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                                    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                    FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
                                    ATLANTA DIVISION
    DONNA CURLING, ET AL., :
            PLAINTIFFS, :
                    : DOCKET NUMBER
vS. :
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL.,
            DEFENDANTS.
            TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL - VOLUME 11 PROCEEDINGS
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE AMY TOTENBERG
                UNITED STATES DISTRICT SENIOR JUDGE
                JANUARY 24, 2024
            MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY OF PROCEEDINGS AND COMPUTER-AIDED
            TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY:
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(...CONT'D....)
FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA DEFENDANTS:
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VINCENT RUSSO
JOSH BELINFANTE
JAVIER PICO-PRATS
EDWARD BEDARD
DANIELLE HERNANDEZ
ROBBINS ROSS ALLOY BELINFANTE LITTLEFIELD, LLC
BRYAN TYSON
BRYAN JACOUTOT
DIANE LAROSS
DANIEL H. WEIGEL
DONALD P. BOYLE, JR.
TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA
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    PROCEEDINNGS
(Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia; January 24, 2024.)
    THE COURT: Morning. Have a seat.
    Where are we at, folks?
    MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, we had a slight
housekeeping measure we were going to take up before we called
Mr. Evans. But it appears that Mr. Miller has stepped outside,
and he was the one prepared to do it, so I'm happy to get
started with Mr. Evans.
    It dealt with scheduling for the week upon learning
the news from Mr. Martin this morning. I will give a brief
overview and then allow Mr. Miller to kind of work through it.
    THE COURT: Here he is.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Sorry, I was filibustering for you.
    THE COURT: Listen, it is a crazy morning.
    MR. MILLER: I took the opportunity to run to the
restroom. I apologize.
    THE COURT: You're allowed. It is a crazy morning.
When it takes -- when it takes 45 minutes to go five miles,
there is a problem.
    MR. MILLER: I heard about that. There were a couple
of wrecks on top of fog already. It is wild out there.
    So just as far as logistics, Mr. Martin mentioned to
        us, you know, the time frame on Friday. And I thought it might
        be helpful to kind of run through the Court what we are
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anticipating to get through the end of trial --
    THE COURT: Okay.
    MR. MILLER: -- or at least the end of our case.
    So we have got up or we anticipate today to hear from
Mr. Evans, who we'll start with, who is outside right now.
    Oh, I'm sorry. He is in here. I missed that too.
    THE COURT: You got here. Very good for you.
    MR. MILLER: And then we'll have Mr. Hamilton and
Mr. Barnes. The order on those -- that is the order we
anticipate, but it could be flipped. Mr. Barnes had a medical
appointment this morning. So we're working those logistics.
    THE COURT: I'm sorry. Which Barnes?
    MR. MILLER: Michael Barnes.
    THE COURT: All right.
    MR. MILLER: And then tomorrow, this has been a
little bit of our challenge is working out our experts'
availability. They have to travel. And so tomorrow we'll
start with Dr. Adida, and we'll also be calling -- I anticipate
calling Joseph Kirk who is --
    THE COURT: Remind me.
    MR. MILLER: I'm sorry?
    THE COURT: Remind me who Mr. Kirk is.
    MR. MILLER: Mr. Kirk is a nonparty. He is the
elections director in Bartow County. He was deposed in this
case back in 2019.
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THE COURT: Right.
MR. MILLER: But I don't believe he testified in the 2019 hearing.

THE COURT: I don't remember him. That is why I --
MR. MILLER: And we also anticipate calling
Mr. Davis, which may be today, if we have time, or otherwise it will be tomorrow afternoon. I have discussed that with Mr. Oles about his client's availability.

And then Friday will be Dr. Gilbert. With the appointment and so forth, Dr. Gilbert is traveling. He is giving a keynote speech at Kansas State University for an event they are having for MLK observance.

And the one difficulty will be, Dr. Gilbert will need to get back to Gainesville, Florida. And so with respect to the break and how we work that, I anticipated his testimony to probably be a half day, maybe slightly longer than a half day.

THE COURT: I can cancel the appointment if I have to. Why don't we see how we're going. I can -- it is not one of these things that you can't modify. I have one the next Friday too, so ...

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, the other thing I would point out is that we will then anticipate going -- calling Ms. Marks and Mr. Sterling. Given those witnesses, we are anticipating we will have a full day on Monday, regardless if we go Friday. It may be a partial day. I was going to raise

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to the Court, you know, if logistically it would work better if
we could take a day off on Friday and be done on Monday still.
Otherwise it will likely be --
    THE COURT: Tuesday.
    MR. MILLER: -- Friday, partial Monday. I think if
we take the day off Friday, there is a possibility we're done
Monday or go into partial Tuesday.
    So that is our anticipated order of witnesses. The
kind of logistical challenges we're dealing with --
    THE COURT: That is a lot.
    MR. MILER: -- but wanted to be clear with the Court.
        THE COURT: Of course, I don't know how long it will
        take or tomorrow will take either.
        MR. MILLER: Right.
        THE COURT: So I'm going to -- and of course I don't
        know how long the cross-examination is going to take. So -- or
        what happens after that.
        So have you -- did you share that schedule with the
        plaintiffs' counsel before?
        MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I have not. We were working
        it out this morning. We shared our witnesses for today.
        And I was just told by my colleague, I may have
        missed Mr. Hamilton. We are planning to have him here today.
        So we are anticipating Evans, Hamilton, Barnes. Likely that
        may take up the full day.
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THE COURT: All right. Well, why don't we let the plaintiffs ' counsel absorb that and they can discuss that. When we have another break or after lunch or something, we'll talk about it.

And I have some flexibility about -- I mean, I realize it is a crazy thing to have to go in the middle of the day. There is nothing else that apparently I could do. But it doesn't mean -- I'm not wedded to it at the moment. I'm feeling all right. So ...

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, could we get a sense of the relevance of Mr. Kirk? Because he has not had any role in this case since the DRE system, and so it is not clear what he is going to testify about.

THE COURT: Can you respond to that?
MR. MILLER: Well, Your Honor, he is a county elections director. If anybody is going to have to deal with what is proposed to be ordered in this Court, Mr. Kirk will.

Mr. Kirk is also an individual that's -- county
elections director that conducts additional risk-limiting audits on top of the minimum statewide risk-limiting audit that is required by the statute.

So Mr. Kirk will be here to talk a lot about that process, why he does it, what he is doing and so forth.

THE COURT: And are there others who are -- many others who are following his process, or are you saying that

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his process is one that the State is considering requiring for
others?
MR. MILLER: Well, so right now the State -- before I
draw an objection, I'm not trying to testify here. But right
now, obviously the State requires the risk-limiting audit for
every November general election. On top of that, the State
encourages counties to conduct additional audits and things of
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that nature.

Mr. Kirk will have some unique testimony and
information as to why he does that voluntarily, why he does all
these additional audits himself, his experience doing it, and
so forth.

MR. CROSS: Okay.
THE COURT: To the extent you want to discuss this, why don't we do that after we have this --

MR. CROSS: Exactly. I was just going to say we're going to reserve our objection because none of that has been disclosed in discovery, but we'll take it up with them, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You take it up later between yourselves and then you can --

MR. MILLER: I'll note one thing. Mr. Kirk has been on our witness list from the beginning, so -- and I don't know that there was an objection at the pretrial conference.

MR. CROSS: There was.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's discuss it in a break later when we don't have a witness standing right here. MR. TYSON: Your Honor, the only thing, before we get started with Mr. Evans, just to remind the Court, he does have that federal program at 1:40 I believe it starts. He will need some time to prepare himself. We have brought computers. He has his own.

But if we get to the point where he would need to take the -- it is a Zoom presentation where he is a presenter. You'll hear more about that in a minute. We have found that the wireless access in the break room is a bit spotty sometimes. If there is a place that he could go.

And then, Mr. Martin, if we could get just a brief order, if need be, to allow him to bring in his own computer to participate in that, if we get to the point where it is running into time. I just wanted to flag it.

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: We'll get it taken care of.
THE COURT: We'll find a better spot if we need to.

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: We'll figure it out.
MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you.

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Do you want to call your witness?

THE DEFENDANT'S CASE (Continued).

MR. BELINFANTE: We call Blake Evans.
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Raise your right hand.

## (Witness sworn)

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat.
If you would state your name into the microphone
there and spell your complete name for the record.
THE WITNESS: My name is Blake Evans. That is
B-L-A-K-E, E-V-A-N-S.
Whereupon,
BLAKE EVANS,
after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Mr. Evans, good morning.

Are you currently employed?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your current employment?
A. I am the elections director in the Secretary of State's office.
Q. Who did you succeed in that office?
A. Before me, it was Chris Harvey.
Q. All right. Could you tell the Court briefly about your education, starting in college. You don't need to get much further than that.
A. Sure. So I have a bachelor's in communication and a minor in community and civic engagement. Following that I received a master's in public administration from Auburn University. And
the bachelor's was also from Auburn. And then the master's in
public administration and a graduate certificate in election
administration.
Q. Okay. Is the graduate certificate independent of the master's in public education?
A. The election administration program was one track that you could choose to specialize in when pursuing the master's.
Q. I see.

Okay. And are you familiar with the Election Center at
Auburn University?
A. I am.
Q. What is the Election Center?
A. The Election Center is the Association of National

Election Officials. They hold conferences around the country and also offer training classes, certification classes.
Q. While you were a student at Auburn, did you participate in any of the programming from the Election Center?
A. I did.
Q. Okay. And in your role either -- well, since graduating, have you attended conferences -- professional education conferences on election administration?
A. I have.
Q. At those conference, have you ever seen Dr. Halderman give
a presentation?
A. Not that $I$ can recall.
Q. Okay. How about Mr. Stark?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. How about Mr. Skoglund?
A. Not that $I$ can recall.
Q. Okay. After you received your degrees from Auburn University, what did you do next?
A. So following that, I worked shortly for about three months with a nonprofit called the David Mathews Center for Civic Life in Alabama. Following that, I got a job in election administration.
Q. Where -- go ahead. Sorry.
A. So that was in Pensacola, Florida, working for the Escambia County Supervisor of Elections office.
Q. Okay. And how long were you employed in Escambia County?
A. I was employed there for about three and a half years from around August of 2015 to late April, early March of 2019.
Q. Did you have a title while you were in Escambia County?
A. Initially an election analyst and then elections coordinator when I left.
Q. An election what? I'm sorry. I couldn't --
A. Coordinator.
Q. I see.

And what were your duties as election coordinator and election analyst?
A. So I started out with more data entry --

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            THE COURT: I'm sorry. Escambia County. What is the
major city in Escambia County?
            THE WITNESS: Pensacola.
            THE COURT: Pensacola. Okay.
            THE WITNESS: And as far as duties, started out doing
a lot of data entry-type stuff, processing registration
applications, processing absentee ballot requests, processing
other mail. Worked my way up to having more of an involvement
in warehouse and logistics, helping oversee preparing equipment
for election day and early voting locations.
            Also participated in special projects like improving
our streets database in the voter registration system, for
example.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Okay. And on election day in Florida or in Escambia
County, what was the methods of voting that a voter could
choose to exercise the franchise?
A. So for a voter who showed up in person, they would vote a hand-marked paper ballot. And then for voters with disabilities, when I first got there, the machine that we used was an ES\&S AutoMARK. And then when I left, it was the ES\&S ExpressVote.
Q. Okay. Were others besides disabled voters able to use the electronic machines, if they preferred?
A. It was provided for voters with disabilities. If somebody
requested to use it, then they would generally be allowed to use it.
Q. Okay. Were there -- in your experience in Escambia County, did you find that there were any issues with voters filling out hand-marked paper ballots and whether those ballots were actually counted?
A. We did see mismarks at times.
Q. Okay. Could you explain what you mean by mismarks.
A. Sure. So marks that cannot be read by scanner.
Q. What would an example of a mismark be in a hand-marked paper ballot?
A. It can be -- come in lots of forms. One example, because the machine is looking for a mark in the oval beside a candidate's name, and so one example could be -- saw cases where a voter might circle a candidate's name. Saw cases where it might scribble on the party affiliation to the right of a candidate's name instead of the oval to the left. Saw one case where the instructions were to bubble in the oval and they bubbled in the \(D\) in the party affiliation column.

So it comes in lots of shapes. Sometimes checkmarks which may or may not be able to be picked up by a scanner.
Q. And if a vote was not picked up by a scanner, were there ways to count the vote in such circumstances?
A. So it would depend on -- essentially, the margin of the contest would determine whether or not there might be further
re-counts to look at the overvotes and undervotes to try to
determine voter intent.
Q. Understood.

What did you do after Escambia County?
A. So after Escambia County, I went to the Fulton County Registration \& Elections Office. And that was 2019, March of 2019.
Q. And for the record, was that Fulton County, Georgia?
A. Fulton County, Georgia, yes.
Q. And what was your title in the Fulton County office of elections?
A. Elections chief.
Q. Okay. What were your duties as election chief in Fulton County?
A. The elections chief was, essentially, a deputy director to the director. And that division of the office oversaw election day and advanced voting.
Q. Who was the election director while you served in Fulton County?
A. Mr. Richard Barron.
Q. Okay. And how long were you employed by Fulton County?
A. I was employed by Fulton County from March of 2019 to July of 2020 .
Q. All right. And just for the record, for clarity's sake, where did you go to after or in July of 2020 for employment?
A. The Georgia Secretary of State's office.
Q. Okay. And have you maintained the same position at the Secretary of State's office since joining it?
A. I have not.
Q. Okay. Tell us about your other positions.
A. So I initially was deputy director. Chris Harvey, who I mentioned earlier, was the director. And then when he left in 2021, I became elections director a couple months later in August of 2021.
Q. All right. In your experience in Fulton County and in the Secretary of State's office, roughly how many general elections, November elections, have you been involved in?
A. In just the Secretary of State's office?
Q. In Fulton and in the Secretary of State's office.
A. So federal general elections, it would be the 2020 and the 2022 general elections.
Q. Okay. And have there been primary elections you have been involved in as well?
A. Have been primary elections, and then also municipal -municipal general elections and special elections.
Q. Okay. How about runoff elections?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with an organization known as the National Association of State Election Directors?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the purpose of the National Association?
A. So the National Association of State Election Directors, it is the election directors -- as the title suggests, the election directors from all the states. We have conferences. We use it as a community to learn best practices from one another.
Q. Do you currently hold a position with the National Association?
A. I am the -- the representative for the south region.
Q. All right. And you said there were conferences hosted by the National Association.

Do you attend those conferences?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. Have there been presentations on cybersecurity at the conferences of the National Association?
A. There have.
Q. And did you attend those?
A. I have.
Q. Are you familiar with an organization known as Electronic Registration Information Center or ERIC?
A. Yes.
Q. What is ERIC?
A. So ERIC is an organization that -- that about 24 states, plus the District of Columbia, are a part of. Those entities hash voter registration data. ERIC conducts analysis on that
to identify cross state movers and also people who vote in multiple states, potentially.

So their mission is to -- it is, essentially, to maintain -- help states maintain accurate voter rolls and to detect fraud.
Q. All right. Do you hold any leadership positions within ERIC?
A. I am the vice chair of the ERIC executive committee.
Q. All right. Are you familiar with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency or CISA?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What is your -- please describe briefly for the Court what CISA is and how you interact with it as an elections director.
A. Sure. The cybersecurity information -- or the cybersecurity agency provides services to states and to local jurisdictions. We utilize them. We partnered with them last year and also the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency to conduct surveys of all 159 counties to assess their readiness in terms of physical security. We worked with CISA on that.

And then also this afternoon I'm on a panel with them where I'll be sharing best practices from my experience of how we maintain and ensure physical security of people and equipment. And I benefit from that as well when I participate
in panels that CISA offers.
Q. Did CISA invite you to participate in this panel?
A. A representative from CISA invited me to participate in the panel.
Q. To your knowledge, is CISA aware of this litigation?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And yet they invited you to speak on what topic again?
A. Physical security.
Q. Okay. Does CISA have regional advisers?
A. They have election security advisers that are regional, yes.
Q. All right. And who is the regional adviser for the region that Georgia is in?
A. It is David Stafford.
Q. And do you know Mr. Stafford prior to him being -- working with CISA, excuse me, as a regional adviser?
A. I do. He was the supervisor of elections in Escambia County when \(I\) was there. So he was our supervisor.
Q. All right.

THE COURT: Could you spell his last name?
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. Stafford,
\(S-T-A-F-F-O-R-D\).
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, we're going to switch gears a minute and
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talk about voting in Georgia.

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Are you familiar with the methods that registered voters in Georgia can exercise the franchise?
A. Yes.
Q. How are Georgia voters able to vote on election day?
A. So on election day when a voter goes to the polls, they check in to vote. They get a voter access card. They go over to a ballot-marking device. They make their selections. It prints out. They take their paper ballot. They review it. And then they put that ballot through a scanner.
Q. Okay. And what about the DREs from Diebold? Are they here any more?
A. They are not. They are not in use.
Q. All right. Don't have to settle that score. We can move on then.

The voters -- are voters able to vote before election day in Georgia?
A. They are.
Q. What are the methods that voters can vote prior to election day in Georgia?
A. Absentee and also advanced in-person voting.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about early in-person voting, as you described it.

How does a voter vote in early in-person voting in Georgia?
A. Early in-person voting is much like election day where a voter shows up. They present their ID. They check in, get a voter access card, go over to a ballot-marking device, pull up their ballot, make their selections, print their ballot, review their selections, and cast their ballot through a scanner. Q. Okay. To your knowledge, can a voter who is voting either on election day or in an early in-person voting situation -are they able to bring sample ballots to the polling place?
A. They are.
Q. Okay. Does the Secretary of State's office provide any kind of signs or posters for county officials regarding sample ballots?
A. We do.
Q. Okay. And to your knowledge, are counties required to have sample ballots at polling locations?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And would that be on -- for early in-person voting and election day voting?
A. Yes.
Q. To your knowledge, is that -- well, I think you have answered that.

How long is the early voting process in Georgia? And by that, \(I\) mean early in-person voting.
A. It is three weeks long for general elections.

For runoffs, minimum of a week. But counties are required
by law to start as soon as possible for a runoff.
Q. Okay. Based on your experience, is that a -- compared to other states, is that a relatively long period of time or a short period of time, as it relates to other states in the nation?
A. Relatively long.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about absentee ballot.

THE COURT: Could we just stop for a second.
I just want to go back to the question you asked, because I may lose it, about sample ballots. And maybe I just didn't hear it correctly.

But counties are required to have sample ballots.
Does that mean that every precinct is supposed to be posting the ballots and have them available for people to take into the ballot booth with them?

THE WITNESS: So every voting location, when a voter shows up to vote, there should be sample ballots available. We also --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to find out what the meaning of sample ballots should be available. You are saying there is a pile of sample ballots or you can ask for -- I mean, I have just never seen that in all my years of voting in Georgia. That is why I'm trying to understand it pragmatically.

THE WITNESS: Sure. I have seen some instances where
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counties will keep a binder for advanced voting.
On election day, it is generally easier to post them.
Because when you show up at your voting location, everybody is
getting either the same ballot or very close and so there is
not many ballots. And so it is easier to post them. So that
is what most counties that I have seen will do.
In advanced voting, I have seen instances where
counties will come up with a creative way to post all the
ballots. But because you have to have all the ballots
available for anybody in the county that shows up, and there
could be a lot of them -- I also know that counties sometimes
will keep, you know, a folder or binder available to offer a
voter if they want to find their exact ballot.
And then there is signage as well that lets voters
know that sample ballots are available.
One of the --
THE COURT: I guess available to look at or available
to take into your -- that you have an extra copy that you can
bring into the -- the booth?
I mean, I'm just -- of course, my experience means
nothing if it's one out of millions of people. But since I'm
an avid voter, I'm just trying to get that to correspond to --
understand that. I have certainly seen them posted but never
an extra one.
In fact, they discourage people from taking anything

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into your -- into the poll with you.
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THE WITNESS: So they shouldn't be -- for sample ballots, two things. One is the requirement is that they are available for a voter to review, not necessarily that the county has to have, you know, a stack of copies to be able to provide.

Now, one thing that is available and any voter -this will be available in a few days when we get all the ballots up for the presidential preference -- can go to their My Voter page. They can log in and click sample ballot.

And we have built in a feature where they can make their selections and then go ahead and print their ballot out with their selections so they can take that to the polls with them. Or they can print out, you know, a regular sample ballot and just leave it blank and take it with them. And that can be taken to the voting booth with the voter.

THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Just for clarity's sake, Director Evans, you said our website. You mean the Secretary's website?
A. Yeah. Secretary of State's website. We offer the My Voter page.
Q. Okay. And how would a voter utilize the My Voter page to find their sample ballot?
A. So once sample ballots are available, the voter can go to

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mvp.sos.ga.gov, put first initial, last name, date of birth,
select the county, log in, and there is an option to view a
sample ballot.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about absentee ballots for a little bit.
You mentioned them before.
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    What reasons would a Georgia voter need in order to cast
    an absentee ballot?
A. There is no excuse required.
Q. Okay. And what is the method by which a voter utilizes
and casts an absentee ballot?
A. So once they request the ballot, they fill it out. They
can mail it. They can use a drop box, or they can take it in
person to their elections office.
Q. All right. And is the absentee ballot a hand-marked paper
ballot?
A. Yes.
Q. And how is an absentee ballot counted or tabulated?
A. With a central scanner.
Q. And can you walk the Court through just how that process works when the county receives the absentee ballot to its tabulation?
A. Yes.

So as a county election official, when you receive a ballot back, you're going to get the envelope back. There is going to be a perforated portion of the absentee ballot
envelope that they can open up. And that is going to reveal some information for the voter.

So as the person who is processing the returned absentee ballot, they -- the county user will pull up the voter's information in the voter registration system and verify that the information on the ballot matches the information for the person in the voter registration system.

First thing is they'll make sure that, okay, we have record this voter was issued the ballot. And then also they will check the voter's name and in most instances the driver's license number, confirm accuracy, and then accept the ballot back.

Once it is accepted back, it will be put into a batch. And then at the time for processing of those absentee ballots, that is when individuals designated by the election superintendent will begin early processing, so opening the ballot, separating it out so that you have a stack of ballots to be scanned for that batch.

And then that batch gets ran through a high-speed scanner.
Q. Okay. Who sends absentee ballots to voters in Georgia between the counties and the State?
A. The counties send absentee by mail ballots to voters.
Q. Okay. And does the State have any role in counting absentee ballots?
A. No.
Q. Okay. If a voter doesn't trust the United States mail for whatever reason or, you know, they want -- they went late, does a voter have other options to return an absentee ballot besides the U.S. mail?
A. Yes.
Q. And what are those?
A. Drop box or returning in person to an elections office.
Q. What is the deadline for a voter to have an absentee ballot returned to their county election office?
A. Generally 7:00 P.M. on election day. There is a carve-out in the law for uniform and overseas military voters called UOCAVA where they can have their ballot postmarked by election day, and then the ballot has until three days after the election for federal elections to arrive at the elections office.
Q. Okay. If a voter requested an absentee ballot and for whatever reason did not receive it and decides they want to vote in person either on election day or in early in-person voting, what options would that voter have?
A. If a voter receives an absentee ballot, then decides they would prefer to vote in person, then they can take the ballot to the polls and they can surrender the ballot at the polls and vote a ballot in person -- a regular ballot in person.

If they don't have the ballot with them to spoil but they have not returned it yet, then they can go -- there is a
process that the poll workers can cancel the ballot and then
allow that person to sign an affidavit saying, you know, they
are not going to try to vote their ballot and then allow them
to vote a regular ballot.
Q. Okay. What about a situation -- and you may have answered
this, but just for clarity's sake -- where a voter requested an
absentee ballot, let's say it is election day, they haven't
received it yet. Does that same process work for that voter
who never received the absentee ballot?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about some recent elections in Georgia.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, this is the point where
I was to going to ask the Court to take judicial notice. I'm going to show the witness some documents. They have been shared with opposing counsel a couple days ago.

THE COURT: Do they agree?
MR. BELINFANTE: I'm not sure. I can -- I can do this the old-fashioned way and approach and ask the witness, and then $I$ can move to enter it.

THE COURT: Why don't you show it to plaintiffs' counsel and find out whether they agree or not.

MR. CROSS: Yeah. The only thing that was raised with me, Your Honor, because I'm not an expert in the stuff, is these are not the official results. These are like summaries from the website, and they are missing certain things like

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write-ins. It seems like it is probably better to use the
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official results.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I will -- well, let me
start by doing this. I'll work through it with the witness.
And then at the appropriate time, I can present it to the court
for consideration on entering it as an exhibit, if that please
the Court.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BELINFANTE: May I approach the witness, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, I'm showing you what has been marked as
Defendants' Trial Exhibit 1234.
MR. BELINFANTE: Y'all still have it from the other
day.
MR. BROWN: Okay. Thank you.
MR. BELINFANTE: Mr. Oles, do you have it?
MR. OLES: Yes.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director, do you recognize this document?
A. Yes.
Q. What is it?
A. So this is a printout of our election night resulting --
results page for the president of the United States contest.
Q. Okay. Which year?
A. 2020 .
Q. And how do you recognize the document?
A. So the -- at the top it says election night reporting, and it looks exactly like our election night results page.
Q. When you say our, again do you mean the Secretary of State?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what does it say -- are these -- well, does it appear to be a true and accurate copy of the election results from the November 20 -- November 2020 election for president of the United States?
A. It appears to be the results from the first certification of that contest.
Q. Okay.

MR. BELINFANTE: Then, Your Honor, at this point I
would move to enter into evidence Defendants' Trial Exhibit 1234.

I'm happy to approach the Court if you would like to see a copy at this point.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, again, I think the official results make more sense. But it is fine for Your Honor to take this for whatever it is worth. I do have a relevance objection to where we're going.



MR. CROSS: I confess I still don't understand the relevance. But, Your Honor, I have no objection to you reviewing it. But I just don't -- I don't understand why that matters.

THE COURT: All right. Well, you can renew that objection after I hear the testimony. I want to -- because it seems like Mr. Oles' client has some concerns that are broader and relate to actual election results, I want to make sure he is given an opportunity to note his objection if he has any.

MR. BELINFANTE: Sure. And --
THE COURT: Wait a second. Let me just --
MR. BELINFANTE: Yes, Your Honor. I'm sorry. I
thought you were done.
THE COURT: Let me see if Mr. Oles has any objection so we can address everything at once, if he does.

MR. OLES: We do not have an objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. BELINFANTE: Then we would move to enter
Defendants' Trial Exhibit 1230 into evidence.
THE COURT: Did any of the other plaintiffs' counsel have objections?

MR. McGUIRE: We do not object, Your Honor.
MR. CROSS: Josh, do you want to just offer all of them right now, if you have more?

MR. BELINFANTE: If I could.

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MR. CROSS: Yeah. That's fine, subject to the discussion we just had.
MR. BELINFANTE: That will speed things along greatly.
Do y'all need more copies? I have them.
MR. CROSS: I would, if you have them.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
MR. BELINFANTE: May I approach the witness, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BELINFANTE: I'm going to give you now just a series of these.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Mr. Evans, we'll try to short circuit this. I have now handed you -- if you will take a look at what has been marked Defendants' Exhibit 1232, which is the Loeffler election results.
A. Okay.
Q. Is that also a true and accurate copy of the Secretary of State's information from the website?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. And how about 1233, the Perdue election results?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that a true and accurate copy as well --
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A. Yes.
Q. -- from the 2020? Okay.

Next, what has been marked Trial Exhibit -- Defendants'
Exhibit 1237, do you have that in front of you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And because the format changed a little bit, I just want to ask you a couple of questions.

What does that document show?
A. So 1237 shows -- this is -- shows turnout for early voting or advanced voting in person. It shows at the top, in the top left, the number of ballots accepted during advanced in-person voting. This is for the November 8, 2022, general election. It shows the number of ballots accepted at $2,289,951$. It shows the county by county breakdown.
Q. And 1236, what does that document show?
A. 1236, this is also for turnout for the November --

November 8th, 2022, general election. It shows election day turnout, which was $1,420,303$ with -- so a turnout percentage of 20.4 percent.
Q. All right. And do you have document Defendants' Exhibit 1235 in front of you?
A. I do.
Q. And what does that document show?
A. It shows turnout statistics for the November 8th, 2022, general election absentee voting. It shows number of ballots
requested, number of ballots issued, ballots that were returned, and then ballots that were accepted.
Q. All right. And last Exhibit 1238, what does that document show?
A. It is for the November 8th, 2022, general election. This is showing total turnout of $3,962,030$ for a turnout percentage of 56.9 percent.

MR. BELINFANTE: All right. Your Honor, then at this
point, I would move to enter into evidence Defendants' Trial
Exhibits 1232, the Loeffler election; 1233, the Perdue senate election from 2020; Defendants' Exhibit 1237, early in-person voting from the 2022 general election; Defendants'

Exhibit 1236, election day turnout from the 2022 general
election; Defendants' Exhibit 1235, which is absentee voting for the November 8, 2022, general election; and finally 1237 -excuse me, 1238, which is total turnout for the November 20 -excuse me, November 8, 2022, general election.

THE COURT: Okay. Any objections?
MR. McGUIRE: Do you mean to omit 1234 or is that --
MR. BELINFANTE: I did. I thought we had already
admitted that one subject to the usage.
MR. McGUIRE: No objection.
MR. CROSS: We don't see the relevance. But no
objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, based on these documents, what would you say is the preferred methods of Georgians in voting in terms of the means of exercising the franchise?

