

But it is a business record that the witness has identified. She is in the capacity to do that. And it is relevant. So I'm going to -- I'm going to allow it.

And Mr. Chaney's statements are offered not for the truth of them but, in fact, basically by Mr. Germany to
summarize the complaint that he has received or -- and what he is saying about this and really what needs to be done in light of it.

MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, just for the record, I did want to put out that we did raise objections in the pretrial order.

THE COURT: That is fine.
MS. LaROSS: The same objections as now.
THE COURT: That is fine.
It is admitted though, subject to the limitations that have been recognized by counsel. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Okay. Ms. Watson, if you could flip to Tab 12, please. THE COURT: I'm sorry. Did you ask her a question in the end about this document? Just simply that she received it? Is that all you wanted to ask?

MR. CROSS: No, I asked her several questions about it, Your Honor. About what she knew based on -- about Mr. Chaney based on Mr. Germany's statement that Mr. Chaney had made completely false statements.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to -- did you or did you not go down as a result to Coffee County? That is what I'm trying to understand --

THE WITNESS: I did.
(Unintelligible cross-talk)

THE COURT: -- receiving this email?
Maybe I misunderstood something that was stated.
THE WITNESS: I did go to Coffee County in December in reference to a -- to this matter, yes.

THE COURT: In reference to this matter? All right.
And did you issue a report as a result of it?
THE WITNESS: There was a report that was provided in
reference to recount issues. The investigator provided -- I
did not issue the report. But there was a final report.
THE COURT: Did you interview Mr. Chaney?
THE WITNESS: I cannot recall if Mr. Chaney was there on the day that I visited Coffee County.

THE COURT: Are there any other questions occasioned by mine?

MR. CROSS: Yeah. Your Honor stole my thunder. That is where I was going.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.
MR. CROSS: Just kidding. I'm kidding.
We're going to pull up some surveillance video to help.

THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Ms. Watson --

THE COURT: I just wasn't clear whether she had been there. I mean, I heard it in passing, but I wanted to make
churr I understood what had happened with her --
Were you there just for a day or you were there for
longer?
THE WITNESS: I was there just for the day.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Go ahead. I'm sorry.
MR. CROSS: Yeah. No, no, that is exactly where we are going. So that is very helpful.

Tony, can you pull up Exhibit 140?
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Ms. Watson, do you see here on the screen Exhibit 140? Do you see the date at the top, December 11, 2020, at 10:00 A.M. -- 10:01 A.M.?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that Agent Blanchard walking in?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: Okay. And, Tony, can we pull up the video clip from that day, December 11?
(Playing of the videotape.)
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Is that you walking in, Ms. Watson?
A. Yes.
Q. So do you recall that you did go down on December 11 and meet with individuals at the Coffee County election office as part of an investigation into election issues?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: And if we can pause it, Tony.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you recognize anyone in that room as Eric Chaney?
A. I do not know the gentleman's name at the end of the table. So no, I do not recognize anyone as -- specifically as Eric Chaney. I don't -- I don't know what he looks like.
Q. And as you sit here, do you know -- to your knowledge as the head of the division, do you know whether you or anyone else spoke with Mr. Chaney as part of this investigation that you were there for on December 11?
A. I do not specifically recall, no.
Q. And Investigator Blanchard was tasked with this investigation; right?
A. I specifically do not recall.
Q. Well, you can see him sitting in the room; right?
A. He is there. That's correct.
Q. Would you have had a reason to have him there if he was not working on the investigation?
A. I know that he did work on several Coffee County investigations. I would assume that he did. But specifically I do not recall that he submitted the report.

MR. CROSS: All right. Tony, pull up the January 26 clip, please.

## (Playing of the videotape)

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    MR. CROSS: Just pause it for a moment.
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BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you see that this is January 26 of 2021, 8:08 A.M., Ms. Watson?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is Investigator Blanchard there; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recognize the woman he is talking to as Misty Hampton, the elections supervisor for Coffee County at the time?
A. That appears to be her.
Q. And you met her in person on December 11; right?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: All right. Play this, Mr. -- Tony.
(Playing of the videotape)
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So you can see Investigator Blanchard went into

Ms. Watson's [sic] office.
MR. CROSS: Pause it here.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You see the individual who came out who walked right past Investigator Blanchard?

THE COURT: Was it Ms. Watson's office or was it --
MR. CROSS: I'm sorry. Ms. Hampton's office.
Thank you.

THE WITNESS: I see a gentleman, yes.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you know who that is?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever heard of Jeffrey Lenberg?
A. Not off the top of my head, no.
Q. You're aware that in January of 2021 there were individuals who gained unauthorized access to the Coffee County voting equipment as part of the State's election system; right?
A. I have heard that, yes.
Q. How did you first hear that?
A. I believe in the news.
Q. After you left the Investigative Division?
A. Correct.
Q. And do you recall that Ms. Hampton's office --

Investigator Blanchard went in and that Mr. Lenberg came out of, her office has a door directly into the EMS server room?
A. That is what I recall.

MR. CROSS: And play the rest of the video, Tony.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You see Mr. Lenberg comes back in, goes in to someplace in the back.

Now, at 8:12 Investigator Blanchard is leaving.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, at 8:15 you see Mr. Lenberg is back at the door that Investigator Blanchard walked out of.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He goes back into Ms. Hampton's office; right?
A. Yes.
Q. 8:17 he comes out of Ms. Hampton's office with a backpack that he did not have when he went in; right?
A. Correct.
Q. During your time as the director of the Investigations Division, did Investigator Blanchard or anyone else raise with you that while he was conducting an official investigation he found a total stranger in the Coffee County elections office that connects directly to the EMS server room?
A. No.
Q. And did you expect, based on his training and the requirements of his job, that if he found something like that he would have flagged a concern?
A. I think visiting elections offices around the -- in various counties, there's numerous people that we're not familiar with who they are that are in the election supervisor's offices and in their facility. It would be a concern if they were in the actual server room.
Q. But not a concern if they are in the election supervisor's office connected to the server room? That is not a concern?
A. Not particularly.
Q. Okay. Let's flip to Tab 1, please.

Ms. Watson, if you turn to, in Tab 1, the third page of the document -- and this is Exhibit 78 that is already in evidence.

Do you see that there is an email on the third -- after the slip sheet there is an email from James Barnes to Chris Harvey on May 7 of 2021?
A. I'm sorry. What was your question?
Q. Do you see that email?
A. I see the email.
Q. And do you see, if you flip to the next page, there is a photocopy of a business card from Doug Logan at Cyber Ninjas?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you come back to Mr. Barnes' email, do you see where it reads, attachment, and it says cyberninja.pdf?
A. Yes.
Q. So do you understand that that Cyber Ninjas card was attached to Mr. Barnes' email to Chris Harvey on May 7 of 2021?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. So come back to the first page of Exhibit 78, if you would, please.

And you see that same email from Mr. Barnes to Mr. Harvey with the Cyber Ninjas card at the bottom?
A. Yes.
Q. And then if you come up in the middle, you'll see that on May 11 of 2021, four days later, Mr. Harvey forwarded this on -- or he responded to James Barnes and he copied you and Michael Barnes; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And Mr. Harvey writes, thanks for sending this. I think it might be prudent to see if there has been any contact between the person on the card and anyone in your office and/or if they have had any access to any of your equipment.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And he explains, I have let our Investigations Division and CES know, and they might follow up with you.

Right?
A. Correct.
Q. And then you forward this on to Pamela Jones who was -was she a deputy director?
A. No. She was the area supervisor assigned to the Macon office.
Q. You asked her to contact the county and verify what, if any, contact Cyber Ninjas had with any election equipment; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And so this concern came in from the county elections office, election superintendent to the State director who asked
you to look into whether there was access to the equipment and you had Ms. Jones look into that; right?
A. If there was any contact with that particular company; correct.
Q. Right.

To be clear, any contact Cyber Ninjas had with any election equipment? That was what you asked her to investigate; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, flip to Tab 2, if you would, please, which is Exhibit 145.

And if you look at the bottom of Exhibit 145, you see there is an -- your email from Ms. Jones we just looked at on May 11?
A. Correct.
Q. She then forwards that on to Josh Blanchard, the investigator who was already investigating Coffee County on election issues; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Investigator Blanchard responds to Ms. Jones the same day about half an hour later.

Do you see that?
A. Correct.
Q. So about half an hour after he got this request to investigate potential unauthorized access to the voting
equipment, he responds that he spoke with Mr. Barnes who said he and his board have not been able to locate anything showing where Cyber Ninjas did any consulting for Coffee County.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He also adds, Mr. Barnes said he was going to contact the county IT department and have them review Misty's emails to see if there was any correspondence; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Ms. Jones then forwards this on to you two minutes later; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And she explains that at this point there's still your --
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.) BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Sorry, Ms. Watson.
A. That's okay.
Q. So to go back, two minutes after Investigator Blanchard flagged this or responded to Ms. Jones she sends this on to you; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And she explains that as of $4: 11$ on -- 4:11 P.M. on May 11, 2021, your investigator was still trying to determine if there was any contact Cyber Ninjas had with the voting equipment; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Your response was, thanks; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Are you -- do you recall any investigation, any interaction you had with the investigators involved in this after your email saying, thanks?
A. I don't specifically recall any -- any information, no.
Q. So it wouldn't surprise you to learn that the State has not produced any documents or any witnesses that say that there was anything done to investigate this further after you responded to Ms. Jones saying, thanks?
A. I know that there was multiple -- there was a simultaneous track with Michael Barnes following up with the machines. So as far as that result, I'm not familiar with that.
Q. And when you say there was a simultaneous track of Michael Barnes following up with machines, what do you mean?
A. That he was -- was to look into the server to make sure if there was any unauthorized access to the machine.
Q. So there were sort of two tracks? There was what Investigator Blanchard was doing?
A. Correct.
Q. And then Mr. Barnes was tasked with figuring out whether there had been unauthorized access to the voting equipment?
A. Correct.
Q. And that included the EMS server; is that right?
A. You would have to check with him.
Q. So these two tracks were moving -- well, let me ask it this way.

You and your investigators did not have responsibility for what Mr. Barnes was doing? He was doing his track and you were doing yours?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And the two weren't really coordinating? You just knew that that was happening?
A. Correct.
Q. And so when Ms. Jones responded to you on May 11 that your office was still trying to determine if there was any contact between Cyber Ninjas and the voting equipment, you didn't think it was important to follow up and figure out whether that contact had actually occurred? It was sufficient to just say thanks and move on with whatever else you had --
A. No. My understanding is that they are still working on it. At that time that they were still following up on it, that that wasn't the completion of it, that they were still working on it.
Q. Ms. Watson, I just asked you a moment ago if you were aware of any further investigation and you said no.

Are you now saying that you are aware of further investigation?
A. I thought you said was there any further communication.

But my understanding, based on this, is that, yes, they were still waiting on the county IT department to follow up and to provide further information, so it wasn't that they were finished. This was just an update of where they were at that particular moment.
Q. No one ever came back to you with any further update; right? You can't -- you can't recall --
A. I can't -- I can't recall that they did.
Q. And you are aware that Mr. Blanchard testified just yesterday that there was no follow-up?
A. No, I'm not aware of that, no.
Q. Is that consistent with what was expected of an investigator who was looking into whether there had been a potential breach of the voting system? To just let it die on the vine?
A. I think that his -- his instructions were to find out if there was contact between -- you know, involving the -- a person having a business card in their possession and whether they had any contact with that particular company and was there any access, yes.
Q. Okay. So the question that was outstanding on May 11, 2021, for your office was whether Cyber Ninjas had had unauthorized access with the voting equipment?

MS. LaROSS: Objection, Your Honor. There is no foundation. No facts in evidence.

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MR. CROSS: The exhibit -- this has already been testified to by Agent Blanchard and others. This is in the record.
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THE COURT: It is in the record.
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THE COURT: It is in the record.
Go ahead.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So, Ms. Watson, on May 11, 2021, the question that was outstanding for your office was whether Cyber Ninjas had had unauthorized access to voting equipment in Coffee County? We're agreed on that; right? That is what they were tasked to figure out?

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A. They were -- they were tasked to find out if there was any particular contact with that company and what that contact may have been.
Q. You keep saying with that company. Let's come back to what your words were because it matters.

Look at Exhibit 145, your email to Ms. Jones. Are you with me?
A. On which one?
Q. Exhibit 145, the bottom of the page.
A. Okay. Go ahead.

THE COURT: It is also on your --
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. It is on your screen.

What you tasked Ms. Jones with -- not just as their
contact between the company Cyber Ninjas and the county. You were very precise, verify what, if any, contact Cyber Ninjas had with any election equipment.

That was the question that was outstanding at 4:11 P.M. on May 11, 2021; right?
A. Correct.
Q. My question to you is this: The fact that no one ever got an answer to that question, according to Investigator Blanchard, no follow-up, just left it with your email at, thanks, is that consistent with the way your office conducted election security investigations while you were there, yes or no?
A. Again, according to this email, is that they were still waiting at that particular time as of that date. That is what I was familiar with.
Q. Right. My question to you is what we have just walked through here and the way things stood with an unanswered question about a potential breach of the system at 4:11 P.M. on May 4th.
A. I was not, based on this email, looking at a potential breach of the system. I was looking at a possession of a business card that was in an elections office and verifying whether or not they had contact with that particular company and for what reason.

And my understanding, based on the email that was sent,
was that they were still waiting on further information. And I do not recall any particular information after that prior to me leaving.
Q. And leaving that as an open question, is that consistent with the way your office handled investigations into election security issues?

Just yes or no, is this how you guys did it?
A. I would anticipate that there would be additional information after -- after this communication.
Q. You expected there would have been follow-up and further investigation; right?
A. I would expect that there would be additional information forthcoming. Yes, we have located information that corroborates there was contact or there was no contact.
Q. And does it surprise you that that never occurred?
A. It would be surprising to me that there was not a completion of that.
Q. Did it trouble you in May of 2021 that you never heard from any of your investigators about this ever again? That this question was just left open in the ether? No one knew?
A. There was a lot of open investigations that were taking place in -- at simultaneously. And so this was not one that I particularly recall going back to to say, can you give me a further update on this or, you know, has it been closed, has it been resolved.
Q. And just so we're clear, you testified a moment ago, when I said this was an investigation into a potential breach of the voting system, you said it was not.

Did you have any reason to believe that the state -- the State Election Board had authorized Cyber Ninjas to access voting equipment anywhere in the state?
A. I did not have any allegation that they had accessed the -- a voting system. Only that there was a -- one of their cards that had been located in an office.
Q. All right. Ms. Watson, we're just going to keep coming back to your words.

You said, verify what, if any, contact Cyber Ninjas had with any election equipment? You wrote that? That was the task; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. My question to you is: Did you have any reason to believe that the state Election Board or anyone with authority on behalf of the state had authorized Cyber Ninjas to access election equipment in Georgia, yes or no?
A. I was not familiar with that, no.
Q. You had no basis to believe that they had legal authorization; right?
A. No.
Q. All right. Flip --

MR. CROSS: Oh, sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Tell me what exhibit -- tab you were on
for this. I want to just make sure I --
THE WITNESS: 2.

MR. CROSS: Tab 2, and it is Exhibit 145, Your Honor.

I think we put this in through Ryan Germany. But I apologize. I don't remember. So we will move it into evidence just to make sure it is clear.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)

MR. CROSS: It is in. All right. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate that. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. I'm almost done, Ms. Watson.

Can you flip to Tab 20?
A. Okay.
Q. Now, if you look at Tab 20, you see that it begins with an email from Vincent Russo who represents the State defendants.

Are you aware of that? Have you dealt with Mr. Russo before?
A. I recognize the name; correct.
Q. And here there is an email from Steven Ellis in the chain with Mr. Russo on June 10 of 2022 .

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And the email is to Sara Koth.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you aware that Ms. Koth replaced you as the head of the Investigations Division?
A. Yes.
Q. And Steven Ellis writes, can you get with Meaghan and let her know the status of the Coffee County case and how long it might take to get the information requested by the Judge pertaining to the open investigations?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if you flip to Tab 21, you will see there is a spreadsheet. It is pretty hard to read. So we're going to pull it up on the screen for you.

And can you go to row 148?
What I have got in front of you is the original Excel file that was produced as an attachment to that email.

MR. CROSS: And if we can go -- is it 148 -- go to row 148, Tony.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So just a couple of quick questions on this. Do you see that there is an investigation number here SEB 2015-0404?
A. Yes.
Q. That refers to Appling County GEMS server violation?
A. Yes.
Q. And then if you come over to case description, it says,
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server connected to the internet.
Do you see that?

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A. Yes.
Q. And before we get into the substance, the spreadsheet that is reflected here that has a listing of various county investigations and the various information, have you seen this information captured in a system at the election -- at the Investigations Division?
A. Yes.
Q. And what system captures this information when you were there?
A. The case management system.
Q. And is that case management -- what is that case management system used for?
A. To track the case assignments when a -- cases are opened, both for inspections and investigations.
Q. And who has access to input information into that system? Who uses it in the ordinary course of their work in that division while you were there?
A. The chief investigator, the deputy chief investigator, the inspection and investigation supervisors.
Q. And is it fair to say that it was expected that whoever in your office at the time was inputting information in this system that they would make a good faith effort to put information they thought was accurate based on what was
available to them at the time?
A. Yes.
Q. So the investigation we just looked at there concerning the GEMS server being connected to the internet in a Georgia county, are you -- have any familiarity with that investigation?
A. I do not recall that specifically. That is one of the things that is checked when the -- Michael Barnes and his group visits with the counties is to make sure if they have any connection to the internet.
Q. All right. So that -- that is an issue that, again, like the Coffee County EMS server issue, this is something you would have -- you would have expected Michael Barnes' organization to investigate?
A. We could have gotten the complaint from his group. But we would send out an investigator to do interviews and then write up a case to be presented to the State Election Board.
Q. Okay. But as you sit here, you don't -- there is no information you can provide about this?
A. No.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 599 into
evidence, the cover email and the Excel file.
MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, our objection is hearsay to this document.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, the cover email -- oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry.

MS. LaROSS: Excuse me. I think the -- sorry. There is a case description, but it doesn't talk about the facts of the case or give specifics about the case.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, the cover email is both a party opponent statement. It is the Secretary of State's office. It is also a business record. And in the document, the attachment, we have laid the foundation is also a business record. This is what they use to track their investigations in the ordinary course. It has sufficient indicia of reliability insofar as they expect it to be accurate.

On the objection about facts, that is actually not an evidentiary objection. And we welcome her to bring a witness and talk about what they found with this GEMS server potentially being connected to the internet.

MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, in particular with respect to the case description column, that only includes allegations.

MR. CROSS: She doesn't get to testify. That is not an objection. That is not an objection.

MS. LaROSS: That is how --
MR. CROSS: We have a witness on the stand. That is not appropriate.

MS. LaROSS: Hang on, if you would, David. That is part of my hearsay objection.

THE COURT: Well, it is not being admitted for the truth of the matter. It is being -- I mean, this -- let me just clarify.

This page here, is it -- I don't have the cover letter in front of me.

MR. CROSS: It is Tab 20, Your Honor. Tab 20.
I mean, the other thing again, this was -- this spreadsheet was produced at Your Honor's directive. You can see above, it is information requested by Your Honor. Mr. Russo has asked them to pull this together.

So for them to now suggest that they pulled something together for the Court that Your Honor cannot consider, I'll just say it is troubling.

THE COURT: Is this the regular format that you maintained for tracking the progress of investigations and the nature of them -- of the investigations?

THE WITNESS: It is a way to track open investigations.

THE COURT: Is it what you-all used?
THE WITNESS: It is what we would use when I was there. The case titles do not necessarily reflect all of the allegations that are included in a particular case.

THE COURT: It is an abbreviated version; is that right?

THE WITNESS: It could have an overall, but there
could be 15 other allegations within that open case that are not --

THE COURT: But you don't include all of them in your summary chart?

THE WITNESS: Correct. Correct.
THE COURT: It is admitted for the purpose of showing how complaints were tracked, not for the truth of any information actually contained in them.

And the letter -- are you seeking to introduce the letter too?

MR. CROSS: Just for the context, Your Honor.
Because it indicates why this was pulled, who pulled it.
THE COURT: All right. For that purpose only, it is introduced. And it was produced in the course of this -- of the litigation and it is -- I don't have any reason to believe that it is not, in fact, a true letter of -- reflecting the correspondence.

But again, it is not admitted for the truth of the information. But just simply is to re-count the transmission and the questions asked.

Do you have more?
MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor. I'm just about done. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Can you flip to Tab 17, please?

The spreadsheet we were just looking at, I think you
testified that the information there resides in a system called
SharePoint?
A. I refer to it as case management. But it is a SharePoint.
Q. Thank you.
    If you look at Tab 17, do you see that it says case
stat -- stops at SharePoint stats. And then there is a case
number SEB 2020-250 Coffee County?
    Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall that SEB -- this case number corresponds to the investigation that Investigator Blanchard was tasked with and that you went to the Coffee County office for in December of 2020?
A. I don't recall the specific case number. So I can't tell by this.
Q. If you come down, do you see -- well, let me ask it this way. The report we have here, have you seen reports like this from the case management system before?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And the information here, you can see that there was an investigation opened on December 9th in 2020 into Coffee County.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And does that -- do you recall that the investigation you
were there for on December 11 opened on or around that date?
A. I would assume so. I don't recall the specific date. But yes.
Q. You don't have any reason to believe that that is wrong; right?
A. No.
Q. And then you can see that it was submitted to the supervisor on September 28, 2021; right?
A. Correct.
Q. You don't have any reason to believe that that is wrong; right?
A. No.
Q. No?