MR. CROSS: Objection. I now see the relevance.
That would be speculation.
MR. BELINFANTE: Objection because it is relevant?
THE COURT: No.
MR. CROSS: I see where he is going with it.
Well-played, sir.
The -- he can't speculate. I mean, they can argue in closing the inference they want to draw from this, but he can't speculate as to what people prefer. I mean, people vote in all kinds of reasons and people aren't available on election day. They can't leave their homes.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you reframe the question so you are not talking about it being preferred --

MR. BELINFANTE: Sure.
THE COURT: -- and it is a less grand question.
MR. BELINFANTE: That is fine.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, based on the election data in front of you, at least as it relates to general elections -- well, let me back up and ask this.

In terms of voter turnout historically, in general

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elections -- statewide general elections, is turnout typically
higher or less than in primaries?
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A. For general elections, generally higher.
Q. Okay. And how about general -- statewide general
elections versus county elections? Is it higher in a statewide
general or higher in a county only election?
A. Higher in a statewide general.
Q. And same question, statewide general election, is it higher than you typically see in municipal elections?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. In -- what is the majority method that Georgians are voting in the general elections of 2020 and 2022?
A. So in 2022, most of the people that showed up to vote showed up to vote advanced in-person voting.

In 2020, most of the people that showed up to vote voted advanced in-person voting as well.
Q. All right.

MR. BELINFANTE: May I approach, Your Honor, the
witness?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, I'm going to show you what has been marked at the top Defendants' Demonstrative Exhibit 1.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I think the question and the answer were a little bit confusing, actually, when I read it.


Between absentee hand-marked paper ballots, early in-person voting, and election day voting, which in the November 2020 election was the method of voting used most?
A. Advanced in-person voting.
Q. Okay. And how did advanced in-person voters vote in November of 2020 's general election?
A. In person. They made their selections on a ballot-marking device, printed out their ballot, reviewed their selections, and cast it.

COURT REPORTER: Your answer, again, for me.

THE WITNESS: So in person, they showed up to vote, made their selections on a ballot-marking device, printed their ballot, reviewed their selections, and then cast their ballot through a --

MR. CROSS: Objection, Your Honor. I would move to strike the reviewed. He can't speak to that. All he can speak to is people showed up, presumably they cast a ballot on a BMD, and that is all he can say.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I think -- I mean, I'm fine if the Court wants to take out whether Georgians review their ballots or not for the purpose of that question. We can get into that later.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's -- let's limit the answer to the cast -- the actual casting of the ballot, having appeared to vote in this manner.

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                                All right. And we'll disregard the rest of the
answer.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Okay.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, you have got in front of you a
Demonstrative Exhibit 1.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Could we go ahead and put that up on
the screen.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Have you seen this document before?
    It is the same one that you've got in front of you.
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And -- and so does this reflect the numbers as you
understand them in terms of the percentage of method of how
voters cast ballots in the 2020 presidential, Perdue, and
Loeffler elections?
A. It does.
Q. Okay. And so again looking at this demonstrative, would
you -- what number of voters cast their ballot on a
ballot-marking device -- let's just go with the presidential
election from 2022. What percentage of voters?
A. 74 percent.
Q. And is that generally the same for the two senate --
United States senate seats?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. BELINFANTE: If we could go to the next page.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Have you seen this document before or this chart before?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. In the 2022 general election, how did the majority of Georgia voters cast their ballots in that general election?
A. Advanced voting.
Q. Okay. And between voters choosing or between voters voting on a ballot-marking device and voters using a hand-marked paper absentee ballot, what do the numbers show you as it relates to the 2022 general election?
A. That 94 percent of voters voted in person on a ballot-marking device, six percent voted absentee by mail using hand-marked paper ballot.
Q. Okay.

MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you. We can take it down.
THE COURT: Have you provided those to the Court?
MR. BELINFANTE: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. All right. Let's switch topics again and talk about GARViS.

Are you familiar with GARViS, Director Evans?
A. Yes. GARViS is the Georgia Registered Voter Information

System that is our current voter registration system.
Q. Okay. And just for clarity, how does one spell GARViS?
A. $G-A-R-V-i-S$.
Q. All right. When did the Secretary of State's office begin using GARViS?
A. So I began building GARViS in late 2021. There are a lot of components to GARViS. The earliest component started to be used in March of -- in production in March, April of 2022. But the -- as we think of a voter registration system and what counties use to maintain the voter registration database, that has been used since February the 6th of 2023.
Q. Okay. And you were elections director in February 6 of 2023?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What is eNet?
A. ENet is short for Electionet, which is the legacy voter registration system.
Q. Okay. Is eNet still used today by the Secretary's office?
A. It is used just as legacy system for reference purposes and archives.
Q. Okay. Did information migrate from eNet to GARViS?
A. It did.
Q. And how did that happen?
A. Our IT team worked with our vendor's technical team to use industry standard methodology to be able to migrate all the
data on voters from one system to the other.
Q. Okay.

THE COURT: Could you just stop for one so $I$ can -- I just wanted to go back to the dates you provided as to the use of GARViS.

You said the earliest component started to be used in March and in production in May and April of '22. But as we -there's some confusion in the transcript. But as we think of a voter registration system and what counties use to maintain their voter registration database that has been used since February the 6th of '23, which is a little less than -- about a year difference.

So what is the difference between the ' 22 and '23 dates? What -- does that mean the eNet started to be -- was not used after February of '23 and was in use before that time?

THE WITNESS: So good question. I did say that confusing.

So in March -- I believe late March of 2022, we rolled out and then kept some components of GARViS rolled out.

For example, the My Voter page that I mentioned earlier, that -- we were able to use that because of GARViS. So the voter information that is in GARViS is shown to the voter on My Voter page. So that functionality was up and available for a voter to go see their information, see their polling location information since late March, early April of 2022.

Also, we had an absentee ballot request portal where a voter can go submit an absentee ballot application. That, when they submitted it, it would go to the GARViS dashboard to where a county can log in and retrieve it. That was rolled out around that same time in 2022 in use for the public.

But as far as -- and then as far as processing voter moves, processing new applications for voters, that was done with eNet. Counties continued to use eNet through 2022 and into 2023. Until February the 6th, they completely transitioned over to GARViS. And that is when they began using GARViS for processing voter registration applications.

THE COURT: So the data from -- if I had moved in 2022, my data would -- my correct data would show up on My Voter page but might not show up on -- on GARViS?

THE WITNESS: So the way that we -- the way that we worked that was counties would process the information on eNet. So a voter moves from Roswell to Sandy Springs. The address gets updated in ElectioNet. And then on a nightly basis, there would be a pull of that information out of --

THE COURT: From eNet?
THE WITNESS: -- out of ElectioNet into GARViS. And then the correct information would display for the voter on the My Voter page.

THE COURT: So the My Voter page data would be

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corrected you are saying --
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    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    THE COURT: -- by that transfer?
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    THE COURT: Okay. All right.
    Go ahead.
    BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. All right. Are you familiar -- switching subjects again.
Are you familiar with the Election Assistance Commission?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the Election Assistance Commission or the EAC as
it has been called in this case?
A. Yeah. So the Election Assistance Commission is part of the federal government. They provide -- they do multiple things. They have resources that they provide to state and to local election officials. They also facilitate the HAVA grant where they can distribute funding to state and local election officials.
Q. All right. To your knowledge, did the EAC review the Dominion election equipment selected as part of the procurement process for the state of Georgia?
A. Yes. So one of the things that the EAC does as well is they do review or they have voting system testing laboratories that they have certified that review voting equipment against a set of certification voluntary voting system guidelines.

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            And the Dominion system that we procured, that the State
procured, was -- was certified through the EAC.
Q. Okay. And what if the EAC did not certify the Dominion
equipment selected by the procurement process? Would that have
an impact on what is used in Georgia?
A. Yes. State law would dictate that we would not have been
able to procure it.
Q. All right. Do you know if CISA made any recommendations
regarding the mitigating potential security risks with the
Dominion equipment used in Georgia?
A. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency did
put out a -- central information regarding the coordinated
vulnerability disclosure.
                    MR. BELINFANTE: May I approach the witness, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, I'm going to show you what has already
been entered into evidence as Curling Plaintiffs' Exhibit 89.
    Director, have you seen this document before?
A. I have.
Q. Okay. Is this the CISA mitigation document you were just
speaking of?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let's go to the second page, Page 2 of 3. The
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title down there is Mitigations.
    Do you see that?
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A. I do.
Q. Okay. And is this the recommendations that you were referring to?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. We'll go to the third page, and I'm just going to walk through some of these with you and ask what, if anything, has been done regarding CISA's mitigation recommendations.

The first one is to contact Dominion Voting Systems to determine which software and/or firmware updates need to be applied. Dominion Voting Systems reports to CISA that the above vulnerabilities have been addressed in subsequent software versions.

Did the State of Georgia contact Dominion Voting Systems to determine which software and/or firmware updates need to be applied?

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we're going to object to this on a couple of grounds. One, it is calling for hearsay. As you just heard the question, the only way anybody can speak to this is they would have to parrot what Dominion potentially has said.

Second, this is clearly expert testimony. Only an expert could talk about whether these specific cybersecurity
vulnerabilities have been mitigated.
Third, Your Honor, we served an interrogatory on -summer of 2021 to which we got a response on October 1st of 2021. And I can provide a copy if we need to. But the question was identify and describe with specificity all measures taken to investigate, evaluate, remedy, mitigate, or otherwise address each of the security vulnerabilities and problems with the current election system identified in Dr. J. Alex Halderman's declarations, reports, and testimony in this matter.

As we have heard, the CISA advisory is simply a validation of his report. Dr. Halderman's explained that. This is the answer we got. It still stands today.

State defendants respond that because Dr. Halderman's expert report in this case is designated attorneys' eyes only -- they omit that it was designated that way by them -State defendants are not authorized to review Dr. Halderman's expert report. Accordingly, State defendants do not have knowledge of the security vulnerabilities and problems with the current election system identified in the report.

And they indicate they have taken no measures. We followed up with them in the end of '22. We have an email on this where we said, are you going to supplement any of your discovery disclosures under Rule 26(e)?

This, of course, is well after the CISA advisory.


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required, number one.
    Number two, I would offer a couple of things. One,
it would be at most or at worst lay opinion testimony just as
Ms. Nakamura provided on day two of the hearing, Page 54 and
55, over objection, Page 77, Page 99, in terms of using her
computer science background to testify about particular methods
of how things worked.
    Also Federal Rule of Evidence }701\mathrm{ would permit it.
    The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a flexible approach,
that is United States v. Estrada, 969 F.3d 1245 at 1270 to 71,
a 2020 case. A witness can testify about particularized
knowledge gained from experience.
    The advisory committee itself says you can testify
about particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue
of his or her position in the business.
    The Eleventh Circuit under this has allowed
bookmakers to testify about pricing. That is Tampa Bay
Shipping --
    THE COURT: I'm familiar with the case law. I'm
familiar -- I am really almost more concerned about -- but, you
know, I don't want to interrupt your flow here.
    MR. BELINFANTE: No, no, no.
    THE COURT: We can return to it. But I'm most
    concerned about the fact that this has never been responded to,
        that there are lots of questions that have been asked about the
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familiarity already in the course of this case and in this
trial regarding re- -- these identified vulnerabilities and
what actions have been taken.
    And people who were supposedly qualified by virtue of
their positions to address this issue have not addressed it at
all -- have been unable to or profess lack of knowledge of
anything relating to identification of these vulnerabilities or
what measures needed to be taken.
MR. BELINFANTE: And to that point, Your Honor, I
would say this. We have with us the elections director of the
Secretary of State's office. The date of the CISA -- and we
can pull it up. The original release date is June 3rd, 2022.
So the import of the date of Dr. Halderman in October 1 of 2020
is, frankly, irrelevant.
    THE COURT: Well, it is not irrelevant to asking you
to supplement your answers to interrogatories.
    MR. BELINFANTE: I believe what Mr. Cross referred to
was an informal email sent to me asking what the status was.
And, frankly, I don't recall the email. I don't doubt that it
happened. I'm not suggesting that.
    THE COURT: Was there an interrogatory about this or
not?
    MR. CROSS: Yes.
            MR. BELINFANTE: There was an interrogatory, as I
        understand, about Dr. Halderman.
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going to supplement -- we're nearing the close of discovery, we want to be sure that your clients comply with their obligations under Rule $26(e)$ to supplement their discovery responses and document productions with responsive information and materials not yet produced.

We mention specifically the Coffee County breach, the CISA advisories, multiple elections, the upcoming audit, and made clear that we wanted whatever they were going to rely on.

And the response from Mr. Belinfante, again perfectly polite, we will look through the pending requests and see if there is anything to supplement.

THE COURT: All right. So I guess the request -this is what I'm trying to get clarified from you, Mr. Cross. There is the general -- you know, there is, on one hand, the general duty to provide relevant information. But then there is also a more specific duty to update your answers to -- to previously served discovery. And that is a lot more specific.

So I'm just trying to find out: Was there a specific interrogatory or request that covers what you are focused on here?

MR. CROSS: Yes. It is Interrogatory Number -- it is the third set of interrogatories. It is the one $I$ just read. So it was a formal discovery request. It is Interrogatory Number 27.

We also had a document request -- which one is that,

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Ramsey?
MR. FISHER: 53.
MR. CROSS: We also had a document request that
state -- that asked documents reflecting any actual,
anticipated, or completed plans to replace Georgia's current
voting software or equipment with different voting software or
equipment, such as BMDs that do not generate barcodes for
tabulation, and any communications regarding any such plans.
And I suspect what we're going to hear is that the introduction of 5.17 is part of what, they are going to say, mitigates CISA. We did not get any such documents.
So we did everything we could to protect ourselves.
The last point I'll make, Your Honor: We have dealt with a lot of discovery issues with Dr. Halderman. And under their argument on Rule 26, by their own argument, this is a much bigger thing here than what we were talking about with Dr. Halderman where he actually said he didn't even rely on what they asked for.
They are relying on this witness to come in with a whole new defense that no one has ever seen.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I would suggest that that is not accurate. Number one, I'm not going be making an argument about using the updated software 5.17 or whatever else. That is not going to be -- and he is not going to testify -- if I may proffer -- that the state has done that.
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So let's get that piece out of the way.
Mr. Sterling testified, $I$ was reminded, in his
$30(b)(6)$ testimony about CISA's recommendations. I don't have the cite with me, and $I$ can certainly find it at a break.

And so this is not a surprise. If you walk through this, none of it is about changing the voting equipment. And to the extent that it is, then that would be an objection based on that specific question.

But to make the objection globally now about all of it is both premature, would be overly broad, particularly if the Court were to say that the State has not reacted to CISA and then enjoin the State for that. That is --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- that is -- I understand the concern. That is why -- I understand the concern. But it would also be a major problem if you say -- if the State says it has reacted to CISA and the CISA recommendation that is made in connection with this specific report and you never updated that information.

That is a pretty major gap on your part, if that is so. And I'm not saying it is so. I just simply am trying to understand.

MR. BELINFANTE: Understood.
THE COURT: I have had one witness after the next in this hearing -- you know, there have been some excellent testimony that the government has provided that has been --
helped to clarify issues. But it has been surprising the scope
to which one witness after the next has said I have never
looked at that report. I never read that report.

MR. BELINFANTE: I think therein, Your Honor, lies the distinction between CISA and Dr. Halderman's report. And, frankly, the different -- the status of Dr. Halderman's report at various points throughout the litigation is what I think you have heard.

I also think the Court -- you know, we have not had our witnesses up on direct. We have not had the opportunity for them to testify and explain these matters. But I do think if Mr. Cross wants to lodge an objection, it would be appropriate to do it perhaps on each of the individual measures.

Because as Gabe Sterling testified --
THE COURT: Well, that is what I think -- that is why
number one was the broadest one. That is why I'm -- that is why I'm paying attention to it. There may be other ones, but the number one is obviously they are identifying the -referencing the vulnerabilities that he identified.

MR. BELINFANTE: But from --
THE COURT: You would have to basically -- and this was meant to basically trigger obviously that agencies go back and reevaluate and look at these issues.

And I am happy -- I mean, let me just say, though,

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there is -- if you're using this witness -- and I'm prepared to
hear the witness about this -- but only on a conditional basis.
I am not -- because that is the best way for me to proceed.
    I do need to see the interrogatories and the
responses and whatever follow-up was given.
    But, you know, we've had a series of perfectly well
qualified people who -- in the agency who are representatives
of the State, from high to not so high, and people who have
expertise in -- supposedly in -- some degree of expertise with
this software and any exposures. And none of them have
professed engagement with these issues at all. So it is --
    MR. BELINFANTE: I --
    THE COURT: And you can -- I understand the
difference also between, you know, they are calling somebody as
an adverse witness and what you might elicit. But I hope that
people, in fact, are not dancing around with this so that they
give you one answer that should have been given on -- while
they were examined on adverse.
    MR. BELINFANTE: And I'll be very clear on that
point, Your Honor. That is certainly not our intent. And I
don't believe that is going to be the case.
    THE COURT: Right.
    MR. BELINFANTE: I do think, as the Court has seen,
you have situations where, you know, Mr. Beaver was there for
a -- and then left at a certain period of time.
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You'll hear the same from Mr. Hamilton as well.
And you also heard testimony from Gabe Sterling in terms of the multitude of people involved in looking at these issues, which is why we called the elections director to provide specific testimony specifically about CISA.

THE COURT: Right. And -- but it -- you know, listen --

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, could I add one factual point
for you?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CROSS: Mr. Belinfante is right. Mr. Sterling did testify about this. But here is why that doesn't help him. They designated Mr. Sterling as their corporate rep. If they want to bring Mr. Sterling to testify, that is fine.

And to Mr. Belinfante's defense, sure they could have Blake Evans testify. But he is bound by the testimony as a corporate rep. The only thing that any witness can testify to in this courtroom on behalf of the Secretary's office or about any of this is what Gabe Sterling has said.

And we can provide it. I think it is a paragraph out of the entire deposition. The person they prepped and designated did not know what, if any, measures they had taken.

So that is why -- that is why you do discovery.
MR. BELINFANTE: Well -- and, Your Honor, to that point, Mr. Sterling was deposed in February of 2022. That is

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when the --
    MR. CROSS: Josh, just to correct you, that
deposition was in October.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. I was going to say the
October.
    MR. CROSS: It is the October. And --
    THE COURT: October of --
    MR. BELINFANTE: October of 2022, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: So after CISA issued its advisory?
    MR. BELINFANTE: It was a few months after the
advisory, yes.
    And at that point -- and this is the challenge. And
I know the Court has seen it. We have seen it in other courts.
Government moves on. And government is still enacting changes.
    And as Judge Jones ruled in Fair Fight, there comes a
point where the discovery obligations to update has to end
because we could, you know, theoretically update something
today on what government is doing.
    And to prevent the government from testifying as to
what it has done in this matter, which the Court ruled in
summary judgment was important, would be highly prejudicial,
particularly based on the opportunities to ask Mr. Sterling,
the questions were asked, the follow-ups were available.
    If the Court wants us to have Gabriel Sterling
testify to this, that is fine. We can do that. But I would
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suggest to the Court that we have a more qualified person to do
it now in terms of direct hands-on.
    And so I don't want to get into the hearsay issues
that we may with Mr. Sterling. But in addition to that, this
is -- that deposition was October. This was June of 2022. You
know --
    THE COURT: What was?
    MR. BELINFANTE: I'm sorry?
    THE COURT: What are you referring to?
    MR. BELINFANTE: This is the CISA vulnerabilities
report, June 3rd of 2022.
    You know, I think it is a fair question on cross as
to when these things were done. Maybe that would be relevant
to the other issues as well.
    MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we can't even assess what has
actually been done or when.
    And, look, in fairness to Mr. Belinfante, things
progress. But that is why the rules are enforced in particular
ways. Right. So when we reached out to them in November of
2022, about a month after Mr. Sterling was deposed, where he
brought up CISA advisory and wasn't -- didn't really have any
information on it as the corporate rep.
    The right way to respond to that is to say yes, we're
going to need to supplement. There is a CISA advisory. There
is new software. There are things that are happening. And
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let's have a conversation about when we would do that.
They said they would let us know if they had anything
to disclose. And that was the end of it. And we didn't get this in summary judgment. It is the absolute worst kind of surprise, Your Honor. Because this goes to the core of the case. Are there mitigation measures in response to CISA? And this is the first time we're hearing that there are other than some very vague speculation on behalf of their corporate rep that there might be something but he really didn't know. They are bound by that.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, we would be bound by that -- well, I am not even -- at most the government would be bound by that as true in October of 2022. But looking through this, again there is not -- it is not -- in fact most of it is not software-related at all. It is use -- close background application windows, encourage voters to verify the human readable votes on the printout, conduct rigorous post election tabulation audits.

THE COURT: There is a particular software issue that was at -- that was identified. So ...

All right. Why don't you give me a copy of what you're relying on as your request as well as -- and the answers and -- so I at least can know what we're walking into.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we -- Your Honor, what I can hand the Court -- and we also have a copy for opposing counsel.

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Because of the brief mention of this before, we were worried
this was coming.
    We have a motion to exclude evidence on the 5.17
software, which it certainly sounds like it would be part of
this. Although this particular issue is broader. We can file
that on the record, and we can hand Your Honor and opposing
counsel a courtesy copy.
    It has the exhibits in it that I was just referencing
on the interrogatory requests, the document requests, and the
emails.
    THE COURT: Okay. Give me a 15-minute break. I
mean, when is the -- when is the witness' --
    MR. BELINFANTE: 1:40 is when it commences.
    THE COURT: All right. Let's take a 15-minute break
then.
    COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
    Court will stand in recess for 15 minutes.
    THE COURT: Can we get the materials from you before
you disappear so we can look at them?
    MR. CROSS: Yes.
                            (A brief break was taken at 11:30 AM.)
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    THE COURT: All right. Counsel --
                            (There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
    THE COURT: Of course, I don't know the full -- I
    think probably you should just go ahead and sit down for a

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second.
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MR. BELINFANTE: All right.
THE COURT: I don't know, of course, every detail of what has happened here. But I'm just going to go through the sequence in terms of the time frame and the concern.

And, of course, I don't know everything that Mr. Evans may -- you may be seeking Mr. Evans to testify about either.

But just in terms of going over the sequence of events, Dr. Halderman's report was issued on July 1st, 2021. Mr. Evans took office as the director in replacing his predecessor in August of '21, one month later. In that same time frame -- technically I think it was July 28th, '21.

Interrogatories were -- in that same time frame of July 28th, '21, was -- the Curling Plaintiffs served an interrogatory, Number 27, which asks the State to identify and describe with specificity all measures taken to investigate, evaluate, remedy, mitigate, or otherwise address each of the security vulnerabilities and problems with the current election system identified in Dr. J. Alex Halderman's declarations, reports, and testimony in this matter.

As all counsel were certainly aware, because of the extensive discussions about this as well as volume of paper, the CISA advisory -- CISA was conducting an advisory in light of this. And the Court had been in communication with CISA
about this requesting an advisory to sort of get some bearings
from the federal agency responsible for these high-level
cybersecurity issues. And the CISA advisory issue was
ultimately issued on June 3rd, 2022.

And the advisory also referenced within it, by number, each of the sections of their guidelines that they also viewed as relevant.

Mr. Sterling then gave his $30(b)(6)$ deposition on October of '22, several months after the CISA advisory.

And then in November of '22, Mr. Cross asked for an update by email to counsel -- defense counsel of their discovery responses and said, among other things, on November 15th, 2022, in an email, given we received your discovery responses and document productions last year, apart from some additional documents from the Secretary's office recently regarding certain investigations, and given developments since we received those, such as the Coffee County breach coming to light, the CISA advisories, multiple elections, the upcoming audit, et cetera, your clients must have additional information and documents responsive to our requests.

These -- those should have been promptly produced on a rolling basis as they were created as Rule $26(e)$ requires. But in any event, they need to be produced promptly now before the close of discovery. Please let us know when we can expect
the supplementary discovery.
You know, I don't know what the response to that was. So I'm just referencing it, but maybe there was a response. Maybe there was not.

But I will say it is troubling to be hearing for the first time after -- that while there was a $30(b)(6)$ witness that -- and given the outstanding discovery requests, that there was -- that we're suddenly going to have Mr. Evans discuss what measures he took on behalf of the agency to respond to the CISA advisory or any -- which really obviously is based on Dr. Halderman's report, which everyone understood. And he was in a position to understand as well.

I want every party here to feel that they had full opportunity to present their evidence in a fair and reasonable way and to respond in a fair and reasonable way. And that -you know, whether that is the plaintiffs or the defendants. But this really is troubling.

And, of course, I don't know what Mr. Evans is going to say. But it is very -- it is very troubling for this to be presented for the first time in this fashion without there having been an update as to what measures the defendants maintain they took and how they -- and who might testify about them or to update whatever Mr. -- to discuss at least, well, we have -- obviously there are measures taken.

But I haven't seen any of that. And I'm struggling
with trying to give the state defendants an opportunity to present what they did. And at the same time it is really not fair game not to have -- to present a witness who you have never -- never been referenced as a person implementing anything regarding changes or -- and with no other updates to the outstanding interrogatories.

So, I mean, this is a central part of the case as, in fact, Mr. Belinfante recognizes. What did the State do?

And, of course, I want to decide the case on the
merits. But $I$ don't know what, frankly -- this is a -- truly troubling. Now, of course, it may be that you want to make a proffer as to what Mr. Evans would say or -- if allowed to testify on this subject. And then it would allow me to at least assess that and plaintiffs to assess that.

But there has been -- as of this point there has been a seeming profound lack of interest in -- in addressing some of the -- you know, the specific concerns identified other than saying, yeah -- by some of -- at least some of the officials in the agency.

And I don't mean that in a necessarily negative or derogatory way. I'm just saying this was -- you know, appears to be that they just did not take it with the same seriousness that I would have hoped for. But what I would have hoped for is irrelevant. It is really what would be required under the circumstances.


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

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objection on the record. There is a motion. They can respond
to the motion. Your Honor can rule on that once you have the
benefit of the full record and reach whatever fact findings.
    THE COURT: If you-all agreed on that --
    MR. CROSS: We haven't discussed it, but we discussed
it on this side is what I meant.
    THE COURT: I thought that meant --
    MR. CROSS: I wasn't clear.
    We discussed it as plaintiffs, and I think that is
probably more efficient. Your Honor will reach fact findings
and rule on the admissibility later.
    MR. BELINFANTE: I think that is an appropriate
thing, but I do want to -- if I may, just because -- I mean, we
take very seriously what the Court has said. And certainly the
last thing we want is the Court to be troubled on anything the
State has done.
    I think that for a couple things we're approaching
this a little bit differently. And I don't want to stand here
and testify. But I do want to explain.
    I have gone through the information I just received.
You know, there is, like many of the issues before this Court
in this case, a discovery dispute and probably on both sides
things that could and should have been worked out better. No
question.
    That said, I think the issues that we're going to
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talk about with Mr. Evans -- and this gets into a bit of the proffer, but $I$ want to explain where we were going with this -from the State's perspective, what the State does in -- and I know that $I$ have said this -- in response to Dr. Halderman may be different from what it does in response to CISA and it may be different from what the State is doing anyway.

And so a lot of what he was going to walk through in here, candidly I can't tell the Court when some of this information was done. But a lot of it is stuff that $I$ think the State would take the position -- and I think in Gabe Sterling's deposition you see this, at least in the portion cited as an exception to -- or an exhibit to the motion -- is focused on Dr. Halderman and cybersecurity and how the State views that.

I think that is the kind of stuff that will come out during testimony.

But at the appropriate time, because we spent time at the break trying to walk through the timeline ourselves, we would like to provide that to the Court so that the Court does not think that the State has purposefully withheld information or that there was not a reasonable basis for the responses which go, frankly, to October of 2021 and -- October 7 of 2021 in a conference we had with the Court in narrowing discovery responses.

I don't need to get into it now. But at the

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appropriate time -- and it may be something we just submit in
writing -- we would like to do so. Just so -- you know,
because we're seeing this for the first time, and I was not
expecting the objection, candidly. And so we just would like
to be able to provide that to the Court.
THE COURT: All right. That is fine.
And obviously anything \(I\) have done in the space of 30 minutes looking at this is just that. And \(I\) think it probably -- I'm glad to know my first reaction was better than my second reaction as to how we should proceed.
But I do agree that it may -- if we take it -- this conditionally and almost -- deem it, it may just be nothing more than a proffer ultimately that you will -- then I'm fine with this.
MR. BELINFANTE: Okay.
THE COURT: I mean, there has been a difficulty in obtaining information at points from the State regarding the issues relating to how the CISA report was being handled. And I feel like I have asked questions before. And so, you know, I am sensitive to this, I realize, because I think that I have never gotten a very clear response.
But I'm hopeful, you know, we can -- this might work. If it doesn't, so be it. The record is whatever it is.
MR. BELINFANTE: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.
With that, we can call back Director Evans, if the
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Court so please.
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THE COURT: Sure.
Remind me again what the dead moment for the witness
to attend his program.
MR. BELINFANTE: You're speaking at 1:40. So we need
to give you some time to prepare.
THE WITNESS: So it is at 1:40. So I would say 1:20
would give me enough time to --
THE COURT: Okay. And have we found any other room
for him to participate that has a better connection?
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: I'll get his laptop. I will
take him to IT to get him closer to WiFi.
THE WITNESS: Maybe say 1:15, just to be safe.
THE COURT: If you could just connect them, write
somebody in IT so they are expecting him.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. All right. Mr. Evans, first, most important question that
we have came as we were trying to determine is it in Georgia
advanced voting with a $D$ or advanced voting without a D?
A. It depends on who you ask.
THE COURT: These are important issues in life?
MR. CROSS: Only to Shannon.
THE WITNESS: With a D. The -- you know, the code
looks at it in many ways as absentee voting because it is
separate from election day. THE typical voter will think of it

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as advanced in-person voting or early voting.
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    MR. BELINFANTE: Got it. All right.
                            THE COURT: I thought you were talking about spelling
    totally.
MR. BELINFANTE: We were. Whether advance or
advanced. I think the code says one thing and maybe there's
another --
THE COURT: That is amazing.
MR. BELINFANTE: If Your Honor will give me a moment,
I'm trying to figure out ways to address some of the issues.
THE COURT: Sure.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. At any time since June 3rd of 2022, to your knowledge, did
you -- well, let me ask you this way: Did you contact Dominion
Voting Systems to determine anything about software upgrades
for the BMD devices in Georgia?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And has the -- are there upgrades currently available for the Dominion voting equipment in Georgia?
A. Yes.
Q. Will those upgrades be implemented or applied, whatever the right term is, to the BMDs in Georgia prior to the November 2024 election?
A. No.
Q. Why?
A. So to back up and provide full context, shortly after June of 2022, I knew that Dominion was working towards a software version at the time that was -- I believe it was 5.13 was the version. And that is what they were looking to put through certification.

So as part of that, we were preparing to pilot 5.13 in the November 2022 general election to confirm compatibility.

They decided not to try to push that through, the EAC certification. So we backed off that pilot. And we continued to look ahead.

THE COURT: When you say they decided, you mean
Dominion decided not to push for approval of that, of 5.13?
THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honor.
And so we were not going to pilot that in November of 2022 .

I continued to stay in contact with Dominion to see when they were going to push through a software update and provide that to one of the EAC-approved testing laboratories so they could take a look at it.

They ended up -- one of the testing laboratories certified 5.17, Dominion version 5.17, which was available in, I want to say, March of 2023, if my memory serves me correctly.

And the -- following that, once -- once software version is certified, it then has to go through a State certification process here in Georgia. And -- because at a
federal level, the testing laboratories are looking to see, okay, does this software -- how does it compare against these voluntary voting system guidelines that the EAC says we have to compare it to.

At a State certification level, we have to make sure that it is compatible with our entire voting system so that when we roll it out there is operability there.

So we started to look at Dominion 5.17 as -- to put it through State certification. As part of that, we conducted a pilot of 5.17 in the November 2023 municipal elections in five counties. And after that, because of the -- and we're still assessing that. But with the elections that we're conducting this year, there is no time to be able to update or reinstall the new application on all of the ballot-marking devices, the scanners, the election management systems in the State of Georgia.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Why is that? What would the process be to go in and update and install new operating software, if operating software is the right thing to call it, the 5.17? What would that take?
A. Yeah. So my deputy director of voting systems, Michael Barnes, has -- began to kind of detail pretty -- in a pretty granular fashion the steps that it would take to upgrade an election management server.

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            So an election -- to upgrade an election management server
    to the new software --
                            MR. CROSS: Your Honor, I'll just object. It sounds
like he's conveying what Mr. Barnes has said. Mr. Barnes is
going to testify. I would say we should hear it from him
directly.
    MR. BELINFANTE: If he -- if there is no objection to
Mr. Barnes testifying to that, that is fine.
    THE COURT: All right.
    MR. CROSS: Well, subject to the objection on this
    whole line of questioning. Here it is a lack of personal
        knowledge.
                            MR. BELINFANTE: I'm going to take this from you, by
        the way, Director Evans.
    THE COURT: I think, though, that he can, in terms
        of -- he can explain his course of action, though, by reference
        to having reliance on Mr. -- what Mr. Barnes has advised him.
        It doesn't mean that he necessarily is an expert on all of
        that. But he can say this is why we did this.
            MR. BELINFANTE: And I was going to make that point.
            And not to belabor another issue, Your Honor, but I
        think we're outside what the plaintiffs' concerns were in this
        line of questioning. Because he is affirmatively stating --
        and I'm happy to remove the witness -- that they are not
        implementing 5.17 at this time, which is consistent with the
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exhibits that they have attached. He's explained why, which my understanding is not a basis of the objection.

So this is kind of the inverse of I think where plaintiffs thought we might be going. So I just want to get that on the record given that Mr. Cross has raised the method by which we were proceeding with this portion of the director's testimony.

THE COURT: You just shook your head up and down. Is that -- is there something you want me to --

MR. CROSS: No. If that is where we're going, that is fine. It was a narrow objection on foundation and personal knowledge on that one question.

MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. But to the larger point, I think this is, again, I think the inverse of what their concern was. This is --

THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. All right. So, sorry. You were saying why or what the process would take to upload the machines.

Could you continue with that explanation.
A. Sure. So election management server, there is a number -the amount of time, it takes several hours in a larger county with larger files. You're looking at, you know, possibly a day or more. Ballot-marking devices you're looking at 15 to 20 minutes per device. Scanners looking at about 20 minutes.

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And so just when you add up all these elements and considering things like we began building ballots for the presidential preference primary in December, we're about to begin working on ballots for the May general primary and looking for when there is an opening to be able to upgrade the quantity of equipment that we have in Georgia, that time is just not available.
Q. You said that you would have to do it for each device in a county. Let's take a large county like Fulton.
How many ballot-marking devices are there made available to voters in Fulton County, if you know? And an estimate if that --
A. It is going to be around a little over 3,000 ballot-marking devices.
Q. All right. Are you familiar with the term unify --
MR. BELINFANTE: Oh, and for the record, Your Honor,
I have removed Plaintiffs' Exhibit 89 from the witness, which is the CISA recommendation. He no longer has that to refer to. BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. For the record -- or excuse me.
Are you familiar with the term unify tabulator security keys?
A. Yes.
Q. And what are those?
A. So my understanding of that is you can set each tabulator
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in an election project to essentially have its own unique
password that is available. So if a poll worker uses a
security key to try to access a scanner or a tabulator, you can
set it so --
    THE COURT: You are using tabulator and scanner as
interchangeable words?
    THE WITNESS: Yes, in this instance.
    And they use that to try to access it. You can set
the scanner in the system to have its own unique password,
using that function.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. And does Georgia do anything regarding -- well, let me ask
it this way.
    It is based on the scanner you said?
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Are ballots scanned at the county level or the
state level?
A. Ballots are scanned at the county level.
Q. And in a county -- again, let's just take a large one like
Fulton. How many scanners do they have for tabulation
purposes?
A. They will have over a thousand most likely. Somewhere in that ballpark.
Q. And does the State require unify tabulator security keys?
A. We do not require that function. The passwords are unique
per county.
Q. Okay. Why?
A. The risk of utilizing that function and making it such that each scanner has its own unique password -- the risk of poll workers not being able to get into the device and causing delays in the voting process or potentially the inability to count a ballot because a scanner is not turned on, and the logistics around communicating those unique passwords in a secure fashion, the risk associated with that are too high.

Also in talking with other election officials, the way that we go about it is not uncommon.
Q. Okay.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I understood your answer, candidly. Not because there was anything wrong with the words. But $I$ just substantively didn't understand it.

So there is a -- you were asked does the State require a unify tabulator -- unify tabulator security keys. And are you -- in your understanding is counsel asking you is there just always one security set of keys? Is that what he is asking you?

THE WITNESS: So think of it in terms of -- in terms of passwords. They are unique per county and they change every election. But for a single county, every scanner, say in Fulton, for an election, the poll workers are going to utilize the same passwords for each scanner.

THE WITNESS: It changes every election.
THE COURT: By scanner number $I$ meant password.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Are counties able to change the password if they wanted to?
A. I do not know.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about counties for a moment and in particular one that we've spent some time on, Coffee County.

Are you aware of any criminal indictments involving activities in the 2020 general election in Coffee County, Georgia?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Has the State undertaken or replaced any voting equipment in Coffee County since the 2020 general election?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What equipment has changed in Coffee County?
A. So the server and the central scanner has changed, along with the ballot-marking devices and the scanners.
Q. Okay. If a scanner -- or excuse me.

If a ballot-marking device were infected with malware in Coffee County or wherever else, do you have an understanding as to whether that malware could infect the county election management system or EMS?

MR. CROSS: Objection, Your Honor. This calls for

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expert testimony.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Just asked if he had an
    understanding. But certainly I think -- so the objection may
    be premature. But I would reraise the testimony from
    Ms. Nakamura, also the Eleventh Circuit, on things that are
    within his particularized knowledge by virtue of his position
    in the business under Rule 701.
    I'm happy to go through a litany of cases if the
Court wants.
    THE COURT: I'm aware of them, but I'm not -- I mean
if -- you're asking him whether he has an understanding as to
    whether the malware could infect the county election management
    system or EMS. I mean, I'm willing to let him testify about
    that. But it is definitely lay knowledge and not
    necessarily -- you haven't laid the foundation for his having
    any expertise in this.
    MR. BELINFANTE: That's fine.
    THE COURT: I mean, you could have somebody who had
        that expertise who is working in lay capacity. But you haven't
        laid a foundation for that.
    MR. BELINFANTE: All right. Let me back up a second.
    Well, let me put it -- this is directed to the Court
        as a response to the objection.
    Virtually every witness the State has -- that the
        plaintiffs have had and called from the State they have asked
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at what point in time did you read Dr. Halderman's report.
    They have opened the door to the State being able to
explain their response to Dr. Halderman's report based on their
understanding. And so --
    THE COURT: I don't have any problem, but he -- but
you've asked a more technical question.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Okay.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Are you aware that there are allegations that the State
voting equipment can be hacked with malware, Director Evans?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. If malware were to be --
                            THE COURT: Now I'm really confused. You had another
question I was responding to that was objections. Are you
just -- you're moving on, you're not asking --
    MR. BELINFANTE: I'm laying a different foundation,
and I'm going from there.
    THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Let me ask again.
    Are you aware that there have been allegations that the
State voting equipment is subject to infection by malware?
A. I'm aware.
Q. Okay. If malware were to be found or infected into a
ballot-marking device, is it your understanding based on your
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experience with the machines --
    THE COURT: You have to ask him a direct question,
not a -- not a leading question. You can ask him is it your
understanding and have him explain the understanding that
you're suggesting.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Is it your understanding that the malware would be limited
to that ballot-marking device?
    MR. CROSS: That is leading, and it calls for an
expert opinion.
    MR. BELINFANTE: It is not suggesting an answer. It
is not leading. It is asking if he has an understanding as to
what it is.
    THE COURT: All right. It is leading, but I'm not
going to spend more time on it. Just try to avoid it after
this.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Understood.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. If malware were on a BMD, what would -- what could happen?
    MR. BELINFANTE: I can do an open one if you want.
It is not leading. Take your pick.
    MR. CROSS: It still -- let me just say it this way.
    As long as it is clear that this is not coming in for an expert
opinion --
    THE COURT: No.
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                MR. BELINFANTE: It is not an expert opinion.
                MR. CROSS: That's fine. All right.
                    MR. BELINFANTE: We agree on that.
    BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. If a BMD were infected with malware, what could happen?
A. In my -- I don't know how it could spread from that machine to anything else.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about county roles in Georgia elections generally.

What are poll managers? And by that, I'm drawing a distinction from poll workers.
A. So poll managers are essentially the manager of their location. So each voting location will have a poll worker team. And the poll manager is the person who is in charge of that team.
Q. Okay. Do poll managers take an oath before they can perform their duties?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have an understanding of what that oath provides or requires?
A. Essentially, in many words, that they will uphold the integrity of the election and do their best to prevent fraud and deceit.
Q. Okay. Who is responsible for providing election day voting supplies -- and I'm not talking about machines. I'm
talking about the other things -- to county polling locations?
A. The county election officials.
Q. Okay. Are counties required to have emergency hand-marked paper ballots on-site during election day voting?
A. Yes.
Q. Are they required to do that for early in-person voting?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Is there a number or a minimum that they are
required to have in terms of actual ballots?
A. Ten percent required by State Election Board rule.
Q. Ten percent of what?
A. Ten percent of their numbered voters.
Q. All right. And who pays for those hand-marked paper ballots? Counties or the State?
A. Counties.
Q. In your role as election director for the State of Georgia, are you familiar with any efforts by the State to train election superintendents?
A. Yes.
Q. And tell the Court what, in terms of training, is the role of the State and particularly as it relates -- as it may differ from the role of election superintendents.
A. So at the state level, we conduct statewide webinars and also some in-person trainings including at the Georgia Association of Voter Registration Officials about laws and
the -- about laws and the State Election Board rules and essentially general, you know, guidelines around those laws and those rules.

The counties will then come in and they will discuss best practices with each other. Then the election superintendents take the information that we train them on and then they train their staff on how to do the day-to-day work.

They also train their poll workers on how to run advanced voting and election day operations.
Q. Okay. If there were to be a change in election day operations or election day requirements as a result of this litigation or otherwise, who would be responsible for providing the training on that order?
A. We would provide training to election superintendents. They would provide the training to their staff and polling -poll workers.
Q. All right. Does the Secretary or has the Secretary provided a poll worker manual in the past?
A. We have.
Q. Okay. Is it binding for counties to use it?
A. I think of it as the floor that sets for the election officials the laws that they need to train their poll workers on. And then it is their duty to construct additional poll worker training to train their poll workers on those laws and to also provide equipment, training, and other things.
Q. To your knowledge, does the State provide training to election superintendents on the physical security of ballot-marking devices?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Who is responsible for maintaining the physical security of ballot-marking devices whether in between the State and counties?
A. County election officials.
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, is that written down or in law or anything like that?
A. The -- yes.
Q. Okay. You testified a moment ago that counties have experience in administering hand-marked paper ballots in a couple capacities.

To your knowledge, in your experience in Georgia, has any county in Georgia used hand-marked paper ballots as the primary method of voting in a general election?
A. No.
Q. Okay. How about a runoff election?
A. No.
Q. You talked about building ballots as well.

In any given county, is it -- well, let's ask a more specific question.

In a large county like Fulton, in a general election, let's take November 2020, do you have an idea of how many
ballots must be made available?
A. Are you asking specifically to ballot styles?
Q. Yes.
A. Okay.
Q. Before you answer that question, why don't you explain what you mean by ballot styles.
A. Yeah. So ballot styles would be essentially how many unique combinations of contests that are on a particular ballot. So if -- if you have one voter that has a race on their ballot for county commission one and another voter that has a race on their ballot for county commission three, those are going to be two different ballot styles.

And so for fulton County with as many districts as they have, I would estimate that they would have had over a thousand ballot styles on November 2020.
Q. In terms of absentee ballots and ballot styles, in the 2020 primary elections, if you could go back to that, remind me again where were you in the summer of 2020.
A. So up until first part of July of 2020 I was in Fulton County.
Q. Until July?
A. In the elections office.
Q. Okay. Is there anything unusual that impacted the elections in the primaries of 2020?
A. Yes.

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Q. What was that?
A. COVID.
Q. And how did COVID impact the elections in 2020? Primary
elections I'm focused on right now.
    THE COURT: You're saying based on his experience in
Fulton or was he -- or --
    MR. BELINFANTE: I think he can -- I'm just asking
how did it impact. It is more open than just Fulton, but ...
    THE COURT: I'm just trying to remember when did you
go to the State.
    THE WITNESS: Went to the State in July of 2020.
    THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. How did COVID impact the 2020 primary elections?
A. Sure.
    So when -- to start kind of generally, when COVID first
began to shut down things, advanced voting in person had just
started for the presidential preference primary. And it was
around the second or so week. And so that presidential
preference primary ended up getting delayed until May, which
ended up then getting delayed until June.
    One of the things that we saw was that there was -- there
    was a lot more people applying for an absentee ballot. And so
    the number of absentee ballot requests was much higher than in
    previous years.
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Q. Okay. And when you say much higher, was that in Fulton County while you were there?
A. That was across the state and $I$ believe the country.
Q. Okay. Were there mistakes made in terms of the administration of absentee ballot delivery and/or receipt in the 2020 primaries?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Were those -- have you seen similar volume of mistakes since the COVID elections of 2020?
A. No.
Q. All right.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, may I approach the
witness?
THE COURT: Yes.
By MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. I'll show you what we haven't marked -- because I'm not sure if we're going to use it as a demonstrative yet, so we won't mark it yet.

And I'll just ask you -- at certain points, I may ask you to refer to that.

To your knowledge, the document $I$ put in front of you, what is it?
A. It is the poll worker manual produced by the Secretary of State's office latest update May 2021.
Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you a series of questions about
kind of election day operations and what is happening on the line so to speak.

Let me know if any question $I$ ask is different for election day in-person early voting.

We talked about -- let's see. We have already answered some of these already.

Do you know if on election day -- you testified about signs that are supposed to be put up.

Are there any signs asking voters to do anything with their ballot once it is printed from the BMD?
A. There are signs informing voters to review their ballots.
Q. Okay. Is there any training provided by the Secretary to election superintendents to perhaps increase efforts to get voters to review their ballots before they turn them in?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what does that training focus on?
A. It emphasizes the importance in the State Election Board rule that requires them to have a person at the scanner that is reminding voters to review their ballots.
Q. Okay. If a -- and in that, if a voter gets their ballot and they decide that it does not reflect their choice, what happens then?
A. So --
THE COURT: I'm sorry. Did you say it was the -- it
was the poll worker who was at the scanner is supposed to

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remind them?
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THE WITNESS: Correct.
THE COURT: So after they have already voted and the BMD is through with their -- has already --

THE WITNESS: Well, so the --
THE COURT: -- printed their ballot?
THE WITNESS: So their ballot gets printed, and then before they scan it, they can still change their mind. They can go back and say they need to spoil that ballot and get a new one because they haven't voted until the ballot goes through the scanner.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. So if a voter concludes that their ballot, as printed from a BMD, does not reflect their choices, what is supposed to happen? What can happen at that point?
A. So if a voter prints their ballot and they change their mind on their selections, then they can tell a poll worker, hey, I need -- I made a mistake. Changed my mind. And the poll worker will spoil the ballot that they have. And then they can be issued another voter access card. Go to a BMD and they will mark a second ballot.
Q. Okay. When you say spoil the ballot, what do you mean by that?
A. So they will write spoil -- the poll manager will write spoiled across the face of the ballot or the -- the voter or

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the poll worker will. And -- to indicate that this is a
spoiled ballot. It is not to be scanned. And then it will be
put in a spoiled ballot envelope to be maintained for
recordkeeping purposes to be able to keep track of the number
of ballots that were -- or the number of sheets of ballot stock
that were printed.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, if I may just for a
moment. I think I'm at a point where I've got -- I'm moving to
a different line of questioning.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    MR. BELINFANTE: And so in terms of allowing -- we've
got lunch for the witness. If he could eat before the 1:15
time he has requested. I could stop now or I can keep going.
I just wanted to see --
    THE COURT: So how long is your program?
    THE WITNESS: It is scheduled to go until 2:15.
    THE COURT: Okay. Do you have another subject?
Because we could stop at 1:00 and then --
    MR. BELINFANTE: I think.
    THE COURT: -- I think he will still have enough time
to eat.
    MR. BELINFANTE: I could keep going and then we will
stop at 1:00.
    THE COURT: Looking at his materials, I assume that
he can eat at the same time.
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MR. BELINFANTE: It is a government specialty. BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. All right. What time -- let's talk about when polls actually open on election day. What time do they open?
A. Polls open at 7:00 A.M.
Q. Okay. What time are election -- county election officials supposed to be at the polling location?
A. Poll workers have to be there no later than 6:00 A.M.
Q. Okay. And is there a means to identify poll workers, poll managers, and others who are working at the polling location?
A. Yes. The poll managers will have a roster that they will use to make sure that they -- that the people that are working for them are working for them. So yes.
Q. And is there a way for the public to be able to distinguish any person being there and someone who is authorized to be there as a poll worker or poll manager?
A. Generally poll workers will have a badge in many cases that will identify them as a poll worker.
Q. Okay. Before the polls open at 7:00, what is happening between 6:00 A.M. and 7:00 A.M.?
A. The poll workers are working on getting things set up. So they are verifying seals on equipment. And then they are getting the equipment set up so the polls are ready to open.
Q. Okay. Is the public able to see this work that is going on between 6:00 and 7:00 A.M.?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about Poll Pads.

How are the -- are there opening procedures for setting up the Poll Pads on election day?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What are those procedures?
A. So the Poll Pad is the electronic pollbook which will contain the information for the registered voters who might be coming in to check in to vote that day.

And the first step is verifying the seals that are on the outside of the case. So poll workers will work together to verify the seals. If they match, then they will remove the seals. If the seals match what they are supposed to on the Poll Pad recap sheet, they will remove the seals, open up the case, and begin to set up the device that is the Poll Pad.

So they will put the stand together, put it altogether, and then they will begin to boot it up, which will include putting in a password to get to the screen where they can make sure that the check-in count at the beginning of the day is zero and that they are, at that point, prepared for the first voter.
Q. All right. And do the county election superintendents receive training on this?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You said that there are seals there. What happens
if an election worker finds that the voting equipment -- and we
were talking about the Poll Pads, so we'll stick to that -- did
not have a seal on it?
A. If they find that it did not have a seal at all on it,
then they will notify the election superintendent to identify
next steps.
Q. Is there training --
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, sorry. Could we get
clarification? Does he mean the county or the state
superintendent?
MR. BELINFANTE: Yes. That's fine.
THE WITNESS: So the county superintendent. So the
poll worker, the poll manager will notify the county
superintendent.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Okay. Is there training provided to the county superintendent on what they are supposed to do upon receipt of such information?
A. They use their discretion to proceed in a way that they deem is secure and appropriate given the information -- all the information that they have available.
Q. All right.
A. There is also -- in the event that they need to not use that Poll Pad, then they can prepare -- they may already have Poll Pads to prepare to issue a new one to the voting location
that can be used. And then there is also an emergency electors
list that are a fall-back option to where they can check voters
in using paper.
Q. All right. Let's talk briefly just about the BMDs themselves.

Are the election superintendents trained on how to set up BMDs on election day?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what are they trained to do?
A. So whatever -- counties have different casings for the BMDs. Some counties use kind of the larger -- larger carriers that are metal and they will have a seal on the doors. Some counties use the softer cases. But regardless you verify the seal that is on the outside of the case.

If it matches, proceed with opening it up; extracting the BMD from it; setting it on a table; plugging it in to the printer and the backup battery supply; and verify the seals, the four seals that are on the outside of the ballot-marking device.

And then if all those match, then they can break the seal that is for the power button and begin to turn on the machine.

The machine turns on and takes you to kind of like a home screen. They can put in a poll worker card. And from that point, they can verify that the opening count is zero. They can verify the date and the time on the ballot-marking device

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is accurate. And they can open the polls on the device.
Q. You once again talked about seals. Is there any
difference in what happens if there is not a seal for the
ballot-marking device as opposed to the Poll Pad?
A. No.
Q. How is the ballot parking device connected to the printer?
A. There is a cable that runs from the ballot-marking device
to the printer.
    THE COURT: Could we just stop for a second?
    MR. BELINFANTE: Sure.
    THE COURT: Of course I'm limited to my own
experience, but -- at one level. But you talked about that
there were both large metal carriers that -- for some BMDs and
other counties use soft -- some type of soft case.
    But where -- are the seals in any -- is that in any
way relevant to whether there are seals on the BMD itself or is
it the seals are only on the cases?
    THE WITNESS: So in all cases, the BMDs have seals on
the device itself.
    THE COURT: All right. So the question of the cases
is not really relevant to this issue; right?
    THE WITNESS: Correct.
    THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, would you like me to
proceed or --
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THE COURT: Do you have a new subject?

MR. BELINFANTE: Well, we're going to get into more
details on this subject. So again, I --
THE COURT: That's all right. I don't want to
torture the witness without lunch.

So -- all right. We'll have you -- we're going to
excuse the witness. Please don't discuss your testimony with -- did you need something?

MR. TYSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

MR. BELINFANTE: Continue, Your Honor. I'll explain
when you are done.
THE COURT: Please don't discuss your testimony with
anyone else. We're going to -- you'll be recalled.
I have to discuss the order how you want to proceed on that.

But just please be sure that your attention is focused on what you need to be doing --

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- as I understand it.
And, Harry, do you have somebody to take him to in terms of the -- our side?
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, given his presentation, we realize it is a bit unorthodox, but Mr. Hamilton is here. We're happy to put him up after the lunch break and then

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continue with Mr. Evans after his presentation, if the Court
and opposing counsel don't object. We're happy to do whatever
the Court prefers.
    MR. CROSS: Fine with us to keep going.
    THE COURT: When is the -- again, when is the program
through?
    THE WITNESS: Scheduled to be done at 2:15.
        THE COURT: 2:15.
        All right. Well, it is 1:00 now. So we'll -- if you
    really think you might be through, we might just take more
    time.
        How long is Mr. Hamilton?
        MR. TYSON: He is relatively short, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: If he is short, we can go ahead.
        All right. Thank you very much.
        So do you know -- do you need him to come with you so
        he can identify the computer.
                            (There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
        THE COURT: Is there anything else we need to address
        now, or should we take a lunch break now?
        MR. BELINFANTE: I don't believe we have anything,
        Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Is 45 minutes enough for lunch for
        everybody? I think no other disasters, surprises, fights.
            (A lunch break was taken.)
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THE COURT: Have a seat.
Who is your next witness?

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, pursuant to our discussion
before lunch, the defendants call David Hamilton.
THE COURT: Okay.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: If you would, please raise
your right hand.
(Witness sworn)

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Please have a seat. Into the microphone, please state your name and spell your complete name for the record.

THE WITNESS: David Hamilton.
MR. TYSON: And can you spell your name as well,

Mr. Hamilton?

THE WITNESS: $\mathrm{H}-\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{I}-\mathrm{L}-\mathrm{T}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{N}$.

Whereupon, DAVID HAMILTON, after having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Hamilton.
A. How are you?
Q. Could you please provide the Court with just briefly your educational background.
A. Started off the U.S. Navy in the late ' 70 s, worked for security services intelligence. Came out, did some DOD, Department of Defense, work, space systems, and then kind of launched the career in infrastructure, IT security over the last 40 years.
Q. And what is your current employment?
A. I work at Shepherd Center. It is a catastrophic care hospital here in Atlanta. They deal mostly in brain injury and catastrophic spinal injury. It's a 165-bed hospital.
Q. And what is your current role at the Shepherd Center?
A. I'm the information security officer and the director of all IT services. So that's infrastructure, networking, cybersecurity, basically anything that plugs in the wall.
Q. Does your role include assessing risks and making recommendations on remediating those risks?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you previously work with the Secretary of State's office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what was your role with the Secretary's office?
A. I was actually a consultant. I worked for a company called TrustPoint Solutions, and I went there initially to help kind of coach up and see if I could help mature their program -- security program with the current ISO that was there.
Q. And do you recall information from when to when you worked with the Secretary's office?
A. It was the tail end of then-Secretary of State Kemp and then through the first part of Secretary Raffensperger's.
Q. And how long have you worked in the cybersecurity -THE COURT: What does that mean? Is that a year, two years, what --

THE WITNESS: Total of about four on and off, I
guess, over a four-year period.
THE COURT: When did you stop? Let me put it that
way.
THE WITNESS: May of '21.
THE COURT: May of '21 was your last year -- last
point --
THE WITNESS: Last time $I$ was there in person. THE COURT: All right. THE WITNESS: True.

BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, how long have you worked in the cybersecurity industry?
A. All total, 40 years; specifically in cybersecurity, 20 years.
Q. And do you train others on issues involving cybersecurity?
A. I do.
Q. What role do you have in cybersecurity certifications, if
any?
A. I participate as a volunteer through a subject matter expert program to help with the construction of questions for the certification exam to apply the rigor that we need to make sure that the folks that get the certification actually deserve it.
Q. And what types of secure computer systems have you worked with in your experience?
A. Federal systems, obviously, when $I$ was in the service. I was a compartmented clearance, which is a fragment of top secret, and $I$ continued that into the DOD realm and then just kind of branched out from there.

And then just basic computer security. I kind of got the bug that, you know, we needed to protect something. I think that was the basis of my interest in it is just being able to protect.
Q. And I believe I heard you say at some point during the course of this case, which $I$ know has been lengthy, that security is a journey.

Is that something you have said before?
A. Correct. Yeah, it is not like an assessment. An assessment is a snapshot in time, but the actual process of risk mitigation and taking care and maturing a security program is truly a journey. It never ends. It is not -- it is like the U.S. mail. It comes every day.
Q. So I want to turn to your work with the Secretary, first with the ballot-building system at the Center for Election Systems.
A. Okay.
Q. Can you explain to the Court what the ballot-building system at CES is?

MS. KAISER: Objection, Your Honor. Lack of
foundation.
MR. TYSON: I'm happy to lay a foundation, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Just make sure I get directed
towards the time frame that he actually personally is familiar with rather than just being generalized.