And you were still the head of the Investigations Division at that time; right?
A. Correct. That would have been when it was submitted to Pam Jones.
Q. And then you see it was presented to the board on

December 14 of '21?
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you don't have any reason to believe that that is wrong; right?
A. I was no longer there. But I don't have any reason to believe it was incorrect.
Q. Okay. And then lastly, do you see it says date closed in investigation?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And it is closed the same day that it was submitted to the supervisor; right?
A. That is what it -- what it says.
Q. And you were still there?
A. I was still there on that date. It should not have been listed as a closed investigation until after it was presented to the State Election Board.
Q. Okay. But in this report from the case management system that was produced by the Secretary's office, it is indicated as closed the same day as submitted; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And is -- you were there at that time. Based on your recollection of the events, you don't have any reason to believe that the entry here is inaccurate; right?
A. No.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 600 into
evidence.
MS. LaROSS: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Lastly, do you agree that it is important to
investigate potential election security concerns and complaints -- did you believe it was important to do that when you were the head of the division?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you agree that delays in investigations can have a serious impact on voters' confidence?
A. I think that you need to do it as efficiently and as promptly as you can for accurate results.
Q. So yes or no, do you agree that delays in investigations can have a serious impact on voters' confidence?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you aware that the Secretary of State himself just said that this week?
A. I'm not.
Q. Lastly, we talked a little bit about whether you were familiar with this lawsuit.

During the time that you were the head of the Investigative Division, did anyone ever come to you -- this is just a yes-or-no question.

Did anyone ever come to you and ask you to help in preparing any kind of information for discovery in this case?
A. I can't say specifically if they asked me for information in pulling documents. It usually wasn't in a context of -- for a particular case or not. It was, can you provide da da da da da.
Q. So as you sit here, you can't recall a specific occasion where somebody came to you and said, hey, we have got this lawsuit concerning the reliability of the BMDs. We need to pull some information for discovery purposes?
A. They could have.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. They could have. I don't specifically recall.
Q. Were you aware that we served a discovery request in this case in the summer of 2021 asking if the State was aware of any suspected or potential unauthorized access of any voting equipment in the State?

Were you ever aware that that was a request that was asked?
A. I don't specifically recall receiving anything. I could have. I don't -- I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall you or to your knowledge anyone else in the Investigations Division being asked that question for the purpose of this litigation or any litigation?

Anyone ever coming to you or anyone in your office and saying, hey, we need to figure out if there was a potential unauthorized access to the voting equipment and whether we ever looked into that? Did that question ever come to you?
A. I don't specifically recall.
Q. And you're not aware of that question going to any of your investigators either; right?
A. I wouldn't know if any of them got a specific request that I wasn't familiar with.
Q. But as you sit here, you're not aware of that question being posed; right?

And given you were the head of the division, a question of that magnitude that is going to be provided in the context of litigation, would you expect to be included?
A. I would expect so.

MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor. CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Good morning, Ms. Watson. My name is Bruce Brown, and I represent some of the plaintiffs in this case.

Who, as between you and Michael Barnes, while you were there, would have responsibility for conducting voting system security investigations?
A. It would depend on what the allegation is and what specifically you're referring to as far as voter security equipment. It could be something that, again, they are not putting the zip ties on the machines. And certainly that would come to the Investigations Division to look into. And also when we do our inspections at the polling places to check to make sure that they have the proper seals when we are there and we're doing our inspections.

So there are -- I would say it is a shared responsibility.
Q. What would typically go to Mr. Barnes' group?
A. Things such as the allegations involving the Fulton County laptop that it would need to -- you know, where -- we would consult with them on what would we need to do with it. Who do we -- do we provide it to you? Do we need to send it straight to someone else for forensics or what?

There could be allegations as far as -- or problems with, for example, posting a password on a GEMS server that was not secure and we would consult with them to look at that machine and verify whether it had been inappropriately accessed or not.
Q. And that's why Mr. Harvey -- you saw the email with the Cyber Ninjas card?
A. Yes.
Q. That is why Mr. Harvey tasked both you and Michael Barnes with the follow-up on that; is that correct?
A. I can't say what Harvey's intentions were with that. Only that, you know, that was the direction.

MR. BROWN: Thank you very much.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Were you aware that Mr. Persinger was engaged in May of 2021?
A. Who?
Q. An expert by the name of Persinger.
A. No.
Q. Do you -- are you familiar with that name?
A. No.
Q. Or how about any forensic investigator hired in May of 2021?
A. Not specifically.
Q. For Coffee County?
A. I'm not -- not specifically, no.
Q. Thank you.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we all just saw what happened
here. These are questions from -- it's not even his client. I mean, how long are we going to do this?

THE COURT: He advises he is his consultant.
And, obviously, Counsel, you have -- even if
Mr. Favorito is your consultant, you still have an obligation to have reviewed questions in advance that are -- so that we're not just having the consultant's questions as opposed to ones that you have vetted that he may have suggested to you.

All right?
MR. CROSS: It also does not appear that Mr. Davis is here again today.

THE COURT: I have already taken notice of that.
Thank you.
MR. OLES: Thank you, Judge. I understand. CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. OLES:
Q. Ms. Watson, my name is David Oles, and I represent Ricardo Davis in this suit, one of the plaintiffs. I just have a couple of questions for you regarding your position as the chief investigator.

There were some allegations or there were some questions raised in 2020 regarding the existence of some pristine ballots during a mail-in ballot audit.

Were you involved with the -- of any investigation with that? Do you recall?

This was Fulton County.
A. I'm familiar with allegations that were in Fulton County. I would have assigned it to investigators to investigate.
Q. Okay. Do you -- you recall this -- do you recall specific assertions that there were stacks of ballots that were pristine and unfolded? Do you recall assigning someone to investigate that?
A. It was part of the Fulton County investigations.
Q. Okay. Do you recall who was assigned to that?
A. I know that Paul Braun worked on part of it. Again, I believe that that was still open when I left. And it may have been assigned to additional investigators.
Q. Okay. So were you personally involved in it at all?

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I object to this line of
inquiry. This is about ballots, folded ballots. This is
garden-variety election issues which may or may not be true but which is not related in any way at all to the substance of the plaintiffs, including Mr. Davis' lawsuit.

THE COURT: I think that is a real concern when I saw -- you know, I've given you some amount of latitude. But -- and there are circumstances that -- where I would allow you.

But this -- this really is going towards some of apparently Mr. Favorito's or other's concerns regarding the handling of the Fulton County hand ballots and any review of those. And that has not been an issue in this case and is not the -- does not entail the claims in the case.

So, you know, if they want -- if your client or Mr. Favorito wants to bring a separate lawsuit -- and I know that they have in the past -- about that, that is something else.

But we have a lot to cover here. And I don't think this is germane.

MR. OLES: May I tie it, Judge?
The reason that \(I\) believe this is relevant is the assertions that these are duplicate ballots. And one of the issues -- and I expect it to come up in Mr. Halderman's report -- is his conclusion that the system does not reject, cannot reject duplicate ballots.

So the existence of there being duplicate ballots in
this re-count that were revealed I believe is relevant to the issues before this Court.

MR. CROSS: No one is challenging the tabulation system. That is what he is talking about. Scanning multiple ballots goes to the tabulation system. That is not a claim in this case.

THE COURT: I will let you ask one more question about this, and that is it. BY MR. OLES:
Q. Ms. Watson, you said this was open at the time you left. Do you recall whether there was any confirmation by anyone within your office that there were, in fact, duplicate ballots?
A. No, not that I'm familiar with.
Q. Okay.

MR. OLES: All right. Thank you, Judge.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I should also clarify because

I -- what I meant when I said not challenging the tabulation system, we are not challenging the use of scanners.

THE COURT: The what?

MR. CROSS: When I say we're not challenging the tabulation system, we're not challenging the use of scanners. I just want to be clear on what I meant by that. Thanks.

THE COURT: All right. I mean, we have obviously in the case had issues regarding the way -- the scan -- the quality of the scanning. That is not before me at the moment.

But -- and that went up -- that question went up to the Eleventh Circuit.

But the question of, you know, how scanners fit into the system clearly are part of the system. So I just think that it is more complex than that, from what you just stated, too --

MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- but -- and obviously the \(Q R\) code is giving instructions as to the -- the scanning. So I think that one has to be careful about the way it is described here.

I have tried to preserve the opportunity of
Mr. Davis' counsel to ask a few questions on this. But I also think what he was getting at was something different.

MS. LaROSS: Thank you, Your Honor. Diane LaRoss for the State defendants.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. LAROSS:
Q. Ms. Watson, do you need a drink of water or can I --
A. I'm fine.
Q. Okay. I just wanted to be sure.

Okay. Happy to provide it if you need it.
You testified already about working for the Secretary of State's office.

From when to when did you work for the Secretary?
A. September of 2013 through November of 2021.
Q. And at all times that you worked for the Secretary's office, were you always an investigator?
A. I was always in the Investigations Division. I had various roles within that division.
Q. And in the Investigation Division that -- you covered elections and the other divisions in the office.

Do I understand that correctly?
A. We investigated claims for elections, charities, corporations, securities, and the professional licensing boards.
Q. And I think you mentioned and am I correct that in June 2019 you became the chief investigator?
A. When the previous chief investigator retired, I was the acting until appointed as the permanent, correct. That was in June of 2019.
Q. And when you --

THE COURT: June of 2019 when you became the acting director?

THE WITNESS: Yes. And I was official in October. BY MS. LAROSS:
Q. And when you began your work and when you were hired at the Secretary's office, did you bring any law enforcement or investigation experience with you to that job?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was that, just generally? We don't need all the
specifics. If you can speak generally.
A. Yes. I was certified as a police officer in the state of Georgia in 1986 with the City of Roswell, and I worked there for 29 and a half years, which was prior to the Secretary of State's office.
Q. And your work with the City of Roswell, was that with the police department for those 29 years?
A. Yes.
Q. And for that time, did you serve as an investigator for the Roswell Police Department?
A. 15 of those years was as an investigator.
Q. And what is your -- if you could mention your current position?
A. Assistant deputy commissioner with the Department of Revenue.
Q. And in your current role, are you still a sworn law enforcement officer?
A. Yes.
Q. And were you a sworn law enforcement officer when you became chief investigator of the Secretary's office?
A. Yes.
Q. And were you a sworn law enforcement officer at all times you served in the Secretary's office?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were asked some questions by counsel concerning

Coffee County and a visit that you made to Coffee County in December of 2020. I'm going to ask you just a couple of questions about that.
A. Okay.
Q. And why did you go to Coffee County on that occasion in December of 2020?
A. Coffee County was reporting that they were having difficulty in verifying their election results with their re-count.
Q. And who also -- who went with you on that visit in December 2020?
A. Pam Jones, the Macon area supervisor, and Josh Blanchard.
Q. And was Supervisor Jones -- was she in charge of the meeting in December?
A. She set the meeting up. I don't know that there was a person that was necessarily in charge.
Q. Okay. Fair enough.

And what all happened at that meeting?
A. We met with them to discuss how they were doing the re-count and if they were following the correct procedures. Q. And what did you find or you and the team find about whether or not Coffee County was following the correct procedures?
A. The main difficulty was that they were not keeping their batches of ballots separated in the batches, and that they were
just clumping them all together and then trying to scan them all in at one time.

And so it was difficult when they had a -- an issue with the scanner jamming and whether or not they -- one batch or another was duplicated or was not counted. It was -- they couldn't go back and identify which batch they were having a problem with. And that was their primary --
Q. And at that meeting, was there a re-count conducted?
A. By hand.
Q. And what were the results of the -- of that hand re-count?
A. It verified their original number.
Q. So that -- the machine count, was that confirmed as accurate and correct?

MR. CROSS: Objection, Your Honor. She has no personal knowledge of this. And it would require expert testimony anyways.

MS. LaROSS: I don't think so, Your Honor. To the extent of -- I'm just simply asking for her understanding of what happened at the meeting and what the results of the meeting were. So I'm not asking her to testify as an expert concerning the machine.

MR. CROSS: If she rephrases the question to her understanding, there is no objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LaROSS: Okay. I'll do so.

BY MS. LAROSS:
Q. So to your understanding at that meeting in December of 2020, were you able to confirm that the count that was registered in the machine -- the voting machines was correct and accurate as compared to the hand re-count?
A. Yes.
Q. And were there any other issues that -- with Misty Hampton that were raised at that meeting, that you recall?
A. Yes. The other -- the other thing that was discussed was a video that she had posted online in which she claimed that the machines could be manipulated. Specifically she was asked, because she had made these claims that this could be done, as to whether or not she had actually done any of those -- those things that she claimed could be done. And she said that absolutely not, that she knew that those were violations.
Q. Counsel also asked you concerning some emails with respect to a Cyber Ninjas business card.

Now, did you assign Supervisor Jones to follow up on that issue?
A. Yes.
Q. And Supervisor Jones, was she, at all times you worked with her, a certified law enforcement officer?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think you mentioned she's supervisor of the Macon office.

To your knowledge, was she also a supervisor to
Investigator Blanchard?
A. Yes.
Q. In your experience working with Supervisor Jones and Investigator Blanchard, did you have any concerns with their ability to handle that investigation?
A. No.
Q. And based upon your working experience with them, would you have considered it within their authority to determine what, if any, further investigation was needed after initial steps were taken?
A. Yes.
Q. And based upon the email from Chris Harvey that you were asked about when you first learned about the Cyber Ninjas business card, was there anything to alert you that there had been unauthorized access to Coffee County election equipment or the system?
A. No.
Q. And in your role as chief investigator, would you consider an elections director finding a business card from Cyber Ninjas to be an indication of an attempted access to the voting system?
A. That alone, I would not.
Q. And we understand that you left the Secretary's office in November of 2021.

Did you have any knowledge, during your tenure in investigations at the Secretary's office, that there had been an incident of unauthorized access by third parties to Coffee County elections equipment?
A. No.
Q. And had you or your team had any indication that that had happened, what would you have done?
A. I would have ran it up the chain to not only notifying Chris, James, or Michael Barnes, Deputy Fuchs, and Ryan Germany, the Secretary.
Q. And I'm going to ask you a few questions. You've been asked about the 2020 election.

And were you the chief investigator during the 2020 general election in Georgia?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you receive complaints about the election from supporters of President Trump?
A. I received complaints from everybody.
Q. Say it again.
A. I have received complaints from everybody.
Q. Okay. Did you receive any threats to you during the 2020 presidential election?
A. Many angry conversations and emails. But no overt threats that I'm aware of.
Q. Okay. And did you actually speak with President Trump
about his allegations about the vote count in Georgia?
A. I had one conversation with President Trump.
Q. And are you confident with the results of the 2020 presidential election in Georgia?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Those are all the questions I have. Thank you, Ms. Watson.

And, of course, thank you for your service to the voters in Georgia and the citizens of Georgia. We appreciate it.

THE COURT: Mr. Cross, do you have any redirect?
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Ms. Watson, if you could go back to Exhibit 522. It is Tab 6 in the binder.

We looked at this a moment ago. On December 10 of 2020, Ryan Germany, the general counsel, alerted you, Chris Harvey, and others in the Secretary's office that Eric Chaney had made completely false statements; right?

Right?
A. What he is saying about us as not helping when asked is completely false.

That is what he advised.
Q. So literally the day before you went into the Coffee County elections office investigating election security concerns, the general counsel had put you on notice you might
be dealing with people who are making false statements; right? At the level of the board?
A. And we were -- we were going to Coffee County to --
Q. My question is just yes or no.
A. Ask me the question again.
Q. The day before you went into Coffee County to investigate election security issues, including a YouTube video where a pass code was put up on the internet, the general counsel had put you on notice that you were potentially dealing with people who had made completely false statements, even at the level of the Coffee County election board?

You were on notice of that from your general counsel?
A. He was advising that his claim that we were not being helpful and we were not responding was not accurate. That's correct.
Q. And you learned that the day before you met with these folks; right?
A. Correct.

MS. LaROSS: Sorry. What was your question again?
She learned that --
MR. CROSS: The day before she met with them.
MS. LaROSS: That she met with Coffee County -- I don't think it is established that she met with Eric Chaney. MR. CROSS: Okay.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Now, can we pull up Exhibit 143?

Actually, go back very quickly, if you would, for the context to exhibit -- Exhibit 1. Or sorry, Tab 1, Exhibit 78.

Do you see again Mr. Barnes' email passing along the news of the Cyber Ninjas card to Chris Harvey refers to a Dominion email?

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Barnes sent his email on May 7 of 2021.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And he writes, the Dominion email today pertaining to Cyber Ninjas was alarming to me.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So you knew -- and you're at the top of this thread; right? You read this email?
A. Correct.
Q. And so you knew when you sent folks in to figure out whether Cyber Ninjas had had contact with the election equipment that the election superintendent there was alarmed by a message that Cyber Ninjas was trying to do exactly that; right?
A. I can't say what his thought was.
Q. Well, you can read it. He was alarmed? That is what he wrote; right?
A. Correct.
Q. So alarmed that he raised this to the level of the State election director; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware that Mr. Harvey testified in this case that when this came to him the reason he passed it on to you was because it raised what he called his worst fear?
A. I'm not aware of that, no.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: Can we pull up Exhibit 143 real quick?
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Take a look at this on the screen, if you would, Ms. Watson.

Do you see the day before Mr. Barnes sends his email in invoking Chris Harvey's worst fear, Dominion sent out the customer notification here about maintaining secure chain of custody for your Dominion voting system?

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And Dominion put on notice, which Mr. Barnes found alarming, Dominion has been alerted that customers are being approached with offers or requests to conduct a forensic audit --

Forensic audit is in quotes.
Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. -- of their voting equipment.

Do you see that?
MS. LaROSS: Your Honor, I have an objection to
reference to this exhibit. There has not been a foundation
laid that this witness has knowledge or received this document.
MR. CROSS: It is in evidence, isn't it?
Yes, this is in evidence.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. When you were tasked with investigating potential access to the Coffee County voting equipment just five days later, were you aware that Dominion had sent out this notice?
A. I was not.
Q. So when you read Mr. Barnes' email saying that he was so alarmed by an alert from Dominion and he finds a Cyber Ninjas card sitting in the office, you didn't think it was important to figure out what Dominion notice had him so upset?
A. Again, my focus was on whether the complaint of whether Cyber Ninjas had had contact with the county and what that purpose was.
Q. By May of 2021, it was public knowledge that Cyber Ninjas
had attempted to gain access to voting equipment in places like Arizona?

Were you aware of that at the time?
A. I was aware of issues in Arizona. The specifics I was not. I had a full plate of things in Georgia.
Q. When this email came to you to investigate this, had you never heard of Cyber Ninjas?
A. I had heard the name. But I didn't know ...
Q. And you had heard of them in conjunction with getting access to voting equipment in states; right?
A. \(\quad \mathrm{No}\).
Q. As the head of the Investigations Division, in May of 2021, with responsibility for election investigations, you had never heard of them?
A. I had heard the name Cyber Ninjas. Again, their specific interactions and what they were doing, I did not have that information.
Q. So let's just be clear, because you testified a moment ago in response to the State's questions, that when you went -when you had your investigators conduct this investigation on May 11, that the only thing you knew about was that there was a Cyber Ninjas card left in the office?

Do you remember testifying to that a minute ago?
A. That is the information that we had.
Q. Okay. But what you also had was the general counsel had
told you months earlier that at least one member of the then sitting election board had made completely false statements? That was in your head too; right?
A. That he had made false allegations about us being helpful to them or not. That wasn't particularly in my head, no.
Q. Okay. But you had received Mr. Germany's email?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. You also -- as you testified a moment ago, you also knew that the EMS server, according to Mr. Barnes, was not accessible and Mr. -- according to James Barnes was not accessible and that Michael Barnes was investigating whether there had been access to that? You testified to that earlier, right? So you knew that was happening, too, on a parallel track?
A. Correct.
Q. And you knew from the email that Dominion had sent out some kind of warning to the Coffee County -- to the Coffee County election and superintendent that alarmed him about the Cyber Ninjas card?

You knew that too; right?
A. The Dominion correspondence with the counties I was not -THE COURT: That wasn't the question. Go ahead. Ask the question again. MR. CROSS: Thank you.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You knew from James Barnes' email that Dominion had sent out some sort of alert to Coffee County raising an alarm for him about Cyber Ninjas being in that office?
A. There was reference to Dominion in that email; correct.
Q. And I believe you said you did not know that the State had hired a forensic investigator to look at the EMS server? That was not disclosed to you?
A. No, it was not -- I'm not familiar with it. I do not recall it.

I mean, if they advised me that they did, I do not recall it.

THE COURT: Let me just clarify. And you knew that there was a Cyber Ninjas card that was what Mr. Barnes --

THE WITNESS: Was reporting, yes.
THE COURT: -- James Barnes was reporting?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Which would have indicated some form of contact with the Ninjas, wouldn't it?

You don't just create your own card.
THE WITNESS: You don't just create your own card. But it could have been sent in the mail. Somebody could have left it there when they were there. They could have --

THE COURT: Well, that's the point. They could have left it there when they were present in the Coffee County
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office.

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THE WITNESS: That was the purpose of the investigator to contact them to find out what their contact was with Cyber Ninjas, if any. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So when your investigators wrote to you on May 11 that they did not yet know whether the Cyber Ninjas or anyone else had had unauthorized access with the voting equipment, you knew all of these things we've talked about? Mr. Germany telling you that Ryan Germany had made -- or that Eric Chaney had made a completely false statement? Mr. Barnes was investigating the EMS server for potential unauthorized access? There was an ongoing investigation into Misty Hampton putting an EMS pass code and a Dominion alert? All of that you knew on May 11; right?

MS. LaROSS: I object to the question, Your Honor. I don't believe she testified that she was aware of the Dominion alert.

MR. CROSS: It is in the email.
MS. LaROSS: It isn't. I don't -- we have a --
THE COURT: Well, it says the Dominion email today pertaining to Cyber Ninjas was alarming to me. And she had that.

MR. CROSS: Right. Right.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So the answer to my question was yes; right? You were aware of all of that on May 11?
A. Correct.
Q. And you testified that it was within the authority of Pamela Jones and Josh Blanchard to make the determination of whether to do any further investigation on May 11; right?