MR. TYSON: Certainly.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, are you aware of different systems that were used at the Center for Election Systems during the time you worked for the Secretary's office?
A. Yes, sir. Some of them were specifically excluded by my statement of work, such as the voting systems themselves. But all of the in-house business systems and the voter registration system was in my framework.
Q. Was one of those systems the ballot-building system at CES?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you conduct an initial assessment of the ballot-building system when you first began work for the Secretary's office?
A. I did.
Q. And what did you conclude at that point?
A. There were just some suggestions that were made to help harden things and make it a little more crisp. Nothing fundamentally was wrong with it. It just needed a little TLC.

At that point the vendor was wholly responsible for the maintenance -- the ongoing maintenance as per their contract. And I found some deficiencies in that. It is just I didn't feel like they were responding fast enough.

So we brought it to the attention of Merritt Beaver, who I reported to as a contractor, and also Gabriel Sterling. And they kind of took it from there, and that kind of started the ball rolling. And we ended up releasing them from that responsibility and bringing that responsibility back in-house, which was a better idea, I think.
Q. What are -- do you know what the security measures are for the ballot-building system during your time at the Secretary's office?

MS. KAISER: Objection. Lacks foundation.
MR. TYSON: I'm asking if he knows, Your Honor. I
think he can say whether he knows or not. That lays the foundation for additional questions.

THE COURT: Well, why wouldn't it?
MS. KAISER: Your Honor, I thought the question was more to do with what the actual security measures were.

THE COURT: Lay the foundation and go ahead then.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, do you know what security measures were utilized by the ballot-building system at CES during your time there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what were some of those?
A. It was a separate --

MS. KAISER: Your Honor, he has to say how he has
that knowledge.
MR. TYSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, how did you come to be aware of the security measures that were utilized by the ballot-building system at CES?
A. A physical inspection and also a risk assessment, a normal risk assessment which I had performed several times in my previous engagement.

MS. KAISER: Your Honor, you know, I think the difficulty here is that Mr. Hamilton gave us some answers in his deposition that suggested he did not have familiarity with

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the subject.
    I'm happy to do a short voir dire of the witness if
that would be helpful.
    MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I believe that is an
appropriate subject for Ms. Kaiser to explore on cross.
    THE COURT: I think so as well, but I think that --
when did you do a risk assessment?
    THE WITNESS: It was shortly after we started with
the -- at then -- I guess probably within three months of my
arrival.
    THE COURT: And your arrival was around 2017?
    THE WITNESS: I think that is right. Sorry.
    THE COURT: And the -- so that is when you did the
risk assessment? Around 2017?
    THE WITNESS: That is when I was first engaged by
TrustPoint.
    THE COURT: And the physical assessment was done
    when?
    THE WITNESS: Shortly -- as part of that. I kind of
        toured the offices of the Secretary of State. I went to Macon
        and looked at that facility as well because part of information
        security is kind of understanding what you have to protect, and
        laying eyes on it is really the best way to do that.
            THE COURT: And then -- so when you are talking
        about -- were you working full time as a consultant for the
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State -- or for the Secretary of State's office?
    THE WITNESS: Full time for TrustPoint Solutions and
it was a -- what they likened to a bucket of hours, agreement
with Secretary of State, statement of work on an as-needed
basis.
    But initially, there was a pretty heavy workload
where it was every single week, and then it scaled back. Then
it would ramp back up, flexed totally at the behest of Merritt
Beaver and crew there.
    THE COURT: So you reported to Mr. Beaver?
    THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. Yes, Your Honor. I'm
sorry.
    THE COURT: That's all right.
    So was it typically anywhere from zero to 40 hours or
zero to 20 hours a week, or --
    THE WITNESS: It was mostly a 40-hour work week or
        even more, just depending on what we had to do after-hours. A
        lot of times when we were making changes to systems or updating
        systems, it needed to be outside of the business day to lower
        the impact on the users.
            THE COURT: So I take it from what you're saying,
        though, that your familiarity was through the DRE system
        because that is what was in effect in 2017?
            THE WITNESS: Right. And it was not just that
        system. It was all of the Secretary of State's -- the
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corporations, the licensing board, all of those business
systems. You know, they were all present in those facilities.
    THE COURT: And so just to clarify -- and then you
can -- later on, plaintiffs' counsel can address the
cross-examination issues you have. And maybe I'm touching on
them, and maybe I'm not. I'm just trying to understand what
you did.
    You said you didn't deal with the voting system, so
you dealt with all the business systems --
    THE WITNESS: Right.
    THE COURT: -- but not the voting systems?
    THE WITNESS: Well, the one voting system that was
considered a business system that was within my scope was the
voter registration system.
    THE COURT: Was the voter registration system?
    THE WITNESS: Right. And then they asked me to
physically look at the Marietta location and do a mini
assessment of that.
    THE COURT: At the Marietta location for the voter
    registration system, or for what?
    THE WITNESS: That is where the ballot system was --
    THE COURT: The ballot system.
    THE WITNESS: -- physically. That is where the
off-net servers were.
    THE COURT: So that was separate from the voter
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registration system --
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    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    THE COURT: -- your review of that?
    And that was around 2017 also?
            THE WITNESS: Yeah. I'm sorry. I'm not good with
    dates. But it has been a minute. Sorry.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. TYSON:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, did you have familiarity with the off-net
system at the Marietta location following the transition to
Dominion ballot-marking devices in 2020, 2021?
A. I don't know if it had already been moved over to that platform or not. I remember archiving, you know, all hard drives, shrink-wrapping them, that kind of thing to preserve them. So that may have been the change that went around at that time.
Q. Let's talk about the voter registration system. You said that was within your scope of work.

Did you say that was within your scope of work for the Secretary's office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which vendor hosted the voter registration system?
A. PCC. I'm not entirely sure what those initials mean, but --
Q. Do you recall if Fortalice found vulnerabilities with PCC

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and the voter registration system?
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A. I do.
Q. And did they?
A. We -- yes. We definitely underlined some things, some deficiencies that they needed to address, and part of the issue was, is their -- they weren't as excited about it as we were. We wanted to get them turned around in a big hurry, and I think that was really the antithesis of making the change to another vendor, taking that in-house because we kind of got tired of having to worry about it. It is something we could have done.
Q. Did you recommend replacing PCC as the vendor for the voter registration system?
A. I did.
Q. And did the Secretary's office accept your recommendation on that point?
A. I'm not sure what went into the actual decision. I'm sure it just was -- added fuel to the fire.
Q. Do you know if the Secretary's office had transitioned away from PCC by the time you concluded your time there?
A. Yes. That was -- they were on their way out because they were the service provider. They were reduced to just the developer. And then they had something go on within their corporation that split off into factions or whatever that made things difficult, and I think that was about the time that the staff there kind of had it. And we made arrangements to
rearrange the server farms, move the servers to what we thought
was a better environment through QTS instead of zColo, which is
here in Atlanta.
So we moved them to two different facilities, so -- and
that was part of the uplift of the underpinning hardware.
There was a lot of things changing at the same time.
Q. And those movements of the server were part of the process
to address vulnerabilities in the voter registration system?
A. It certainly helped; right. Yep.
Q. Do you recall an incident while you were serving with the
Secretary's office involving a laptop from Fulton County?
A. I do.
Q. And do you recall -- can you tell the court what that situation was?
A. I received a call from one of the investigators -- I can't recall who exactly it was -- for the secretary of state and said, hey, we've got this laptop in Fulton County, and the user said that they believed that the mouse was moving without their input and kind of freaked out and shut down the notebook. What do we do?

I said, box it up, wrap it up, take control of it, and we'll send it to Fortalice and let them do a forensic analysis.
Q. Do you recall what the result of that analysis was?
A. Yes. It did come back to us. It took two or three weeks, but it did come back to us that there were no issues found.

They didn't find any remnants of any malware or anything else. Indicators of compromise is what it is referred to.
Q. Mr. Hamilton, I believe you said earlier, did you address the security of the Dominion voting equipment itself during your time with the Secretary's office?
A. No, sir.
Q. Which entity was responsible for the security of the Dominion equipment?
A. The vendor.
Q. In your experience, is it normal to rely on a vendor for security of a particular system?
A. They are primarily responsible for the security. It is their code line. But yes, it is not unusual.
Q. Mr. Hamilton, what was your personal assessment of cybersecurity in the Secretary's office at the time you left?
A. I believe I left it better than $I$ found it, but then again, the next person in line would say the same thing. That is what we're supposed to do.

You know, it wasn't bad by any means. I mean, everybody at the Secretary of State was very interested in making things secure and accessible. You know, they did a great job. And frankly, the folks that were identified that weren't pulling their weight didn't last long. You know, Merritt and team weeded those out pretty -- so for the smaller teams that we had, they were pretty dedicated. A lot of late nights, a lot

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of overnights. You know, that was -- they were in for the long
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haul.
Q. Are you proud of the work you did with the Secretary's office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Hamilton, are you a Georgia voter?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you vote on the Dominion ballot-marking devices?
A. I do.
Q. Do you have any concerns about election results in Georgia?
A. No.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, if I could consult briefly, I think that's all the questions I have.

THE COURT: Okay.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
MR. TYSON: Mr. Hamilton, thank you. I know you've
had to make several trips down here. I appreciate your time.

THE WITNESS: I appreciate the flexibility of my
schedule at the hospital.
MR. TYSON: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Thanks very much.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Hamilton. I'm Mary Kaiser. I

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represent the plaintiffs. It is nice to see you in person. I
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think we met over Zoom.
A. In person. That's awesome. Thank you.
Q. I think -- believe the judge asked you if you worked full time as the CISO for the Secretary of State.

Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you, sir?
A. It was a contract, so actually not a direct employee. I was a consultant that was hired under contract with a specific statement of work. The statement of works -- actually, there were four -- as I remember, there were four different ones as we went along that changed scope a little bit as we progressed.

Once they decided to release the other information security officer, what $I$ thought was we were going to go ahead and go to market, hire a new one. That is usually my mantra when I engage with customers is I teach them how to fish, teach them how to be more resilient.

I don't want to make a career out of it because I've got a real job, but $I$ want to imbue that knowledge to them so they can be better, so --
Q. And I believe you spent approximately half your time working on security issues for the Georgia Secretary of State's office during your tenure; is that right?
A. All total if -- it was probably more than half if you look

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back at the actual time sheets.
Q. Do you recall being deposed in this matter, Mr. Hamilton?
A. I do.
Q. And you were under oath?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Do you recall being asked the following question:
And so from roughly summer of 2018 --
    MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I'll object here.
If Ms. Kaiser is attempting to refresh Mr. Hamilton's
recollection, I think she can do that with the deposition. I
don't think this is proper impeachment for her to read the
question and the answer to him.
    MS. KAISER: That is exactly how impeachment works,
Your Honor. I'm happy to put a copy of it in front of him, but
I'm not refreshing his recollection.
    THE COURT: Well, you can put a copy in front of him,
but just ask him whether he -- this is what his testimony was.
    THE WITNESS: That would be great. I appreciate it.
Thank you.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. I'm on Page 25, Mr. Hamilton, starting with Line 19.
A. 25. Got it.
Q. You were asked, question: And so from roughly summer of
2 0 1 8 \text { until June of 2021, you spent approximately half your time}
working on security issues for the Georgia Secretary of State's
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Office; is that correct?
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A. Yes.
Q. Answer: Yes, ma'am.
A. Yes.
Q. Did $I$ read that correctly?
A. You did.

THE COURT: So you actually came in 2018 and not 2017?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I guess it was off. Yeah,
that's a little bit -- but half time, approximately, yeah.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. You recommended to the Secretary of State's office that they should have a full-time CISO; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. But they did not do that?
A. Not -- I don't know what happened after I left. But not while I was there. They decided to use me, you know, as a consultant during that time. I think it was a comfort. That was it.

I think they probably went to market. And I don't know if they could have hit the mark as far as a salary requirement. At that time CISOs were kind of in demand, so it might have just been a problem of trying to find it for that rate.
Q. Mr. Hamilton, I don't want you to speculate.

Do you have any personal knowledge of the secretary of State's office trying to hire a full-time CISO?
A. Well, they engaged an outside firm. It was the same firm that we used for network engineers and system engineers. I don't recall the name of it. Somebody here local in Atlanta, I'm sure that is who they engaged. It was kind of their in-house go-to person for finding employees.
Q. Okay. But at the time that you left the Secretary of State's office, the arrangement for the CISO position was still fractional arrangement; is that right?
A. Correct. Yeah.
Q. But you thought that it would have been better for the Secretary of State's office to have a full-time CISO; correct?
A. I believe that they were -- they were at the apex of having a mature enough security program that warranted it. But yeah, in fact, on my, you know, way out the door, they were trying to figure out a way to make it so $I$ could stay full-time. The only reason $I$ left TrustPoint is they were acquired by a company, and the company that acquired them, the health benefits changed so much, it affected my spouse.

So I kind of was in a hard place. I had to go to someplace that had the benefits that supported her. She has a disability. So I kind of chased a job that had that. Shepherd, of course, dealing in brain injury, obviously a good place to go for insurance. So that is where I ended up.
Q. I'm glad to hear that, sir, for you and your wife. You reported to the CIO, Merritt Beaver; is that right?
A. I did.
Q. In your experience working with Mr. Beaver for several years, did you form a view on whether he shared your level of expertise when it comes to information security?
A. No. I was much more of a specialist, you know, as far as information security. I think Merritt was a great generalist, and he understood -- I mean, we could have an intelligent conversation about things. He understood risk and mitigation and how risk treatments work within it, and frankly was very supportive of things I came up with. And I don't ever remember anybody on the staff just out and out telling me, no, we're not going to do that.

You know, there was always a timing or a budget constraint. But yeah, they were very supportive of it, so -THE COURT: I think the question was not whether he was supportive but what his knowledge level was. THE WITNESS: Yeah. He was not a specialist. He was more of a generalist, as a CIO should be. BY MS. KAISER:
Q. And I just wanted to discuss the scope of your responsibilities, you know, just to clarify, Mr. Hamilton.

Georgia's voting equipment fell outside the scope of your work for the Secretary of State's office; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. The security of Georgia's voting equipment fell outside the scope of your work?
A. Correct.
Q. And the counties did not report to you regarding election security; correct?
A. No.
Q. And your role did not have anything to do with the tabulation of votes or the voting machines themselves; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. All of that was handled by the vendor Dominion; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. You have never examined Georgia's ballot-marking devices, sir?
A. No. I mean, other than being a voter, not from a technical standpoint.
Q. At the time you were deposed in January of 2022, you had never been inside the election center; is that right?
A. Is that the Marietta facility?
Q. I'm asking you what your testimony was during your deposition, sir. We can take a look at it if that would be helpful.
A. I don't know what they referred to as the -- if it is Marietta, I definitely went there, or Macon, I definitely went

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there. There was a facility that was used as kind of the nerve
center during elections. I wasn't able to go there. That
wasn't our premise, so --
Q. Okay. If you could, please look at Page 108 of your
deposition, sir.
A. 108?
Q. 108.
A. Okay.
Q. Starting at Line 8, you were asked, what is the election
center?
    Answer: --
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    MR. TYSON: Your Honor, again, objection. I don't
    think we can just read his answer into the record. He's -- he
can look and see if it refreshes his recollection and go from
there, but if we are going to impeach him, we need to ask the
exact question and get the answer.
MS. KAISER: I just asked the question, Your Honor.
I referred him to the deposition transcript because that is
what Your Honor asked me to do.
THE COURT: Just ask him the question.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that kind of mirrors what I was
just saying. If they are talking about the war room thing, I
had never been there, but $I$ have been to the Marietta facility.
That is where Michael Barnes works, for instance. I have been
there.

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. What is the terminology that you would use for that location, the Marietta center, sir?
A. Marietta. Just like we call Macon, Macon. Physical sites.
Q. You wouldn't call that Center for Election Services or the election center?
A. I don't know what other people do, but I didn't.

THE COURT: So is this where a server data center --
are these server -- data centers or not?
THE WITNESS: The servers that are directly connected
to that off-net system are located there, but all of the other systems are in hardened data centers elsewhere. Started off when $I$ first got there, it was Atlanta and Dallas, Texas, and then as we moved off that, we went to a different provider. We moved them to a different facility here in Atlanta and Ashburn, Virginia, through a different provider called QTS. Quality Technical Services, I think, is what the acronym is. BY MS. KAISER:
Q. At the time that you were asked what is the election center during your deposition, you did not ask for clarification; right, sir?
A. Maybe not. It has been a minute.
Q. Okay. So you --
A. Maybe I've assumed that that is what they were talking
about.
Q. Okay. At the time you were deposed in January of 2022, you could not speak to where the server for the new BMD election system was hosted; is that right?
A. Which page is that on? I'm sorry.
Q. I'm asking you if you recall.
A. Oh, I mean, I -- the ballot-marking and the ballot development is all done in Marietta.
Q. You said during your deposition, do you recall -- do you recall, sir, telling us during your deposition, when it came to elections, you could only speak to the registration side?
A. Yeah, and that was mostly from the statement of work, but

I think that extended out as $I$ was there because they asked me to do physical reviews of the -- because it wasn't -- you know, there was business systems people that existed at those facilities, so I needed to be able to go there and see what was being used because the off-net system, it is an A and B; right?

So there is off-net system in that facility. There is also the business system that is connected to the Secretary of State's network. So it is kind of duplicative. There are two systems overlaying, totally separate physically, but the same people use them, so --
Q. When you were asked during your deposition, sir, about the scope of your responsibilities with respect to elections, that is not something you disclosed, is it?

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A. I can't recall.
THE COURT: What is the off-net system that you
reference?
THE WITNESS: The off-net system is the ballot
development. It is where Michael Barnes' group develops the
ballots and constructs all of those, and that is the one that
is not connected to the internet.
    THE COURT: Or not supposed to be.
    THE WITNESS: Yeah, we hardened that and made some
changes to it that made it a little more crisp, but --
    THE COURT: When did you do that?
    THE WITNESS: It was probably during my second
statement of work. It wasn't during that first 90 days because
really that was really focused on James and kind of coaching
that part of the business up.
    After the assessments, we created a thing called a
risk register which is a standard document that is used within
information security that allows you to kind of rate risks
across the enterprise. And the physical sites are on there
about, you know, we have to go to them and see how they --
simple things like physical controls. Like are the doors
locked? Do they have cameras? Do they -- you know, the
technical controls, you know, what is available as firewalls?
    All the different things that go into a security
program. So yeah, I definitely went to Marietta to validate
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that. One of the changes that was made to that BMD system was the timing -- every computer in the world needs to know what time it is.

THE COURT: Okay. I think you're veering off what the question was, and I'm sorry if I had any responsibility for that.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. That's fine. Just trying to help.

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. And I just want to clarify, Mr. Hamilton, the visit that you are talking about to the Marietta center, was that a single visit?
A. No. I went multiple times.
Q. And when did you go visit the Marietta center?
A. Over the period of my engagement with Secretary of State, probably half a dozen times.
Q. And you didn't think that was relevant to disclose during your deposition, sir, when you were asked about -- when you were asked about servers that hosted the elections, that was not something you cared to disclose?
A. No. I didn't mean to omit it at all. It was a Secretary of State site, and $I$ went to that one and the one in Macon. We talked about that, so --
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that either -- any of these visits occurred after the transition from the old

DRE-based voting system to the new BMD-based voting system?
A. Yeah, I think probably because $I$ was there for so long. Probably, yeah.
Q. During your deposition when you were asked about the election management system, do you recall saying that that was something that we should ask Michael Barnes about?
A. Because he was the leader of that site, sure.
Q. Do you recall that your attorney objected that you lacked foundation to ask -- to answer questions about the election management system?
A. Well, $I$ don't know the internals of it; $I$ only know the systems it runs on, the hardware.

THE COURT: You only know what?
THE WITNESS: The hardware, the underpinnings, the infrastructure.

About the individual application that runs on it, I really don't have much knowledge about that. That would be a Michael Barnes question.

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Mr. Barnes [sic], would it refresh your recollection to look at your deposition testimony on this topic?
A. Sure. Where --
Q. If you could look at Page 108, Line 17.
A. Okay.
Q. To Line -- to Page 109, Line 1.
A. Right. QTS. Right. I remember.
Q. Does that refresh your recollection, sir, that you could not speak to where the servers for the BMD election system was hosted as of January 20, 2022?
A. I don't know. I mean, I -- obviously, I knew where Marietta was. I was there.
Q. But you chose not to provide that answer during your deposition, sir?

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, I'll just object. I'm
looking at the question. It is referencing the election
management system.

THE WITNESS: Yeah.
MR. TYSON: It has a particular meaning in this
context.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Again, you did not ask for clarification when asked this question; is that right?
A. I guess I didn't, no. I should have.
Q. Or you understood what we were asking you, sir.
A. Was that a question? I'm sorry.

I missed -- what was the last --
THE COURT: All I -- I think, just trying to clarify
the scope of your working knowledge, I guess the question
really is, for me at least, at the bottom of Page 108 you say -- in response to question, okay. What is -- the question

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was: What server is the election management system for the new
BMD election system? Where is that currently hosted?
    And you said, yeah, I can only -- I can only speak to
the stuff for the election side of the house for the
registration side, and those are housed in -- here in Atlanta.
    THE WITNESS: I got you. Right.
    THE COURT: I think that is what --
    THE WITNESS: Not the ballot-marking, but actual
registration; correct.
    THE COURT: Yes. And you said that was the only
thing you could actually speak to, so I guess that is what the
question is, as to what -- was that really the area you focused
on, not the election management system?
    THE WITNESS: Correct. I did focus primarily on the
registration system.
    THE COURT: Okay. And that was the older system.
    What is it called? I'm sorry.
    THE WITNESS: The PCC developed?
    THE COURT: The PCC system that you were focused on;
is that right?
    THE WITNESS: Right.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, I believe you testified that you would view
security as a journey; is that right?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
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Q. And you would agree that threat landscapes -- the threat landscape changes every day?
A. Every hour, yep.
Q. And just to be clear, you left the Secretary of State's office in May of 2021 or June of 2021?
A. Yes.
Q. Over two and a half years ago?
A. It has been a while; right.
Q. And so you cannot speak to the security of any part of Georgia's election system today, can you, sir?
A. I wouldn't -- yeah, I wouldn't try to guess.
Q. I believe you testified about some recommendations that you made to the Secretary of State's office.

Do you recall that in terms of security?
A. Sure.
Q. It was common practice for the Center for Election Securities [sic] to share data with the counties in Georgia via USB; is that right?
A. Correct.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'll object in terms of scope
of direct. We didn't ask about any transmission of data to counties from State.

MS. KAISER: Your Honor, they asked Mr. Hamilton
about recommendations that he made as CISO, and this is -- I will proffer something that he recommended and it was not
adopted, and we think that is responsive and within the scope of his direct examination.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I don't remember
exactly, but assuming that you heard him ask about his
recommendations, then $I$ have no reason to disbelieve you as to
that. You can ask the question.
MS. KAISER: Thank you.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, the Center for Election Services would FedEx
a USB drive to counties with election data; is that right?
A. For the ballot, $I$ believe, yes, $I$ think that is true.
Q. And counties would mark up changes to the election files, save them to USBs, and mail the USBs back to the Secretary of State's office; right?
A. Sounds correct.
Q. But you thought that the Secretary of state needed a more secure managed solution for USB drives; correct?
A. I did.
Q. The Secretary of State was using commodity-based USB drives; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And your view was that was not a best practice, from a security perspective, because the commodity $U S B$ could have all kinds of things on it that you wouldn't know about; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And so you recommended that the Secretary of State implement a more -- a managed USB solution; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Specifically from a vendor called DataLocker; is that right?
A. Correct. I gave them two options, but DataLocker was one. MS. KAISER: May I approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes.

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. If you could, please turn to Tab 5 in the binder, Mr. Hamilton.
A. Okay.
Q. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36.

Do you see that?
A. I guess I didn't go far enough.

THE COURT: It says 299 or 07.
THE WITNESS: It is Exhibit 7 under Tab 5. Sorry.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. I'm sorry. It is Tab 3 in your version. Apologies. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36.

MS. KAISER: This is already in evidence, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: Yep. I recall this email.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. This is an email that you sent to Michael Smith at
DataLocker around -- on July 1st 2020?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. And you were CISO at the Secretary of State's office at this time?
A. Right.
Q. Under Item 1 you wrote, we have a group in the election center that uses consumer-grade USB flash drives and software encryption to move data regarding ballots and poll information (not votes) to and from the 159 counties in Georgia.

Do you see that?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. That is referring to the practice that you just explained of the Secretary of State sending data to the counties by mailing them consumer-grade USB drives; is that right?
A. With encryption; right.
Q. And you wrote, I would like to create a program for them to be able to use fully encrypted drives that are able to be tracked.

Do you see that?
A. Correct.
Q. To your knowledge, at the time you left the Secretary of State in 2021, that recommendation had not been implemented; correct?
A. Not by the time I left.
Q. Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Tyson asked you some questions about a

Fulton County laptop.
Do you recall that?
A. Yes, ma'am.

MS. KAISER: Tony, could you please pull up
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 294.

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Do you recognize this document, sir?
A. If he could page forward.

I don't know if $I$-- yeah, I think so. Yep.
Q. What is this document?
A. That is the review of the laptop that we sent.
Q. And this is a review by Fortalice; is that right?
A. Correct. They were our contracted people to do that kind of forensic work.
Q. And do you recall reviewing this report?

MS. KAISER: Your Honor, we would move for admission of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 294.

COURT REPORTER: I didn't hear an answer.

THE WITNESS: I did. I'm sorry.

Yes.

MR. TYSON: No objection, Your Honor, to the
admission of the exhibit.

THE COURT: Okay. It is admitted.

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, if you could turn to the second page of text
in this, and it has got a chart at the top with three rows. Do you see that?
A. Okay.
Q. The third row, it is under area of focus. It says malware review.

Do you see that?
A. Correct.
Q. And under the description it says, scanned forensic image for signs of malware with multiple malware detection agents.

Do you see that?
A. Correct.
Q. And the finding is no malware observed?
A. Correct.
Q. So it is your understanding that Fortalice tested this laptop for malware; is that right?
A. Well, as part of the forensic review, they snapshot the hard drive of the unit and then work on that. They don't work on the original, so they did the forensic review of a copy.
Q. And that is the capability that Fortalice had, to review for malware?
A. Absolutely, yeah. That is a normal process. That is to preserve the original, so if they have to do any destructive testing, it doesn't mess with the original.
Q. Just bear with me one moment, Mr. Hamilton.
A. No problem.
Q. As CISO at the Secretary of State's office, did you undertake any threat modeling, sir?
A. We engaged an outside firm for some threat modeling, Fortalice.
Q. Fortalice did that for you?
A. Well, we use a bunch of different inputs; right? The ISAC for the election center, Homeland Security, FBI, the vulnerability list. There is a bunch of different inputs that go into threat modeling, and that is how we come up with a qualitative and a quantitative look at risks. And that way, we can gauge it correctly and prioritize things that we think would have impact or, you know, for that individual organization, that is how we tailor the program based on the risk profile.

You know, Secretary of State was a low-risk candidate. They didn't want to put up with a lot of risk, but at the same time, they didn't want to get in the way of the average voter, so there was kind of a balancing act there.
Q. Did Fortalice ever provide you any written reports about threat modeling?
A. I don't recall if they were written. I know we had tons of conversations on the phone.
Q. What threats did you consider important to the Secretary of State's office?
A. Malware, ransomware probably was the most prevalent. I
was concerned -- you know, there really was a shift in that it used to be that information security programs were put together to kind of protect the castle; right? That has kind of moved now, to the castle is okay, but we also need a way to get back if something bad happens.

So that is why we, you know, came up with the incident response plan, that we had a way to get back to where we were. It is kind of a shift of thought over time. Just we evolved based on the threats, so --
Q. Mr. Hamilton, I'm going to ask you, could you please turn to Tab 10 in your binder.
A. This one. Okay.
Q. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 127.
A. Got you.
Q. I'll give you a moment to review that.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you recognize this document, sir?
A. Not directly, but you have it, so yeah, it exists.
Q. Is this something that you think you would have reviewed as the CISO?
A. Yes, I would think so. I just don't recall this specific document.
Q. You don't recall if you requested this document from Fortalice?
A. No. It might have been something that was just
downloaded. It looks kind of like a boilerplate.
Q. Do you recall downloading it?
A. Not specifically, no. It has been a minute.
Q. Okay. But this looks like a report from Fortalice, much like many of the other reports that you reviewed from Fortalice?
A. Not really a report. This is basically the instruction of how to gather evidence. You know, it is for folks on our end of the pipe to be able to gather what they need to do forensic analysis.
Q. And that is the type of information that you would routinely get from Fortalice as a CISO; is that right?
A. In the same way that $I$ was brought on to help kind of coach James, I mean, Fortalice did the same thing with our group. So yep, best practices.

MS. KAISER: Your Honor, we would move to admit Plaintiffs' Exhibit 127.

MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, we would just object on the basis of relevance and authentication here. Mr. Hamilton has testified he doesn't remember seeing this document, he doesn't remember requesting this document. He is only assuming that he would have seen it in the scope of his work.

In addition, the only Fortalice vulnerability discussions we had during direct involved the voter registration system and the Fulton laptops. We also think this
would be beyond the scope of direct, and further that it would be hearsay as to what Fortalice said if it is coming in for the truth.

MS. KAISER: Your Honor, the only objection that defendants asserted to this document in the PPO was a relevance objection for 403, so I believe their hearsay and authentication objections are waived.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'm looking at the pretrial order. We objected on the relevance 403 and confidentiality. The authentication objection only arises when the witness is not able to authenticate it.

THE COURT: Could I see the document?
MS. KAISER: Yes, Your Honor. It is at Tab 10 in the binder, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KAISER: And, Your Honor, I would just point out that in the PPO, defendants raised authentication objections to many documents; they did not with respect to this document.

THE COURT: Do you agree as to that statement?
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I confess I don't have an encyclopedic recollection of all of our -- I don't see an authentication objection as to this exhibit, but again, the witness has testified he doesn't know where this came from. It is not a Secretary document. It was produced by Fortalice. There is no one from Fortalice here to authenticate it. I

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don't think we have a basis. Some of these things only arise
as the party offers a document, including with hearsay.
    MS. KAISER: And, Your Honor, we know that Fortalice
produced documents in the course of litigation at the direction
of the Secretary of State and the Court. He has testified that
he recognizes this as the kind of document that Fortalice would
have provided, and he believes that Fortalice did, so I really
don't think there is any real authentication issue here.
    THE COURT: All right. Have you had -- if you would
just -- review the document so that we can understand really
whether you're familiar with it at all in the context of it
since you were providing instruction to leadership and staff
regarding --
    THE WITNESS: Yeah, it certainly looks like --
    THE COURT: -- USB drives and how to track malware,
et cetera.
    THE WITNESS: Right. It does look like a document
        that they would have provided us as part of a playbook. You
        know, we conversed with Fortalice a lot when we came to
        policies and things like that, what should be, what is best
        practice.
            So I am sure this might have been part of the
        playbooks that were given to us. I just don't specifically
        remember this single document. But it is written as a very
        instructional, here is how to do this for us, kind of thing.
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    So not reflective of anything specific to the
Secretary of State, but it is just how to do process X. That
seems like a playbook item to me.
THE COURT: And when you say playbook, what do you
mean exactly?
    THE WITNESS: So an engagement with anybody in
information security, they usually have preformatted
boilerplate type playbooks that they instead of, you know,
coming up and writing it specifically for the customer, they
just say, well, here is how we engage, and here is what we
expect. When you send us a request for X, here is what we will
need us to do.
    So we refer to those as playbooks, just the
engagement -- rules of engagement, for lack of a better term.
    THE COURT: So -- and that is why it gives
information on how to review and pull out --
    THE WITNESS: Yeah.
    THE COURT: -- information from the USB ports, memory
    images --
    THE WITNESS: Correct.
    THE COURT: -- look for malware, disc images?
    THE WITNESS: It is just what they would want if we
    came into a situation where we needed to corral that kind of
    information on their behalf.
    THE COURT: And you were still working for the
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Secretary of State February 26, 2021?
    THE WITNESS: Yeah. I left in May, I believe.
    THE COURT: And would this be the type of document
you would at least be -- look at, even if you don't recall it
now specifically, when it was provided by Fortalice?
    THE WITNESS: Sure. Probably as a book; right.
    MS. KAISER: And, Your Honor, I would just add that
under Federal Rule 901(b)(4) can authenticate with
circumstantial evidence, which I believe we have gotten from
the witness.
    THE COURT: It would appear to be so because besides
everything else, it was produced, I gather, by the State.
    Was it produced by the State, or was it produced by
Fortalice?
                            MS. KAISER: It was produced by Fortalice, Your
Honor.
    THE COURT: And did the subpoena request or the
request ask for all of the information produced to -- on behalf
of the defendants in this case?
    MS. KAISER: Yes, Your Honor.
    MR. CROSS: Unfortunately, poor Jenna and I are the
        only ones who have been on this case from the beginning, Your
        Honor.
            So the quick background -- we talked about this the
        other day. My memory is Your Honor ordered the State to have
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Fortalice produce documents, and that is how we got these
documents. That is my memory of it.
    THE COURT: Well, I'm sure --
    MR. CROSS: They came from Fortalice.
    THE COURT: -- it didn't say just produce generic
documents from any variety.
    MR. CROSS: Right. We had served a subpoena on
Fortalice, I think, for a deposition and a documents. There
was an objection over that, and you directed the State to have
Fortalice produce those documents on -- the position was those
documents were within the possession, custody, and control of
the State. And the State complied with that by some
communication, I assume with Fortalice, because Fortalice then
produced those documents.
    Part of that, as I remember, was there was also, I
think, a state secret issue which was raised, and they reviewed
some of them and had some privilege issues.
    But the short of it is, it came from Fortalice in
response to the response to a subpoena, but that was directed
to the State.
    And if I am misremembering, please somebody jump up.
Because there is a lot of water under the bridge.
    MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, I will just confess as
to standing here not remembering the specific circumstances
surrounding this. I think we still do have the relevance
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problem, though. This is -- Mr. Hamilton said it is a generic
document. It is for a Windows system. It is not for a voting
system or anything else. Again, we just stand on our
objections for that.
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THE COURT: All right. Well, I think it is relevant, but how significant it is, is a whole other question.

So I do recall once you reminded me of that whole chain of events having ordered that because you didn't want -the State didn't want to have to do that and deal with it, so this was a resolution. But $I$ think it has the indicia of reliability that they produced it as a document they made available to the Secretary of State's office for purposes of addressing security issues or assisting in the education of staff as to that, so -- and the witness has said it was typical of the type of documents that they would receive.

So I will admit it with that reservation.
MS. KAISER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I don't know, it may well be relevant
because it is dealing with how do you -- how do you look for various scripts and functions and check on things.

But that is just -- so it has limited value, but it has some value.

MS. KAISER: Thank you, Your Honor.

BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Mr. Hamilton, if you turn to the first full page of text,

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Page Number 3 at the bottom right-hand corner, middle of the
page, it says, this document outlines the various steps
necessary to properly acquire digital evidence related to an
incident.
    Do you see that?
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A. Yes.
Q. And I believe if you look back at the front page, this
document is dated February 26th; 2021; is that right?
A. Okay.
Q. To your knowledge, did the Secretary of State request
Fortalice's assistance in collecting digital evidence related
to a security incident in February 2021?
A. Not that I remember, no.
Q. You don't recall?
To your knowledge, did the Secretary of State ever request
Fortalice's assistance in collecting digital evidence related
to a security incident related to the voting system?
A. No, not related -- not that $I$ have had knowledge of, no.
Q. If you look back on Page 3, there is a heading that says
Triage Zip File.
Do you see that?
A. Triage Zip File; right.
Q. Yes. It states that Fortalice Solutions has created a
simple Windows batch script that extracts and aggregates key
evidence from Windows systems.


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is all about the red team, so let the experts do what they do
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best.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. You can get rid of that document
if you would like.
A. Okay.
Q. You testified that you are currently the information security officer for the Shepherd Center; correct?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And the Shepherd Center is a hospital that specializes in treatments for patients with spinal cord and brain injuries; is that right?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. If a federal agency recommended that your hospital take specific measures as soon as possible to mitigate serious security failings, would you work to implement those measures as soon as possible?
A. Of course.

MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I'll object on the basis of speculation and outside the scope of direct.

MS. KAISER: They asked him about his
responsibilities at the Shepherd Center, Your Honor. I think this is within the scope.

THE COURT: I'll let his answer be on the record, but I don't think you should go further.


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as anybody in information security, we make the recommendations
to the business and we tell them the risk profiles.
Q. Mr. Hamilton, I don't mean to interrupt you, but I think
you are straying pretty far afield from what the question was.
A. My apologies.
Q. You do not believe that it is appropriate to leave
significant vulnerabilities unmitigated when you are dealing
with critical infrastructure; right?
    MR. TYSON: And, Your Honor, I'll object. Asked and
answered. Mr. Hamilton answered the question and then was cut
off in his answer.
    THE COURT: Well, then if he was cut off, he can
provide the full answer again so that we have it in one place.
    MS. KAISER: Excuse me.
    Do you want me to ask the question?
    THE COURT: Did you hear the question?
    I mean, I think you are saying your objection is he
    was cut off before, so he should answer completely the -- and
    don't cut him off. All right?
    THE WITNESS: All I was trying to say is just that
    everything has to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Just
    because somebody else says there is a vulnerability, that
    doesn't make it true. It has to be weighed, so that is all.
    BY MS. KAISER:
    Q. Mr. Hamilton, do you recall being asked at your
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deposition, question: So you were not suggesting that it is
appropriate to leave significant vulnerabilities unmitigated
when you are dealing with critical infrastructure?
    There was an objection by your attorney.
    Answer: Not at all --
    MR. TYSON: Objection, Your Honor. We can't keep
impeaching him this way. If she needs to refresh his
recollection or impeach him, she needs to put the document in
front of him and let him see it.
    MS. KAISER: Impeachment and refreshing recollection
are two separate things, Your Honor. I'm happy to let him look
at the testimony.
    THE COURT: Right. Let him look at the testimony.
BY MS. KAISER:
Q. Can you please turn to Page 97, the binder with your
deposition, sir? Yes.
    Starting at Line 21 and going on to the next page, 98 at
Line 4, you were asked, question: So you were not suggesting
that it is appropriate to leave significant vulnerabilities
unmitigated when you are dealing with --
    Answer: Not at all.
A. Right.
Q. Question: -- critical infrastructure?
    There is an objection.
    And you answered, not at all; is that right?
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A. It is.
Q. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Hamilton, just one more question -- well, before I
consult with my colleagues.
I believe that you testified that it is standard practice to rely on an outside vendor for security -- for security of IT systems; is that right?
A. The applications, yes.
Q. In your role at the Shepherd hospital, do you rely on the outside vendor for the security of your IT systems?
A. We do.
Q. Thank you.

MS. KAISER: If you'll just give me one moment.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)

MS. KAISER: Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. I don't have
any further questions.
THE WITNESS: You're welcome.
MS. KAISER: Thank you for your time today.
THE WITNESS: You bet.
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, no further questions from us.
MR. TYSON: Your Honor, I have no further questions
for Mr. Hamilton as well.
Thank you for your time, Mr. Hamilton. THE WITNESS: You bet.

THE COURT: Is this witness excused, or might he be

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on recall at some other time?
    MR. TYSON: Not for our case, Your Honor.
    MS. KAISER: We don't anticipate recalling
Mr. Hamilton at this time, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: All right. Well, you're excused. It
sounds like they are not going to recall you, but I can't
promise you anything here.
    THE WITNESS: I totally understand.
    THE COURT: Because of that, please don't discuss
your testimony with anyone else -- all right?
    THE WITNESS: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: -- until this matter is concluded. Thank
you very much for coming and for your patience and waiting for
the moment of being called.
    THE WITNESS: You bet. Okay. I appreciate y'all's
flexibility with my schedule.
    THE COURT: Good work with Shepherd.
    THE WITNESS: Great place to work.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, our next witness we
will -- we plan to call Mr. Evans back up. We just need to
find him. I know his matter has concluded.
    He is right there? Okay.
    THE COURT: Do you want to take down -- if there is
material up here, why don't we remove it.
                            (There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
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THE COURT: Have a seat.

Tell me where we were at.
MR. BELINFANTE: Sure. Where we were at, I just
asked him about setting up BMDs on election day, and after conference with opposing counsel, we are going to move to enter into evidence the poll worker manual, so that would be the next thing I would do.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BELINFANTE: I'm happy to proceed when the

Court --

THE COURT: Go ahead. I'll send a note.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
Whereupon,
BLAKE EVANS,
after having been previously duly sworn, testified as
follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Director Evans, you have a document in front of you
entitled poll worker manual from May 2021.
Have you seen that document before?
A. I have.
Q. How do you recognize it?
A. It is the poll worker manual produced by the secretary of State's office, and we keep the document on Firefly, which is a
medium through which county election officials can access documents. And so I recognize it from there.
Q. Do you know if it is also publicly available through an internet search?
A. It might be, but $I$ know we've got an open records request for it before, and so --
Q. Does it appear to be -- and feel free to flip through it -- a true and accurate copy of the poll worker manual dated May 2021?
A. It does.

MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, at this point -- and we're working on getting stickers because I honestly thought we might have to use it as a demonstrative.

We will move to enter into evidence the poll worker manual as Defendants' Exhibit 1242. We will also have tomorrow hard copies available that are the Bates-labeled where this was produced in discovery at State Defendants' 00130421 [sic].

THE COURT: One, zero --
MR. BELINFANTE: Sorry. 100130421.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BELINFANTE: May I approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BELINFANTE: Sorry. I was just waiting. I don't
believe there was an objection. We had talked to opposing counsel. I was just wondering --

THE COURT: I assume that.
MR. BELINFANTE: -- the status, Your Honor.
MR. CROSS: Nothing from us.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. All right. Let's see where we were.

If you could go to Page 19 of the poll worker manual. I
had asked you some questions earlier about when the polling place opened. You said 6:00 A.M.

Is that reflected here on this document on Page 19?
A. So 6:00 A.M. would be the time poll managers and poll workers can arrive, and then from 6:00 to 7:00, they are preparing and that is open to the public. They are preparing to open the polls at 7:00.
Q. If you could go to Page 22 of the document. I know you testified a moment ago about opening the polls and Poll Pads, and I believe you testified as to about all of this.

But is this -- this is the information that is provided as part of the poll worker manual; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Let me ask this, and feel free to -- on the Poll Pads themselves, feel free to go to Page 71.

And my question is, what would happen if a Poll Pad does not encode a voter card? First off, do you know what that

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means, would not --
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A. Yes.
Q. What would that mean?
A. So when a voter checks in to vote, they present their ID. The poll worker can scan -- if it is a driver's license, scan the driver's license, pull the record up, make sure that it is the correct person based on the information presented. And then to check them in, the voter signs, and then once the voter is checked in, the Poll Pad will encode a voter access card that can be taken to the BMD to bring up a ballot on the screen.

So if the card encoder is not working, that means that that functionality is not -- that the card is not getting encoded, so there needs to be an alternative method to be able to give the ballot to the voter.
Q. And what is that alternative method in terms of how election superintendents are trained?
A. So there's a couple of alternative methods. One would be continue to check the voter in on the Poll Pad, and then the poll worker could manually, using a manual activation code, bring up a ballot, the voter's ballot on the ballot-marking device for the voter to be able to mark the ballot, print it out.

And then the second option is to use the emergency ballots that are available.
Q. All right. I think right before we broke for lunch, we had asked you about physically setting up the BMD and connecting it to the printer. In terms of -- that was the physical setup, as I recall.

How does one who is a poll worker or poll manager actually open the BMD so that it is turned on and ready for someone to vote?

You can look to Page 24 of the poll worker manual if that would help.
A. So once the poll worker hit the power button, the screen comes up. They are -- they can put in their poll worker card. Insert a poll worker card, insert a password, and then they are brought to an administrative screen. From the administrative screen, they can, number one, make sure that the count on the BMD at the beginning of the day is zero.

Number two, they can check the date and time to make sure that it is accurate. They can change it if they need to.

And then Number three, they can open the polls so that the machine is ready for voting.
Q. You talked about a poll worker card.

Who programs, if that is the right term, the poll worker card?
A. County election officials.
Q. You also said, check to make sure that the public counter is zero.

that if the counter was not at zero, they should notify their election director.

Here in B, it says, check that the counter is zero; if not, press the reset button.

Why would one press the reset button?
A. Yeah, you would press the reset button so that at the beginning of the day the count on it is zero.
Q. I see. Okay. And -- okay.

What happens now --
MR. CROSS: Could I just ask a question?
What page is this screen from?
MR. BELINFANTE: That screen is Page 24.

MR. CROSS: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you were on 23.
I'm sorry. Go ahead.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. All right. Let's -- if a -- I think we have already answered what happens if the BMD malfunctions.

What if the BMD, though -- we have talked about malfunctions, generally.

What if the BMD is not actually marking ballots?

So in other words, either a document doesn't come out. Let's start there.
A. So there is a form for the poll worker to complete that documents the issue and the particular BMD that is having the issue. But if it is not functioning in that way, then they
would still notify their county election superintendent, but it
would need to be taken out of service.
Q. Talking about the scanners, is a scanner what is referred
to sometimes as the ICP?
A. Yes. That is the ImageCast Precinct, or ICP for short.
Q. All right. Could we look at Page 25 of the poll worker manual.

Is this an accurate reflection of the scanner as it comes to a poll location?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Walk the Court through -- we're still at election day sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 A.M. They are opening the polls.

What is the procedure for opening the scanners?
A. So the scanners would be sealed in their case. Those seals will be verified, assuming they match. Then the seal is broken and the -- in this case, the lid will be taken off the scanner so that it reveals the scanner. When that occurs, there is going to be additional seals to be verified. Those seals are checked.

At that point, the poll worker can plug the machine in. When the machine is plugged in, the scanner begins to boot up, and it is going to get to a screen where it is going to ask for -- where it is going to ask for a security key. And the poll worker will be able to take their security key, put it on
a little spot on the scanner, and then they will be prompted to put in another password.

When that password is put in, at that point the -- this is also shown on Page 27 -- the poll worker will be asked if they want to print a zeros tape or a status report. The poll worker always prints the zero tape because what that will show that will document that at the beginning of the day the machine did not have any ballots run through it yet. They will print out that tape.

And then once they have done that, they will be taken to the screen where they can open the polls and so they can open the polls, and at that point, the machine is prepared for voting.
Q. Who creates the security keys?
A. The counties program the security key.
Q. They program them.

And where would one get a security key?
A. Dominion Voting Systems.
Q. All right. Are the security key -- is this process, just so I understand it to be clear, it is two steps? You need a security key and a password; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

THE COURT: All right. I didn't understand your
testimony, though, then.

Dominion makes the key?
THE WITNESS: The physical key, yes.
THE COURT: So -- but then you said it is created by the county's programming.

THE WITNESS: So as part of programming equipment, the county will take the physical key, the physical hardware, and then they will program the key for that election, so -- and then they will use that key for logic and accuracy testing and for the election.

THE COURT: And are we talking about physical key, or are we talking about a card?

THE WITNESS: It is a physical key, but it is really like -- it is like a little button. It presses against the metal -- a metal piece on the --

THE COURT: Because I'm looking at Item 2 in this picture, opening up the poll on the ICP. Please insert -- if you turn around -- you know what it looks like.

THE WITNESS: It is just like a little iButton.
THE COURT: iButton.
All right. And so you're telling me that the counties actually create the iButton, or they simply -- the security -- the election file information is somehow encrypted onto it?

THE WITNESS: Correct. So they program the key for that election.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.
But where do they put the key to get encrypted? Are they putting it -- the three-dimensional part of it is what is getting me --

THE WITNESS: Sure, sure, sure.

THE COURT: -- confusing me from what you are saying.

THE WITNESS: So when the county gets from the State the elections project and they are ready to begin testing their equipment, one of the first steps that they will do is they will create the technician cards --

THE COURT: Right.

THE WITNESS: -- and the poll worker cards and then also the iButton security keys. And so those keys and those cards get programmed at that point with the election-specific information so that they can be used on the equipment.

THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. And just to clear up for the record, is the security key a separate device or thing, I mean, like this clip?
A. It is separate from the cards in a completely separate piece of hardware.
Q. Is it separate from the scanner itself?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What happens if the scanner malfunctions?
A. The emergency procedure for that would be to use the
emergency backup compartment until the scanner can be put back into service.
Q. Let's go to Page 69 of the poll worker training manual.

Does this reflect the Secretary's advice in terms of backup procedures if the scanner is not scanning ballots?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. It references in the second full paragraph an emergency bin which is connected to the ballot box.

Can you explain what the emergency bin is?
A. Yes. So it is a separate compartment. It gets checked at the beginning of the day to make sure that it is completely empty and then closed back up and locked. And then in the event that it has to be used, it can be unlocked. There is a flap. And then voters have the option of depositing their ballot through the -- through the slot into the locked emergency bin.
Q. We talked earlier about a voter's experience, both in in-person early advanced voting and then on election day voting, and you mentioned that the voter gets a card.

After the voter uses the card, what happens to that card?
A. So the voter will take their ballot and the card to the scanner, and typically, there is a poll worker standing at the scanner who will remind them to review their ballot and who will take the poll worker card from them. And then that poll worker card will make its way back to the -- back to the table

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where the Poll Pads and the electronic pollbooks are.
    MR. CROSS: Your Honor, if I can -- as long as he is
testifying only to what is supposed to happen, I have no
objection. It sounds like he is testifying to what he thinks
actually happens, but he can't speak to what happens at any
given moment across 159 counties.
    But as long as it is the State's expectation, I have
no objection.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I think that is what the
purpose of the testimony is.
    THE COURT: All right.
    MR. BELINFANTE: If we could get a witness to testify
what happens in every situation, we would love to find them,
but we haven't found --
    THE COURT: But this is the -- this is the procedure,
that what you --
    MR. BELINFANTE: That's right.
        THE COURT: -- what he is anticipating the procedure
is as identified in this manual?
    MR. BELINFANTE: That's it.
        BY MR. BELINFANTE:
        Q. And so the card you talked about that comes back to the
        poll workers, what do they do with that card once it has been
        used by a voter?
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        A. So it will get put back into the stack to be used again.
    Q. All right.
A. And it can be encoded again and given to another voter to be taken back to the BMD.
Q. In your time as election director for the State of Georgia and deputy director for the State of Georgia prior to that, are you aware of any attempts to manipulate the BMD voting software on election day?
A. No.
Q. How about during the in-person early voting or advanced voting period?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of that happening in other states that also use electronic voting equipment where someone on election day tried to manipulate voting equipment?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. All right. We've gotten through polling opens, generally what happens during the polling day. Let's talk about what happens when polling locations close.

What time in Georgia do polling locations close on election day?
A. Typically, 7:00 P.M.
Q. Is there a uniform time for early advanced voting in person?
A. No. On the last day of advanced in person, they can close anywhere from 5:00 to 7:00 P.M.
Q. Are there procedures around end of election day and procedures with what to do with the Poll Pads themselves?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. BELINFANTE: Could we pull up Page 90 of the poll worker training manual.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Does this reflect what is expected in terms of closing the polls and the procedure with Poll Pads?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you could, just look at Pages 91 and 92 as well. Given what is in front of you, can you just summarize for the Court what the procedure is for closing the polls in the Poll Pad issues or Poll Pad procedure?
A. Sure. So as part of end-of-night reconciliation, the poll workers will record numbers from off the Poll Pad that indicate the number of voters that checked in that day, and then they will begin the process of disassembling and packing up and resealing -- recording the new seal numbers after that.
Q. How about the ballot-marking devices? Is there a process for what to do with them at the end of election day?
A. Yes.
Q. And could you summarize that process for the Court.
A. So the poll workers will go to each ballot-marking device. They will record on the touch screen recap sheet the number of
ballots that have been printed from each ballot-marking device on that touch screen recap sheet, and then once that has been done, they can insert their poll worker cards, put in their PIN, and they can then close the polls on the BMDs, and from there, shut down the BMDs. At that point the hardware, the BMD will get sealed up completely, put in a case, case sealed, seal numbers recorded, and prepared. At that point, everything is sealed.

THE COURT: Could I just ask you, you said after they have done the recap report, they use their card, their poll worker card; is that right?

THE WITNESS: So the -- poll worker card will go in
first, the PIN put in. At that point, the next screen will show the number of ballots that are printed, and that number gets written on the touch screen recap sheet.

THE COURT: Poll worker card number, again, is the number for the county at large so everyone has the same one?

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: And is that also so for the fob? The fob also has the same -- it has been imprinted.

It also has the county's same number; is that right?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Is there a process -- and is that process that you
described -- we're looking at Page 93 of the poll worker
manual -- is that what is reflected there?
I wanted to see if you could do it without looking at it,
but is that it on 93?
A. That is it.
Q. How about the process? Is there a process for putting
away or addressing the scanners at the close of election day?
A. Yes.
Q. And $I$ won't do that to you again.
MR. BELINFANTE: Could we go to Page 94 of the poll
worker manual.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Can you just summarize for the Court what that process is
for closing up the scanners at the end of an election day?
A. Sure. So the iButton will -- will get used again. The
password gets put in. The poll worker is presented with the
option to close the polls, and they will close the polls.
As part of that, they will print multiple copies of
results tapes, and they will use that results tape or the
information -- they will use the information on the results
tape to complete their ballot recap sheet to record how many
ballots were cast. And at that point, they can power down the
scanner, seal it up, and prepare it to come back to the
elections office.
Q. All right. What happens with the results tapes?
A. So one results tape will get posted on the door or window of the voting location, and then one will come back to the elections office.
Q. County election office?
A. Yes, county elections office.
Q. You talked about a couple of sheets before.

Are you familiar with a touch screen recap sheet?
A. Yes.
Q. What is a touch screen recap sheet?
A. So the touch screen recap sheet is used to report information from the ballot-marking devices, so it will list out each of the ballot-marking devices that have been deployed to a location, and then it will have a spot for the seal numbers that are put on the ballot-marking devices. That -the poll workers will use that touch screen recap sheet at the beginning of the morning to verify the seal numbers; then at the end of the night, they will use the touch screen recap sheet to record the new serial -- seal numbers that they put on.
Q. Go ahead. Sorry.
A. Well, the only other thing $I$ was going to mention is, as $I$ said a little earlier, that touch screen recap sheet will contain information about the ballots that were printed from the ballot-marking devices.
Q. Could we turn to Page 30 of the poll worker manual.

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            And looking at the bottom there, is that what you're
referring to as a touch screen recap sheet?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. There is one there, a scanner recap sheet.
            Are you familiar with those?
A. Yes.
Q. What is a scanner recap sheet?
A. So the scanner recap sheet will list the scanners that were deployed to a location. It will list the seals that were put on the piece of equipment to be deployed to the location. The poll workers will use that form to verify the seal numbers in the morning, and then for any seals they have to be put back on in the evening, they will use this sheet to record the seals there. They also use it to confirm that the opening count is zero and to write the closing count from the scanner.
Q. Okay. Is -- does the Secretary of State's office provide training to election superintendents on touch screen recap sheets and scanner recap sheets?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there an expectation regarding whether or how these will be used?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that expectation?
A. That they will be used, and that they will be -- that the election superintendents will train their poll workers on how
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to use them, train their warehouse staff on how to use them so
that the warehouse staff, if they are the ones that are
completing the first half of the report when they seal up the
equipment, that they do it properly, and the expectation is the
poll workers know how to use the form to put the information
that is needed on them during the day and the evening of
election day.
Q. All right. Are you familiar with a ballot recap sheet?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that?
A. A ballot recap sheet is used to reconcile that the number
of ballots or the number of voters that checked in -- it should
list the number of voters that checked in. It should also
record the number of ballots that were cast. It should record
the number of spoiled ballots that were there. And all that
information should be on the ballot recap sheet to be able to
reconcile at the end of the night that you have one ballot cast
for every voter that showed up. And if there's a discrepancy
there, it should be able to explain why on this sheet.
Q. And how about a Poll Pad recap sheet? Are you familiar
with those?
A. Yes.
Q. What are those?
A. Poll Pad recap sheet is used to record the seal numbers that are on the Poll Pad when it goes out. Also, the poll
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workers uses them to record the seal numbers in the evening. And the counts from the Poll Pad get put on there as well. There is also a spot on the Poll Pad --

THE COURT: It counts the people who checked in?
THE WITNESS: Correct. The counts of the people that
check in on the Poll Pad are recorded on the Poll Pad recap sheet.

The other thing that gets written on there is three times a day, poll workers record wait times.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. When the Secretary of State's -- or does the Secretary of State's office provide training on ballot recap sheets and Poll Pad recap sheets?
A. Yes.
Q. Who is to complete those forms at the close of election day?
A. At the close of election day, the poll workers complete the forms.
Q. All right. If we could pull up Page 31 of the poll worker manual.

Are these documents down here in the manual -- are these the ballot recap sheet and Poll Pad recap sheet that you were describing or examples of them, at least?
A. Yes. Those are correct.
Q. Just a few more.

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                    Are you familiar with what is known as a chain of custody
form?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What is the chain of custody form?
A. So the chain of custody form is used for memory cards and ballots, and it is used to record the seal numbers that are used along with who is transporting either the memory cards or the ballots and then the time that they are transporting those materials from the polls. And then when that information gets received at the elections office, that person should verify the seal numbers that were written on the chain of custody form with the information on the seal and record the time received and sign for it.
Q. And again, more for the record, when you say received at the election office, do you mean the county election office?
A. Correct, county elections office.
Q. Could we look at Page 33 of the poll worker manual.
There at the -- if you look in that chain of custody, that
middle area there, it says see SEB rule at the bottom.
I'm sure everyone in the room knows, but just for the record, what is an SEB rule?
A. It is a State Elections Board rule that they have passed.
Q. Okay. And is the document there at the bottom -- it looks
like on the right on Page 33. Is that the chain of custody
form or at least an example of one that you were describing?
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A. Yes.

MR. BELINFANTE: We can take this down.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. Starting to wrap up now, Director Evans.

Are you familiar with the term vote dilution?
A. Yes.
Q. What is vote dilution?

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, is this -- we're getting a
legal opinion or what is the purpose?
MR. BELINFANTE: The purpose is he will -- it speaks
to some of the elements that the plaintiffs have to
demonstrate. I'm happy to -- it will take two seconds.
But if we're talking about comparing hand-marked
paper ballots and electronic ballots, to the extent that there are illegal ballots that could come in, that speaks to vote dilution. I was just going to have him explain what the concept is, but I'm happy for the Court to take judicial notice of it as well.