You said that?
A. It was my understanding that they were still waiting on the IT department in Coffee County, that that was continuing.
Q. I just want to make sure I -- your testimony. The question asked of you: Was it within the authority of Pamela Jones and Josh Blanchard to determine next steps to do anything further?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So do I understand that you, as the head of the Investigations Division, with all of the facts known to you at the time and the broader environment of what was happening in the United States around elections in May of 2021 --
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. -- you decided to just send an email that said, thanks, and leave it to your investigators to determine whether anything more was needed?

Is that right?
A. My understanding was that they were still waiting on

Coffee County IT department to see if there was any further information that was there. So my impression is that this was continuing.
Q. But you never followed up?
A. Again, without being able to go back and research, I can't, you know, off the top of my head say if there was any further contact with them or not.
Q. Who made the decision not to do any further follow-up investigation beyond May 11 of 2021?
A. It was my understanding that it was continuing.
Q. Investigator Blanchard testified yesterday there was nothing more.

Who made the decision to do nothing more?
A. I did not say not to do anything further.
Q. Okay. So who made that decision? Investigator Blanchard?
A. My understanding was that it was continuing. So I did not know that it had not been.
Q. You keep saying it was your understanding it was
continuing. But if you thought it was continuing, wouldn't it be sensible for you to follow up in a few days, few weeks and say, hey, where does this stand?
A. In --
Q. Let me ask you this way: Why didn't you follow up if you thought it was continuing, given everything that you knew at the time?
A. In -- again, if \(I\) were there, that may have happened. But I'm not there.
Q. You can't tell the court -- you can't give any reason why you decided just to let this go, given everything you knew at the time? No follow-up?
A. I can't say that \(I\) let it go. I can say that at the time I thought that it was continuing.
Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you that this investigation was not a priority for the office?
A. No.
Q. So it was your decision? You made the decision not to do any follow-up with your investigators; right?
A. Based on the information that \(I\) was provided that they were still waiting on additional information, I was waiting to hear back. You know, we had not had any verification that there was any inappropriate access to the machine or that we were able to confirm that there had been any contact with cyber Ninjas.
Q. You also testified, just lastly, that you had no knowledge of the breaches that occurred in Coffee County in 2021 before you left the office; right?
A. I don't recall any additional information that would have alerted me to that, no.
Q. So just to be clear, as you sit here, is your testimony that you did not know in any way that anyone had gained
unauthorized access to any equipment, any voting equipment anywhere in the state of Georgia while you were the director of the Investigative Division?
A. Unauthorized access?
Q. Unauthorized access.
A. Unauthorized access could be an allegation within a county that someone has gone in and done something in a machine that they were not supposed to, as far as somebody having unauthorized access to change a voter registration. So I can't say that there hasn't been unauthorized access into the election system.

I can say that \(I\) was not familiar with any unauthorized third-party access to fraudulently access the election system.
Q. And the reason you didn't learn about the breaches that occurred in Coffee County, while you were there, is because on May 11, 2021, when your investigators told you they were still looking into it, the sum total of your follow-up was simply to say, thanks; right?

MS. LaROSS: Objection, Your Honor. This has been asked and answered.

THE COURT: I think it has been.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. That was the total of your response?

MS. LaROSS: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I think --

MR. CROSS: Oh, sorry.
THE COURT: I think you've explored that.
MR. CROSS: Thank you.
EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
Q. Did it ever occur to you to direct your investigators and Ms. Jones and Mr. Blanchard meanwhile to call -- to try to contact someone with the Cyber Ninjas?

I mean, you had a card. There was a telephone number. There was an email.

Did anyone think to even call them, had they been there?
A. Correct. I -- I did not tell them not to contact them. I do not know if they did or they did not, other than the updates that I have. I did not specifically recall telling them, you know, see if you can get in touch with them or not.
Q. You were aware that there was an incredible amount of commotion in the nation at that point and in Georgia regarding the election results and how they are handled and including regarding the Cyber Ninjas and that they had a part in that? Did you --
A. I recall -- I recall hearing the name Cyber Ninjas, but their particular involvement with that I did not know that -those specifics. Again --
Q. But you knew it was -- they were related to election matters because of the letter that --
A. Right.
Q. -- was sent to you; right?
A. Correct.
Q. All right. Did you ever talk about this at all with the deputy superintendent who had asked you to go and interview -go deal with Coffee County in December of '20?
A. Deputy Secretary Fuchs? Is that who you are referring to?
Q. Well, you had it -- wasn't he copied on this? It was --
A. James?
Q. Who wrote you the letter asking you to do it, saying he was very concerned? I don't have the -- where you started off

A. Chris Harvey? Is that who you are referring to?
Q. No. I'm not talking about --

THE COURT: Mr. Cross, you began --
MR. CROSS: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: -- with the letter of December of 2000 --
Why she goes down there in the first place. I just
need the exhibit number or the tab number.
MR. BROWN: 254, David.
I believe it is 13, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
No.
MR. CROSS: I'm sorry, Your Honor. You're looking
for why she goes down there?
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THE COURT: In December of 2020. She has the interview with them. Mr. Sterling is very upset with the falsehoods in his mind.
MR. CROSS: Oh, Mr. Germany's email. Sorry.
THE COURT: Mr. Germany.
MS. CONAWAY: That is Tab 6.
MR. CROSS: Tab 6.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. CROSS: Yes. Thank you. Sorry, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT:
Q. This is from Mr. Germany and he is saying he's very upset about a host of matters that Mr. Chaney mentioned and that they were false.
And you go down personally to deal with that. But you didn't manifest any other concern beyond just leaving this matter with -- in May just as is? Never heard about it again? Never resolved it? Never -- there was no -- never looked at whether they had resolved the case and it was closed or how they had resolved it?

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A. Right. With the -- with the response back, my understanding is that they were still waiting on information, so ...
Q. That was the end of your follow-up though; right? That is, as I understood your testimony?
A. That is the last that \(I\) got from it that I'm familiar
with.
Q. When did you discover, in fact, if you ever discovered, that Mr. Logan and his colleague Mr. Lenberg had, in fact, been in the Coffee County election headquarters on January 18, 2021?
A. In the news after I had already left the Secretary of State's office in November.
Q. Who did you report to?
A. Deputy Secretary Fuchs.
Q. And did you ever discuss this with the deputy secretary?
A. We did -- we did have regular discussions. But I don't specifically -- you know, I can't say, you know, I recall a specific time of having a conversation.
Q. Were you at all involved in renumbering or reclassifying the dates of different investigations relating to Coffee County?
A. The what?
Q. I think that there was some consolidation and also changes of dates of the sort of what they were associated -- various investigations associated with Coffee County.

Were you involved with that at all?
A. Changing dates, I don't know --

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
THE WITNESS: -- about ...
MR. CROSS: Could I ask just literally one question,
Your Honor?
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            THE COURT: Is it related to one of the matters I
    raised?
        MR. CROSS: Yes.
        THE COURT: All right.
            RECROSS-EXAMINATION (Further)
    BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Just one question, Ms. Watson.
Is it your position that your investigators, including
Blanchard and Jones, that they lack the skill or training
needed to uncover the Coffee County breaches on their own in
the summer of 2021 or at any point?
A. No, I'm not saying that.
Q. Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: May this witness be excused?
MS. LaROSS: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Please don't
discuss your testimony with anyone until the conclusion of the
trial. I appreciate that.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: We'll start at -- at 1:15. Take a lunch
break until then.
Thank you.
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. Court is in
recess until 1:15.
(A lunch break was taken.)

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THE COURT: Please have a seat.
Would you call your next witness.
Mr. Cross, do you want to call your next witness?
MR. CROSS: Yes.
Christian?
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: We call Dr. Alex Halderman. COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please raise your right hand.

\section*{(Witness sworn)}

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. If you would, state your name and spell your full name for the record.

THE WITNESS: My name is Alex Halderman. That is A-L-E-X, H-A-L-D-E-R-M-A-N.

THE COURT: All right. Before we begin with your testimony -- thank you very much -- good to see you again.

I don't remember whether the report is part of the exhibits or not.

MR. CROSS: It is in evidence, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What is the -- do you have it so that I can refer to it to the extent that I might need to?

MR. CROSS: Yes.
MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, just to clarify for the record, \(I\) believe the report is in evidence for a limited purpose, not for all purposes, and it is the redacted version, not the unredacted version.

THE COURT: That is fine.
MR. TYSON: Thank you.
THE COURT: Secondly, this -- this witness is Curling
Plaintiffs -- is retained counsel by the Curling Plaintiffs; is that right?

MR. CROSS: Retained as an expert, yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And so, accordingly, also, I mean,
obviously, Dr. Halderman's work has played a seminal role in this case, but I want to just be clear that we are only going to have one attorney be asking him questions from the plaintiffs' side.

MR. CROSS: Okay.
MR. BROWN: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And that is your -- the people from your team.

Is your colleague going to be asking all the questions, or are you going to be asking any of them?

MR. CROSS: Christian is going to ask all the questions.

MR. OLES: Judge, does that include Mr. Davis as well?

THE COURT: That's right. It includes -- this is the witness -- the consulting -- the expert witness on behalf of
the Curling Plaintiffs. He has developed all -- I mean, it is very complex testimony. They have worked with him. It would be really a -- not fair or appropriate for any other of the plaintiffs' counsel then to sort of take over and do some other -- try to elicit other issues from Dr. Halderman because he is going to be testifying about what is in the report, not about other matters.

MR. OLES: I respect -- I respect what Your Honor had to say.

For the record, I would like to lodge my objection that I did have about four questions.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: What the counsel said, he had about -- he objected, he had about four questions.

And this sort of goes to the whole issue of -- you
can come up -- if you have a small number of questions like that, then what I encourage you to do is to consult with plaintiffs' counsel about your questions so that they can ask them on your behalf.

And if you have follow-up, you know, you're welcome to sit up closer for the period of time that your questions are being asked in case there is follow-up.

But, you know, I think that what I've tried to encourage as much as possible is that you confer with your -with plaintiffs' other counsel regarding where they are going
with something because it is simply not appropriate for you to go off into a whole other set of theories that have not been, in fact, litigated or advanced in this case by present counsel and/or addressed by the Court's prior rulings.

So, I mean, I've tried to be as flexible as possible in allowing you to pursue things, but \(I\) think this is such a refined area. And enormous amounts of time have been devoted, both by Dr. Halderman and plaintiffs -- the Curling counsel.

So if there is something that you want to be followed up, talk with Mr. Cross and his colleague here. And then if you have a concern afterwards, we'll address that. You can come up to the bench and explain what you wanted to raise that they wouldn't raise for you. Okay?

MR. OLES: I will certainly endeavor to do that, Judge. I would respectfully say, for the record, my prior efforts have met with threats. Okay? Thank you.

MR. CROSS: What?
I have no idea what that means or who it involves. I think we can just move on.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we have a copy of the public version of the report for you. My understanding is we do not have questions that will relate to the redacted portions.

If the State does, we can make that available.
THE COURT: Would you restate that for the court
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reporter.

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    I just -- I want to remind everyone to speak into the
microphone.
    So restate what you just stated.
    MR. CROSS: Sorry. So what you have is the public
version of the report. It has got some modest redactions. We
don't anticipate any questions that would require Your Honor to
reference the unredacted version.
    If you want it, we can provide that. But that is
still under seal.
    THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
        MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Shall I proceed, Your Honor?
        THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.
        Whereupon,
        J. ALEX HALDERMAN PH.D.,
        after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
        DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Halderman. My name is Christian
Andreu-Von Euw. I'm here on behalf of plaintiffs.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. What do you do for a living, Professor Halderman?
A. I'm the Bredt Family Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan.
Q. What are your primary academic focuses?
A. My work is about computer security and privacy. I deal with the security of internet-connected systems, cryptography with cybersecurity, computer forensics. And for the past 15 years or so, another large fraction of my work has been about the security of election infrastructure.
Q. And what do you teach?
A. I teach computer security at the undergraduate and graduate levels. I created Michigan's undergraduate security curriculum. I also teach courses about election security, including a Coursera massive online course that has been widely used by election officials.
Q. Thank you.

Can you briefly summarize your educational background?
A. I have three degrees in computer science from Princeton University.
Q. Those are bachelor's, master's, and doctorate?
A. That is right.
Q. Can you give us some of the highlights of your published work on election security?
A. Sure. I was part of the -- excuse me. I was part of the first university team to do a hands-on security analysis of a U.S. voting machine that the analysis found significant security problems. I have done security analyses of election systems used not only in the U.S. but in Australia and Estonia and India.

I more recently conducted human subjects tests of voter verification performance in a peer-reviewed study that won a major award.

And in 2020, I published another peer-reviewed study that was a forensic investigation of an election incident that occurred in Antrim County, Michigan, in 2020. And that was based on work that I conducted for the Michigan Attorney General and Secretary of State.
Q. Do you ever work with election officials on election security?
A. Yes. Yes, I do. I was part of a team in 2007 that the California Secretary of State assembled of leading election security experts to conduct top-to-bottom source code review and security study encompassing all of California's polling place equipment.

More recently, the Michigan Secretary of State and Attorney General brought me into investigate problems that occurred during the 2020 election in Antrim County and to understand those problems and make recommendations about how to avoid a recurrence in the future.

I've also -- I have also been contracted to advise the Secretary of State of Louisiana about the security of that state's election equipment, including its Dominion equipment.

I should add that in Antrim County, Michigan, the equipment involved was the same Dominion Democracy Suite system
that is used in Georgia except that the BMDs there were all used for accessibility.
Q. Thank you.

Have you ever been asked to testify before Congress?
A. I have. I have testified to Congress twice about election security matters, including to the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Q. Can you turn to Tab 1 in your binder, please?
A. I am sorry. I don't have my binder. This is the Frances Watson binder.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: One second, Dr. Halderman.
We'll come back to that.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. In this case, Dr. Halderman, what were you asked to do?
A. The Curling Plaintiffs asked me to examine the security of Georgia's election system, including the BMD hardware, in order to understand the vulnerabilities in that system and the risks and to help inform the Court about how those risks might impact individual voters and elections in the future.
Q. Were you asked anything about Georgia's general security processes?
A. General election security processes? Yes. I considered the security practices that are in place, defenses. I wanted to -- I was asked to understand how the equipment might be attacked or what threats it might face in the real world.
Q. Thank you.

I'll just wait a second for counsel to get a copy of your binder, and then I'll ask you a question.

Can you turn to Tab 1 of your binder, please, Dr. Halderman?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recognize that document?
A. This is my CV.
Q. Does it accurately reflect your educational and professional accomplishments to date?
A. Yes.

MR. VON EUW: I would like to move the CV into
evidence.
MR. TYSON: No objection.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. So turning back to your tasks in this case, Dr. Halderman, what were you given to evaluate the -- Georgia's ballot-marking device?
A. The Curling Plaintiffs provided a ballot-marking device and an optical scanner that the Court allowed them to receive from Fulton County.
Q. Have you provided anything beyond a ballot-marking device and a scanner?
A. I was also provided accessories for that equipment
necessary to operate an election, assorted memory cards, data files, et cetera.
Q. Do you see the Dominion ICX BMD you were given here in court?
A. Yes. It is right here.
Q. Right in front of you, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do to determine if this ballot-marking device had vulnerabilities?

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, at this point I'll object. I believe Dr. Halderman can testify to this, but he has not been qualified as an expert at this point.

I would request to voir dire him before he gets into his opinions.

THE COURT: All right. Is there more you would like to do to elicit information regarding his expertise?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: No, Your Honor. I think we have sufficient information.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, could I request specifically what the boundaries of what Dr. Halderman is being offered as an expert in?

MR. VON EUW: Dr. Halderman is being offered as an expert in election security -- or election devices, and more specifically, the security thereof and the security of election
systems.
THE COURT: I'm sorry. Before you speak, I think it looked like Mr. Cross had something he wanted to add.

MR. CROSS: I was just going to say, just because Christian hasn't lived through this case, Your Honor has certified him as an election security expert before, so the objection has long since been waived. So I'm trying to understand where we are.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, this is the first time we have been at trial in this case, and I think Dr. Halderman, under the rules, needs to be qualified as an expert to testify here in trial.

MR. CROSS: That's not how it works. He's offered testimony in this case in three different live hearings. Not once -- I don't think they have ever objected. I think Your Honor has certified him.

The idea that now he is no longer an expert
doesn't -- they have given this up. This has long since been waived unless they are going to say that something has happened to him between the last verification that renders him no longer an expert.

THE COURT: Well, I think it is certainly strong evidence of that, but I want to allow the defense counsel to make his record.

MR. CROSS: Okay.

THE COURT: If there is anything after the questions has been asked, of course, that plaintiffs' counsel wish to do to clarify or rehabilitate anything, you are welcome to do that.

I would -- Christian, I would like you just to tell me so that I know what I'm calling -- what you go by in your last name -- because it is a hyphenated, long name, I want to know what would be best to ask you when I'm referring to you, which I feel like I will have to do and not just by plaintiffs' counsel.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, first, Christian is fine, but Mr. Andreu will work as well.

THE COURT: Mr. Andreu. Okay.
MR. CROSS: This is why I called him Christian, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, but I don't call the rest of you by your first name, so I'm not going to do that.

But, you know, if you want -- if I need to do the whole thing, Christian Von Euw, is it?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I rarely say my whole name, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. That's my question for the day.

One other question: My understanding -- but if it is not correct, you should address it as you deem appropriate --
is that when you say that you're offering Dr. Halderman as an
expert in election system security, are you embracing within
that software security?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Yes.
THE COURT: As well as equipment security?
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: The equipment, the protection of the equipment, the software, everything inside it.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else within
that, Dr. Halderman, that you think you should specifically flag for purposes of clarity?

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honor.
Specifically within?
THE COURT: Well, that you are offered for -- as an expert for -- with respect to election devices, election system security. I asked about software with security, and you said yes.

And I didn't know if there was something else within that that you consider as embraced within that or that needed to be specifically identified that they agree with, obviously.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.

Perhaps the cybersecurity and forensic aspects of election systems.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Also, Your Honor, to be clear, when \(I\) said election system security, that included physical security to the extent that wasn't clear.

THE COURT: You're getting very soft.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Excuse me.
THE COURT: That's all right. I heard it, but just
warning.
Cybersecurity and forensics elements of election
security, as I understood what you were saying.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Dr. Halderman?
THE COURT: Dr. Halderman, yes.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Yes. Okay.
And there was one thing you added?
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Yes. Within election security
system, that includes physical security.
THE COURT: And do you agree with that,
Dr. Halderman?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Halderman.
A. It is nice to see you again, Mr. Tyson.
Q. Good to see you as well. It is a little bit warmer in

Georgia than \(I\) think it was in Michigan last week when we were -- or week before when we were together.

Dr. Halderman, do you have any specialized training in the
analysis of risks outside of the context of cybersecurity?
A. No. My training is in cybersecurity.
Q. Do you have any specialized training regarding the administration of elections in Georgia?
A. No. Although I've reviewed election training material for elections in Georgia.
Q. And in forming your opinions or the areas of discussion in this case, did you rely on the functioning of the malware that you designed in your expert capacity?
A. Can you repeat the question?

I'm not sure I understood.
Q. Certainly. In forming the opinions, your expert opinions in this case, was one of the things that you relied on the malware that you designed and put on to the Dominion ballot-marking devices?
A. I would -- I would say no. The malware is a -- the malware is a way of confirming and demonstrating the results that I relied on with my testing.

MR. TYSON: So, Your Honor, at this time, we would not object to Dr. Halderman testifying as an expert in cybersecurity. We would object to any expert testimony regarding the administration of elections in Georgia.

And at this time, we would also renew our prior objection based on Rule 26 for lack of disclosure regarding the malware and the software involved in Dr. Halderman's opinions.

And as we discussed, we provided a sealed declaration to you and plaintiffs' counsel furthering the basis for that. We understand the Court has ruled previously on this issue. But for purposes of perfecting the record, we wanted to renew our objection before Dr. Halderman began offering opinions.

THE COURT: All right. I will note for the record that I received your sealed additional memorandum only today, and, as agreed, I was not going to look at it until -- unless you were actually offering it formally. So I have not, and I can't really address that.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, just to respond to the Rule 26 objection, couple of quick points. One, that objection was waived. So in the pretrial order, we identified the voting equipment as Exhibit 487.

Your Honor might recall that what got us back to the issue of them needing access to some of Dr. Halderman's source code -- or to his source code, I guess, in general, was the idea that when they saw that Exhibit 487 was there with the equipment, they said, oh, it looks like you're going to do a demonstration in court. We said, yes, that is the plan. They said that's the reason they suddenly needed access to the source code.

They do not have a Rule 26 objection to Exhibit 487, even though they knew it was coming in for a demonstration, so
the objection is waived, first and foremost, Your Honor.
I'll also just note, Your Honor, of course, recalls we also told them again on January 9th when we were going to do a demonstration with Mr. Schoenberg, we were going to do this. There was no Rule 26 objection or any objection, as I recall, to Mr. -- Dr. Halderman doing a demonstration.

Your Honor may recall we learned about a case from them just this morning. State's counsel left out some important parts of that decision, Your Honor.

First and foremost, the Court there, while it does discuss about --

THE COURT: What is the name --
MR. CROSS: Oh, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: For the record, can you tell us the name of the --

MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor.
This was the case Mr. Tyson cited, Estate of Thompson v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and the citation is -- looks like 291 F.R.D. 297, and it is out of the District of Iowa in March of 2013.

What Mr. Tyson did not share this morning is that the court, over the objection that the demonstrative for expert purposes was untimely, allowed the demonstrative to go in. To the extent there was even an issue, it was justified or harmless.
And what the court also says, Your Honor, is, there is no controlling authority on whether disclosure of demonstrative -- which is in quotes -- demonstrative aids is required pursuant to Rule \(26(a)(2)(B)(3)\), and, in fact, it is not. When you look at the plain text of Rule 26 that they are citing, it is exhibits, not demonstratives. Exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them, that has to be given at the time of the report, which makes sense because that is something we would seek to put into evidence.

Lastly, Your Honor, we did have some time, despite learning about this just this morning, to take a quick look. I say we, the team.