MR. CROSS: We can see where it goes.
BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. What is vote dilution, Director Evans?
A. So vote dilution is essentially if you have unlawful or fraudulent ballots that are cast. They negate the ballot -- or negate lawful ballots that were cast.
Q. And vote dilution doesn't distinguish as a theory -- well,
it could happen if those unlawful or illegal ballots are cast
electronically and with a hand-marked paper ballot, or does it
require one or the other?
A. Can you repeat the question?
Q. Sure. Could vote dilution happen with an illegal vote
cast on a ballot-marking device?
We'll start there.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And could vote dilution happen with an illegal ballot cast with a hand-marked paper ballot?
A. Yes.

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THE COURT: Did you say legal or illegal?
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MR. BELINFANTE: Illegal. I'm sorry.

BY MR. BELINFANTE:
Q. An illegally submitted hand-marked paper ballot, could that result in a vote dilution?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. In your time in elections, do you have any personal knowledge of any vote being cast on an electronic marking -- or electronic ballot-marking device where a voter's vote was not counted as cast?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware in your experience in elections of cases where individuals were prosecuted for illegal conduct involving hand-marked paper ballots?
A. Generally, yes.
Q. Based on your experience with other entities, ERIC, we talked about the National Association -- is it your position that the State takes reasonable precautions to mitigate known risks involving electronic ballot-marking devices?
A. Yes.
Q. How about with hand-marked paper ballots?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you conduct your professional obligations in good faith?
A. Yes.
Q. You've administered elections in Florida using hand-marked paper ballots. You've been a director in Georgia where ballot-marking devices are used.

Do you have a preference as to which one for election administration?
A. So what $I$ would say is that they are both good systems. You've got colleagues that run -- of course, we run BMDs here. Similar in South Carolina. Other places, they run hand-marked paper. I did in Florida.

They are both good systems. They both have pros and cons. I think, you know, with a BMD system one of the harder aspects of it is the initial rollout where you're having to adjust the logistics of having additional pieces of equipment, like BMD, the printer, and the scanner.

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I think once you've -- once you've done that, I think for the voter experience, I prefer the BMD system, and I think, you know, from the purposes of the ballot, I prefer the BMD ballot because you don't have the -- as many mismarks, like we talked about earlier. And then \(I\) think, you know, once the ballot has been cast and to preserve the ballot, I think the BMD ballot is very obvious to tell what voter intent was.
MR. BELINFANTE: No more questions at this time,
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reserving for rebuttal.
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reserving for rebuttal.
Thank you, Director.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's take five minutes. I just -- I would like to take five minutes to stand up.
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
(A brief break was taken at 3:41 PM.)
MR. BELINFANTE: We have one housekeeping measure.
Michael Barnes was here. He has professional obligations that are time-sensitive, so we sent him back. We talked to at least -- Mr. Cross, it is coming up on 4:00. It may be close if it is 5:30 or not. We don't expect this witness to go tomorrow.
So we can have Mr. Barnes come back --
THE COURT: No, that is all right.
MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you.
THE COURT: That's all right.
MR. BELINFANTE: It may just be even half an hour

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
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early.
THE COURT: I'm sure some of you are tired.
I did have one -- before Mr. Cross begins, I just
want to circle back to make sure I ask the same question again
about these county passwords to make sure I haven't
misunderstood.
So the same county password is used, you indicated,
for the fob, for the poll worker password, and for the county
scanner password.
THE WITNESS: So each of those is countywide.
THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS: And Deputy Director Barnes will be able
to go into a lot more detail on those, but each of those is
countywide.
THE COURT: All right. So is it the same overall for
each of those, or is it, for instance, 123 for the county
scanner password and 125 for the poll worker password, or is it
always the same number? County -- if it is the county, it is
always the exact same number or configuration?
THE WITNESS: I would want to defer to Mr. Barnes to
confirm.
THE COURT: Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Evans.

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A. Good afternoon.
Q. I'm David Cross. I represent three of the plaintiffs in this case. I don't think you and I have met before. Let me start.

You talked a little bit about your experience in Florida dealing with hand-marked paper ballots.

Do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. And you're not suggesting in any way that the use of hand-marked paper ballots in Florida was in any way inappropriate?
A. No.
Q. Not suggesting that any election that occurred there was unreliable?
A. No.
Q. Not suggesting that any outcome there was wrongly decided?
A. No.
Q. And you're not suggesting that any voter who cast a hand-marked paper ballot in Florida did not have their vote counted; right? Or does this get into the mismarks?
A. It gets a little bit into the mismarks.
Q. And mismarks on a hand-marked paper ballot tend to be made by the voter.

Is that what you meant by mismark?
A. Yes.
Q. I believe you said in Florida, voters with disabilities who couldn't vote on a hand-marked paper ballot voted on equipment provided by ES\&S; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And sorry.

Remind me, what kind of device is that?
A. So when I was initially there, the first piece of equipment was the AutoMARK, and then by the time that I left, we had moved to the ExpressVote.
Q. And while you were there, you didn't object to anyone at the State that this was somehow inappropriate to make voters with disabilities vote on different equipment; right?
A. No.
Q. And you're not suggesting today that that is inappropriate; right?
A. No.
Q. And I believe you testified that the ES\&S machine was available to voters who requested it; is that right?
A. It was. If somebody requested it, we didn't ask any questions.
Q. They didn't have to demonstrate a disability, for example?
A. No.
Q. And fair to say very few voters in your experience in Florida requested that; right?
A. Correct.
Q. You testified at the end of your testimony that once a BMD system is rolled out, sort of the hard work has been done up front with rolling it out.

Did I get that right?
A. What I -- with adjusting to a ballot-marking device system, there are logistical things that you have to -- that you have to determine on the front end to make sure you're prepared to administer it. Things like, you know, the electrical current that it is going to pull. You know, how are you going to ship the equipment, being that it is a ballot-marking device, a printer, a backup battery supply?

So those kind of concerns are an extra dynamic that you have to take into consideration on the implementation, so that was my intent there.
Q. And we have walked through the poll worker manual that we'll come back to.

One of the things this does is explain the steps that the counties are supposed to take to set up an election using the BMDs; right?
A. Correct. It has suggested layouts and that kind of thing.
Q. Right. And right now in the current system, poll workers have to set up somewhere in the neighborhood of about 40,000 ballot-marking devices across the State?
A. It seems a little bit high. It is probably closer to 30,000 or so.
Q. \(30,000 \mathrm{BMDs}\), and then how many printers, roughly?
A. One printer per each.
Q. So 30,000 BMDs, 30,000 printers.

And when you were in Florida when the poll workers were setting up an election, they set up -- was it just one ES\&S machine at each polling site or how many?
A. It was one device, one ballot-marking device per voting location.
Q. And in Georgia today, you also have to have enough paper on hand to print a ballot for every single voter who votes; right?
A. You do.
Q. Okay. In Florida, instead of having to set up 30,000 BMDs and 30,000 printers, you just had to have enough paper ballots and pens for voters to vote by hand; right?
A. The preprinted paper ballots, the pens, and voting booths, yes.
Q. And since they are -- when the voter cast their -- strike that again.

In Florida when the voter was making their selections on a ballot, putting aside someone voting on the ES\&S machine, when the voter was voting on a paper ballot, there's no risk of their selections being manipulated in some way by a computer.

We're agreed on that; right?
A. The ballot gets scanned and read by a tabulator that looks
at the oval position in relation to the timing marks.
Q. And I'm not talking about the scanning.

The point at which the voter is making their selections on the ballot in Florida --
A. Sure.
Q. -- right, there is no computer that can alter what they are doing on the paper ballot; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And are you aware that when a voter is voting in Georgia that Dr. Halderman in this case has actually shown that a BMD can be manipulated to change votes using just a pen? Have you heard that before?
A. I am not aware of any demonstration -- I'm aware there may have been a demonstration. I have not seen that demonstration and how exactly he did that.
Q. Have you read Dr. Halderman's report produced in this case?
A. I have.
Q. And do you recall in his report, he walks through the steps of how a voter could vote in the voting booth with the secrecy of -- ballot secrecy that is required with all the screens and reboot a voting machine with just a pen?

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection, Your Honor. Outside the scope of direct in terms of Dr. Halderman's report.

MR. CROSS: They brought him in to talk at length
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about the security of the voting system. That was a huge topic
that he walked through.

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    MR. BELINFANTE: If that's okay, Your Honor, then we
can talk about CISA too.
    MR. CROSS: I'm not sure what that means.
    MR. BELINFANTE: That means if the door is open and
he is going to testify about Dr. Halderman, then he ought to be
able to testify about CISA.
    MR. CROSS: I'm not asking -- I thought we had
covered that.
    THE COURT: I thought we had too.
    MR. BELINFANTE: I thought we had, but we have a
conditional record as to at least some questions. And so if \(I\)
need to go back in while the witness is here and correct the --
    THE COURT: Well, I think I let you do those
questions. It was conditional, but then you decided how you
were -- what questions you were going to ask.
    And just to the extent the record needs
clarification, they are all fine. They didn't object to any of
them in the end, the ones that you actually asked.
    MR. BELINFANTE: All right. That works, Your Honor.
        Thank you.
    THE COURT: So I think in the limited way in the
        same -- you didn't go that deeply, but you asked questions
        about it, and some amount of questions without spending lots of
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time on this, Mr. Cross --

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                            MR. CROSS: I'm not going to spend a lot of time on
it.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you recall reading in the report that the BMD in
Georgia can be manipulated with a ballpoint pen?
A. I don't recall only a ballpoint pen being used to manipulate a BMD.
Q. Were you aware that a ballpoint pen can be used to reboot the BMD in the polling site?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you understand from reading the report that once you reboot it, all that is needed at that point is for the voter on the touch screen to get superuser access? Do you recall that?
A. All that is needed on the touch screen is to get superuser access?

I'm not sure \(I\) understand the question.
Q. Do you know what superuser access is in the Android operating system that is used on the BMD?
A. I am not fully aware of what all of that means.
Q. Suffice to say that as the state election director, you have not provided the court any mitigation measure that is meant to eliminate that risk for future elections; right, sir?
A. I would not agree with that.
Q. So you testified earlier to a mitigation measure that keeps someone from putting a ballpoint pen in the back of a machine and rebooting it?
A. I testified earlier about seals that poll workers have in place to make sure that the equipment is not tampered with.
Q. Do you know where the seals go?
A. The seals go on all four doors of the ballot-marking device.
Q. Do you know based on your read of Dr. Halderman's report, if a voter were to reboot the system, do you know where the pen goes to do that?
A. My understanding is he would get to the power button with the pen, but I have not seen that actual demonstration.
Q. So as you sit here as the state election director, are you aware that a voter can reboot the system without breaking any seals?

It goes through a hole in the back of the machine.
Were you aware of that before now?
A. I have heard that.
Q. So, again, we're agreed that seals are not going to mitigate this because the seals don't get broken.

Do you understand that?
A. I understand.
Q. Is there another mitigation measure you've provided to the Court today that would prevent just this one simple hack from
happening in a future election?
A. As far as somebody being able to reboot it, I'm not sure if I want to call a reboot in and of itself a hack, but \(I\) have not introduced a mitigation, I suppose, that would keep somebody from being able to use a pen to reboot the machine. Q. And as you sit here, you are just -- you don't have enough familiarity with what the voter can do once it is rebooted?
A. Correct.
Q. You talked about your work with CISA and how you worked with them on election security in the state.

Do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. One of the things CISA does is physical inspections of election sites in Georgia; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. Do they prepare reports of those inspections?
A. They do.
Q. Are those written reports that are provided to the state?
A. The counties -- the counties receive written reports following each inspection, and then we get a -- we will be getting a finalized election -- or executive summary report, but we don't get the county-specific reports.
Q. Is this an annual thing? How often is this?
A. So it was done once, I think, around the time the system was rolled out, if \(I\) remember correctly. But it was done the
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second time that I was more heavily involved with beginning

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around July, August of last year and went through the calendar
year. There may have been a small number of counties finished
in January.
Q. So when this has been done in the past, it sounds like once maybe around 2020 and then again in July, August of last year, there's some kind of -- is it like a summary report that the Secretary's office gets on CISA's findings?
A. I'm not sure what we got the first time around, but this time around, we have gotten a draft executive summary report, but it has not been finalized yet.
Q. And is the Secretary's office -- the county-level reports that are more specific, that is not important for the Secretary to understand what risks may be happening there?
A. It is very important, but those reports are specifically directed and targeted towards county election officials and the officials at the county level.
Q. And the Secretary does not ask for them?
A. We have not asked for those. The reason for that would be that we want counties to feel comfortable in speaking with Department of Homeland Security and GEMA when taking the survey.
Q. Is your concern that if the county officials were aware the Secretary's office would get the more granular report, the counties might be less forthcoming about deficiencies they have
when they are talking with CISA?
A. That is a consideration.
Q. You mentioned you spoke on a panel for -- or with CISA today; right? For a CISA conference or something?
A. Right. It was a Region 4 round table that they conducted; correct.
Q. I believe Mr. Belinfante pointed out that CISA invited you to speak on that panel; right?
A. A representative from CISA, yes.
Q. And you're familiar with the breaches that occurred in Georgia's voting system in Coffee County in January of 2021 ; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're not aware of any comparable breach of any electronic voting system in U.S. history; right, sir?
A. I'm aware that things have happened in other states. You know, as far as comparing that to the Coffee County incident, you know, \(I\) don't want to sit and do that necessarily.
Q. Can you point us to an example where a dozen or so individuals were able to get access to all of the voting equipment in a county elections office over the span of eight days? Can you point to us anything else that seems even close to that?

And they copied all the data and they put it on the internet.
A. Not necessarily. I know that, again, things have happened in other states, but as far as getting in and comparing those things to this, \(I\) don't necessarily want to do that.
Q. And you were the deputy state election director at the time; is that right?
A. At the time, yes.
Q. Fair to say you have pretty unique insight to offer folks at a CISA conference, for example, on how things can go sideways when physical security measures and others break down?
A. I have the insights that \(I\) have from local and state experience.
Q. You talked about sample ballots that are available at polling sites.

Do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. There are 159 counties in Georgia; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Roughly, how many polling sites are there?
A. It is around 2,400, so close to 2,500.
Q. And as you sit here, you don't actually know whether sample ballots are provided at each of these polling sites in any election; right?
A. Counties are required to. We have investigators that go and inspect, but we don't get to every single location.
Q. And fair to say that even if a sample ballot is provided
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at the polling site, the voter is not allowed to take that
sample ballot with him into the voting booth; right?

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A. Generally correct. There may be some counties that print out copies and stuff, but generally, there needs to be one on display.
Q. You also mentioned that voters could bring a sample ballot with them.

Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. You are aware that many voters in Georgia don't have access to printers; right?
A. Sure. Yes.
Q. In fact, there are some voters in Georgia that don't have internet access at all; right?

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. This is a case about the
standing of individuals, and \(I\) believe at least the only individual asked about the printer said he did have one. This isn't a class action.

MR. CROSS: It is directly responsive to the questions they asked. If he wants to withdraw the testimony -THE COURT: I'll allow it, for whatever it is worth. MR. CROSS: That was the only question I had. THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You also emphasized that absentee ballot is considered
no-excuse voting?
A. Correct.
Q. And that means that right now a voter can vote in Georgia absentee without having to provide a reason?
A. Correct.
Q. And do I understand correctly that the State Election Board has recommended eliminating that?
A. You would have to ask the State Elections Board.
Q. As the state election director, you don't know?
A. I have heard that they are looking -- or that at least a board member has mentioned that, but how heavily the chairman and entire board is looking at it, I don't know.
Q. You also talked about absentee voting as a way to avoid BMDs.

Did I understand that right?
A. I did not say that.
Q. In fact, absentee voting is not necessarily a way to avoid BMDs because oftentimes an absentee ballot will be duplicated on a BMD; right, sir?
A. There are some counties that will duplicate absentee ballots using BMDs.
Q. And there is no way -- that is not conveyed to the voter who voted by absentee; right?
A. No.
Q. What -- sorry.

What is the deadline by which early voting has to be done before election day?
A. Early voting ends the Friday before election day.
Q. So roughly four to five days before election day?
A. Yes. Four days before.
Q. And so anyone who is not available on election day and votes in early voting, whatever information might affect their vote between Friday and Tuesday is not available to them; right?
A. Do you mean like campaign information?
Q. Campaign information, Secretary of State.
A. Once they cast a ballot in the election, they cannot vote again.
Q. And same with absentee, someone who votes absentee in advance of election day, there is information that would not be available to them when they vote; right?
A. They will not be able to vote again.
Q. Do you have the demonstrative, the pie charts?
A. I do.
Q. The pie charts are only for Georgia; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Are you aware that there are only seven counties across the entire United States that require voters to vote in person on an ICX machine as Georgia does?
A. Can you repeat the question?
Q. Sure. Are you aware that there are only seven counties across the entire United States that require voters voting in person to vote on a Dominion ICX?
A. I was not aware of that.
Q. And the only other state I believe you mentioned that has a BMD at all as a primary form of voting is South Carolina; is that right?
A. I know they do. I don't know that they are -- I don't know that they are the only.
Q. So if the idea was for the Court to draw an inference on the preference of voters on how they vote, fair to say that a very small number of voters across the United States vote the way they do in Georgia; right?

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. I'm not sure the witness can testify to as to what inference the Court was supposed to draw in explaining a --

MR. CROSS: As long as we're agreed on that, I'll
withdraw it.
MR. BELINFANTE: Yeah, the data speaks for itself.
THE COURT: Well, you said you were not aware of -- I
just want to talk about -- I don't have the demonstrative in front of me right now, but you were at -- I just want to make sure that we're not talking apples and oranges when you -Mr. Cross, you were pointing to some information on the State's pie charts, and you asked, I think -- he answered something
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that he was not aware of the data. And I just -- if I don't --
I need to have it in front of me so I can understand the
question again.
MR. CROSS: Did you get a copy of this, Your Honor,
the pie chart?
THE COURT: I assume I did, but I don't have it here
right now.
MR. BELINFANTE: He can pull it up, if that helps.
MR. CROSS: Sure.
THE COURT: I think I looked at it this way. That's
all.
MR. CROSS: The questions that were asked earlier
seem to be emphasizing that the vast majority of Georgia voters
vote on either election day or in person, meaning they vote on
BMDs. And there seemed to be an inference that Mr. Belinfante
wanted the Court to draw from that.
So the only point I was making is if we're going to
look at how voters vote --
THE COURT: All right. Well, that's a good argument,
but that is -- I mean, if he doesn't know anything about it
that is --
MR. CROSS: Exactly.
THE COURT: -- that's all.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, just to clarify, my
objection is that the data speaks for itself. The witness

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doesn't -- the witness wasn't conveying anything other than
providing the data itself.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. BELINFANTE: We'll make legal arguments as to what it means.

THE COURT: I guess the question that flows from this is something different, which is what \(I\) think you were trying to get at.

But are you aware of any other state where there is such a high percentage of voters who are voting on electronic voting machines, or are you just not aware of the data?

THE WITNESS: I think the question was aware of other jurisdictions voting on this exact electronic voting machine. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Or a BMD as the primary form of voting; right? So it is -- South Carolina is one.

But it is ES\&S; right?
A. Sure. Correct.

THE COURT: And any other place besides Georgia and South Carolina, just based on your experience as somebody who has been involved in elections?

THE WITNESS: Sure. I think, you know, Louisiana has jurisdictions that do, and I would guess there are others, but I don't have them readily available.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Are you aware that the Republican party of Georgia as part of its platform has called for replacing all Dominion voting systems with secure hand-marked paper ballots?

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. Hearsay. Relevance.
MR. CROSS: Your Honor, again, the whole point of this pie chart was to suggest to the Court that voters across Georgia prefer to vote on a BMD. This is directly responsive. We have more direct evidence that they don't. And he is either aware of it or he is not. If we want to start getting --

THE COURT: I mean, the thing is, I understand what the point is, but I don't -- I don't know that -- you know, to cite something that the Republican party has done absent some sort of at least record of that, it seems like it is not proper.

So I'll allow you a very limited amount to be asking about this because it was -- the information was sought by defense counsel in the direct. But very limited. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And I'm just asking Mr. Blake if you're aware of that.
A. I'm aware.
Q. You talked about a software upgrade that you guys contemplated -- the Secretary contemplated installing, 5.13.

Do you see that -- or do you remember that?
A. I do.
Q. But, ultimately, the Secretary abandoned that with Dominion.

Did I understand that right?
A. The -- once we learned that Dominion was not going to move forward with the EAC certification with that software version, then we decided to not pursue piloting that software version. Q. And did \(I\) understand right that 5.13 was meant to mitigate vulnerabilities that had been identified in the current 5.5-A?
A. My understanding is that was going to be essentially Dominion's response to that, and then they decided not to push it through EAC certification.
Q. When you say response to that, do you mean the CISA advisory from June of 2022?
A. Yes. That's my understanding.
Q. And you talked about 5.17 as a new Dominion software, and you mentioned pilots of that.

Was that piloted in five counties?
A. Five counties, yes, sir.
Q. Three of those counties went quite poorly; right?
A. I wouldn't say poorly, but we learned things from the pilot.
Q. You had significant challenges?
A. There were challenges. All three -- or all five counties, the elections were run successfully. But there were things that we learned, and there were challenges.
Q. One of the challenges also is that 5.17 is not compatible with the KNOWiNK software that you use on the Poll Pads; right?
A. It is now. When they initially got it through EAC certification and we began state certification, we realized that it was at that time not compatible.
Q. When it was EAC-certified?
A. Correct.

THE COURT: Are you saying they went through another process to make it certified, or it is certified now?

THE WITNESS: So when 5.17 was certified by the EAC, they compared that software to the guidelines that they have -the testing lab does. And they said, okay, this meets those guidelines, so we're going to certify it.

When we take it as part of our state certification and we begin to take it through state certification, we realized that the Poll Pads could not encode cards that would work with 5.17 on the BMD, and so that is something that the Poll Pad vendor had to work through.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, can we hand him a binder and also for Your Honor?

THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Barnes -- I'm sorry.

Mr. Evans, if you would grab -- if you would flip to Tab 1 in the binder that you were just handed.
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            MR. BELINFANTE: I'm sorry. Could you just hang on
    one second. We're trying to get me a binder.
MR. CROSS: Do we have one?
MR. BELINFANTE: You're at Tab 1?
MR. CROSS: Tab 1.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you recognize Tab 1 as a document from the EAC
concerning the certification of Democracy Suite 5.17?
A. I do.
Q. And do you see that the testing standard there is VVSG 1.0
that was established in 2005?
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact, the testing standard that was used for 5.17
is that standard; right?
A. Correct.
Q. That is not the current standard, is it, sir?
A. That is the highest standard that any election equipment is certified to.
Q. That wasn't my question.
A. There is a -- there is a newer VVSG 2.0 that has no election equipment certified to it.
Q. And that is the current standard that the EAC is using; right?
THE COURT: Which one?
MR. CROSS: VVSG 2.0.

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BY MR. CROSS:
Q. The bottom of this page from the EAC, do you see that it says, following this, VVSG 1.0 and 1.1 is now no longer to be used by the EAC to vote -- to certify voting systems?
A. I'm sorry.

What page are you on again?
Q. The bottom of Page 1 under Tab 4, the last sentence
following this.
Do you see that?
A. Correct.
Q. VVSG 1.0 and 1.1 is now no longer used by the EAC to certify voting systems.

Do you see that?
A. Correct. And my understanding of that would mean from that point forward, equipment submitted to be certified would go against the 2.0 standard.
Q. If you flip back to Tab 1, the certification document for 5.17, do you see that when we go to the second page?
A. I do.
Q. The testing application date, this was submitted for testing on October 4th of 2022; right?
A. Yes.
Q. If we flip back to Tab 4, again, just a reminder, the EAC unanimously adopted VVSG 2.0 almost two years earlier on February 10th of 2021; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And one of the key differences between VVSG 1 and 2 is that 2 requires penetration testing; right?
A. I would have to review the standards. That sounds right.
Q. But you're aware in getting VVSG 1 certification for 5.17, there was no requirement for penetration testing; right?
A. I would have to look at the standards.
Q. As you sit here, you just don't recall?
A. Say again.
Q. As you sit here, you don't recall?
A. Correct.
Q. Do you know whether the installation procedures for 5.17 are the same basic steps as what was involved to install 5.5-A?
A. I would be hard to speak to that since I wasn't with the Secretary of State's office at the time of the rollout.
Q. You were deputy state election director in September, October of 2020; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Do you recall at that time the Secretary's office had a mandatory software update on the BMDs that was version 5.5.10.32?
A. Correct.
Q. And the installation of that software had to be installed on every BMD across the state; right?
A. That is what I recall, yes.
Q. And that took about 20 minutes per BMD or so?
A. No. That one was a much faster update.
Q. How long is it -- what is your understanding of how long that took?
A. It was much quicker. Mr. Barnes would have intimate details of that.
Q. Fair to say that the State got that done on every BMD in a matter of about a couple of weeks; right?
A. It was about that time frame.
Q. You talked about unify tabulator security keys. And that is the key to the scanner; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And do I understand correctly that there's only one security key that -- sorry. Let me ask it a different way. The security key is physical; right?
A. The -- yeah, you have the iButton, which is sometimes called a security key.
Q. Okay. And the iButton is encoded for each election; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. But it is encoded the same way for every security key across the entire county; right?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: Can you play the video, Tony?
(Playing of the videotape.)

MR. CROSS: And just to pause here for a second.
Sorry. Go back one second.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. This is a page from the manual Mr. Belinfante asked you about, and it is about opening the polls on the ICP, the precinct scanner; right?
A. Correct.
Q. If you look at the third picture in the middle across the top, that is someone using the security key on the scanner; right?
A. Correct.
Q. You said this is an iButton.

It is secured by iButton; right?
A. I don't know the technical specs, but this is a security key.
Q. And it is iButton?
A. That is my understanding, yeah.

MR. CROSS: Can you play the video?

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. I've just got a really short video here for you. MR. BELINFANTE: Well -THE COURT: Have you shown this video before? MR. BELINFANTE: I have not seen the video, Your

Honor.

MR. CROSS: It is a demonstrative, just like we got
demonstratives for the first time today, Your Honor. It is only going to take a moment.
(Playing of the videotape.)

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Let me ask you this way: Do you know if you or anyone else at the Secretary's office has ever done a Google search to figure out how easy it is to hack iButton?
A. I don't believe \(I\) have ever done that Google search.
Q. And you are not aware of anyone who has?
A. Correct.
Q. The video \(I\) just showed you, you have never seen that before?
A. No.

MR. CROSS: Tony, can you pull up the Dominion
manual?

Not that one. Sorry. Hang on. Here it is.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. I'll just hand you a hard copy.

Mr. Barnes -- I don't know why I keep calling you that.
I'm so sorry. There are so many Barneses in this case, it is just the name I default to.

Mr. Evans, take a look at what is going to be Exhibit 605 and tell me, do you recognize this as an excerpt from the Dominion voting manual for the EMS election event designer user guide?
A. I don't know. I mean, it looks like that. I don't know that \(I\) have ever looked at this exact document.
Q. But you're familiar that there is a user guide Dominion provides on how to use the voting equipment that is used in Georgia; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can see on the cover -- it is a little hard to read, but it is version 5.5.

Do you see that in the middle of the cover?
A. I see it.
Q. And if you come, do you see that there is a table of contents on the second page?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you see under 4.7, Project Parameters, at the bottom?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there's 4.7.2, general tabulation options at Page 27.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So if you flip in, we have got that section, Page 27 in Exhibit 605.

You see at the top, 4.7 Project Parameters, the heading?
A. Yes.

You said Page 27; right? Project Parameters?
Q. Yes.
A. Yep.
Q. Again, on the topic of unify tabulator security keys, which you spoke about at some length, if you look in the middle of Page 27, you will see there is a box, Number 3, with a heading Unify Tabulator Security Keys.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And here what Dominion states is, when this check box is selected, all tabulators share a single iButton security key. This mode is very useful in a testing environment when using many tabulators at once.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And it goes on, if the check box is not selected, each tabulator is assigned a unique key; right?
A. I do.
Q. And then what Dominion advises the Secretary's office here is, for security reasons, it is not recommended to use unified security keys in a real election.

Do you see that?
A. I do.

I would like to add a little context to my --
Q. I'm just asking, you understand that is what is advised by Dominion; right?
A. I understand.
Q. And Georgia does exactly what Dominion advises against in a real election for security reasons; right, sir?
A. I would say that we weigh the risks and discuss with other election officials outside of Georgia to figure out what best practices are to mitigate risks when it comes to something like this.
Q. That is not at all responsive. Let's try it again.

You understand -- you agree that in the State of Georgia with respect to unified tabulator security keys, the Secretary's office does exactly what Dominion says not to do in
a real election, yes?
A. I'm aware that we do something different --
Q. Can you answer?
A. -- than this document does.
Q. Is the answer yes?

THE COURT: That's -- I think that he has given you a sufficient answer.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. As long as we understand that is what you do.

And you understand, as we have heard from numerous
witnesses, that the Secretary's office depends on Dominion for the security of the system.