Two decisions we would direct your attention to, Your Honor, that I just got over the lunch break. One is SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson. It is in the District of Oklahoma, June of 2020. And I have a Lexis cite, 2020 US District Lexis 98418.

Similarly there, there was an objection about demonstratives being used with an expert, Your Honor. In fact, it was 54 demonstratives that were sought to be used at trial, so something quite substantial beyond what we're talking about here.

Again, the Court allowed it, and the reasoning holds here. The Court points out that the defendants' demonstrative exhibits, 54 undisclosed demonstratives were permissible because they were based -- they were not based on undisclosed
expert opinion, which, as you will see, is going to be the same here. They were based on admissible evidence, and they were based on -- the substance of them already had been disclosed in the expert report.

And so, essentially, what you'll see -- and this is at star 69 to star 70 in the Lexis cite -- the Court finds that the demonstratives themselves did not have to be disclosed because they were simply another way to capture the analysis and the opinions and the testimony that would come out, and Your Honor will see that today in the trial.

And then at star 71, 72 the Court says, the demonstrative exhibit is based on facts in the record, and thus the court will not exclude the exhibit.

And you will see today that the same is true.
The second opinion, Your Honor, PHT Holding I -- I think that's an "I" -- LLC v. -- it is SEC.Life of Denver Insurance Company. This is out of the District of Colorado in February just last year. In this one --

THE COURT: What is the citation?
MR. CROSS: Oh, sorry, yes. It is another Lexis cite. 2023, and the Lexis number is 145942.

Here, the demonstratives actually went further than what we have been talking about. The expert came in with demonstratives that, quote, do not merely update schedules previously disclosed to account for reasonably produced data.

They present new opinions.
So this is far beyond anything we're talking about here. As you'll hear from Dr. Halderman, he's simply going to have a demonstrative that demonstrates his analysis and his opinions. Here, it was something entirely new, new opinions.

The court nonetheless allowed it and emphasized that the court has to look at whether there's prejudice, whether it is harmless. And it says, even if to the extent the plaintiffs should have disclosed the data in this format earlier pursuant to Rule \(26(a)(2)(B)(3)\), the failure to do so is harmless.

We have not found any decision, nor has the State cited any decision, where a demonstrative was excluded under Rule 26. And again, Your Honor, the objection is long since waived.

And let me hand up copies of the decisions so Your Honor has them.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. CROSS: Sorry. We had to compile this very quickly in the meeting room.

And for reference for Your Honor, the initial waiver of the Rule 26 is at Docket 1728.

THE COURT: And this is one of the cases --
MR. CROSS: Oh, there should be -- sorry.
I only have one copy of each.
THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. CROSS: So I was referencing the pretrial order Docket 1728. It is Page 206 of 847 on the docket pagination. It is Page 152 of the PDF. And again, it is Exhibit 487, and there is no objection under Rule 26.

THE COURT: You're back.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. TYSON: If I could respond briefly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TYSON: To the waiver point, just to briefly
recap, we had previously requested the underlying data underlying Dr. Halderman's opinions in this case earlier. As the Court will recall, we had several discovery dispute documents about that, ultimately allowed to wait for ruling on those until after summary judgment because our key was going to be dealing with this at trial.

We also filed a motion in limine regarding this issue. And to Mr. Cross' point that the pretrial order somehow waived this issue on Page 2 of Docket 1728, we clearly indicated that this motion regarding Dr. Halderman's data was still pending at the time of the entry of the pretrial order, so there was no waiver.

As the Court will recall, there was some additional new software disclosed at the beginning of trial, and that led to an additional review on Monday of this week.

Mr. Persinger's declaration was prepared immediately after that to summarize the issues.

So we would submit that as a matter not of the demonstrative issue but as a matter of Rule 26 disclosure, since we did not receive the underlying data and the malware, that Dr. Halderman should not be able to offer opinions on that.

Ultimately, I think if the malware is nothing but a demonstrative, then it is not evidence before the court. If it is substantive evidence, then --

THE COURT: Well, he's going to be testifying about the malware.

MR. TYSON: Well, then Rule 26 would apply, I think, at that point, Your Honor. We would request that Dr. Halderman be limited on that point.

THE COURT: All right. Is there any other further reply that you would like to give?

MR. CROSS: Yes, Your Honor.
As Mr. Tyson just acknowledged, they made a decision to wait to ask for this for trial. This is the worst kind of gotcha game. If Your Honor were not to allow this, you would set a precedent where a party can deliberately decide not to pursue something in discovery that they asked for, and then when you get to trial say, you should have voluntarily produced this, affirmatively produced it even though we didn't follow

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up. We told the Court and you we didn't want it until trial. Because you didn't give it to us until the timing in which we asked for it, now you keep it out.

To the waiver point, Your Honor, Mr. Tyson's only response to the waiver point is to say, well, they had filed a motion in limine on his testimony. The motion in limine has nothing to do with the demonstrative. In fact, the motion in limine is premised on us doing a demonstrative.

Because this is how it played out. They told Your Honor in a hearing -- or in a pretrial conference in November of last year that the only reason, the reason they were asking for this discovery, is because they saw a demonstrative. And they said if we don't do the demonstrative that might resolve it. We offered that as a compromise. We said we will not do the demonstrative. We can go forward and the parties don't have to spend time and effort on this discovery.

They then did a complete reversal and said no, no, no; even if you do the demonstrative, we still want this.

Point being, the whole premise of them filing the motion in limine was to say they are going to do a demonstrative; therefore, we're entitled to this discovery. If we don't get that discovery, his testimony should not come in. It was never a discovery motion about doing a demonstrative. It was always accepted he was doing this, and so the Rule 26 objection has long since been waived.

Lastly, Your Honor, Dr. Halderman did not say the malware is not a demonstrative. He said he is not relying on it for his opinions. But it is an input. It is something he has considered. And it is highly valuable for the Court to demonstrate that his opinions, contrary to what Secretary Raffensperger has said, are, in fact, real world because he will show you with this equipment from Fulton County, configured as it is used in elections, exactly how someone could walk into a voting booth in minutes, upload that malware, and change elections.

So this is directly responsive to their defense in this case that he is talking about something that can't be done in the real world.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you.
Consistent with my representation to counsel who were directly involved in this and who had signed the confidentiality agreement as to the review of the malware also, I'm going to at this point move forward.

I'll look at the motion. I hadn't because I told you I wasn't going to look at it unless you told me it was still a live matter. I can't really be on the bench and be doing more than having a cursory review of the decisions that are now being presented, but --

So I think that wisest thing is to move forward. We'll issue an order -- a written order since it is a matter of
some concern on the part of the defendants. But \(I\) think given how long this case has been going on and the difficulty of getting any case to trial and moving through trial, it is important to go ahead with his testimony at this point. And to the extent that \(I\) rule in favor of the defendants' motion or restrict some evidence, it will be articulated at a subsequent -- in a subsequent order. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman -- I'll move the microphone closer to myself and then ask you a question.

Dr. Halderman, focusing on the ballot-marking device, what did you do to determine if it had vulnerabilities?
A. Yes. So I applied a methodology called open-ended vulnerability testing. This is an established methodology within the election security field for trying to understand at the security posture of a piece of election equipment.

And what that consists of is first taking the software in the device apart to understand its functionality and potential vulnerabilities, then forming hypotheses about how those vulnerabilities might be exploited, and then confirming those hypotheses with experiments based on the data.

It is essentially a way of playing the role of an attacker and trying to discover ways to compromise the equipment.

And, in general, this methodology considers the equipment as it would be used in a real election and tries to find
vulnerabilities that would apply in that context.
Q. Dr. Halderman, you said -- you mentioned taking the software apart. I want to make sure that was clear.

Did you receive any source code for this device?
A. No, I did not. This was what is known as black box testing. That is a testing methodology that doesn't benefit from access to source code.

So it is certainly more work for the analyst. There is maybe more of a chance that the analysis will fail to find certain vulnerabilities.

But on the other hand, it is perhaps a clearer view into what a real attacker without access to source code could also discover.
Q. Putting aside source code, did you receive any -- any software for this ballot-marking device other than the software that was loaded inside the machine?
A. I also received a copy of the version 5.5.10.32 software's update that Georgia applied in the fall of 2020.
Q. Okay. Did you ever open up the ballot-marking device?
A. No. At no point did I open its chassis.
Q. And this is the -- are you aware if this ICX device in front of you -- if this type of device is publicly available?
A. Well, Dominion doesn't sell them, to my knowledge, to anyone who isn't a municipality. However, ICX --

THE COURT: You mean a municipality or a governmental
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entity?

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THE WITNESS: Yes, a governmental entity. Thank you. However, an ICX was sold publicly on eBay within the last two years. It was purchased, in fact, by Harri Hursti who is an election security expert who has previously testified in this case.

And that ICX had been previously used in the State of Michigan. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Have you personally seen that device?
A. I have.
Q. Do you know if anybody else has seen the device, the ICX BMD that Harri Hursti purchased?
A. Well, yes. So Mr. Hursti runs an annual event called The Voting Village, which is part of DEF CON, one of the world's largest annual hacker conferences. And Mr. Hursti this past year in 2023 brought the ICX that he purchased to DEF CON and made it available to attendees to perform testing on.
Q. Turning back to your findings, Dr. Halderman, were your findings reviewed by any Government agencies?
A. My findings in this case, yes. So from when I first discovered the vulnerabilities, I thought it very important to make sure this information was taken through what is known as a responsible disclosure process.

That is a process that would get the information into the
hands of parties responsible for the design and operation of the equipment.

And so in -- I believe it is January 2022, the Court authorized the Curling Plaintiffs to send my report to CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. It is the arm of the Department of Homeland Security that is responsible for critical infrastructure and election security.

And I worked with CISA through its coordinated vulnerability disclosure program to take the information through responsible disclosure.
Q. Can you turn to Tab 2 in your binder, please?
A. As I'm looking at Tab 1, I remember one more important thing about my background that I neglected to say, which is that I also work as the -- I am also the co-chair of Michigan's Election Security Advisory Commission by appointment of our Secretary of State.

And I wouldn't want my friends at the Michigan Bureau of Elections, who I talk to about that topic almost every other week, to be angry at me for omitting them.
Q. Thank you, Dr. Halderman.
A. Tab 2.
Q. Tab 2.

Do you recognize that document?
A. Yes.
Q. What is it?
A. So this is a public vulnerability advisory that CISA produced after the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process was complete.
Q. So was this the end result of your disclosure to CISA?
A. That's --

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, objection. I just want to be clear for the record that as to this portion, I don't believe Dr. Halderman has a report covering CISA and its recommendations.

So as to this portion of his testimony, I think he can only testify as a fact witness, not as an expert.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that that is so,
frankly. He might not be an expert on the CISA advisory
process. But he -- certainly, given the scope of his qualifications in cybersecurity and his active role as an advisor to the Government, it would certainly -- it would seem he would have the expertise to be able to discuss the advisory opinion even if he can't -- and the opinion process even if he can't act as a representative of CISA itself.

So proceed with that understanding.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Sir, the CISA document, was this the end result of your disclosure process with CISA?
A. Yes.
Q. Does it reflect the vulnerabilities that you discovered?
A. Yes, it does.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I would like to move this into evidence as PX 0089. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Did you prepare a demonstrative summarizing the vulnerabilities the suit CISA included in its advisory?

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I believe I get to object or need to say whether I have an objection to Exhibit 89.

THE COURT: That's fine. Go ahead.
MR. TYSON: Just one moment, Your Honor. I want to make sure I'm consulting the pretrial order.

First, Your Honor, I think we would say as to this document, that if it formed part of the opinions of Dr. Halderman in this case, it was not attached as an exhibit to any of his reports in this case, so we would object on that ground.

And then we would just object as a general hearsay objection as to the other contents.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think that the witness can speak as a fact witness as to what is in the advisory. I don't know the nature of his interaction with CISA other than providing the report, but -- and then you can ask the witness in his expert capacity, what portions of his -- did this adopt of his report or his findings.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, I would also add
that this is a Government document, a public record, and it serves as notice to the State for other reasons for admissibility.

THE COURT: When was it issued?
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: And again, there is no Rule 26 objection on the exhibit.

THE COURT: That's fine, but it still doesn't
affect -- I'm not saying it can't come in. I'm just explaining how it can come in.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Understood, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And so if you would just also give the date of the report, if you would. It probably might have been referenced earlier, but just give the date.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: The original release date on the face of the document is June 3, 2022.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, I may have asked you this already, but does this disclosure summarize the vulnerabilities that you found?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Did you prepare a demonstrative summarizing the vulnerabilities that you found and CISA validated?
A. Yes.
Q. Sir, let me get in --

THE COURT: You're saying you found and CISA found,
or CISA validated?
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: CISA validated.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman --

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TYSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Could I briefly review the demonstrative? I haven't seen this document before.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
When it says CVE under a heading there, what does CVE
reference? That is to you.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, CVE, that stands for common
vulnerabilities and exposures. CVE numbers are an
industry-wide form of tracking individual vulnerabilities in technology products.

So these are numbers that were assigned by CISA after they completed their process of validating each of the vulnerabilities.

THE COURT: So these are standardized codes, you're saying?

THE WITNESS: Those are unique --
THE COURT: Language in the cybersecurity field?
Is that what you are saying?
THE WITNESS: Yes. To refer to this particular vulnerability in the ICX, yes.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any further --

MR. TYSON: So, Your Honor, I would just reiterate, I believe this falls outside the scope of any report Dr. Halderman has offered in this case, but we don't have any dispute about his summarizing the CISA exhibit.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to allow him to proceed and overrule your objection to the extent I think it isn't valid at this juncture.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: You asked my next question, Your Honor. I'll proceed from there. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, could you please demonstrate Vulnerability Number 1.

Actually, first, can you please the read the vulnerability as you have summarized it on the board?
A. Yes. So I have summarized each of the CISA
vulnerabilities because CISA's language is a little bit jargony.

The first one is that safe mode is accessible and allows installation of malware.
Q. With the Court's permission, could you please step down to the BMD and demonstrate CISA Vulnerability Number 1.

THE COURT: I want to just make 100 percent sure I understand what is going on here.

I understand the vulnerability in Number 1, and then you give a -- and is the CVE code one that you ascribed or that
was ascribed in the review by IC -- by CISA?
THE WITNESS: This a number that CISA has assigned, and it refers to the specific problem rather than a class of problems so you can reference the CISA advisory, and one of these particular headings under it is going to say which CVE number has been assigned to that.

THE COURT: All right. And in your experience in the cybersecurity field, is that typical of what CISA does when it is reviewing reports to it?

THE WITNESS: Yes. This is how coordinated vulnerability disclosure typically works.

THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS: Once a vulnerability is confirmed and validated, it is assigned a CVE number and published.

THE COURT: And they were reviewing your work in that connection when they identified this CVE number?

THE WITNESS: So the way a program like this works is the agency receives a report from the parties who have discovered a vulnerability and then they confer with the manufacturer of the product to confirm that that is how the technology works and indeed a problem. And then they --

THE COURT: They being, again, the agency?
THE WITNESS: CISA, in this case, would publish an advisory on that -- on the basis of that investigation. Sometimes they might have to do their own further technical
work as part of that; sometimes not.
THE COURT: And if you would just explain a little bit about the basis of your familiarity with the -- with the CISA -- I guess its ICX process.

THE WITNESS: I have taken vulnerabilities -actually, numerous vulnerabilities through responsible disclosure processes with -- in the course of my career.

I have also -- and having participated in the CISA process in the course of this report involved spending substantial time with them to make sure that as the discoverer of the vulnerability, I understood the -- the process that they were going to apply.

THE COURT: And in working with CISA in terms of your experience in the cybersecurity field professionally, is it -is coordination or collaboration with CISA in conjunction with this sort of vulnerability assessment accepted as a responsible, integral part of your work as a cybersecurity specialist?

THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, absolutely. Responsible disclosure, for instance, through CVD programs like this, when that is the appropriate means of disclosure for a particular class of problems, is absolutely an integral part.

THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, I think this might be clear already from
the Court's question.
But just to be clear, does this demonstrative summarize
your own findings?
A. Yes.
Q. Does it summarize your own findings as reflected in your expert report?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, may I ask
Dr. Halderman to step down to the machine?
MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, could I take a position
so I can observe?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TYSON: And for the record, this is reflected --
this particular item is reflected step by step in
Dr. Halderman's report, so we don't have a problem with this particular demonstrative.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, before you start --

THE COURT: I think that's going to be a problem for the -- this whole podium is moveable if you want to move it.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, may we observe as well, please?

THE COURT: Of course.
The only question I have relative to where you are standing, Mr. Andreu, is, are you wanting to be so close to the screen? Is that why you are there as opposed to -- since I -you could stand at the podium and move your --

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I don't necessarily need to be close to the screen, Your Honor, but I do need to be able to observe it.

THE COURT: To observe it. All right.
Well, anyone else can also stand over here if you wish.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I'm afraid I may not be able to stand in front of the screen if --

THE COURT: I'm not worried about -- I can come over here. That's fine.

THE WITNESS: I wish this was a little bit longer.
THE COURT: But we have a portable microphone, don't we?
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE WITNESS: Maybe if I stand like this.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE WITNESS: Now if I face this way, you will be able to hear.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman --
A. Yes.
Q. -- before you start, I do have a few more questions for you.

First, where did you get this ballot-marking device in front of you, again?
A. This is the ballot-marking device that was provided to the Curling Plaintiffs by Fulton County under this Court's -- at this Court's direction.
Q. On the left side of the BMD, there is a sticker and some sort of device.

Can you point to it and explain what it is?
A. Yes. It is -- over on this side, it is a state of Georgia acceptance testing seal, and there is a small barrel seal. They are both covering one of the compartments on the side of the device. These indicate that the machine has undergone Georgia acceptance testing.
Q. And those seals are not broken because you have never opened the machine; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Is the machine configured in the same way as you received it?
A. It is configured in the same way that we received it from Fulton County, except that I have updated the software as

Georgia did following Georgia's procedure to the . 32 version which was installed after Fulton County gave us the machine.
Q. So it is configured in the same way it would be configured for a Georgia voter?
A. That's right.
Q. And this machine hasn't been hacked, just to be clear; correct?
A. That is right.
Q. It is not in a hacked state; right?
A. It is not in a hacked state.
Q. Okay. Can you please demonstrate the first vulnerability on your demonstrative?
A. Mr. Andreu, can I borrow your pen --
Q. Here you go.
A. -- just a second?
Q. Dr. Halderman, I saw you just put a pen behind the machine.

What did you do?
A. Yes. So the first vulnerability as confirmed by CISA is that by holding down the machine's power button, it is possible to reboot the machine into what is called safe mode. And that power button is covered by a plastic door that is closed with a tamper-evident seal.

However, there is a door -- a hole in that door where the cables come out for the printer and the machine's power. And
by inserting a tool through that door, it is possible to reach the power button and hold it down. And a pen works well enough. I just used your BIC pen here. You can have it back.
Q. And before we take -- return to --
A. Now, that caused the machine to reboot into what is called safe mode. This is a mode that bypasses the normal Georgia election software and allows you to get to the underlying Android operating system.
Q. And I think you might have just answered this, but what do we see on screen right now?
A. This is the Android desktop, and it is rotated. I'm going to just hit a button here to rotate it so it is right-side-up so that maybe we can all see it just a little bit better.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Before we go any further, Tony, can we get -- I think it is the first slide. It is the photograph.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, what do you see on the screen?
A. So in the center, that is a photograph of what is behind the plastic door. The machine's power button is highlighted. And then on the right is a picture of the door in a closed and sealed state, and you can see the right side of the right-most picture the hole through which the cables have to pass.
Q. Sir, does the ballot-marked -- so what -- is there a seal on the door in the picture?
A. Yes. It is a seal of the same type that are typically used in Georgia polling places. It is called a strap seal.
Q. Is the same --

MR. TYSON: I'm sorry. Your Honor, I would just move to strike that last answer. I think there is a foundation for Dr. Halderman's knowledge of what seals are typically used in Georgia polling places. I think that can be laid, but it hasn't been yet.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, are you familiar with how election equipment is sealed in Georgia?
A. Yes, I have undertaken study of that question.
Q. Okay. Does the voting machine in front of you have a similar seal to the Georgia seal on the photograph?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Did you cut, break, or in any way damage the seal as you demonstrated the hack?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Can you estimate roughly how long it took you to boot the BMD in front of you into safe mode?
A. It took just five or ten seconds to effectuate the reboot. Q. And I think you answered this a second ago, but what do we see on the screen right now?
A. This is the Android desktop.
Q. What version of Android is this?
A. The machines run version of Android 5.1.
Q. Do you know what the current version of Android is?
A. Oh, I believe it is Android 14.
Q. Do you know if Android 5 is still supported by its manufacturer?
A. No, it is not.
Q. Can you show us what one can do with this level of access?
A. Sure. So if I do this, I get the Android launcher, and this is a menu of different applications that are installed on the device.
Q. Can you walk us through some of those applications, please?
A. Well, here we have the file manager. This is an application that will let me on-screen navigate through the files on the machine. You can use that to copy or delete files or to open them up in an on-screen text editor and edit or even change the contents of the files on the screen.

Here, we have the settings icon that allows you to change any of the operating systemwide settings or to remove or install software on the device.

So through the settings application is one way that someone could directly install malware using this safe mode vulnerability.

Here is another application, the terminal emulator, and that one is particularly powerful.
Q. What does the terminal emulator allow you to do?
A. Well, a terminal is a text-based interface to a computer that allows you to type in commands, usually more advanced commands than you can get to through a graphical interface, and the computer will respond with more text that indicates the result of the command that you have typed.

Could I start it?
Q. Yes.
A. All right. I'll start the term --

THE COURT: Stop there.
MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, at this point we would object as beyond the scope of Rule 26 for this demonstration because there is not a discussion as I can find it in the report regarding the functioning of the terminal emulator and what it carries out.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, I'm just checking. Yes, I'm correct. Section 8.3 discussed terminal emulator, and I quote, says, makes it easy for an attacker to install programs or to run automated commands for malicious purposes.

MR. TYSON: I apologize, Your Honor. I'll withdraw that. I see that section of the report now. Thank you.