Do you agree with that?
A. We depend on -- it is a collective effort. We depend on
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Dominion, county election officials for the security of the
equipment.
Q. And, of course, the Secretary's office as well; right?
A. We have a role.
Q. Dominion has a significant role in the security of the
State election equipment?
A. Dominion has a significant role, yes.
THE COURT: Well, is it, in fact, in charge of
security for the operation of the Dominion -- the State's
implementation of the software and hardware?
THE WITNESS: Your Honor --
THE COURT: As I understood it from another witness
that he regarded Dominion as essentially the cybersecurity
agent responsible for the system.
THE WITNESS: In my view, they are the developer of
the system, and so they play a huge role in doing that.
From a physical security perspective, I think that's
where in large part the county election officials come into
play.
THE COURT: Well, I think that is a different -- I
guess I'm still trying to understand this is that I don't know
who any longer is responsible for cybersecurity within the
system and -- based on the testimony presented here. And I
realize multiple different people may be responsible, but one
of the witnesses unequivocally said it was -- that it was

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Dominion that was responsible for all of the cybersecurity, as if they -- so this is the recommendation -- and do you agree with that or not?

It is no judgment, but I'm just trying to understand because we have a lot of different players here, and it is a little bit confusing to me when different people say, I'm not responsible; somebody else is responsible.

And that may be true, so I'm just trying to pursue that.

THE WITNESS: So I think the way that \(I\) view it is from the -- Dominion has the largest role in making sure that the software and the solutions that they develop are adequate from a security perspective. They then have to train our staff on how to maintain security standards, and we have IT personnel that make sure that the environment that we build election projects in is protected and that the environment that we're working on the Dominion system is in isn't connected to internet or anything like that.

And so their job is to make sure the product they give us is adequate and to train us. At that point, we do have a responsibility in making sure that we don't connect it to internet, that we're doing what we need to do. And then counties have, once it is in their hands, responsibility to make sure that they aren't allowing unauthorized access to the equipment and that they are following State law and State

Election Board rule to protect the equipment.
That is the way that \(I\) view it.
THE COURT: Thank you.
If they, in fact, say here also, Dominion expressly says for security reasons it is not recommended to use unified security keys in a real election -- I mean, have you consulted with Dominion about that recommendation?

THE WITNESS: So the context that \(I\) was wanting to add is, from my experience in the local jurisdictions that \(I\) have been in, it is common to have the same password across the entire county because the risk of losing a password in translation in trying to get it to the hundreds of poll workers that you have in your county -- that risk is high that you are not going to be able to open the equipment in time for election morning or that you make it so complicated that they are writing passwords down.

So that is -- I don't believe from my experience that is an uncommon practice that it is done. I know that in some research that I have conducted that Colorado, I believe, tells their clerks, make sure you have this function on.

But one of the differences in Colorado is -- I was talking with their state elections director -- I believe in their entire state, they have about 220 scanners because their system is different than ours. They central scan everything. They don't have precinct scanners. So there, you are talking
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about having to maintain passwords for 220 scanners instead of
10,000 scanners, like here. So it is apples and oranges.
So I think -- again, this is a little bit me drawing

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inferences, but Dominion's writing a user guide to use across
all their customers that run elections in different ways. And
then we as election officials have to take them, put them in
the environment that we are operating in, and then mitigate
risks -- all the risks involved as best we can.
    THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You talk about what other states do.
        Are you aware that California requires disabling unified
tabulator security keys exactly as Dominion recommends?
A. I'm not aware.
Q. People sometimes write passwords down on, like, sticky
notes to remember them; right?
A. I have heard.
Q. And so because of the way you guys have approached the password, if a poll worker, for example, dropped or left a single Post-it note with a password on it and it became publicly available, it would be accessible for the entire county; right?
A. That would be a -- that would be a security vulnerability, yes.
Q. You mentioned briefly the breaches in Coffee County.
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            In the summer of 2021, the ICC and the EMS server were
    replaced by the Secretary's office; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Were you involved in that decision?
A. I was not intimately involved in that decision.
Q. Were you involved at all?
A. I was aware, yes.
Q. Were you aware at the time, as Ms. Watson and others testified, that the Secretary's office had an open investigation into whether there was unauthorized access to the EMS server and other equipment?
A. I don't recall when the investigation was opened.
Q. But do you recall there was an investigation in the summer of 2021 by the Secretary's office into whether there was unauthorized access to the EMS server about other voting equipment?
A. That sounds right.
Q. Do you know who made the decision at the Secretary's office in light of that investigation to replace only the EMS server and the ICC?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Was that a Dominion decision, or you just don't know one way or the other?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall that in late September of 2022, the

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Secretary's office replaced additional equipment in Coffee County, including the BMDs?
A. I do remember.
Q. And do you recall at that time the Secretary made the decision to leave the EMS server and the ICC that were being used in the county?
A. I remember.
Q. Do you know who made the decision to do that?
A. It was a collective decision.
Q. With the Secretary?
A. It was a collective decision with -- I remember specifically the people that were involved in making the decision. I was a part of that decision. Ryan Germany was a part of that decision. Gabriel Sterling was a part of that decision. We consulted with a security expert and Deputy Director Barnes and made the decision to complete the replacement of the equipment with the replacing the BMDs and the ICPs.
Q. But you're not suggesting a decision of that magnitude was made without the Secretary's approval; right?
A. I don't know to the extent that he was involved. I know to the extent that \(I\) was involved.
Q. Okay. Was Dominion involved in that decision?
A. I believe we did reach out to Dominion. I spoke directly with Ryan Germany, and then Ben Adida, our expert on it, and
also Deputy Director Barnes.
Q. So the expert you said you guys consulted was Ben Adida?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said Dominion was consulted, but the decision was made by the Secretary's office; right?
A. The decision was made by us, yes.
Q. You said you've read Dr. Halderman's report.

Do you know whether anyone at the Secretary's office has
ever discussed the findings of Dr. Halderman with anyone at Dominion?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether anyone in the Secretary's office has ever discussed the CISA advisory with anyone at Dominion?
A. Yes.
Q. Who? Who has been in those discussions, both in the Secretary's side and Dominion?
A. So I have been in some of those discussions; Gabriel Sterling, Ryan Germany, Michael Barnes. Then from the Dominion side, the folks that we would normally speak with would be Nicole Nollette, also Tom Feehan, Jerry Wagoner, three of the primary ones.
Q. And the communications between the Secretary's office and Dominion concerning the CISA advisory or Dr. Halderman's report, have those been emails, phone calls, kind of all of the above?
A. Probably a combination of everything.
Q. Would it surprise you to learn that the Secretary's office has not produced a single written communication between anyone in the office and anyone at Dominion concerning either of those topics?
A. I would have to do a search to confirm.
Q. But certainly you've had emails on that topic with individuals at Dominion?
A. I would have to do a search to confirm.
Q. You've had internal emails discussing that topic; right?
A. So it is a lot of phone conversations. I would have to do a search to confirm.
Q. Did the Secretary's office at some point alert Dominion that its proprietary software had been stolen in Coffee County?
A. I believe that Gabriel Sterling had some of those
conversations. I don't recall having those initial conversations with Dominion.
Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when the Secretary's office alerted Dominion that its proprietary software had been stolen from the Georgia voting system?
A. I don't remember exactly.
Q. Do you know the year?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you know whether it was in 2021 or 2022?
A. I don't recall.
Q. So it could have been either year? You're just not sure?
A. Correct.
Q. All right. You testified on direct -- you were asked the question, are you aware of any allegation that any voting machine in Georgia has ever been subjected -- subject to an infection of malware?

Do you remember that?
A. I do.
Q. And you were asked the question, if that were to happen, what could happen with the malware?

And you said, well, I don't know how it could spread to other devices.

Do you recall that testimony?
A. I do.

MR. CROSS: Tony, could we pull up Exhibit 89,
please, Curling Plaintiffs' Exhibit.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So I believe you said you have seen the CISA advisory from June of 2023; right?
A. Yes.
Q. If you come down to the bottom of the first page -- it is on the screen in front of you -- do you see where there is the heading Vulnerability Overview Section 2.2?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there is a Section 2.2.1.

has to have on hand as a backup; right?
A. Yes.
Q. You also testified that you're not aware of any Georgia county using hand-marked paper ballots in a general election. Do you recall that?
A. I believe the question was as the primary voting method.
Q. Oh, yeah. That is a good correction.

You said you weren't aware of any Georgia county having used hand-marked paper ballots as the primary form of voting in person in a general election.
A. Correct. Correct.

One correction I'll make, at least going back to, you
know, the DRE system. Before that, I can't really speak.
Q. Were you the deputy state election director in the fall of 2019?
A. I was not.
Q. Where were you then?
A. Fulton County.
Q. So you were election chief for Fulton County?
A. Yes.
Q. And I gather you're not aware that in the fall of 2019, Cobb County used hand-marked paper ballots as the primary form of in-person voting as a pilot for the State?
A. I'm not aware.
Q. So I gather you are also not aware that the election
superintendent at the time said that cobb County would have been, quote, dead in the water if they had to use BMDs like other counties? Never heard that before?
A. Not aware.
Q. You testified quite a bit about seals on the voting equipment and how they are used to secure the equipment.

Do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. And why are seals so important on the voting equipment for security purposes?
A. So good chain of custody and make sure that seals are on equipment can help prevent and detect if you know there's some kind of tampering with the equipment.
Q. Under the rules, if a BMD, for example, has a broken or missing seal, it is not supposed to be used in an election; is that fair?
A. I believe -- and I would have to look back in the rules, but I believe if a seal is broken on election morning, then the poll worker would contact the election superintendent for them to determine -- for them to investigate the situation.
Q. Is it your understanding that despite finding a BMD with a broken or missing seal on the morning of election day or in early voting that the county could just decide to use it in the election?
A. They need -- they would need to make sure that it is still
operating correctly.
Q. How would they do that?
A. They could run it through testing again, but the county election superintendent would need to use their discretion to make sure that it can be used.
Q. Is it your testimony that the Secretary's office is not involved in that situation?
A. I don't recall the exact -- I don't recall the exact
training that we've given on that.
MR. CROSS: Tony, can you pull up Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 104, please?
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Evans, if you look down here, you'll see that there is an email in July of 2020 from the Clinch County election supervisor.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And the election supervisor here is emailing Michael Barnes at CES.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And she reports that they discovered that two of the BMDs' election data seals were missing. She indicates poll workers found that.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And then she asked Mr. Barnes, do we need to send these back to be resealed?

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And Mr. Barnes responds to her.

Do you see his response?
MR. CROSS: If we go up, Tony.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. There is nothing here from Mr. Barnes saying this is a decision for the county; right?
A. Please repeat the question.
Q. There is nothing here -- Mr. Barnes doesn't say, why are you emailing me? This is a decision for the county; right?
A. No.

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection, Your Honor. Only to the extent that I believe the document has -- the bottom portion of the document from the Clinch County G-A government email was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.

MR. CROSS: Right. We're still not using it for the truth.

THE WITNESS: One thing \(I\) will note is in the original email is she was saying it was discovered during logic and accuracy testing, so not after deployment to the poling location.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. On July 9th of 2020; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And do \(I\) recall correctly that was a primary day?
A. June 9th was the primary, so this was probably logic and accuracy for the runoff.
Q. Okay. And then Mr. Barnes responds, just please put your own seal on the equipment and document the seal number attached.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And it is your view that that is consistent with -- that instruction is consistent with Georgia State election security policy?
A. Can you go back to the original email --
Q. Sure.
A. -- from Clinch?

MR. CROSS: Just leave the whole thing up, Tony.
THE WITNESS: I think the one thing I would want to clarify there is, I think it would be acceptable to put the new seal on, but I would want the equipment to go back through logic and accuracy testing again.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And we don't see that instruction from Mr. Barnes; right?
A. Not in this particular email thread.
Q. Okay. All right.

MR. CROSS: Let's pull up Exhibit 100, Tony, please.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And this one again, it is in evidence, but to

Mr. Belinfante's point, the original email from Laura Jones is not in for the truth, it is just in the statement that was made to the Secretary's office, so still using it with that limitation.

If you look at the bottom, do you see that there is an
email that Frances Watson forwards on to yourself, Ryan
Germany, and Chris Harvey on November 5th of 2020?
A. I see that.
Q. And it comes from Laura Jones.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand -- do you recognize Laura Jones as a county election official or a poll worker?
A. I do not recognize the name.
Q. Okay. Well, let's look at what she reported.

Do you see a description of violation?
A. I do.
Q. And do \(I\) understand correctly that there is an email address that poll workers and county officials or others can make reports like this to the Secretary's office?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you look at the description of the violation, this is the day after the general election in November 2020; right? General election was November 4?
A. Yes, that's correct -- yeah, two days after.
Q. And here, what at least was reported, is that when they opened the large cabinets containing the voting machines, we discovered that most of the voting machines' election database doors were wide open and not secured with a zip tie with a serial number. Seals were already broken or a zip tie was put on but was not put through the door.

Do you see that?
A. I see that.
Q. It then goes on in the middle, also, all of the machines are supposed to show zero ballots cast upon opening. One of our machines did show one ballot having cast on it. We did not use this machine, but we did use all of the other machines that had the election database door open.

Do you see that?
A. I see that.
Q. Also, it goes on, we did not follow the protocol for opening the large cabinets and starting up the machines. In training, I was instructed that all serial numbers on zip ties on the doors were to be compared with the serial numbers written down on a form. We did not do this.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It goes on, and if we go to the top of the second page, it ends, it is disheartening not to see the security measures followed.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Harvey responds to Ms. Watson, 10-4, I assume you're investigating?

Do you see that?
A. I see that.
Q. Are we agreed that what is reported here, if it were true, if this actually happened, that would not be consistent with State policy; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you were copied on the original email.

Do you know whether this was investigated?
A. Based on how Frances dealt with things, I would assume that it is -- that it was.
Q. But as you sit here, you yourself as a State election director, you don't have any knowledge to be able to tell the Court that what is reported here is in any way inaccurate; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. You also testified that you are not aware of any attempt to manipulate a BMD -- to manipulate BMD voting software on
election day.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm sorry.

And do you recall that you were asked the same question about early voting and you said you weren't aware of that either?
A. Correct.
Q. But, to your knowledge, no one in the Secretary's office has ever engaged for this case a cybersecurity or forensic expert who has examined BMDs to determine whether there is malware; right?
A. We have not as of yet.

So following 2020, we did go to a couple of counties or --
not we -- but I believe it was Pro V\&V to a couple of counties and examine machines. We had plans to do parallel monitoring to some extent going forward. But we did not do parallel monitoring. We have not yet done parallel monitoring.
Q. And what Pro V\&V did was it did hash testing on some randomly identified BMDs in a handful of counties?
A. I don't have the details to be able to speak in detail on those.
Q. But fair to say that Pro V\&V did not go examine any BMDs in the state to see if there was malware on them; right?
A. They examined BMDs from a couple of counties after --
after the election. I'm sure we can get the details of what
they did.
Q. Let me ask it this way: As the state election director,
is it your belief that what Pro V\&V did was capable of
detecting malware on a BMD, or you just don't know one way or
the other?
A. I would think that it would, but I wouldn't be -- I can't
give a firm yes or no.
Q. You don't know?
A. Correct.
                            THE COURT: You're talking after the 2020 election
they did this? They went to a few counties?
    THE WITNESS: It was two counties following the
November 2020 election.
    THE COURT: What counties were those?
    THE WITNESS: I believe one was Spalding, and I do
not -- maybe Morgan, but \(I\) don't remember for sure.
    THE COURT: Did they give you a report -- a written
    report about what they did?
    THE WITNESS: I know they reported it out. I don't
    remember seeing an artifact from it. It might exist, but I
    don't recall.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    MR. CROSS: We have that report, Your Honor. We can
    get to it if we need to. And that's the only -- sorry.

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THE COURT: How much more do you have just so we --
MR. CROSS: Probably at least until 5:30.
THE COURT: And will you have follow-up?
MR. BELINFANTE: Yes, Your Honor.
And we can take this up later. I think Mr. Evans has
to be in Perry tomorrow morning, so I don't --
THE COURT: He has to be where tomorrow morning?
MR. BELINFANTE: Perry.
THE COURT: Perry.
MR. BELINFANTE: I think for a security matter, of
all things.
THE COURT: What time?
THE WITNESS: It is at 9:00.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BELINFANTE: Perhaps we could work it if the
Court was going to -- if you were going to take a break, we
would try to work and see how long -- because my questions are very pointed to where Mr. Cross is going.

MR. CROSS: If it is okay --
THE COURT: I can stick it out. I mean, I just
was -- I mean, I'm just trying to figure out how much more time
we have. That is all. I mean --
MR. CROSS: I'm going to try to get done today if we keep going.

THE COURT: And I think you have co-counsel who --
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    MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, I should flag, we have some
    non-duplicative cross-examination as well.
MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. I think if it -- if it
pleased the Court, we would like him to be able to pursue what
he needed to do in Perry, and then I think we might have him be
available tomorrow afternoon as opposed to --
THE COURT: Perry is a distance. Doesn't it take a
few hours to get to Perry, from my recollection?
MR. BELINFANTE: Couple of hours. With a stop at
Buc-ee's may add half an hour.
THE COURT: What is he going to bring to the rest of
you?
MR. CROSS: That's an hour.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
MR. BELINFANTE: I think -- and at least previously,
he was available to come back tomorrow afternoon.
THE COURT: Is that still so, or not?
THE WITNESS: I expect it would take me about
two hours or so to get back.
THE COURT: You think the meeting will last
approximately --
THE WITNESS: I should be able to leave around noon
from Perry.
THE COURT: All right. Well, let's keep on going.
Do you need a restroom break?

THE WITNESS: I'm okay.

THE COURT: Lucky you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. The benefit of youth.

THE COURT: The benefit of youth, yes, that's right. MR. OLES: Your Honor, we would also have a few
questions.
THE COURT: Naturally. I don't mean that --

MR. CROSS: Tony, can you pull up Defendants'
Exhibit 1224?

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. Mr. Evans, do you recognize Exhibit 1224, which is in evidence as the appendices to a report that was prepared by the SAFE Commission? Have you ever seen that report?
A. So I don't think I have ever seen this before, but I'm generally aware of the contents.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: So, Tony, can you go to about ten pages
in or so?

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. There's a cybersecurity presentation by Dr. Wenke Lee.

Just a couple of questions on this for you.

Are you familiar with Dr. Lee?
A. I'm not.
Q. Never heard of him?
A. No.
Q. So -- but you're familiar with the SAFE Commission?
A. Yes.
Q. You're aware that they put out a report with recommendations on a new system to replace the DRE system; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware that there was one cybersecurity expert on that commission?
A. I was not.
Q. Well, take a look -- it has already been established in evidence that Dr. Lee served on this commission, and this is a presentation he made to the SAFE Commission.

MR. CROSS: And if we come to the seventh page, Tony. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Let me just see if you're familiar with the concept.

Although you're not familiar with the presentation.
Do you see at the top --
MR. BELINFANTE: Objection, Your Honor. Two grounds of objection. One, this has been admitted before not for opinion testimony, but for notice to the State. He's already testified he is not familiar with Dr. Lee or many aspects of the SAFE Commission, so I don't see what the relevance of this would be. It also seems cumulative given the other testimony
about Dr. Lee's report.
MR. CROSS: I just want to see if he's familiar with the concept here. If he's not, we'll move on.

THE COURT: All right. Please move with due speed. BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Evans, do you see at the top it refers to advanced persistent threats?
A. I do.
Q. If we come down three lines from the bottom, do you see APT, referring to advanced persistent threats?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see here Dr. Lee warned SAFE Commission that APT malware is designed to carry out activities below the detection threshold? Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. As the state election director, is that something that you have ever been engaged in any discussions at the Secretary's office, the concern that the malicious code that CISA warned could be uploaded through one of the vulnerabilities, that that malicious code could avoid detection as Dr. Lee warned? Are you aware of that risk?
A. I've been aware or been a part of many conversations about

CISA mitigations but can't say that I've heard advanced
persistent threats as a terminology much.
Q. And you haven't participated in and you're not aware of
any discussions about how the malicious code that CISA warned about could go undetected, it could literally delete itself as Dr. Lee warned? You just haven't heard any discussion like that?
A. I'm not aware.
Q. It was Defense Exhibit 1242.

Do you still have the poll worker manual?
A. I do.
Q. And this was a document that was prepared by the Secretary's office; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. So that the Secretary's office determines the processes and practices that counties and poll workers are expected to follow in elections; right?
A. Generally, we'll explain -- explain the laws set forth, State Election Board rules, and then the counties will take it and train their poll workers.
Q. Right. This is a 104-page document that walks, as we saw with Mr. Belinfante, step by step for how the county election officials and poll workers are supposed to handle elections; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And this was prepared by the State; right?
A. Yes.
Q. You also mentioned Firefly.

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            That is a system that the Secretary's office uses to
        communicate with counties about State election issues; is that
        right?
    A. It is a variety of topics, but it is a SharePoint platform
    we use to get messages out and also county election officials
    can post on it.
    Q. And if the Secretary's office were to decide that the
    emergency hand-marked paper system needed to be invoked in an
    election, might it rely on Firefly to convey that to the
    counties?
    A. I mean, something -- depending on the magnitude of what a
    decision is, sometimes we'll post something and say, hey, we
    want to have a statewide call and have a statewide call to be
    able to articulate things. I don't think anything -- I would
    be shocked if anything of some magnitude like that would be
    articulated in a buzzPost.
    Q. Got it.
    So if that decision were made by the Secretary, how would
you expect that to get conveyed?
    A. Likely in posting information about a statewide webinar
        and then getting on a statewide webinar and articulating it in
        a presentation.
        Q. Okay. All right. Flip to Page 5, if you would.
            Do you see there is a list of offenses here, election
        offenses?
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A. I do.
Q. And the third one, the offense here is intentionally observing an elector while casting a ballot.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then if we come to Page 7 under the heading of polling place, do you see in the first paragraph there is a statute here OCGA 21-2-267(a)?

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And here what we see is that the polling places are required to have a sufficient number of voting compartments or booths with proper supplies in which the electors may conveniently mark their ballots with a curtain, screen, or door.

Do you see that, first four lines of the paragraph?
A. I do.
Q. And what is explained here is the -- these privacy requirements, the curtain, the screen, the door are intended so that there can't be observation of the elector when the elector is marking their ballot; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you certainly expect -- as the state election director, you certainly expect counties to comply with that requirement; right?
A. Yes.

THE COURT: Counsel, it also says something different in the next sentence, so --

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. So the next sentence -- let me just make sure we have the right context.

It says a curtain, screen, or door shall not be required, however, for the self-contained units used as a voting booth in which the DREs or electronic ballot markers are located if such booths have been designed so as to ensure the privacy of the elector.

So what the next sentence is saying, Mr. Barnes, you don't need a curtain, screen, or door if the booth itself is already designed to provide privacy; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And if we come down to the last of the three lines, just to be clear here, again what is explained in the final sentence here is that, in the case of direct recording electronic voting units or electronic ballot markers, the devices shall be arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on such device.

Do you see that?
A. Correct.
Q. And so your understanding as the state election director is there has to be privacy for the voter so no one could
observe them in the voting booth, and that could be a curtain, a screen, a door, or it could be how the booth is set up?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Let's jump to Page 9 if we could, please.

The sign on the top right here that is required to be posted reads, do not leave the balloting area with your printed ballot.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And that sign is required because sometimes voters when they vote on the BMD actually walk out without scanning their ballot; right?
A. It has happened before, yes.
Q. And you understand the reason for that is because when voters vote on the BMD, they sometimes get confused and think that is how they cast their vote? You have heard that before; right, sir?
A. I think that is one of the reasons.
Q. All right. Jump to -- let's go to Page 23, if you would. There may have been some questions on this.

So Mr. Belinfante asked you a lot of questions about sort of the procedures and opening the polls. This is the procedures for opening the polls specific to the BMD at the touch screen and the printer.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. There is no mention of seals, inspecting them, confirming they are there, validating them on this page; right, sir?
A. Correct.
Q. And if we go to Page 24, continuing on the steps to open the polls with the touch screen BMD and the printer, there is also no mention of seals here as well; right?
A. Correct.
Q. If we go to Page 25, however, where we get into the precinct scanner, there are two mentions of seals; right?

If you look in the bottom right corner of Page 25.
A. Correct.
Q. And so the instruction from the Secretary's office on setting up the polls, the BMD, and the scanner, only the scanner does the Secretary's office emphasize the need to confirm the seals in this document; right?
A. In the poll worker manual document as a whole, I would say the seals are also discussed on the BMD on that particular page -- or two pages, and then $I$ would say they are not mentioned.
Q. Right. The step by step setup for the BMDs does not mention seals.

We're agreed on that?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, you also mentioned -- you talked about a technician
card.
Do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. And can you just remind the Court what the technician card is, briefly?
A. The technician card will allow for folks to be able to get into some additional operations of the ballot-marking device. I'll also say that that is an area that Deputy Director Barnes will be able to speak more to.
Q. One of the things you said on direct is that the technician card used with this system is specifically programmed or is programmed with election-specific information. Did I hear that right?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. So it is your understanding that a technician card that is used with the Georgia Dominion system, that that card is specifically programmed for each election?
A. That is what I recall, yes.
Q. What is the basis for that belief?
A. That is my understanding.
Q. From where?
A. I don't recall where $I$ got it from.
Q. I gather it would surprise you to learn that that actually is not right, that the technician card is not -- it is generic? That would surprise you?
A. That would be different than my understanding.
Q. And it is fair to say that is not something you have considered from a security perspective as the state election director because you didn't know it?
A. Correct.
Q. Were you also aware that technician cards for the Dominion BMDs in Georgia can be counterfeited with only publicly available information?
A. I'm not aware of that.
Q. So you had not considered that from a security perspective either; right, sir?
A. Correct.
Q. Were you aware that voter cards and poll worker cards which you talked about can also be counterfeited?
A. I feel like I knew there was some way that you could counterfeit a card. The methodology to get to that counterfeit card, you know, I'm not sure of.
Q. You don't know what information might be needed and whether that is only public information; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Were you aware that voter cards that are used in the Dominion BMDs in Georgia can be counterfeited so that they allow unlimited voting?

You can use the same voter card to vote as many times as you want?

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            Were you aware of that?
A. Not aware.
Q. So that is not something you have considered from a
security perspective; right?
A. Not something I have been aware of.
Q. All right. I think last on this, if you jump to Pages 58
and 59 -- 58 and 59, if you would.
Do you see the photos on Pages 58 and 59 showing the
privacy setup? You can see the way the booth is set up on 58?
A. I do.
Q. And on 59, you can see that sitting inside that booth, the
BMD sits right next to the printer?
A. I see that.
Q. And if we go to 61, we can see the same thing, a bit more
visible without the individual standing there.
    Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can see on 61, the printer and the BMD are sitting
back inside the screen that has three sides and comes around
the printer and the BMD; right, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And fair to say since the Secretary's office prepared this document and uses it for the county workers to follow, that those are accurate depictions of how the State expects the BMD and the printer to be set up?
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A. That is one way. Some counties do it differently, and some counties -- and that would -- there are other acceptable ways to do it also.
Q. All of which by law require to have that sort of privacy setup, though, right, as we saw?

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection to the extent that it
calls for a legal conclusion as opposed to his understanding.

> MR. CROSS: That's fair.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Just on your understanding, your understanding is that while those setups might be some ways, all of them are required to have the privacy protection; right?
A. Some sort of privacy protection for the BMDs.
Q. Okay.

> MR. CROSS: Tony, can you play Clip 4?

## (Playing of the videotape.)

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Let me just pause it for a second. Mr. Evans, do you see yourself here?
A. I do.
Q. Is that you on the left?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall where this was?
A. This was a Senate Ethics Committee meeting. I believe it was November 1st of last year, early November last year.
Q. And is that Charlene McGowan seated next to you, the general counsel of the Secretary's office?
A. Correct.

MR. CROSS: And can we go back, Tony?
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Why were you there to testify?
A. The Senate Ethics Committee asked for an update on election security, and specifically one of the things that they wanted to mention was the Dominion 5.17 software.

MR. CROSS: Can we play this short clip real quick, Tony?

## (Playing of the videotape.)

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. By Alex, you mean Dr. Alex Halderman?
A. That's correct.
Q. And again, this was in November of 2023 that you said this?
A. Yes.
Q. And fair to say that was -- what you said there is not really an accurate statement, is it, sir?
A. What I -- I'm not aware of anybody who has gotten the level of access that he has gotten to any of the equipment for the extended period of time. That is what I meant. Because of the laws and the State Election Board rules that are in place and the job that county election officials do.

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Q. You specifically said you can't gain access to the
election management server.
    You were very precise; right?
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A. Correct.
Q. But you were aware as of November 2023 when you provided
this testimony that several individuals had gotten direct
access to the election management server in its operational
environment in Coffee County day after day after day?
MR. BELINFANTE: Objection, Your Honor. If counsel
is going to ask him about a Senate statement and a longer
hearing, then the entire hearing ought to be played, or at
least more of it, to provide the context that is possibly
there.
MR. CROSS: He is welcome to do that on his time.
That is not required for cross-examination.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You were aware of that when you made that statement;
right, sir?
A. I was aware.
Q. You understand --
THE COURT: Counsel, you are welcome to present
more -- a better context later.
MR. BELINFANTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Are you aware that the access Dr. Halderman got was not in

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the operational environment of any election office in the
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State; right?
A. Correct.
Q. He examined a standalone BMD detached from the election system.