THE COURT: It is very understandable. No problem. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, what is the most powerful command one can run with the terminal emulator?
A. Well, among the most powerful commands is something called SU, and that stands for superuser. And the \(S U\) command is a way of requesting that the computing device allow you and your subsequent commands to essentially bypass the operating system's normal security controls.
Q. Is the \(S U\) command secret or unique to this device in any way?
A. No. No. This is a standard Unix operating environment command. It is probably since the 1970s.
Q. What happens on a typical computer when one types SU?
A. Well, typically --

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'll just object. I don't believe there is discussion of a typical computer as part of the Rule 26 report.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, the report discloses a normal Android terminal. This -- normal Android terminals have normal commands. \(S U\) is typically included -- \(S U\) is typically, if not always -- I don't know -- included, and this is an example of what one can do with a standard Android terminal, which we discussed.

COURT REPORTER: I need you to slow down.
THE COURT: Let the witness explain that and go
forward and explain why you think it is within --
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, could I add one quick thing?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CROSS: I think it is important not to lose sight that this equipment was provided by the State and Fulton County, so this --

THE COURT: Fulton County.
MR. CROSS: Right, Fulton County. Fair enough. But it is provided to counties by the state, as we know. So I just want to not lose sight of the fact that, unlike other demonstrations where an expert might come with their own equipment, the State presumably knows how their voting system works.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: And further, Your Honor, the report does say that he is able to easily access, control, and modify any part of data or software. And he is explaining how that is right now.

THE COURT: All right. Just keep that microphone close to you. Because, otherwise, the extent of having a public court proceeding is going to be defeated by no one being able to understand you, past counsel's row. Thank you.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, what typically happens when one types the SU command?
A. Well, typically on a computer system, the computer would challenge you for some secret password before allowing you to receive that superuser level of access.
Q. Is the password required in the case of the Dominion BMD?
A. Could I run the command and show you?
Q. Please.
A. I'm going to hit the enter key on the on-screen keyboard which will cause the machine to execute the SU command. All right. And instead of asking for a password, it's displayed an on-screen prompt just asking, would I like to allow superuser access, allow or deny. And I'm going to say allow.

And now the computer has responded by changing its prompt. It now says root and has a different character here at the end of the string. That indicates that I have received root access, which is another name for superuser access to the device.

So now subsequent commands that I type will be able to bypass the security controls.
Q. Dr. Halderman, what can you do with this root superuser access?
A. Well, gosh, it -- superuser access would allow me to -- to read, to modify, or to change any of the data or software that is installed on the device.
Q. Are there any limits to what you could do with a ballot -to a ballot -- excuse me -- using this access?
A. To the ballot data on the machine? No.
Q. Are there any limits to what you could do to the election software on the BMD with this access?
A. No.
Q. Are there any limits to what you could do to the operating system of this BMD with this access?
A. No.
Q. And to be clear, you were -- sorry, you were going to say something, Dr. Halderman?

To be clear, you received this access by sticking a BIC pen in the back of the machine for three seconds; correct?
A. It may have been five seconds.
Q. Dr. Halderman, did you discover this vulnerability yourself?
A. Actually, no, I didn't discover this one myself. I actually first read about this on the US EAC's website. THE COURT: The US EAC is what?

THE WITNESS: The EAC, that's the Election Assistance Commission, the federal agency that is responsible for working with state and local election offices.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. And what did you see on the Election Assistance Commission's website?
A. The EAC published a technical advisory that Dominion issued to its customers. It is dated January of 2020. I think that is the first month that Georgia had deployed the Dominion system.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Can we put this on screen,
please, Tony? Next exhibit. Next exhibit.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, can you turn to Tab 3 in your binder?
A. That is --

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Tony, it is the slide you had up earlier before the --

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Does Tab 3 contain the advisory you are referring about, Dr. Halderman?
A. Yes. Yes, this is the advisory.
Q. When is it dated?
A. January 16, 2020.
Q. What is the purpose of this advisory?
A. The purpose, presumably, was to alert customers about this -- this vulnerability.
Q. Can you please read the first two -- can you please read the first two sentences of the description in the advisory?

THE COURT: Which one? By EAC or by Dominion?
THE WITNESS: By Dominion.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: It says a scenario exists when it is possible to restart the ICX prime in, quote-unquote, safe mode and access the Android menu. If the mechanical power button behind the ICX door is pressed, a power-down option is presented. At this point, if the power-down screen button is
pressed and held, the safe mode option is presented. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Is this what you did, Dr. Halderman?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I know that the advisory is dated January 2022 [sic]. When did you receive the ballot-marking device? THE COURT: I think it is January -THE WITNESS: Of 2020. THE COURT: -- 2020, not 2022. MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Thank you, Your Honor. THE WITNESS: I received the ballot-marking device in August of 2020. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. So this advisory is roughly half a year before you received the device?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Did your demonstration right now demonstrate any other vulnerabilities on the ten vulnerabilities on the board in front of you?
A. Yes. It also demonstrated the second vulnerability on the list, that the terminal is accessible and allows the installation of malware.
Q. And that is the one that was assigned CVE 2022-1741 by CISA?
A. That's right.
Q. As of now, have you made any changes to the configuration of this device in front of you?
A. No.
Q. Could one install malware from here alone?
A. Yes.
Q. Could we -- actually, before we talk more about malware, could we step back and have you demonstrate the normal voting process using this machine.
A. Okay. So to do that, I'll have to reboot the machine again to exit safe mode.
Q. Please do.
A. So I'm going to type another command at the screen. I'm going to type the command reboot. I'm going to press the on-screen enter key, and the machine is going to reboot back into its normal mode of operation.
Q. Can you describe what is happening on-screen, Dr. Halderman?
A. The screen looks like -- maybe looks like an old PC. As it is booting up, it is black with some white characters. Now it says Dominion Voting. And now we're going to briefly see the Android desktop, and now the normal voting interface has appeared on the screen. It is the animation of a hand inserting a card into a slot.
Q. Is this machine ready to vote?
A. It is almost ready to vote. Since it just booted up, it
needs a poll worker to come along and enable voting.
Q. Can you please show us how that is done?
A. Sure. So what a poll worker would typically do is take a poll worker card -- this is a kind of Smart card with a computer chip in it -- and insert it into this slot and then enter an on-screen PIN and hit \(\log\) in.

Now, the machine is going to ask me to confirm that the clock is set correctly. It looks right, and now everything looks okay, so I can take out the card and the machine is ready for voters to come along.
Q. Can you please go through the voting process, Dr. Halderman?
A. Sure. So a voter would be -- when they check in at the polling place would receive another Smart card, a voter card from a poll worker. The voter card allows them to activate the ballot-marking device and print a ballot.

So I'm going to put a voter card into the slot. Okay. Now, the machine is responding by displaying the ballot.
Q. Can you please proceed to vote?
A. Well, I'll just -- can I briefly describe that this ballot is the November 2024 Fulton County ballot, it says, and this is a ballot I have prepared for the demonstration.

All right. If I move to the first screen of the ballot, it is the -- for the president of the United States, and the candidates on the ballot are George Washington and Benedict

Arnold.
Q. Are you a Washington man or an Arnold man?
A. I think every good-blooded American is a George Washington fan. So here, I'll vote for Washington. For demonstration, let me just skip over the remainder of the ballot.
Q. Dr. Halderman, you just pressed a button.

Can you tell us --
THE COURT: Wait a second.
MR. TYSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I was just going to renew our objection. I believe this ballot was prepared after Dr. Halderman's report, so we would object to -- under Rule 26 that this was not part of the opinions offered in his report.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, as we discussed earlier, there were just changes made to names on ballots, and this ballot was provided to defendant in electronic form.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, the ballot was provided to us, I believe, Friday of last week. We looked at the source code on Monday of this week.

But our objection is that it was part of the basis of his opinions and was not part of his July 2021 report but has been created later.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: And, Your Honor, the ballot is illustrating the vulnerabilities that result from his opinions. It is not the basis of his opinions.

THE COURT: Your voice is trailing off.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, I'm sorry.
The ballot illustrates the vulnerabilities found --
not even. Is used to illustrate the vulnerabilities found in his opinion. It does not form the basis of his opinion.

THE COURT: All right. I overrule the objection. I think this is nothing new, frankly, in this case. We have seen this again and again. I'm not saying this particular, but I don't think that this is a surprise, and it is not the basis -these documents are not the basis of his opinion.

But -- so go ahead and proceed.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, before the back-and-forth, you pressed a button on the screen.

Can you tell us what you did?
A. Yes. I pressed the review button. That just takes the voter to the review screen which summarizes the voter's selections. And here on the review screen, it shows each contest, and it shows for president of the United States that I have selected George Washington. I could touch that to go back and change my selection, or I can touch a print ballot button to print the ballot.
Q. Can you please print the ballot?
A. Sure. I'll touch print ballot.

There is a confirmation. Do I really want to print my
ballot? Yes. Right now, the printer comes to life and the paper is coming out.
Q. Can you please pick up the ballot that is printed and describe what you see?
A. Yes. So the ballot says the title of the election, and it has a large \(Q R\) code, and then it has some text on it. And in this ballot style, the only part of the ballot that is tabulated by the kind of ballot scanners used in Georgia is the contents -- the digital contents of the \(Q R\) code.

The text below is another form of summary of the voter's selections. It shows the name of each office and the selected candidate, or it is supposed to.
Q. Does the ballot reflect -- does the human readable text in the ballot reflect your vote for George Washington?
A. Well, voters might not take the time to review it. But if I read it, it says, for president of the United States, vote for George Washington.

So that does reflect what I picked on-screen.
Q. Do you know if the \(Q R\) code on that ballot reflects your vote for George Washington?
A. If read by an appropriately configured scanner, it would, yes.
Q. So how would this ballot be tabulated?
A. The voter would put it into a scanner, and the scanner would read the \(Q R\) code and extract the data from that, and it
is just the data in the \(Q R\) code that would be tabulated through the scanner.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I would like to move this ballot into evidence as an exhibit.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, we would just object. Either this is a demonstrative or it is not, so we would object to it being included in evidence. Also on the grounds of relevance because it is not from an actual Georgia election. It is from an election that Dr. Halderman created.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, we can keep it as a demonstrative.

THE COURT: That's fine.
Would you just send this demonstrative that way before it gets eaten up. Give it to Harry. That is the most -- he is the anti-garbage. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, next, \(I\) want to talk about the third vulnerability you discovered that was assigned. This one was assigned CVE 2022-1746.

And my first question is: Where did you get the poll worker card you used for this demonstration?
A. Oh, so the poll worker card I just used is a card that I created. This is a counterfeit poll worker card. And Fulton County provided a poll worker card. But rather than using it for this demonstration, I'm using this counterfeit one.
Q. Can you describe the process of making that card at a high level, please?
A. Yes. So these are Smart cards. They are just plastic cards with a programmable computer chip in them. And I bought blank programmable Smart cards online, loaded them with some software that I created, loaded the cards then with the appropriate data, and that is the card that you see here. It is a poll worker card.
Q. Roughly, how much did that card cost you, Dr. Halderman?
A. These cards cost about \(\$ 10\) each. You can get them from numerous online stores.
Q. Are there any restrictions on the sale or use of those cards?
A. No.
Q. Did you need any special tools to make the counterfeit poll worker card?
A. Special tools? Nothing exotic, just a USB Smart card reader. You can buy those for about \(\$ 20\) on Amazon. It is a commodity device.
Q. Any restrictions on the sale or use of those commodity devices?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Now I want to talk next about the fourth vulnerability on your list assigned CVE 2022-1747 by CISA.

Did you also make the voter card you used to vote,

\section*{Dr. Halderman?}
A. Yes. The voter card that I used, I also made this as a counterfeit voter card. It is a very similar process. It is also a programmable Smart card that I loaded with my software.
Q. Could that voter card be used on other BMDs besides the one in front of you?
A. If it was for the same election, this voter card -- for the same election within the same county, the voter card would function.
Q. So your counterfeit voter cards could be used countywide?
A. Yes.
Q. Is the same true for the poll worker card you just showed us? Can your counterfeit poll worker cards be used countywide?
A. Yes.
Q. At the high level you described, was the poll worker card made using the same process as the voter card?
A. Yes.
Q. Is the voter card you created different in any way from an ordinary voter card a voter would use?
A. Well, in a way, it is more powerful. A normal voter card is programmed to allow the voter to print one ballot and then it is deactivated by the BMD. My voter card ignores that deactivation request, and so it allows you to print as many ballots as you would like.
Q. Could you demonstrate that by printing a second ballot,
please.
A. Sure.
Q. So again, you see the same screen sequence as before?

THE COURT: Is that right? It is the same sequence on the ballot?

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's right. I just went through the same thing, voted for George Washington again, and it came out again a ballot for George Washington.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Okay. Dr. Halderman, I want to turn now to the fifth vulnerability on your list CVE 2022-1745. I see -- I'll read it out loud, and then I'll you ask a question.

It says anyone can forge technician cards for all BMDs that allow installation of malware.

So as a starting point, can you tell us what a technician card is?
A. Yes. So a technician card is the third kind of Smart card for the ICX BMDs. A technician card is sort of like a master key. It unlocks a technician menu from which service workers at the county or Dominion personnel perform functions like loading the ballot designs before an election or performing software updates.
Q. Did you prepare a counterfeit technician card as well?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Can you show us how it is used?
A. So I am inserting the technician card, and it is prompting for an on-screen PIN. My card will just ignore the PIN, so I'm not going to bother typing anything. And the machine has unlocked, and it is displaying the technical administration menu, and there is a prompt on-screen saying that menu is unavailable while the poll is open. But we can just say okay and ignore that.
Q. At a high level, can you describe -- can you tell us what the technical administration menu is used for?
A. So as I said, service workers, county personnel would use this for things like -- things like updating the software or loading data beforehand. This has functions that are more powerful than what a normal poll worker would have access to. Q. And you unlocked it in one second using a technician card you created?
A. That is right.
Q. Can you show us what one can do from this technician menu?
A. Sure. So what I'm going to do here is I am going to hit this button at the top of the screen that says exit.

I'm sorry to block your view, Mr. Tyson.
THE COURT: That's fine. Go ahead.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE WITNESS: It is asking if I want to exit the application. I'll say yes. I'm going to touch something at the bottom of the screen here. And now we've gotten back to
the Android desktop.
We see all of the same stuff that we did when I rebooted into safe mode. I can touch here and go back to the launcher. And we have -- it is rotated a little bit, but we have the same file manager, terminal, settings application. All of that is accessible. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Can you access the same terminal application as you did a minute ago with Vulnerability Number 1?
A. Yes, I can. Perhaps I'll rotate the screen for everyone's benefit once again.

All right. So I can go to the terminal and run my SU again and say allow on the screen. Now I have superuser access.
Q. So this is the same as before?

You now have full control of the BMD and everything on it; correct?
A. That's right. And from this technician card that \(I\) was able to make and without access to any secret information.

But the technician card, I should note, works on -- would
work on any BMD -- any ICX BMD running compatible software anywhere. It is not specific to Georgia, a county, or a specific election.
Q. Okay. Now, again, this master key you created can be used to change any ballots or any ballot files for any software;
correct?
A. Yes. So it can be used to gain superuser access and change any data or software on the device.
Q. On your report, you described automated commands.
A. Yes.
Q. Can automated commands be used to cause the machine to print ballots that do not reflect the voter's intentions?
A. Yes, they can.
Q. And I think you said this, Dr. Halderman, but just to be sure: Did you need any nonpublic information to make the card, the technician card?
A. Remarkably, no.
Q. Now, back -- could you please demonstrate the use of automated terminal commands to cause the machine to print votes that do not reflect the voter's intention?
A. Yes. And let me show you. What I'm going to do, I'm going to go back to the voting app.
Q. One second, Dr. Halderman.

This is the voting screen as a voter would see it; correct?
A. Yes. Now we're back to the voting screen. I'm going to put in another technician card I have prepared, and this one I'm going to insert a few times. You can see I'm pulling it out and putting it back in.

THE COURT: If you want us to hear you, we're not
hearing you.
THE WITNESS: I say I have another technician card I have prepared that I have removed and inserted now several times in a row. And --

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, before you continue, as of now, is this machine still configured as it would be in a normal election?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Please continue.
A. This is just very awkward with the microphone and the screen, but I'm going to do my best.

So now I'm back in the technician menu. I'm going to hit exit at the top. And what I'm going to do is I'm going to go to the file manager and open the ICX's audit log file. This is one of the log files that the machine creates, and I'm going to open it with the on-screen text editor.

What I have just done with the technician card is I have loaded this technician card with the automated commands that I want to run in a way that they appear in the audit log. But I'm going to open the audit log and edit it with the on-screen text editor.

I'm actually going to highlight a portion that came from my card and hit the cut button to move it to the machine's clipboard. And I'm going to save the audit log just to show you that I can delete portions of the audit log with the
on-screen text editor.
Q. Let me stop you there, Dr. Halderman.

So you just inserted using the card information you wanted into a log and manually deleted information from a log; correct?
A. That is right. That is right. So if the card from -- the technician card, one thing that the technician card can do is provide just normal data that is going to become part of the log file in the normal operation of the machine.

And I opened the log file in the text editor and was able to copy that out.
Q. Are there any limits on what you can add or remove to the \(\log\) files on the Dominion BMD?
A. No. With the text editor, you could select and cut or delete log entries that would otherwise be evidence of some malfeasance.
Q. Could that be done programmatically?
A. Yes, it could.
Q. And could you please continue with your demonstration.
A. All right. We should have thought about this. I'm left-handed, so this is very awkward.

THE COURT: Do you want to come over -- do you want to come on the other side?

THE WITNESS: Maybe what I'll do is --
THE COURT: Do you want a chair there?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: You can also just --
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I can reach the
microphone. Maybe if I do this, this is going to --
THE COURT: No, don't do that. That doesn't help at
all. That is too awkward.
THE WITNESS: That is not going to help. Excuse me.
Here is what I'm going to do now: I'm going to go
and go back to the launcher and open the terminal again, and now I am going to hold down my finger on the screen and paste that snippet of command that I copied out of the log file, and then I'm going to type just some very basic and short commands to complete the function that \(I\) want to execute.

All right. So you can see I'm still in superuser
mode, and I've pasted a command and then typed a few characters afterwards. And what this command that I have constructed will do is it is telling the machine to take the other automated commands out of the \(\log\) file that were copied from my technician card and execute them.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. And to be clear, were those the commands that were produced to the defendants as part of the code review?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Thank you.

What is the next step, Dr. Halderman?
A. Now I'll press enter on the on-screen keyboard. Okay.

Now the machine has responded with okay, indicating that the modification is complete.
Q. Could you go through the voting process one more time, Dr. Halderman.
A. Okay. So now I'll exit back to the voting application. Now, since this is restarted, we'll use the poll worker card to activate.

All right. Now we're back to voting. MR. TYSON: Your Honor, just before we proceed here, I just wanted to object. I believe the installation of malware that is discussed in Dr. Halderman's report relates to USB devices being connected to this.

I don't recall -- and I'm happy to be corrected on this -- if there is a reference in his report to installation of software via technician card alone.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, did you install any software right now?
A. No, I didn't. I just ran an automated command. There is no malicious software now resident on the machine.
Q. And what did that command do?
A. That command made changes to the ballot definition file on the machine.
Q. Okay. Can you please continue to vote?
A. All right. So I'll put in my voter card once again.

All right. We're back to the Fulton County November 2024
demonstration ballot, and again, we have for president Benedict Arnold, George Washington. I'll do George again.
Q. Before you continue, you voted --

THE COURT: Just a second.
MR. TYSON: I'm sorry for that.

Again, Your Honor, I'll just renew my objection here.
I still don't see in Dr. Halderman's report where this method of modifying a ballot definition file is part of his report in this case.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, I think I pointed to one of the more poignant sections, and again, these exact commands were produced to defendants.

THE COURT: In the report or at another time?
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: The report discloses the use of automated commands, and the commands were produced over the course of the pretrial process.

MR. TYSON: Could I have the reference where in the report that is referenced?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: It is what I read earlier, Section 8.3.

Specifically, 8.3 says the terminal can be used to access, control, or modify any part of the data or software.

The data was modified right here.
MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, we would -- again, we would just object. The reference is to modifying part of the
data or software. It is not part of any part of Dr. Halderman's report related to modifying the actual ballots that is being offered.

We think this needs to be spelled out further in the report to be a sufficient Rule 26 disclosure.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, we think the
disclosure is sufficient.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, it is --
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: And just to be clear, the ballot
is data on the machine, and we have disclosed the modification of data quite expressly.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I think it is data on the machine. So let's proceed.

THE WITNESS: May I print the ballot?
We're back at the review screen, and I have a vote for George Washington for president. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Please print.
A. I say print the ballot. All right. And it has printed my ballot.
Q. Can you look at the human readable text and tell me what vote it reflects?
A. All right. My read here, again, president of the United States, vote for Benedict Arnold.
Q. And, again, you voted for George Washington; right?
A. I did. The review screen isn't up anymore. That disappears when the paper comes out.

But yes, I voted for George Washington.
Q. So if you weren't sure how you voted, you would have no way to check at this point; correct?
A. Or to prove to anyone else, that is right.
Q. Okay. Now, do you know if the \(Q R\) code reflects a vote for George Washington or Benedict Arnold?
A. The \(Q R\) code, if scanned on a normally configured scanner, would also read as a vote for Benedict Arnold.
Q. Do you know how this ballot would tabulate if it was put into a scanner?
A. As a vote for Benedict Arnold.
Q. If this ballot was audited, would there be any signs to indicate that that was not the vote intended by the voter?
A. No. Because all of the records of the voter's choice on this ballot, the \(Q R\) code, and the printed text say Benedict Arnold. They are the same.
Q. Okay. Dr. Halderman, why don't I let you take a seat and we can continue testimony.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to allow a restroom break for five minutes, and then we'll start.

Do you need any water?
Yes, you have it.
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.

THE COURT: If anyone needs to use the restroom, use it now. We're going to start back right away.

\section*{(A brief break was taken at 3:06 PM.)}

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Before we continue, I would just like to move the Dominion advisory into evidence, Exhibit Number PX 602, I believe.

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, we would just object to this Dominion advisory. Dr. Halderman has testified he relied on this for part of the design of his report but didn't attach it as an exhibit or reference it. So we don't think it is proper.

We also believe it is hearsay as from Dominion.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: It would take me a second to find it for Mr. Tyson, but it is expressly cited in a footnote in his report.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. TYSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I'll take counsel's representation on that. We'll just then lodge only a hearsay objection in that case.

THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, is any kind of special training needed to use the commands you just demonstrated?
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    MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'll object here in terms of
    Dr. Halderman's ability to talk about the need for specialized
training. I don't think that is covered in his report.
I'm happy to be corrected again. I know it is a
lengthy report.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I think Dr. Halderman teaches
students as his profession.
THE COURT: I think you have to ask him, what is the
basis for -- if you are saying that he doesn't -- it doesn't
require a specialized training, just ask him, does it require
specialized and what --
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman --
THE COURT: -- based on his experience and --
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Based on your experience as a professor and otherwise,
does -- is any specialized training needed to use the commands
you just used?

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A. Well, you might need specialized training to invent the commands the first time. But after that, you could just write them out or make instructions for anyone and send anyone to a polling place to interact with the machine.
Q. Thank you.

And I want to ask you now, changing subjects, Dr. Halderman, I believe it was Mr. Beaver earlier in this
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trial testified about certain file size checks that are
performed to look for malware.
Did you review that portion of his testimony?

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A. I did.
Q. Do you know if the attack you just demonstrated can be
detected by checks like the ones Mr. Beaver described?
A. Well, the attack I just demonstrated doesn't change the
size of any file except for ones that naturally change sizes
the machine is operating.
    So no, that wouldn't detect it.
Q. Is the size of the ballot file you modified changed by
your attack?
A. No, it is exactly the same size.
Q. And to be clear, you mean it is the same size before it is modified and after it is modified?
A. Before and after.
Q. Right. Turning back to the list of vulnerabilities that you disclosed to CISA, the sixth one is titled Alt-Tab Allows Installation of Malware. And the seventh is called Inadequate Application Signing Allows Installation and Spreading of Malware.

Did you prepare a video that demonstrates exploitation of these vulnerabilities?
A. Yes.
Q. Does your video illustrate the use of malware described in
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your report?

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A. Yes.
Q. Was the code for that malware provided to defendants?
A. Yes.
Q. At a high level, can you tell us what the video shows?
A. The video shows -- the video shows BMD running an election. Then an attacker attaches a malicious USB device that uses these vulnerabilities to install malicious software onto the BMD. Then there are some subsequent votes, and we scan all of the ballots through the Dominion scanner and show the totals in the election.
Q. Was the video taken in all one take?
A. Yes.
Q. So it is fully contiguous from one camera?
A. Yes.
Q. Does it accurately depict the process of installing malware that exploits Vulnerability Number 6?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Okay. The video is almost 15 minutes long, so I'm just going to ask you about a few short sections.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Tony, could we go to Segment 1, which is at the 2 minute, 47 mark on the entire video, I believe.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, before we get into this particular demonstrative, \(I\) wanted to interpose an objection to
this video itself.
We have reviewed this demonstrative, and while --
unlike the other things we have just looked at which were described in detail in Dr. Halderman's report, this particular video, while the concepts are described in the report, the steps that are taken in this video with this particular election file and the particular election are not.

So we would lodge an objection under Rule 26 disclosure based on the case we cited earlier, The Estate of Thompson v. Kawasaki, 291 F.R.D. 297313.

Mr. Cross is correct, the court ultimately allowed that, but recognized that demonstrative evidence which summarizes or supports an expert's opinion has to be contained in the report.

The other case we can provide is United States \(v\). NortonLifeLock. That is 2022 WL 278773 at page star 4. That is from the District of Columbia District Court on January 31st, 2022.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, I would note that the steps depicted in the video shown in steps one through five in Section 8.5 of Dr. Halderman's report -- I believe Mr. Tyson was referring to the fact that the report doesn't say exactly which ballot would be demonstrated -- would be used to demonstrate those steps, but the steps are in the report.

THE COURT: Does that modify your -- your position?
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MR. TYSON: It doesn't, Your Honor. Again, with the other items in the report, Dr. Halderman describes step by step. With this particular demonstration, he discusses the concepts: If I could install this device on the USB of the printer cable, I could have this result happen.
But the specific method is not outlined in terms of this particular election file and election in this -- in the report.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, what Dr. Halderman is demonstrating -- I'm sorry.
THE COURT: I think that you can ask him to explain and respond to that. I think it would be more helpful than have you describe it.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I agree, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: So if you can -- Dr. Halderman, if you could address the difference, if there is any, between the way you have handled the descriptions.
THE WITNESS: The report describes the process by which malware alters a ballot in great detail. And this video is showing that applied to not just any ballot but the acceptance testing ballot that was provided to us with the Fulton equipment.

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THE COURT: Are there any steps that you left out?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I think you can get at
these issues in cross-examination, and I'm going to allow him to proceed.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, could you please review Section 8.5 in your report in front of you before we start, and you may want to review Section 8.4 as well.
A. Yes. So Section 8.4 explains in detail the steps of the attack in a manual fashion, and Section 8.5 says that they can be automated with a malicious USB device.
Q. One second, Dr. Halderman.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Could you -- Tony, could we please play the video.
(Playing of the videotape.)
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. And, Dr. Halderman, could you explain what we're seeing on the screen.

THE COURT: Do you want them simultaneously, or are you going to stop the --

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, how would you prefer?
A. Oh, I didn't see that it had started. I would be happy to talk over the video if you can go back to the beginning.

I think it will be -- all right. So here we see the Fulton ICX configured to run an election with the acceptance testing ballot.

Now our attacker is going to reach behind the printer and unplug the USB cable and plug it into an attack device. This is a device called a Bash Bunny. It looks like a big USB stick, but it is able to -- we're able to load it with a sequence of commands that it will then send to the device as if it were a keyboard.

Now the Bash Bunny is going to start -- if you can play the video, the Bash Bunny will start driving the device, and you can see that it is moving through a sequence of things on the screen. This is the USB device controlling it.

And it is going to go through and modify settings, as I describe in the report. It is going to then open a terminal, get superuser access, and take steps to install malicious software that is stored on that same USB device.

Now, the USB -- the malicious software is a version of the ICX application that we have -- we have extracted from the machine and slightly modified to add some malicious functionality. And the Bash Bunny device is installing the malicious version of the application on the machine and replacing the version that regularly would function.
Q. Dr. Halderman, has anything been done by the attacker other than connect a device to the USB cable?
A. No. In this case, the attacker only needs to attach the device to the printer and to the USB cable, and the device will automatically go through the remaining steps.
Now it is finished with the attack, and it is restarting
the election software.
Q. And no special --
THE COURT: Stop there.
Just for those of us who don't live in a world of
hacking ourselves, explain -- you're saying it has gone through
the attack process, so you just --
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: You loaded the software via the drive -- extra drive?

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Substituting it with --
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: And then tell me what happened next.
THE WITNESS: So the -- when the device is attached,
what it does is it goes to the -- it uses the settings app to enable the installation of foreign applications. Then it goes to the terminal and uses the terminal to install -- to uninstall the original app and install a malicious version of the ICX app that is stored on the USB device.

So this device can both be a USB drive and an automatic USB keyboard at the same time, and as a keyboard, it just enters a series of keystrokes that are preloaded by the attacker.

THE COURT: And this can happen in the time period we
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just saw?

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THE WITNESS: Yes. It takes a little less than two minutes.

And the end result is the election software on the machine has now been changed to a version of the election software that contains malicious code rewrote.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Shall I proceed, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. And so there were no special cards or anything needed for this attack other than that USB device; correct?
A. Yes. It is a device called a Bash Bunny. It costs maybe \$100. You can buy it online. It is made for this kind of hacking purpose.
Q. So on the screen right here, Dr. Halderman, there is a Bash Bunny connected to the end of a USB cable; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Where does that USB cable connect to?
A. Well, the other end of that USB cable connects to the BMD. Q. Why is the Bash Bunny connected to a cable as opposed to the BMD itself?
A. Well, so the USB ports on the BMD are behind sealed plastic doors in order to make it so they are not accessible to the voter during voting. In other phases of the election process, they might not be sealed, they could be directly
reachable. But during voting, those doors are sealed.
But the other end of the USB cable that attaches the printer to the USB -- excuse me. There is a USB cable from one of those ports that attaches to the back of the printer, and the end of that cable that attaches to the printer is not typically sealed to the printer.
Q. Now, in the video, the Bash Bunny device is sitting on top of the printer.

Is that -- go ahead.
A. Yes.
Q. The question is: Is that what one would do if one were trying to evade detection?
A. Well, no. Of course you could sit it back behind the printer, for instance.
Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether a voter could connect the USB cable to the back of a printer without being detected?
A. It depends on the layout of the polling place. But in many Georgia polling places, there are privacy Shields that surround the printer and BMD that would provide an opportunity to tamper behind the printer without it being readily observable.

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, I'll move to strike the last part of Dr. Halderman's answer regarding the typical setup of a Georgia polling place. We established he has no
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specialized training or knowledge in Georgia election
administration, and I don't think there is a foundation for
observation of Georgia polling places that will allow him to
opine about what a typical Georgia polling place would be set
up as.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman --
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I think I can address this, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, are you familiar with the layout of polling
places in Georgia?

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A. I have undertaken a study of Georgia polling place layouts.
Q. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, what did you do? I mean, there is a lot of different places and people --

THE WITNESS: Of course. Of course.
THE COURT: -- and lots of places do different things.

THE WITNESS: Of course. So I -- what I did was I reviewed all of the press photographs that I could find that have been taken during elections in Georgia in polling places to see what the layout would be. I have also reviewed the --
the polling place -- the poll worker guide and other documentation provided by the defendants.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I don't know that it is an expertise, but he has a basis for his observation as to there are at least some places. I don't know that we know the percentage of them from that in any way, but that will provide secrecy to -- I guess is what you are saying to the -- to the printer where you are trying to connect up the equipment; is that right?

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. But having been a voter
myself, I think that there are -- in a variety of locations, there is a variety of arrangements that people end up facing.

THE WITNESS: Oh, no doubt, and that is why I would say that this is going to depend on the layout of the polling place for sure.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, we also saw some activity on the ballots -the marking device's screen as the Bash Bunny remote controlled it.

Could that be seen by a poll worker?
A. Potentially. But because of the existence of privacy shields around the BMD, it might also be easy for the -- it might also be possible for the attacker to just shield the screen with his or her body to make it so it would not be
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readily apparent.

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The issue is that if someone can see the screen, they can likely see the voter's selections, either on the ballot or the review screen, and so the -- in order to defend against that, polling places are laid out so that the -- there is some amount of privacy for the screen.
Q. Turning back to the full video, Dr. Halderman, I think you said there was voting that occurred on the screen on the video; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Does the video include the scanning and tabulation of that voting?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Actually, first, did you prepare a slide showing how the votes were cast in the video just summarizing the screenshots?
A. Yes. Just summarizing what is in the video, that's right.
Q. Are these images for the video of the five ballots that were cast on this slide?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to focus you on the Sunday liquor sales race.

Can you tell me what the votes are for the Sunday liquor sales race?
A. So in that contest, there is a vote for yes on each of the five ballots.
Q. So that's five yeses and zero noes; correct?
A. That is right. And in the video, the voter votes yes on the screen five times to produce these five ballots that say yes in the ballot text.
Q. Okay.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Tony, could we please go to Segment 2 which corresponds to, I believe, 10 minute, 12 second mark on the full video. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Can you tell us what this video depicts as we play it, please, Dr. Halderman?
A. So this video shows the --

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Tony, can you press play?
THE WITNESS: This video shows that scanner that plaintiffs received from Fulton County. It does not have any kind of tampering or malware involved. It is just running the normal acceptance test election.

We're going to scan five ballots. These five ballots that I was just talking about, all yes on that liquor sales question through the machine, and it is going to count those ballots as it normally would by reading the \(Q R\) codes.

All right. That's the fifth ballot.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. So, Dr. Halderman, is this scanner configured and operating as it would be in a normal election?
A. Yes. And now there are a number of steps to close the
polls and ask the scanner to produce a poll tape showing the results that it has determined from the ballots. We'll go through those now.
Q. Those are the steps we're watching right now?
A. Yes. That is what is happening now. This is just closing the polls.

And again, no tampering with the scanner of any kind.
Q. And what is happening now?
A. Now the polls are closing, and the scanner is going to print the poll tape showing the number of votes it counted for each candidate.
Q. So to be clear, the five ballots we saw a second ago with yes votes for the Sunday liquor sales have been fed into the scanner, and what we're seeing is the tabulation of those votes; correct?
A. That's right. And it will print for each contest the votes tabulated for each candidate.
Q. Do you see the tabulation for the Sunday liquor sales election on-screen?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What is it?
A. It says two votes for no, excuse me -- two votes for yes, and three votes for no.
Q. Does that reflect what was shown on the human readable portion of the ballots that were scanned?
A. No. It should be five votes for yes and no votes for no. And the scanner sees only two votes for yes and three votes for no, so three of the yes votes have been changed to no votes.
Q. How were the three yes votes changed to no votes?
A. This is the effect of the malware that was installed onto the scanner -- excuse me -- the malware that was installed onto the BMD by the USB device.
Q. Sir, I just want to be clear for the record.

The scanner had no malware; correct?
A. The scanner had no malware. I just misspoke. This is the result of the malware that was installed onto the BMD by the USB device. It changed the QR codes on three of the ballots so that they reflected votes for no instead of votes for yes in that contest.
Q. Have you made other versions of this malware -COURT REPORTER: I couldn't understand you. MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I'm sorry.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Have you made other versions of this malware we just saw demonstrated that changed both the \(Q R\) code and the human readable text?
A. Yes.
Q. And the attack we demonstrated earlier, that also changes human readable text and the \(Q R\) code; correct?
A. Yes. The attack I demonstrated on the BMD in front of me.
Q. So focusing on human readable text, have you personally done any research about how carefully voters review their ballots?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Can you summarize it, please?
A. In a 2020 study, my team and I conducted a mock election with around 250 people who we brought into a mock polling place and asked to vote on a BMD that we had hacked to change one selection on each printed ballot in the human readable text.

And we let those voters vote and didn't tell them that the machine was hacked. We just measured and recorded how many people noticed a problem or reported it.
Q. And what were your results?
A. Approximately 93 percent of the participants in our base case failed to notice that there was a problem with their printed ballot, that one of the selections had been changed. Q. So only seven percent of the voters noticed that you had changed their votes?
A. A little bit less than seven percent in the base case.
Q. Are you aware of any other research about how carefully voters review their ballots?
A. I have reviewed a study conducted by researchers at the University of Georgia, I believe, in collaboration with the Secretary of State's office where they observed polling places in Georgia during the 2020 election to record how long voters
spent looking at their ballots before scanning them.
Q. And what were the results of that study?
A. The UGA study found that half of voters either didn't look at the ballots at all or only briefly glanced at them, and only about -- I believe about 20 percent of voters looked at the ballots for five seconds or more.
Q. In both studies, some voters reviewed ballots; fair?
A. That is fair.
Q. Now, if an error is caught by a few voters, won't that cause poll workers to investigate?
A. Well --

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'll object here in terms of Dr. Halderman's ability to opine on the actions of poll workers if an error is brought to their attention.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, could you please summarize any knowledge you have on how poll workers react to errors being reported.

THE COURT: I think --
MR. TYSON: Your Honor --
THE COURT: I think you've got to lay the foundation of -- for whatever he is going to be testifying about, or ask him to explain the basis upon which he is -- whatever -- I mean, I know what we've just said here. But then the question was that Mr. Tyson objected to, Your Honor, I'll object here in terms of Dr. Halderman's ability to opine on the actions of
poll workers if an error is brought to their attention.
So the point is, is that he studied voter conduct. I guess what Mr. Tyson is suggesting is, how does he know how voter -- poll workers would react to it?

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, to be clear as well, I also believe that it is beyond the scope of any reports Dr. Halderman has provided in this case on the actions of poll workers.

THE COURT: All right. You listened to this colloquy, Dr. Halderman.

Is there anything that you can say that you think is based on the information and studies that you've referenced in the course of this case and in your report?

THE WITNESS: Well, let me give an answer based on my peer-reviewed study of voter verification behavior.

THE COURT: You've referenced that in your study here --

THE WITNESS: It is referenced in my --
THE COURT: -- that you submitted in this case?
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. It is referenced in my report.

And one fact we reported in that study was that voters in our experiment, when they did notice something was wrong with the text of their ballot, they often blamed themselves and they said, oh, I must have made a mistake while
voting on-screen.
They didn't -- it didn't occur to them that it might be a malfunction or a hack of the machine.

And I would say on the basis of that behavior by
voters, I would also expect that poll workers would sometimes erroneously conclude that voters made a mistake rather than that the machine had malfunctioned if a voter reported such a problem.

THE COURT: All right. But we have no way of
quantifying that at this point; right?
THE WITNESS: I don't have quantification of that
that I'm offering.
THE COURT: Your observation is obviously based on your study. It is just simply we don't have a quantification. All right.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Dr. Halderman, could one design malware to take advantage -- to avoid the risk of detection -- to minimize the risk of detection?
A. Yes.
Q. How?
A. Well, one way -- one way you could do that, which I have programmed in malware -- some of the malware for this -- that is the basis for my report does that.
Q. How?
A. Excuse me. Some of the malware I created in the context of the report does this.

Instead of cheating on every ballot, you could program malware to cheat on every second ballot, every third ballot, et cetera, something like that. So that if a voter noticed a problem and complained and then was instructed to go back to the machine, try again, we'll see if it is a problem with the machine. When the voter repeated the same selections, the ballot would come out correctly.
Q. So for a close race, could one program malware to change every tenth ballot, for example?
A. Or even less frequently.
Q. Any number one wanted?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to change topics slightly to hand-marked paper ballots.

Do you have an opinion as to whether hand-marked paper ballots have -- present more or less risk than Dominion ballot-marking devices?

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'll object here as beyond the scope of Dr. Halderman's report. I believe his report is about vulnerabilities in the ballot-marking device system, not about the relative degree of risk between different types of election systems.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, I can't say whether
he's done express comparison. But within his declaration, he has certainly presented opinions on the safety of a hand-marked paper ballot.

THE COURT: Can one of your group identify where that is for the Court and for defense counsel?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Well, let me come back to this, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I want -- one second. Let me just step up and get my copy of the report, Your Honor. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. So I want to turn back to the vulnerabilities that you disclosed that we have up here on the demonstrative, sir. I want to turn now to the next two -- excuse me.

Going back to the video we just watched, can you please explain what Vulnerability 6 is and how it relates to that video?
A. Yes. So Vulnerability 6 is a vulnerability that is present in the machines as a result of the software update process that was applied to install the . 32 version of the Dominion software in Georgia. Following that process leaves the machine in a state where a keyboard device or a Bash Bunny attached to a USB port can access the Android desktop and other things by sending just the single keystroke, the Alt-Tab keystroke.

And that's just like you would switch windows from one window to another on a PC. That keystroke has an analogous function on the Android operating system on the BMD and allows you to access the Android operating system.
Q. And is that what the Bash Bunny did in the video?
A. That is -- yes, that is the beginning of what the Bash Bunny does to access Android.
Q. Can you speak -- can you tell us what Vulnerability Number 7 is and how it relates to the video we watched?
A. Vulnerability 7 is that there isn't an effective cryptographic protection in the ICX to validate that applications installed on it actually are genuine software that comes from Dominion.

As a result of that lack of application signing, a modified version of the ICX application software can be installed that will change the functioning of the device. Q. Thank you.

Now I want to turn to Vulnerabilities 8 and 9 that we have in front of us that is CVE 2022-1743 and CVE 2022-1744.

And now, before we discuss the details, I want to step back a little.

All of the vulnerability exploits you have demonstrated thus far require physical access to a ballot-marking device; correct?
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. Is there a way to use Vulnerabilities 8 and 9 to install malware without anybody having physical access to the ballot-marking device?
A. Yes. And for that reason, I think these vulnerabilities are particularly concerning.
Q. And how do they do that?
A. These vulnerabilities provide a way to install malware by piggybacking, essentially, on the normal pre-election processes that are used to install the ballot information onto all of the BMDs prior to an election.
Q. Before we discuss the vulnerabilities and the malware, why don't we go into that pre-election process.

Have you prepared a slide that allows you to describe this process to us?
A. Yes.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Can we see Slide Number 7, Tony? BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Okay. Can you please describe the normal pre-election process, or at least the relevant parts for explaining how your vulnerability exploit works?
A. Yes. So as I said, before every election, every BMD needs to be loaded with what is called an election definition. This is information, data that tells the BMD what is on the ballot.

In Georgia, the election definitions for the entire state are prepared by the Center for Election Systems at the

Secretary's office using an election management system computer. This is disconnected computers running Dominion software.

From the Secretary's office, the election definition data for each county is sent to the county, and the county loads that data into its own election management system computer, another disconnected computer, and then the county uses Dominion software to burn the relevant data onto one or more USB sticks that are used to copy the data to each ICX.
Q. So by ICX, you mean the Dominion ballot-marking device?
A. The ballot-marking device.
Q. And so just to make sure \(I\) understand, generally, in every -- every BMD in the county is loaded with the same election definition file?
A. Yes.
Q. And in each county, that file comes from the same EMS computer?
A. The county's EMS.
Q. And each county gets its file from the State's EMS computer?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you please explain what Vulnerability Number 8 -again, that is CVE 202-1743 [sic] is and how it relates to this process?
A. Yes. This vulnerability is a flaw in the BMD's software
system that makes it possible for an attacker to -- that makes it possible for an attacker to make certain modifications to the ballot -- excuse me -- to the election definition file in a way that allows the attacker to overwrite other files on the BMD when the election definition is loaded.

So there's no readily observable thing that is wrong with the election definition, but when the election definition is loaded in the normal course of setting up the BMD for an election, the attacker gets the ability to overwrite another part of the data on the system.
Q. Make sure I understood here, sir.

This vulnerability means that one can use an election definition file to sneak a file anywhere onto the BMD; correct?
A. To slip in this extra file into the election definition in a way that it can overwrite some part of the BMD's memory that is not the election definition itself.
Q. Could you please explain what Vulnerability Number 9 is. That is CVE 2022-1744.
A. So Vulnerability 9 can be used in conjunction with Vulnerability 8 to allow that specially modified election definition file to execute malicious code and gain superuser access on the BMD without even showing an on-screen prompt.
Q. At a really high level, Vulnerabilities 8 and 9 means that one can use the election definition file to sneak malware onto a machine and replace or supplant the existing Dominion
software; is that fair?
A. That is right. It is possible to make particular changes to an election definition file that will make it so when that election definition file is loaded onto a BMD, the BMD will be infected with malware from the election definition file.
Q. Who would have the access as --

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Tony, can we go back to Slide 7, please?

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Who would have the access necessary to get an infected election definition file into the distribution chain you have described?

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, I'll object again on disclosure. I don't believe that topic is in Dr. Halderman's report, and I don't think there is a foundation about his knowledge of the various structures of who would have access to these systems.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: I think it is discussed in his Coffee County declaration, at least, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to look at it?
MR. TYSON: I've got it right here.
THE COURT: Is it in the -- I'm not sure where I have it, but I have his report here. I'm not sure I have that other affidavit here.

I may. Is it a number?
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MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, to be clear, I believe Paragraph 69 of Dr. Halderman's Coffee County declaration talks about, for example, insiders.
But the question was, who would have the access necessary to get an infected election definition file, which I think is a broader question, so --
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Thank you.
Maybe it is a poor question. Let me ask a simpler question. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Would election insiders have the access required to infect an EMS or swap out the files -- excuse me. Let me ask a clear question.
Would election insiders have the access necessary to insert an infected election definition file into the distribution chain you described?

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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Would outside parties who broke in or otherwise obtained physical access to an EMS computer be able to insert an infected definition file into the supply chain?
A. Yes.
Q. How would an election insider install malware on an EMS using this technique?
A. Excuse me. Install malware on an EMS using --
Q. I said -- yeah, how would an election insider install an
infected election definition file into the supply chain? What steps would they take?
A. Well, an insider who was an insider who wanted to attack the system -- so this would have to be someone dishonest -would have the -- would simply replace the election definition file on the county EMS with one that had been modified.

Now, that could mean copying the file out and having someone more sophisticated modify it and then putting it back in. This would have to be done before the malware -- excuse me -- the election definition was distributed to the BMDs. Q. Okay. Now, earlier this week, Mr. Sterling said that the State does logic and accuracy testing to protect from a bad actor in the state.

Do you have a reaction to that?
A. Yes. So I think Mr. Sterling was acknowledging that it is also at least a possibility that a dishonest insider at the -with access to the Secretary of State's systems at the Center for Election Systems could modify election definitions before they were sent to counties. That is my understanding of what he was reacting to. And he suggested that logic and accuracy testing on the county level would defend against that.

I don't think logic and accuracy testing is at all an effective countermeasure against that threat. Although I think it is commendable that he is at least considering the threat as something that requires a countermeasure.
Q. Why do you think that logic and accuracy testing is not sufficient?
A. So logic and accuracy testing, in general, can be defeated by malware running on a voting device because there are many different ways that you could program malware to either recognize that -- to recognize that it is under test and only cheat under circumstances that are not part of the L\&A test.

In Georgia specifically, the logic and accuracy procedures only require a single ballot to be cast on each ballot-marking device and printed, and so a very simple way for malware to avoid that test would be to not cheat until after the first ballot had been cast.

And, in fact, the malware demonstrated in the video you just saw waited until after the first ballot was cast after it was installed to begin cheating just in case that was part of an L\&A test.

But more sophisticated malware could do things such as just look at the date and time to see whether it was before or during election day and only cheat if it was the middle of election day, as one example.
Q. How could remote attackers with no physical access install an infected election definition file?
A. I'm sorry. I don't think I heard your question.
Q. Could remote attackers with no physical access install an infected election definition file?
A. Without physical access to the EMS system, you mean?
Q. Correct.
A. Yes. So that is also certainly a potential threat. A remote actor could try to exploit the vulnerabilities that we've just been talking about to spread malware through the election definition files by first infecting a county or state election management system with a different form of malware that would modify the files. And that infection could be done, for instance, using a Stuxnet style attack to try to spread malware from some other internet-connected system to the EMS computer on USB sticks that workers use to move data back and forth.
Q. What is a Stuxnet style attack?
A. Well, Stuxnet famously was a form of computer malware created to sabotage the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. It worked by -- the enrichment centrifuges were controlled by computers that were not connected to any external networks, much like the EMS computers are supposed to not be connected to any external networks.
Q. That's what has been described as air-gapped in this case previously?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. So the Stuxnet campaign spread -- the Stuxnet campaign involved malware that was designed to infect USB sticks that
were connected to a computer that had the Stuxnet malware running on them. And then if those USB sticks were moved to another computer, that computer would automatically and with no user interaction become infected with the Stuxnet malware too.

So it spread as a kind of a computer worm or virus on USB sticks into air-gapped environments and then proceeded to -when it found it was on -- when it found it was in the air-gapped environment that was being targeted, as part of the sabotage campaign, the malware would proceed to execute other commands that would disrupt the enrichment centrifuges.
Q. So at a high level, USB sticks were used to infiltrate the air gaps in Iran's nuclear enrichment computers?
A. That is right.
Q. Were you aware that during yesterday's hearing, Mr. Maggio testified that SullivanStrickler tested the USB sticks they used in Coffee County using antivirus from Kaspersky?
A. I am aware.

THE COURT: I didn't hear the last word.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Using USB software from -- using
antivirus software from Kaspersky.
And I would like to commend the court reporter for getting that in the transcript last night.

THE COURT: She's marvelous.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I did review that part of his testimony.

BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Did it cause you concern?
A. Yes. It is concerning because at the time that the Coffee County incident took place, well, the Kaspersky antivirus had been -- already been banned from use on any federal government agency computers because the -- the Russian-owned company was regarded as a potential threat to national security.

Part of the concern is that it is antivirus software specifically, and antivirus software has access to all of the files and data on a computer necessarily for its operation. It also receives software updates on a very frequent basis; daily, if not more often.

And so the concern with the Kaspersky tool was that it might be possible for the company to remotely update instances of that software in order to carry out a malicious campaign against high-value targets.

So I think it is concerning that that software was used by SullivanStrickler on devices from which USB sticks were being directly attached to the Coffee County EMS.
Q. So you said, just to summarize, antivirus software has access to all of the files and all of the data on a computer necessarily for its operation.

Can you explain that?
A. Sure. So an antivirus program needs to be able to inspect the other files on your computer in order to tell whether they
contain viruses. That requires a very permissive level of access to the data on a computer, and it usually requires access to external devices that are plugged into your computer. Your computer's configuration will be such that the antivirus software has -- essentially has superuser access to the computer.
Q. And you also said that antivirus software received software updates on a very frequent basis -- excuse me -daily, if not more often.

Can you explain why that is and why that concerns you?
A. Antivirus software, in typical practice, is updated frequently in order to allow the software to detect new threats that have been discovered and analyzed by the antivirus company. And that takes the form of an antivirus definition that gets delivered over the internet to the antivirus software from the manufacturer. But those antivirus definition files can contain code updates for the antivirus software too to change its functionality.
Q. So in some -- the concern of the Kaspersky is that it is software that has full control, essentially, over a computer that is remotely controlled through updates by a Russian company that could be potentially influenced or controlled by the Russian government?
A. That is my understanding of the basis for the federal government prohibiting Kaspersky antivirus software on federal
computers, exactly that concern, that it was potentially a threat to national security.
Q. And how could Kaspersky antivirus software be used to carry out a Stuxnet style attack?
A. So it could be used to infect the SullivanStrickler computer with malicious software that would then write -- that would then infect USB sticks plugged into that computer, and those infected USB sticks, if plugged into another computer, would infect that other computer even if it was a disconnected system with no network path to the rest of the world.
Q. Now, are your opinions about the threats of advanced -COURT REPORTER: Please slow down.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Thank you. I'll rephrase -restate my question. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Are your opinions about the threat posed by advanced actors, such as nation-states, limited to infection via antivirus software?
A. No. There are other means by which such infection could take place. And, in fact, nation-states, unfortunately, frequently do infect internet-connected computers via a variety of methods.
Q. Have you reviewed any evidence as to whether Georgia's EMS servers are vulnerable to this sort of attack, all the sorts of attacks we've been discussing in the context of

Vulnerabilities 8 and 9?
A. Have I -- excuse me.

Can you state that again?
Q. Yes. Have you reviewed any evidence that informs your opinion as to whether Georgia's EMS servers are vulnerable to the types of remote attacks we've been discussing or any attacks we've been discussing?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. What evidence did you review?
A. I reviewed a copy of the Coffee County EMS server hard drive that SullivanStrickler created and produced to the Curling Plaintiffs.
Q. Do you know how that hard drive image was obtained?
A. It was obtained during the Coffee County incident.
Q. Okay. Did you prepare a slide summarizing your findings?
A. I did.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Tony, can we have
Slide Number 8?
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. At a high level, what does this slide show?
A. The plaintiffs asked me to review the EMS server hard drive to understand whether there were vulnerabilities in the system configuration that might allow attackers to compromise the EMS, and this slide is a summary of vulnerabilities that I identified.
Q. Do any of the vulnerabilities listed on this slide raise concerns with respect to access by insiders?
A. Yes. So the first three on that list at the Coffee County EMS was configured in such a way that all of the normal users used the same account with a single password.
Q. Why is that a concern?
A. Well, because if -- if one of those users did some action that compromised the server, it wouldn't be possible to identify which one.
Q. Any other of these vulnerabilities raise concerns with respect to access by insiders?
A. Yes. Vulnerability 2 on the list is that that shared user account had what is called on Windows administrator access. This is the Windows form of superuser access. It had the ability to override the operating system's security controls and install new software, change the software, change any of the data.

Vulnerability 3 is essentially equivalent to superuser access over the database files that are the core repository for the Dominion EMS software, which would give an analogous ability to override the security controls and passwords that are built into the Dominion software.

THE COURT: And you're talking about somebody who is in a management position who would have that type of direct access to the database?

THE WITNESS: So it is not limited to someone in a management position. It would be anyone who was a user who could log into the shared EMS account could get that ability to have direct database access just by opening a database management application that was installed on the PC. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Do any of the vulnerabilities here present concerns with respect to an insider with physical access but without permission to use the computers?
A. Yes. The -- the next two on the list do.

So the EMS was configured without encryption for the hard drives and without what is called a BIOS password when the computer starts. As a result of this, someone who had physical access to the EMS computer but not the password to log in could bypass the password and be able to arbitrarily change any of the files or programs, including changing election definition files or infecting the EMS with malicious software.
Q. Do any of these vulnerabilities raise concern with respect to others -- with respect to remote attackers?
A. Yes. So the last three vulnerabilities on the list include the fact that the Microsoft Windows installation on the EMS server was a version of Windows that dated from -- I believe it was 2015, and it had never received any security patches in that time.

The antivirus software installed on the machine, Windows

Defender, had antivirus definitions that were more than a year out of date, and as a result of that, the system contained a large number of known and unpatched vulnerabilities and not antivirus updates that would cover even known malware, let alone malware specially crafted for the purpose of attacking the server.

Among the vulnerabilities in Windows that were not patched was a known vulnerability that Microsoft had categorized as critical that would allow malicious software to automatically launch and install itself from a USB stick, exactly the sort of vulnerability that would enable a Stuxnet style attack if an infected USB stick was attached.
Q. So just to be clear, the EMS server you examined had a known vulnerability about being specifically vulnerable to USB attacks?
A. Yes. A known and unpatched vulnerability in Windows.
Q. Did you see anything to indicate whether other counties would have the same vulnerabilities?
A. Yes.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I'll object here.
I don't believe this is part of Dr. Halderman's Coffee County declaration. He's moving from Coffee County's EMS to all Georgia EMSs, and I think we at least need foundation, and I think it is beyond the scope of his reports.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Let me make my question a
littler clearer.
BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. Did anything on the Coffee County EMS server give you any reason to believe one way or the other whether other counties would have the same vulnerabilities?
A. Yes. As I describe in my declaration about Coffee County, I found evidence in the way the system was set up that suggests county EMSs were created from a standard image or template, so other county EMSs likely do share most or all of these vulnerabilities.
Q. Now, you also reviewed evidence about the Coffee County intrusion more broadly than just one EMS server image; correct?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you know what access the Coffee County intruders had -what level access they had?
A. Oh, they had a very great level of access. The data that they took included not only data from the EMS server, a complete copy of the EMS server, but also a complete copy of the central count scanner workstation of a laptop that was used for ballot preparation or printing, I believe.

They took the most critical piece of the ICX BMD software. They got a version of the software that operates the ballot scanners. They imaged numerous pieces of removable media, including USB sticks and memory cards used with the election equipment.

And beyond -- and this required attaching external
devices. This would have required attaching external devices to these different pieces of equipment, of the Poll Pads as well.

So just from the data alone, you can tell that this was a very large degree of access.
Q. How does the access the Coffee County actors had compare to the access you had?
A. Well, it was significantly more access than \(I\) had. I only had access to this single BMD and single scanner from Fulton County which were provided under the Court's authority before they were ever used in a real Fulton County election and which will, \(I\) hope, never be used in a real election in the future.

In contrast, in Coffee County, they had access to the live election system, to systems that had real voter data, and not only to a single BMD and scanner, but to the EMS itself.

I never received access to Georgia EMS Image until after the -- after the Coffee County incident came to light.

And so they had much more access, a much more dangerous kind of access.
Q. In your opinion, has the theft and distribution of data in Coffee County affected the security of future Georgia elections?
A. Well, yes. And this is what is dangerous about it, that the access in Coffee County -- well, unfortunately, the -- we
now know that the data from Coffee County that was taken has been distributed to a large group of -- a large group of people. Probably the total number of people who received copies is impossible to determine because individuals involved shared their passwords or may have further disseminated the data.

But the data that they took -- the data that they took would be sufficient to rediscover really almost any of the attacks, maybe any of the attacks -- excuse me -- any of the vulnerabilities that CISA has validated here. There are potentially -- the data would also allow the attackers to study Georgia's exact configuration of the EMS and other equipment to replicate that configuration and then to develop and test malware or exploits for these vulnerabilities at their leisure.

And that infiltration, the incident in Coffee County took place what -- it has been three years now since that incident took place. It is far, far more time than \(I\) had to work with any of the equipment.
Q. Dr. Halderman, do you have any opinion on the ways Georgia could mitigate the vulnerabilities you have identified and CISA validated?
A. Pardon me? Can you say that again?
Q. Yeah. Do you have an opinion on the ways Georgia could mitigate the vulnerabilities you have identified?
A. Could mitigate the vulnerabilities?
Q. Yes. Yes.
A. Well, the -- I think the vulnerabilities -- the vulnerabilities that are described in my report, the way -- the way that Georgia could mitigate them most directly would be by adopting a system involving hand-marked paper ballots which then couldn't be altered by malicious software on the BMDs. By minimizing the use of BMDs and relying on them only for voters who need them, Georgia could make the BMDs much less of a target, and that would be protective of people who still need to use the BMDs even if they are -- the risks or the vulnerabilities remained as they are now.
Q. Thank you.

We almost missed the last entry on your list of vulnerabilities.

Can you explain Vulnerability Number 10, CISA CVE Number 2022-1740?
A. Yes. So this is another vulnerability in the design of the ICX. The ICX provides certain functions for the purpose of verifying whether the software that is installed has been -- is the genuine software or whether it may have been replaced with malicious software. This vulnerability is that those mechanisms don't work. There is a way for malicious software to lie about its presence on the system and evade those methods of detection.
Q. You identified a number of vulnerabilities in these BMDs.

Do you have any opinions as to whether there are other vulnerabilities?
A. Oh, yes, I'm quite certain that there must be other vulnerabilities that I haven't identified.

So my methodology -- my methodology cannot exhaustively find all of the vulnerabilities in such a system, but moreover, I had limited time to work with the device before my expert report was done.

Once I found a vulnerability of note affecting a certain component or subsystem of the device, I moved on to look at other components rather than trying to find more that might be equivalent and affected that original component. It would take much more time and many more resources to hope to find all of the vulnerabilities affecting it.

And I'll note that my original plan was to first find all of the vulnerabilities that I could in the time available without opening the device and then to open it and proceed to look for even more things, but I never got to that second step of looking at vulnerabilities that one could find after opening the device.
Q. Were you here for opening statements?
A. I was.
Q. Do you recall that in opening statement Mr. Tyson listed other jurisdictions that used BMDs for in-person voting?
A. Yes.
Q. You listed, I believe, Los Angeles and San Diego, California, and then South Carolina, Arkansas, and huge portions of Texas; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do any of these jurisdictions use Dominion BMDs as their primary form of voting?
A. No.
Q. Do you know how many counties do use Dominion BMDs -Dominion ICX BMDs as the primary form of voting?
A. I reviewed the latest data from Verified Voting, and it appears that outside of Georgia, there are only seven counties in the United States that use the ICX as the primary form of voting.

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, I'll just move to strike that answer. Dr. Halderman indicated he is relying on another source for that information. I think we need to bring that source in if he is going to rely on that for his testimony.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I feel sure he is going to still be here tomorrow, so maybe he can bring that source to light then and share it beforehand with all counsel and the Court.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: We can do that, Your Honor. BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW:
Q. So, Your Honor -- excuse me -- Dr. Halderman, in closing, who could implement the hacks you designed in future elections?
A. Well, so the attacks that -- the kinds of attacks that I described might take someone technical to develop, but once the attacks are developed by someone technical, they could recruit almost anyone to implement them and put them into practice. And, frankly, you know, we worry about -- we have worried about things like nation-state threats to voting for a long time, but those are not the only threats that election systems base.

Beyond the nation-state wanting to perhaps change results, there are all kinds of politically motivated attackers who would be glad to affect a result, but even happier or as happy just to cause chaos.

So what really keeps me up at night -- one of the things that really keeps me up at night is looking at just how easy to attack this system can be for someone, potentially even a voter, to walk up to it with a pen, stick in a card, something like that.

Well, what keeps me up at night is, what if some fanatics on the internet, you know, recruit a few dozen people to go around a state like Georgia on election day and program BMDs even in a simple way that will really visibly swap votes?

Well, what would the result be? It would be chaos, and it would take tremendous work to figure out the full scope of that chaos. You would have to go and inspect every single BMD to see if something was wrong. And you probably couldn't know for sure, even with a careful inspection, how many BMDs have
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actually been affected.

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And if just one BMD at a polling place has been malfunctioning, maybe eventually some voter notices something is wrong, but by that time, voters' ballots will be in a ballot box from people who didn't notice the problem.

And you can't go back and fix that. The entire -- any ballot in the whole polling place might have been affected.

So all of these things worry me, Mr. Andreu, just how easy this machine is to tamper with. It is so far from what would be a secure system.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Thank you, Dr. Halderman. I have no further questions for you.

THE COURT: Do you need a restroom break?
THE WITNESS: Please.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, before we do that, could I just respond real quickly to Mr. Tyson?

We had another case dropped on us, but we did find it. It was -- United States v. NortonLifeLock is the one you cited; right, Bryan?

MR. TYSON: That's right.
MR. CROSS: So we took a look at this, Your Honor. Again, it is nowhere near on point. The objection there had nothing to do with it being a demonstrative. The objection there was that the demonstrative had an entirely new damages
calculation.
So it wasn't that it was a demonstrative, it was the substance of it, which the court did keep out because it was an entirely new opinion and an entirely new approach. There has been no suggestion of that here.

In fact, Mr. Tyson acknowledged in his objection, his words, the concepts -- the opinions in these demonstratives are fully captured in the report.

And we did find another case. I'm going to spell this because \(I\) don't know how to say it -- \(Z-A-U-K-A-R\) v. United States. This is from January 21 of 2022, in Alaska, where the court directly rejects the State's position here, which, again, is clear on the face of Rule 26 because it talks about exhibits, not demonstratives.

But the Court says demonstrative exhibits that merely support an expert's analysis or demonstrate existing expert opinion in the record do not fall within the scope of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)'s pretrial disclosure requirements.

The Court then goes on to reject an objection under that rule to a demonstrative and indicates the Court will consider the demonstrative for demonstrative purposes as we have sought here.

THE COURT: And what is the citation?
MR. CROSS: Oh, yes, thank you, Your Honor.
It is -- it is 2022 Westlaw, WL, 198714. That
discussion is at the end of the case at star 8, Your Honor.
Judge, I can give you the decision if I can approach.
THE COURT: Thank you.
All right. We're going to take a break of a few
minutes. I saw that Mr. Oles had something he wanted to say, but I had directed that he talk with other counsel before he proceeds.

Anything else before we turn it over to you?
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, \(I\) was just going to note that I'm definitely not going to finish today.

THE COURT: I know that.
MR. TYSON: So I was wondering, do you want me to take the evening and see if \(I\) can shorten this up and start in the morning? Do you want me to see how far I can get?

I hate to stop in the middle of cross if we can, but I'll take the Court's direction on that.

MR. CROSS: We should start today, Your Honor, because we want to wrap our case up tomorrow, and we still have got an hour. We need to get done today.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. CROSS: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BELINFANTE: -- given what Mr. Cross indicated, I would like to raise a housekeeping matter that I think we've
discussed internally and have very limited conversation with the other side about.

Tomorrow seems relatively unpredictable given the list of witnesses that would be there. One thing we would like the Court to consider is that the State would not be expected to start its case until Monday.

THE COURT: That's fine.
MR. CROSS: And we don't have an objection to that given where we are.

THE COURT: I didn't expect that, that you would.
MR. CROSS: That's fine.
MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I just expected the cross-examination to go for a substantial amount of time and the redirect to go, and I don't know whether you have any other witnesses after this.

MR. CROSS: We have two experts, at least one plaintiff.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. CROSS: The two plaintiffs are short, the two experts --

THE COURT: All right. Okay.
MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let's take a five-minute break.
(A brief break was taken at 4:33 PM.)
THE COURT: Have a seat. Let me just say it is 20 of

5:00, and while I'm allowing -- basically saying, let's proceed, there is no way we're going past 5:30. We would be killing our most valuable resource here, is our court reporter, and so that is -- and if we get to a natural stopping point in half an hour, we're stopping there. So let's not begin a new topic when -- go with what you have got.

And just before you stand, were you able to address whatever -- did you confer and did Mr. Oles confer with counsel?

MR. OLES: Go ahead.
MR. CROSS: Go ahead.
MR. OLES: Yes, we did, Judge. And I was satisfied on most points, but there are two questions that were not asked.

THE COURT: All right. Do you want to come up here and tell me your questions with the rest of the -- with all counsel? That is fine.

\section*{(A bench conference ensued, as follows:)}

MR. OLES: Thank you, Judge.
Judge, we were down to two questions. And as the Court knows, my issue has been that the system goes from the BMD to the scanner. And the Court has found that is within scope.

The question I would like to ask is whether or not the doctor can say that -- confirm that the system is unable to
detect photocopies of duplicate ballots and that -- and that weakness occurs both on the in-person ICP [sic] scanner as well as the mail-in ballot ICC scanner -- that is really the point that I would like him to address.

MR. CROSS: The reason we're not asking --
THE COURT: Folks, can you be quiet so I can hear the -- counsel? Thank you.

MR. CROSS: The reason we're not asking is because it
has no relevance to the claims because it goes to the reliability of the scanner, and no one is seeking to eliminate the scanner except for Mr. Favorito, and he is not a party. They want a hand count. That is not this case.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think that is an adequate basis for me to -- in addition, I would say, it is a whole separate issue about the scanner being able to detect voter copies of duplicate ballots. You just -- they haven't litigated that. So if that was something that your client wanted to happen, it needed to have been raised a long time ago. It would be a -- it is sort of outside baseball at the moment.

So I appreciate your raising it in this way and -but I'm going to decline to allow it. Thank you.

MR. CROSS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. OLES: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you for considering it.
(The bench conference was thereby concluded.)
THE COURT: Who is at bat? You are?
MR. TYSON: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Good afternoon, again, Dr. Halderman.
A. Good afternoon, Mr. Tyson.
Q. What I would like to begin our discussion is with what you are not offering opinions about and what you don't have evidence about in this case.

So you are not offering the opinion in this case that any vulnerability in a DRE has been exploited to alter election results in an actual election; right?
A. No. There's no evidence that a vulnerability in a -- you said a DRE, has ever been exploited to change votes in an actual election.
Q. Okay. And you have no evidence that any vulnerability in a DRE has been exploited to alter election results in an actual election; right?
A. There is no evidence, to my knowledge, that a vulnerability in a -- in a DRE has been exploited to -- to alter an actual election.

The concern is forward-looking about elections in the future and the risks that they face.
Q. And you have --

THE COURT: Are you using DRE to refer to anything where there is a computer involved, or are you referring to the original DRE system?

MR. TYSON: So, Your Honor, I was referring specifically to the original AccuVote TSx units. I know one of the claims -- the DRE claims have been dismissed, but the plaintiffs have raised concerns about there being something carrying over. I just wanted to establish if there is evidence of that.

THE COURT: I think what the claims really related to
were the -- was the information in the voting database rather than the DRE itself at -- at the point that there was the transition.

So it might -- I'm not sure your question is
really -- totally conforms with what they have argued.

MR. TYSON: And if that is what they are arguing, I'm happy to talk about voter registration system. That is my next topic.

THE COURT: I don't want to have misstated what
plaintiffs think their claims are relative -- their outstanding issues were regarding the DRE.

So if there is something else?
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What about the Coalition?
MR. McGUIRE: If we have questions or -- I'm sorry, I
missed -- I'm sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Counsel asked the witness did he -- was asking him questions about the DRE and did it -- and did he have concerns or evidence that it had impacted an election or been a cause for concern as to malware.

And I indicated -- I asked to clarify, are we talking about DREs as a group of machines that encompassed the current machines, or is it really the old DREs?

He then -- and then Mr. Tyson said he meant the old
DREs. And I said, my understanding was what you were contending was being carried forward was problems and flaws in the voter database.

And that is why the way \(I\) understood it, at least until recently when there has been a change in the -- in the whole software for the voter database. But I know originally, in the last number of years before it was changed, at least, that was your position. I don't know whether it is still now.

So that is what I was asking, so that -- for
clarification about what are we talking about.
MR. McGUIRE: Our position has been throughout the litigation that the old system had vulnerabilities and that certain aspects of the old system were shared with the new system, some hardware, but mainly through the passover from the old voter registration system to what is used now.

So as far as DREs go, we understand that is over, so
we are not continuing to rely on the DRE issue.
THE COURT: All right. So if you maintain still that there are issues about the carryover on the voter database, then I'll let you go ahead. That may still be a totally different machine. I don't know what is going to be maintained.

MR. TYSON: Certainly, Your Honor. Thank you. BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Dr. Halderman, you're not offering the opinion in this case that any vulnerability in the State's prior voter registration system, referred to as eNet, has been exploited to alter information in an actual election; right?
A. No. That's not an opinion I'm offering.
Q. Okay. And you have no evidence that any vulnerability in the State's prior voter registration system, eNet, has been exploited to alter information in an actual election; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have no evidence that any malware was ever installed on eNet; right?
A. On eNet?

I have not had an opportunity to inspect eNet-related infrastructure for malware, but no, I don't have any evidence. Q. And you're not offering the opinion in this case that any vulnerability in a Dominion ICX BMD has been exploited to alter election results in an actual election; right?
A. No. The opinion -- the -- what I'm talking about is the risk going forward.
Q. And so you have no evidence that any vulnerability in a Dominion ICX BMD has been exploited to alter election results in an actual election; right?
A. I don't think there is any good evidence of that happening -- happened in a past election.
Q. And to be clear, you don't have any evidence, or you don't have any good evidence?
A. Any evidence. Any -- any evidence that is -- that is at all convincing.
Q. What evidence do you have that you feel is not convincing?
A. Oh, the evidence that \(I\) have, \(I\) just mean false claims.
Q. So it is your testimony that the only evidence that could exist about manipulating a Dominion ICX in an actual election is a false claim?
A. I don't think that is what I said, no.

THE COURT: Do you want to explain what you said?
THE WITNESS: Mr. Tyson, what I said was that I
have -- to my knowledge, there is no evidence that shows any of these vulnerabilities has ever been exploited against a real election. We're talking about prospective risks. There have been -- there have been false claims or conspiracy theories about past elections that talk about vulnerabilities and Dominion systems, but \(I\) don't find those credible to the extent

I have reviewed them.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. And you have, on the same line, no evidence that any vulnerability in a Dominion election management server has ever been exploited to alter election results in an actual election?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have no evidence that any vulnerability in the State's current voter registration system, referred to as GARViS, has been exploited to alter information in an actual election; right?
A. That is right.
Q. And you have no evidence that any malware has ever been installed on GARViS; right?
A. That's right. I have never inspected the GARViS system.
Q. And so with your various reports in these cases, you're not offering any evidence that any vulnerability you identified in your reports had been exploited to alter election results in an actual election; right?
A. That's right. The vulnerabilities I discuss are problems that are present and threaten elections in the future.
Q. And I know there was some discussion earlier about Coffee County.

To be clear, you don't have any evidence that any malware was ever installed on any Coffee County equipment; right?
A. I haven't had access to the equipment in Coffee County to
inspect whether malware was installed. The State never provided that, even after the equipment was taken out of service over the security concerns in Coffee, so no.
Q. And you agree that it is very possible that no malware at all was installed in Coffee County in 2021; right?
A. It is possible malware was, or that it was not.
Q. And you testified earlier you had the images that SullivanStrickler obtained; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you haven't found malware on those images; correct?
A. That's correct. I haven't found any. The images only cover some of the places on one of those servers where malware could exist and are only from the point in time when they were taken.
Q. You referenced earlier the antivirus updates and a definition file.

Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And it is your opinion, \(I\) believe, in these reports that operating system updates should be applied regularly; right?
A. My opinion is that the lack of operating system updates creates additional security risk.
Q. But then regarding antivirus updates, your testimony was that applying those antivirus updates could also create security risks; right?
A. Well, so there's a sense in which it is true that there can be a risk from applying updates, especially if they are coming from a company that the U.S. Government has determined is a threat to national security, but that doesn't mean in general that antivirus updates were operating without recent antivirus updates is a secure practice.
Q. So, Dr. Halderman, you agree that all voting systems, including primarily hand-marked paper ballot systems, face cybersecurity risks; right?
A. Well, cybersecurity risks, certainly there are cybersecurity risks that systems of all kinds must deal with. But some voting systems are designed in ways that are resilient to those.

Now, also, of course, it is a matter of degree. Not all voting machines can be hacked with a pen.
Q. But to be clear, you agree that hand-marked paper ballot systems face cybersecurity risks even if they are different than other systems; right?
A. Of course. But a hand-marked paper ballot system that is coupled with appropriate audits has a record of the voter's intent that just can't be changed in a cyber attack. That is a material difference, even if there are still risks that have to be -- that have to be addressed.
Q. You agree that the presence of vulnerabilities does not mean that an election has been compromised; right?
A. Yes, absolutely, it is a risk of compromise.
Q. Do you recall that following the 2016 presidential election you urged the Hillary Clinton campaign to seek re-counts in states because of the closeness of some contests?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Objection, Your Honor.
Relevance outside the scope of Dr. Halderman's opinion in this case.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, \(I\) believe it goes to bias and Dr. Halderman's statements at the conclusion of different elections on whether or not he has taken a consistent position on assessing vulnerabilities and threats to elections after they were over.

THE COURT: Well, you can ask that. I would prefer you not -- are not getting into any particular race. I mean, you can ask the question, have you opined?

And that -- I think that is sort of dragging us
into -- I think you can rephrase this so we're not into the mud.

BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Dr. Halderman, have you recommended campaigns seek re-counts following close elections?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And why did you make that recommendation?
A. Well, I have recommended that following close elections in which otherwise there wouldn't be a re-count of -- excuse me --
there wouldn't be any kind of audit or examination of voters' paper ballots where the states sometimes will not conduct any kind of review of those paper ballots absent a challenge from a candidate.

And so I have -- I made in one instance those recommendations to a candidate in hopes that an audit -- a re-count substituting for an audit would increase voter confidence in the same way that -- I can finish there.
Q. And you issued a joint letter with computer scientists on November 16, 2020.

Do you recall that?
A. Yes.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, if I may approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Dr. Halderman, I have handed you what we have marked as Defendants' Trial Exhibit 67.

Is this the letter you signed with other computer scientists in November 16, 2020?
A. Yes, it is. This is the letter I helped write.
Q. And that was my next question.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I would move the admission of Exhibit 67.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Your Honor, this is hearsay, but we have no objection.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. You have no objection? MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: No objection.

THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Dr. Halderman, if you would look with me down to the third paragraph, second sentence, the letter says, merely citing the existence of technical flaws does not establish that an attack occurred, much less that it altered an election outcome. It is simply speculation.

Did I read that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you agree with that statement today, don't you?
A. Yes. Merely because vulnerabilities exist in election systems doesn't mean that they were attacked in any particular past election.
Q. And the next sentence, the fourth full paragraph says, the presence of security weaknesses in election infrastructure does not by itself tell us that any election has actually been compromised.

Did I read that right?
A. Yes, you did.
Q. And you agree with that statement today; correct?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And at the bottom of the first page, the letter refers people looking for facts about election security to the

National Academy of Sciences study Securing the Vote.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?

And that study recommends paper-based systems for elections, including ballot-marking devices; right?
A. That study -- you are right, but the scientific consensus has moved since that time as a result of further research which that study recommended be done that has since been done, so --
Q. Did the scientific consensus move after November 16, 2020, in your view?
A. It has continued to move since that time, but even by then, it was starting to, but that doesn't mean that the academy's study has no merit. Just certain pieces of the scientific consensus have evolved since that time. But there's still much -- much merit to material within that study.
Q. And the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine has not published an additional paper study regarding election equipment since this time that you recommended the Securing the Vote study; right?
A. No, they haven't.
Q. Do you recall if that National Academy of Sciences study said the most significant threat to American elections come from efforts to undermine the credibility of election results?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Objection. Hearsay.
MR. TYSON: I asked him if he recalled, Your Honor.

I didn't ask if --
THE WITNESS: I don't recall.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. So, Dr. Halderman, you referenced in your testimony earlier analysis you did in Antrim County, Michigan.

Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that the only time you've analyzed Dominion equipment in another jurisdiction besides Georgia?
A. I'm trying to remember. That would certainly be the most -- the most recent. There may be work that I have done on older versions of older forms of Dominion equipment and of equipment that they subsequently bought after my research.
Q. And I believe you said that Antrim County runs the same version of Dominion software that Georgia does.

Did I get that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were asked to analyze some anomalous election results from that Dominion equipment; right?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Can you explain to the Court what the situation was in Antrim County?
A. In Antrim County, the county reported on election night incorrect results for contests really up and down the ballot that showed implausible -- implausible political shifts in the
county and so forth.
The results triggered -- the results -- the county announced the next day that this was the result of human error and downed the results and proceeded to post new results that corrected some but not all of the errors.

And eventually, the -- after further errors were corrected by the county, the State, the State conducted a full hand count of the presidential ballots in order to publicly confirm that the errors hadn't affected the county's result in that contest.

There was a lawsuit from a voter alleging that this was the result of fraud. The Michigan Secretary of State and Attorney General responding to that lawsuit hired me to investigate the incident and determine the -- determine the causes and whether they had been corrected and make recommendations.
Q. And did you issue that report in March of 2021?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And that was before your report in this case; right?
A. Yes.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, may I approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TYSON: Thank you.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Dr. Halderman, I have handed to you what we have marked as Defendants' Trial Exhibit Number 1225.

Is this the report from Antrim County, Michigan, that you were discussing and that you authored?
A. Yes.

MR. TYSON: We move the admission of 1225, Your
Honor.
MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Objection. Relevance and hearsay.

THE COURT: Well, I will let him try to establish the relevance of it, and we'll see.

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, to be clear, it is not hearsay. Dr. Halderman confirmed he wrote this report.

THE COURT: I understand that.
MR. TYSON: And it involves the same software and analysis he conducted, so we think it is very relevant to his analysis of Georgia equipment as well.

BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Dr. Halderman, if you could turn to Page 10.
A. Yes.
Q. And if you look at the last full paragraph there, you are discussing part of your analytical process involving the EMS.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And that refers to the election management server?
A. Yes.
Q. And about two-thirds of the way down there, you indicate
that each election project is individually password-protected. Then you say, however, I circumvented this by creating a new project with a known password, extracting the password hash from the project's database and copying it into the databases for the other projects. Performing similar steps on the real EMS would require physical access to the computer or the hard drive, and I have been informed that Antrim County applies physical controls to limit such access to authorized personnel.

Did I read that right?
A. That's right.

I don't comment on the strength of those controls because
I didn't have information to make --
Q. And that was my question.

You relied on what you were told about the physical
security of Antrim machines for this part of your analysis; right?
A. No, not really, Mr. Tyson.

So this paragraph is not stating whether -- this paragraph is not offering a conclusion about vulnerability in Antrim, Michigan. It is just describing my technique.

And in order to -- and I'm qualifying that technique by stating what the requirements would be to -- to do it lest people misunderstand what I am -- what I am writing about here. Q. Do you know if third-party groups attempted to access Antrim equipment at any point?
A. I -- that was not a relevant -- that question, I have no evidence that third party -- well, actually, I'm sorry.

So, in fact, SullivanStrickler did image the Antrim County equipment as well in the context of the lawsuit in which I participated.
Q. Did that happen before or after your report?
A. That was before my report. I'm not sure I was aware of it at the time.
Q. You became aware later?
A. Yes.
Q. And did that fact change any of your conclusions in your report?
A. I didn't offer opinions in this report about the risks to future elections that arose from the imaging that SullivanStrickler conducted. That was outside the scope of what I was charged to do.
Q. Sitting here today, do you believe there are risks to Antrim County elections based on the imaging conducted by SullivanStrickler?
A. Based on the testimony that was given in this case this week, I believe so. And that is certainly something that I would like to bring up with the Michigan Bureau of Elections. Q. If you could turn to Page 45 of this report. This is a section of the report where you are responding to claims from Mr. Ramsland; is that right?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. The first category you discuss there is software updates.
A. Yes.
Q. And you note that the report about claims for the Antrim equipment was correct, that the EMS was missing important Windows security updates; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the second paragraph there that begins, this is a serious security problem, you say, in fact, missing software updates are frequently an unfortunate consequence of the federal certification process under which voting system vendors must obtain EAC approval for any changes to election system software, including Windows updates.

Is that right?
A. So yes, that is what it says.
Q. And you did not conclude that a lack of Windows updates on the Antrim EMS called the election results in Antrim County into question; right?
A. No. I concluded that the lack of updates was a serious security risk, but the election results -- the election results were -- my opinion I offered -- my opinions I offer in this report are about whether the -- the cause of the anomalies that were discovered in Antrim County, the known anomalies in Antrim County which are completely explained by human error, as I discuss in this report.
Q. And at the end of that section, you say, installing unapproved updates, even for critical vulnerabilities, would potentially violate the system's certification; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you still believe that today?
A. Well, so that -- yes. So installing -- installing unapproved updates might well cause regulatory problems with certification. That is why -- that doesn't make it any less of a security risk.

Fortunately, the Michigan system in Antrim was primarily hand-marked. So even if updates had been exploited, a re-count or an audit by hand of those ballots would still determine the right result, which is, in fact, how the State of Michigan verified the presidential outcome.
Q. But to be clear, you agree that sometimes federal regulatory interests would be a reason why updates wouldn't be installed; right?
A. I agree. Although that doesn't make it less of a security risk.
Q. The next section of this report discusses the security event \(\log\) and then network connectivity.

Do you see those sections?
A. Yes.
Q. And you relied on the log files in the Dominion EMS to reach the conclusion that it did not appear that the EMS had
ever been connected to the internet; right?
A. Well, I qualify it with "appear," in that there is nothing in the log file. There was nothing in the log file to suggest it. Now --
Q. And you didn't raise any issues that the log files could have been altered; right?
A. Again, that was outside the scope of my analysis because my analysis was able to explain the known anomalies.
Q. The last part of that section on that page discusses authentication and access control, and you reference that Antrim workers --

THE COURT: Which page are you on?
I want to make sure \(I\) understand.
MR. TYSON: I'm sorry. Page 45, Your Honor.
Mr. Montgomery has got it on the screen if you need it.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Antrim workers almost exclusively used a single Windows account that had full administrative privileges over the computer; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And going to the next page, the last full paragraph, you say, these problems should be promptly mitigated; however, I am not aware of any credible evidence that any security problem was ever exploited against Antrim County's election system.

Did I read that right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And you still believe that today; correct?
A. Yes. I have no evidence.
Q. If you could go with me to Page --

THE COURT: I think it would help me to understand what is here if you could explain the nature of the human error involved.

THE WITNESS: Yes. So the nature of the human error in Antrim County had to do with the election definitions that were created before the election. It is similar to the problem that occurred in DeKalb County in that there was a last-minute change to some of the ballot designs, and election workers updated the election definitions in some of their equipment but not other equipment.

As a result of that, when results were scanned and loaded back into the EMS, the EMS awarded the wrong -- awarded votes from some contests -- excuse me -- from some candidates to the wrong -- to the wrong candidates, so the results were shifted to the wrong candidates from a large subset of the precincts in the county.

THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: So that in and of itself is another potential security risk, but there was no evidence that it was done deliberately.

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, I have one more question along this line.

THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Page 48, Dr. Halderman, this is your conclusion in the report before your recommendations; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And in this paragraph you say, furthermore, the EMS lacks important security updates as weak authentication and access control mechanisms and is vulnerable to compromise if an attacker has physical access to the computer. These are serious vulnerabilities that should be mitigated on a priority basis, but there is no evidence that any of these problems was ever exploited in Antrim County.

Did I read that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you believe that today; right?
A. That there is no evidence that they were exploited?

Yes, I have no evidence that they were exploited.
Q. And that was despite the presence of vulnerabilities; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. TYSON: So, Your Honor, at this point we would again move 1225 into evidence. I believe we have shown its
relevance to the case.

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: We don't see the relevance, and it is still hearsay, Your Honor. But no objection.

THE COURT: You don't see the relevance, but you're not -- you don't have an objection?

MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: Correct.

THE COURT: That's fine. That is a perfectly
acceptable way of handling it, which I would recommend to everybody in here for the next day or two. Thank you -- or three or four because we had a lot of objections on relevance. And so that is acceptable.

Why don't we stop at this point, and then \(I\) can also
read it. And we'll start tomorrow at 9:30 then.

MR. TYSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. Court is in recess.
(The proceedings were thereby adjourned at 5:26

PM.)
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    C E R T I F I C A T E
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
    I, SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR, Official Court Reporter of
        the United States District Court, for the Northern District of
        Georgia, Atlanta Division, do hereby certify that the foregoing
        2 4 6 ~ p a g e s ~ c o n s t i t u t e ~ a ~ t r u e ~ t r a n s c r i p t ~ o f ~ p r o c e e d i n g s ~ h a d
        before the said Court, held in the City of Atlanta, Georgia, in
        the matter therein stated.
    In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand on this, the
        18th day of January, 2024.
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                            Dnarrox R. Weicu
                SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR
                OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

\section*{BY MR. ANDREU-VON EUW: [55]}

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