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    You understand that; right?
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A. I do.
Q. Are you aware that he did that in a conference room of a law firm, not even in a laboratory? Did you know that?
A. I didn't know the exact place that he did it.
Q. So you understand that -- let me just ask: Do you
disagree -- is it your view that Dr. Halderman with a standalone BMD in a conference room has greater access than individuals sitting at an EMS server in the operational environment of a county election office day after day after day?
A. No, I don't disagree with that.
Q. Right. You agree that the access in Coffee County is much greater; right?
A. I don't know the degree to which they got passwords and other information needed to be able to access the equipment. The physical access of having access to the machines would be similar.
Q. So as the state election director, no one has informed you the degree to which the individuals who went to Coffee County
day after day received all of the passwords they needed from Misty Hampton? No one has told you that?
A. Maybe they have.
Q. Again, you also said that you can't gain access like Alex had in his report to be able to make adjustments to a ballot-marking device. You can't gain that level of access.

Is it your understanding that in Coffee County no one got access to any BMD software either?
A. No. I knew they had.
Q. As the state election director, what concerns you more, an
expert who got access to a standalone BMD by court order under security protocols or numerous individuals doing what they did in Coffee County?
A. The Coffee County instance.
Q. All right. Briefly on one quick topic.

Do you recall that in or around August of 2021 you learned about an effort in Spalding County to bring in

SullivanStrickler, the same folks who went to Coffee County in January of that year, to bring them in to do some sort of forensic copying of the election system?
A. I do recall.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: Can we give him this binder, Jenna?
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. While she hands you that, do I understand correctly that

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the Secretary's office stepped in and shut that down?
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A. I remember generally the back-and-forth, and -- yeah, I remember that is generally what happened. Yes.
Q. Okay. Flip to Tab 5, if you would, please, in that binder, which is Exhibit 194. So Tab 5, Exhibit 194.

And do you see that this is an email exchange that you had with Spalding County on August 18 of 2021?
A. I do.
Q. And if you come to the third page -- if you come to the third page, you see there is an email from Kimberly Slaughter to you, Michael Barnes -- and Michael Barnes on August 18th of 2021?
A. I see that.
Q. And you can take a moment to look at this.

But do you recall that this email concerns the event we were just talking about involving SullivanStrickler about somebody coming in to copy the voting equipment?
A. I remember, generally, this was a part of that discussion.
Q. Okay. If you look at the email that Ms. Slaughter sends to you on the top of the third page, in the second sentence she writes --

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. We're not reading
hearsay into the record. Ms. Slaughter's --
MR. CROSS: It is not for the truth, if that helps.
MR. BELINFANTE: That does help. THE COURT: Wonderful. We'll just press that button. MR. CROSS: We should just --

THE COURT: All of your respective tables.
MR. CROSS: We need an easy button. Hearsay easy
button.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And it is really more of a question, I think, she's posing, but let's just read it. She says, I have been and am presently working with Chris Bellew at the direction of Mr. Barnes in working out a time for the State to visit Spalding County to recertify our equipment.

So again, whether that is true or not, my question to you is: Do you have any recollection of whether the Secretary's office worked with Spalding in light of these events to recertify their election equipment?
A. I would want to consult with Deputy Director Barnes before coming back with an answer I'm confident in.
Q. You just don't know?
A. I don't recall the specifics as far as exact actions that we took.
Q. If the equipment had been accessed by -- if there had been unauthorized access, is it the Secretary's office policy to require recertification of that equipment before it is used?
A. If it was -- if it was accessed -- if there was unauthorized access, then we would likely replace the

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equipment.
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Q. Okay. Then if you -- one more question on this. If you come to the second page --

THE COURT: Of that correspondence chain?
MR. CROSS: Yes, ma'am. Still in Exhibit 194.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. And for context, go to the first page because the email blends over. Go to the very first page.

Do you see there is an email from Ben Johnson at Spalding still on the same day?
A. I do.
Q. And there is a question -- well, there is a statement in the second paragraph that reads, also, for a county to not have the ability to back up systems critical to performing our duties and running our elections, if that is indeed the case is a whole different conversation, but one that needs to happen.

Do you see that at the top of the second page?
A. I see that.
Q. And my question to you is: Do you know, as the state election director, whether counties are allowed to perform a backup of their voting equipment, or do they have to have State authorization to make a copy?
A. They do not -- they should not copy -- my understanding -again, this is something $I$ would want to consult with

Deputy Director Barnes on, but the election project, which is
different than the equipment, they can make copies of that. They don't need to make copies of their equipment.
Q. Okay. In fact, if you -- just to help you out, come to the -- I'm sorry. I was trying to move a little quick. Come to the second-to-last page. If you flip in the binder, you'll see there is an email that you yourself sent on August 18 copying Ryan Germany and others, but you send it to Kimberly Slaughter, and it is the second-to-last page.

You will see that you actually wrote to individuals in Spalding, I'm attaching to this email State Election Board rule -- and you've got Rule 183-1-12-.05 -- which states that election equipment cannot be modified, changed, or upgraded without authorization from the Secretary of State.

Do you see that?
A. I'm sorry.

Where were you again?
Q. Your email at the top of the second-to-last page.
A. Yep.
Q. And do you see the first paragraph that $I$ just read out loud?
A. Yes.
Q. And so is that a correct statement of your understanding of what State law requires or allows?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

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A. I'm getting close to needing a break, like five minutes.
    MR. CROSS: Sure.
    THE COURT: You can take it now.
    THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: How much more do you have?
    MR. CROSS: That is what I was looking at. It is a
good time to break because I've cut out a bunch of stuff. Let
me see what else I can cut.
    Oh, and I should -- 194, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Well, we're not -- the witness --
    MR. CROSS: Well, I was just going to introduce the
exhibit.
    MR. BELINFANTE: Our objection would be to the
first --
    THE COURT: Which exhibit?
    MR. CROSS: 194.
    THE COURT: Okay. Your objection is what?
    MR. CROSS: Again, I might be able to help, Judge.
    Exhibit 194, we would offer any statements -- other
than the statements from the Secretary's office, like
Mr. Evans', we would not offer those for the truth.
    MR. BELINFANTE: All right. With that -- with that
limitation, we don't have an objection.
    THE COURT: Okay. Would you do us this favor when
you submit it that you cross out what you're not offering?
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MR. CROSS: Well, it is still in. It is just not for
the truth.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. CROSS: You're going to need the context that
he's -- yeah.
THE COURT: All right. That's fine. I'm going to follow the witness' direction and --

COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
(A brief break was taken at 5:36 PM.)
MR. CROSS: Are we at Exhibit 606? Does that sound right, Mr. Martin?

COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Do what now?

MR. CROSS: Exhibit 606 .
Do you know?

I was trying to figure out what exhibit number we
were on. We'll get it.

MR. BELINFANTE: You were on 194 was the --
MR. CROSS: Yeah, I know. We have to label a new one.

MR. BELINFANTE: Oh, I got you.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Evans, can you flip to Tab 13, please?
A. I'm there.
Q. And do you see Tab 13, there is an email here that you sent on October 22 nd of 2020 regarding ENR update?

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
A. I do.
Q. And you're emailing -- is it Leigh Combs?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what is or was Leigh Combs' responsibility at the time? It looks liaison for the elections division; is that right?
A. She was, yes.
Q. Ms. Combs reports to you, below is a list of the counties that have not done L\&A uploads.

And this is on October 22nd of 2020.
Do you see that?
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. And then you respond to her, copying other individuals at the Secretary's office, we really, really, really, really, really, really, really need for all counties to do an L\&A upload. We don't want to go into election night with any doubts that the results reporting processing is working correctly.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And she provides a list that looks to be about a little over a third of the counties in Georgia at that time had not provided the uploads; right?
A. Yes.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 606 into

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evidence.
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    MR. BELINFANTE: No objection.
    THE COURT: It is admitted.
    BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Flip to Tab 14, if you would, please.
A. Okay.
Q. Here, do you see there is an email you sent to Chris
Harvey on March 24 of 2021, with the subject notes for review?
A. Okay.
Q. And do you see there is an attachment that you included,
challenges to not having a uniformed voting system? Do you see
that?
A. Okay. Yes.
Q. And if you look at the next page on Tab 14, do I understand correctly that is the document that you drafted and sent to Mr. Harvey on what you described as challenges to not having a uniformed voting system?
A. Just to be clear, on mine, it is Tab 15.
Q. Tab 14.

So Tab 14, you see the email, and then if you flip the page, do you see the --
A. I don't, but if $I$ flip to tab --
Q. Oh. Why is your binder different?

THE COURT: I think it is under Tab 15 instead.
THE WITNESS: Tab 15, I see a document called
challenges to not having a uniformed voting system.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Okay. This is going to get tough then because you guys have a different setup. Hopefully, we'll fix that.

Take a look at Tab 15.
And you see the challenges document?
A. I do.
Q. And do I understand right that you prepared that?
A. This looks like something I prepared. I don't necessarily recall preparing it, but it looks -- does look like, based on the email, that I did prepare it.
Q. As you sit here, you don't have any reason to believe that you did not prepare that and send it to Mr. Harvey?
A. Correct.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 607 in, which
includes the attachment.
MR. BELINFANTE: Just for clarity's sake,
Document 607 -- or Exhibit 607 would include State Defendants' Bates-labeled 96614 and 96615.

MR. CROSS: Yes.
MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. No objection.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Go to what I'm guessing is going to be Tab 16 for you. It should have a number at the bottom that ends in 5665.


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administer the voting system?
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A. Yes.
Q. And if you look down at the bottom, do you see that the thread begins with an email that was sent to the voterfraudemailalerts@sos.ga.gov on January 5th of 2021?
A. I see that.
Q. And you'll see there is a report here that two individuals voted on a BMD and that the only thing they saw on the ballot was a $Q R$ code, no human readable text.

Do you see that?
A. I see that.
Q. Again, putting aside whether that is true or not, let me just ask you: Are you familiar that that is a glitch that sometimes happens when the Dominion BMDs in Georgia, a voter just gets a $Q R$ code?
A. I've never seen that happen.
Q. But have you heard reports of that beyond just this one?
A. I don't recall anything other than this right now.
Q. Okay. Do you know whether there was an investigation to confirm whether that actually happened?
A. I would have to look. I don't know.
Q. Okay.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 608 into
evidence. The statements that were provided by a third party are not offered for the truth.

MR. BELINFANTE: With that limitation, no objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It is admitted with that limitation. MR. CROSS: That was 608 . COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: Yes.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. If you would flip to Tab 17, please.
A. I'm there.
Q. Do you see there is an email here that you sent to Scott Tucker, Tom Feehan, both at Dominion, and copying Chris Harvey on January 12th of 2021?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was Mr. Feehan's role with respect to Georgia elections at that time?
A. He helped for a project management perspective with the rollout from the Dominion side.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we move Exhibit 609 into
evidence.

MR. BELINFANTE: Just making sure I'm looking at this
correctly, 609 is 184811?
MR. CROSS: Yes.

MR. BELINFANTE: Okay. Your Honor, we would object to the extent that it has statements from third parties, and on this one we would say, even if it were not admitted for the truth of the matter of asserted, the relevancy of it would
presume that it is true, and so we think that it is hearsay.
MR. CROSS: Are you talking about the first email, the description of violation?

MR. BELINFANTE: I'm talking about the one from Scott
Tucker to Blake Harvey -- I'm sorry, Blake Evans, Chris Harvey CC in the middle, not the one from Blake at the bottom.

MR. CROSS: Got it.

MR. BELINFANTE: And on the back, it looks like we've got personal identifiable information as to an individual voter that $I$ would want taken out as well.

MR. CROSS: That's fine. The description of violation is, again, not offered for the truth. The email from Scott Tucker, again, we believe it is ample evidence that Dominion operates as an agent for the state, and so it would come in as a party opponent admission, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Where is the one that is causing the first concern? Is it the one from -- on the flip page that is a voter with the name -- well, I'm not going to give her name, but with her initials being JS?

MR. CROSS: Right. The description of violation, that came from a third party. We're not offering that for the truth.

THE COURT: All right. Is that what -- is that the beginning point of this complaint, though?

MR. CROSS: That looks to be what started the thread.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CROSS: And so the relevance we're offering it
for is that report came in. Whether that is true or not, it sparked discussion within the Secretary's office with Dominion about implementing a fix because Mr. Evans suggests that this is something that should be fixed in future --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CROSS: So that is why it is offered.
THE COURT: With that qualification, it is admitted.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I think just at the time
that it is admitted to the Court, again, there is personal identifying information on the second page.

THE COURT: Right. It needs to be -- I think the county can be left in.

MR. BELINFANTE: Sure. Thank you.
MR. CROSS: That is 609. We'll redact that when it goes in.

Okay. Almost done here.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Do you still have this other binder that says 5.17?

I think it is the other one to your left.
A. I do.
Q. If you can flip to Tab 5 --
A. Okay.
Q. -- do you see here there is a document from the EAC
entitled EAC issues advisory on Dominion ImageCast $X$ component,
and it is dated June 3rd of 2022?
A. I see that.
Q. And if you look at the introduction, it indicates that on Friday, May 27th, the EAC was made aware that CISA had drafted an advisory based on a coordinated vulnerability disclosure provided to them by a security researcher related to the EAC-certified Dominion ImageCast $X$ component.

And it goes on, CISA has noted nine specific vulnerabilities disclosed by the researcher in its advisory and included additional steps states and local elections administrative jurisdictions can take to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And have you seen this before?
A. I have.
Q. And do I understand correctly this is a notice that the EAC sent out in response to the CISA advisory?
A. Yes.
Q. And it is actually -- if you look at the date, this went out on June 3rd and refers to a May 27 advisory.

Do you recall that the EAC actually issued this in response to a draft embargoed version of the CISA advisory rather than the final one?
A. I don't recall.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we would move Exhibit 610
into evidence.
MR. BELINFANTE: No objection.
THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Mr. Evans, we spoke earlier about the work that Pro V\&V did when they examined some BMDs in late 2020 in a handful of counties.

Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. And again, you read Dr. Halderman's report.

Do you recall Dr. Halderman explaining that the work Pro V\&V did is nowhere near sufficient to identify whether there is malware or some sort of compromise on those machines? Do you recall that?
A. I don't recall.
Q. So fair to say that is not something you've considered from a security perspective as the state election director?
A. That is not something I've thought about, so yes.
Q. Okay. All right. Fair to say that you've been familiar with this litigation while it has been pending; right?
A. This litigation?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.

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Q. And just yes or no -- I don't want to get into specifics.
    Did anyone ever come to you during the course of this
litigation pending and ask you whether the State was
undertaking any specific steps to respond to the findings of
Dr. Halderman or CISA?
    MR. BELINFANTE: Object to the extent that it would
require the witness to reveal attorney-client communications.
    THE COURT: All right. Don't reveal anything that
your attorney and you've communicated about directly.
        THE WITNESS: So we had -- I've had many
conversations about the mitigations listed in the CISA
advisory.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Just yes or no, did you ever discuss that with counsel for
this litigation? Just yes or no?
    MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. He can't answer the
question as to whether he has discussed it with counsel.
    MR. CROSS: Okay.
    THE COURT: Sustained.
        MR. CROSS: All right.
        BY MR. CROSS:
    Q. Let me hand you -- should be the last document.
        MR. CROSS: May I approach, Your Honor?
        THE COURT: Okay.
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BY MR. CROSS:
Q. All right. You should have in front of you, Mr. Evans, an email that you sent to David Greenwalt on April 30 of 2021.

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And you see you're responding to an email that

Mr. Greenwalt sent you on the same day?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Greenwalt, at least at this time, worked with KNOWiNK; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And KNOWiNK is the company that provides the applications that are used on the Poll Pads; is that right?
A. That is right.

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, we offer Exhibit 611 into evidence.

MR. BELINFANTE: Objection on the grounds of
relevance. I'm not sure it has been explained what the purpose of the email is. And we would object to Mr. Greenwalt's inclusion as hearsay evidence as opposed to Mr. Evans at the top.

MR. CROSS: So Mr. Greenwalt's statements we're not offering for the truth, but let me ask a couple of questions and see if we can explain the relevance.

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BY MR. CROSS:
Q. If you look at Mr. Greenwalt's email, he indicates,
attached are three documents describing the Poll Pad system
design and security architecture.
    Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He goes on, these files contain data which is proprietary,
sensitive, and related to election security.
    Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. They are to be used by the Secretary of State staff to
evaluate the system's security architecture for potential use
during advanced in-person voting and shall not be disseminated
outside of the Secretary of State's office.
    Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. Did anyone at the Secretary's office, to your knowledge,
ever alert KNOWiNK that their proprietary sensitive software
was stolen in Coffee County in January of 2021?
    MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. KNOWiNK is not a party.
I'm not sure the relevance of any notification or
non-notification.
    MR. CROSS: It bears on their security practices,
Your Honor.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, I don't think the
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question was related to security practices. But otherwise, the use of proprietary software being used, quoting an email talking about the trade secret information would not be the basis of it.

THE COURT: So is your contention that this -- all I can see is that obviously there are security concerns and privacy concerns that are related to proprietary and sensitive nature of the information that are expressed by Mr. Greenwalt at KNOWiNK, and then Mr. Blake says, yes, I'll pass along the information to our security team.

I mean, I understand that you can contend that it has broader ramifications that KNOWiNK -- the information might have also been exposed as others start accessing the system, but I mean, that is a -- and no doubt that probably is true, but that doesn't -- at the point in April of '21 --

MR. CROSS: Your Honor, just to be clear --
THE COURT: Do you think that Mr. -- it reflects that
Mr. Evans understood that he was exposing that?
MR. CROSS: No. No. No. Your Honor, I'm not suggesting that Mr. Evans -- no representations about what he knew in April of 2021. It is merely meant to show two things. One, whether true or not, KNOWiNK put the State on notice that they considered their software that was copied from the Poll Pads in Coffee County as proprietary sensitive election security and not meant to be disseminated outside.

And then the question becomes, given that notice of sensitivity, did the Secretary's office, once they learned about Coffee County, inform KNOWiNK, similar to the questions we asked about Dominion, because it bears on the security practice that is --

THE COURT: Well, it does, arguably, at least. But I think you ought to think about another way that you could get at this because this is sort of a little roundabout. I mean, we know that this is -- this is their warning.

So it really is, in fact, being -- there is nothing that is -- it is an odd situation because this is an advisory from Mr. Greenwalt. It is not actually being, at the same time, offered for the truth of anything other than if you argue that maybe the things that they are saying are proprietary and sensitive are -- that that is not -- it is true or not true.

But at the same time, I don't think it takes you all the way to where you are contending other than -- I mean, you could probably do that five other different ways without messing with this letter, which is a sort of roundabout way. There are lots of probably other entities that even had proprietary information, including Dominion, and I don't know what they did about that.

So, you know, you can get the witness to acknowledge that there were -- others might be impacted by it --

MR. CROSS: Right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- without having this.

MR. CROSS: Certainly this is not a document that makes or breaks the case. Our position, right, is that the Secretary's office did not take the breach in Coffee County sufficiently serious once they learned about it, whenever that was, and so it is just meant to find out, understanding how sensitive the KNOWiNK software was, according to the notice they got.

THE COURT: Well, ask that question.
MR. CROSS: Oh, that was the question. I'm sorry. I
thought -- let me try it again because I thought that is --
MR. BELINFANTE: I think it was on introducing the evidence --

MR. CROSS: Okay.
MR. BELINFANTE: -- is what led to the objection.

MR. CROSS: Okay. That's fair. Let me ask it this way.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Did you understand that KNOWiNK considered the software used on the Poll Pads that was taken in Coffee County as --

THE COURT: All right. Now you're talking about --
MR. CROSS: Let me ask it this way then.

BY MR. CROSS:
Q. You understand that the software that was taken in Coffee County included software from the Poll Pads; is that right?

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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Do you know whether anyone from the Secretary's
office ever alerted KNOWiNK that their software had been taken?
    MR. BELINFANTE: Objection. Relevance.
        THE COURT: I'll allow it.
        MR. BELINFANTE: Okay.
        THE WITNESS: I know that KNOWiNK knew about it. Who
notified them, I don't recall.
BY MR. CROSS:
Q. Okay. And you don't know when that was?
A. No.
(There was a brief pause in the proceedings.)
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            MR. CROSS: No further questions at this time, Your
    Honor. Thank you.
Jenna did remind me, I did not move Exhibit 605 in.
It is the Dominion manual. I thought we did. Maybe we didn't.
THE COURT: The user guide?
MR. CROSS: Yes, the user guide.
MR. BELINFANTE: Your Honor, we would only ask two
things. One, I'm not sure what the designation of when it was
made, if it is still relevant. There is an attorneys' eyes
only on it, but candidly, standing here today, I don't know
that -- if that has been replaced on some other grounds.
The other thing we would ask is that if we're going
to introduce a portion, we would introduce the entirety of the

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document, which seems like there is no objections.
    MR. CROSS: That's fine. Yeah, we were printing what
we could.
    But there is no objection?
    MR. BELINFANTE: Yeah.
    THE COURT: All right. Well, that is fine.
Exhibit 605 is accepted.
    But I guess you should both look at whether there is
any of this that needs -- needs to be sealed if you're saying
some part of it was attorneys' eyes only. I don't know whether
it any longer needs that.
    MR. CROSS: Do you want to right now just admit it
provisionally sealed, and then the State can get back to us on
whether --
    THE COURT: Yes, that is fine.
    MR. McGUIRE: Your Honor, I understood we might be
stopping now, but I just want to reiterate, we do have some
non-duplicative follow-up.
    THE COURT: How much more do you have?
    MR. McGUIRE: I would estimate maybe 20 minutes or
25 minutes.
    THE COURT: All right. Well, then we're stopping.
    MR. BELINFANTE: You've seen what that means in
lawyer time.
    THE COURT: I think the witness has been in good
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cheer and despite being on target for a long time.
    All right. I would like to start at 10:00 tomorrow,
and we'll see you then.
    MR. TYSON: Your Honor, just to -- so our timing is
clear, we'll start at 10:00 and our plan would be with
Mr. Barnes; is that correct?
    THE COURT: That's fine.
    MR. TYSON: Okay.
    THE COURT: And we'll talk again about schedule
tomorrow, but it seems like I just need to move my appointment
to another universe. So don't consider anything given on
Friday under the circumstances. I'll figure out your schedule
tomorrow, and I will act accordingly.
    MR. CROSS: Your Honor, one more thing just to maybe
end the day on a bit of good news.
    Without getting into specifics, I think we're very
close to a compromise on the issues -- some of the issues
raised with Mr. Persinger. Mr. Tyson and I have talked, and
I'll get back to him today, so hopefully, we'll have something
for Your Honor.
    THE COURT: That would be so pleasant.
    MR. CROSS: We figured. We figured. We set this up
yesterday. We're working on it.
    MR. TYSON: We are trying, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: That is so lovely. I'm sounding older
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and older, aren't I?
Okay. Thank you.
And for all of those who are in chairs without pads
of any variety, you have great seat power. I'm very admiring
of your stamina. You are -- you would not be -- as a matter of
security, if you wanted to bring in a tiny pad -- I think if
anyone had to go through it, that would be something else, but,
you know, they do have those that you can bring if you are -- I
don't want to be the source of anyone's backaches or other
aches.
    So -- all right. We will see you at 10:00 tomorrow,
and I'm excited -- so excited about the possible resolution of
that issue.
    MR. CROSS: I know. You're going to sleep great
tonight, Judge.
            THE COURT: Before long, I'm going to be singing
about -- isn't there a song -- one of the songs, I'm so
excited.
    All right, everyone. Let's go home.
    COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
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                            (The proceedings were thereby adjourned at 6:12
    PM.)

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I, SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR, Official Court Reporter of the United States District Court, for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, do hereby certify that the foregoing 279 pages constitute a true transcript of proceedings had before the said Court, held in the City of Atlanta, Georgia, in the matter therein stated.
In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand on this, the 24th day of January, 2024.
Dnarnor R.Wercu
SHANNON R. WELCH, RMR, CRR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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BY MR. BELINFANTE: [47] 12/11
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BY MR. CROSS: [51] 183/24 190/4 196/24 201/14 201/25 202/19 204/22 205/6 206/5 206/25 210/3 210/19 211/4 211/17 214/19 218/10 223/17 227/12 228/9 229/1 229/23 230/3 237/11 237/21 238/16 239/5 243/4 249/9 249/17 250/5 250/13 251/16 251/24 253/24 255/6 256/6 259/21 261/4 262/2 262/23 263/16 265/6 267/19 269/6 270/13 270/21 270/25 271/25 275/18 275/23 276/9
BY MR. TYSON: [6] 105/21 107/18 109/15 111/5 111/16 115/8
BY MS. KAISER: [21] 119/24 121/20 122/12 124/21 127/1 127/19 130/9 131/19 132/15 133/22 135/8 136/9 136/18 136/24 138/6 138/24 148/24 151/3 152/2 153/24 154/14
COURT REPORTER: [2] 42/10 138/18 COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: [10] 11/17 11/19 11/21 11/25 12/2 74/11 105/7 105/10 259/12 265/5
COURTROOM SECURITY OFFICER: [4] 65/16 182/13 259/8 279/20
MR. BELINFANTE: [181] 5/5 5/14 11/20 11/24 30/12 30/17 31/3 31/9 31/15 31/18 32/16 33/7 33/22 34/1 34/14 34/16 34/23 35/10 35/12 35/18 $35 / 2536 / 3$ 36/8 36/11 38/8 38/20 39/7 39/18 39/20 40/18 42/19 43/3 43/7 44/2 44/17 44/19 49/14 52/6 52/12 52/14 52/19 53/22 54/9 54/17 54/24 55/9 55/14 57/21 58/22 59/4 59/21 60/12 60/19 60/23 61/24 62/4 62/8 62/10 63/8 63/10 64/11 65/13 66/2 71/12 73/15 73/24 74/5 75/2 75/5 75/9 78/7 78/13 78/20 79/13 80/16 85/2 85/17 85/21 86/7 86/16 87/11 87/17 87/20 88/1 88/3 93/7 94/12 97/7 97/11 97/19 97/22 98/1 100/11 102/10 102/24 103/2 103/10 103/23 104/21 156/19 157/3 157/9 158/11 158/19 158/21 158/23 159/2 159/5 163/12 169/9 169/12 169/17 169/20 171/5 173/10 179/2 179/10 180/13 182/8 182/15 182/23 182/25 188/23 189/3 189/6 189/12 189/21 196/15 199/14 199/19 200/8 200/24 201/4 202/5 205/1 205/4 210/21 210/23 228/16 235/4 235/8 235/10 235/15 236/3 236/9 236/15 238/20 249/6 251/9 251/23 254/22 254/25 258/13 258/22 259/17 259/20 261/2 262/17 262/21 263/8 263/13 265/1 265/19 265/22 266/4 266/8 267/10 267/15 269/4 270/6 270/16 271/17 272/20 272/25 275/12 275/15 276/4 276/6 276/19 277/5 277/23

MR. BROWN: [2] 31/17 155/20 MR. CROSS: [146] 9/10 10/13 10/16 10/25 30/22 32/22 33/18 35/1 35/23 36/1 36/6 38/23 39/5 39/9 42/15 50/19 54/23 55/19 56/21 57/3 61/8 61/11 62/2 62/6 63/15 64/24 65/20 70/17 70/20 71/5 71/8 74/22 78/3 78/10 79/10 84/25 87/9 87/22 88/2 100/8 104/4 146/21 147/4 147/7 159/3 163/10 163/13 169/2 179/8 179/19 188/25 189/5 189/9 190/2 196/19 196/22 199/17 200/4 200/9 200/12 200/22 202/6 204/19 205/3 205/5 205/25 206/23 209/24 210/1 210/18 210/25 211/14 223/15 227/10 228/8 228/20 229/18 230/2 234/24 235/2 235/19 235/23 236/13 237/9 237/19 238/15 239/2 249/8 249/15 250/4 250/10 251/14 253/23 254/24 255/2 255/4 256/5 258/2 258/6 258/11 258/16 258/18 259/1 259/4 259/10 259/13 259/18 260/25 262/15 262/20 263/12 263/15 264/23 265/4 265/17 265/21 266/2 266/7 266/11 266/20 266/25 267/2 267/8 267/16 269/2 270/18 270/20 270/23 271/15 271/22 272/23 273/16 273/19 274/25 275/2 275/10 275/14 275/16 275/22 276/13 276/18 277/2 277/12 278/14 278/22 279/14
MR. FISHER: [1] 57/2
MR. McGUIRE: [6] 35/22 38/19 38/22 236/1 277/16 277/20
MR. MILER: [1] 8/11
MR. MILLER: [17] 5/16 5/21 6/3 6/8 6/13 6/15 6/21 6/23 7/2 7/5 7/21 8/5 8/14 8/20 9/15 10/3 10/22
MR. OLES: [3] 31/19 35/16 237/6
MR. TYSON: [31] 11/3 103/9 104/13 105/3 105/14 109/9 109/14 110/23 111/14 112/4 119/13 119/17 119/21 121/8 126/12 132/9 132/13 134/20 138/21 142/18 143/8 143/20 147/23 151/19 153/9 154/6 155/21 156/2 278/4 278/8 278/24
MS. KAISER: [31] 109/7 110/22 111/2 111/12 111/23 121/13 126/17 134/23 135/7 136/7 136/21 138/4 138/16 142/16 143/4 143/13 143/16 144/3 146/7 146/15 146/20 148/17 148/23 151/21 152/1 153/14 154/10 155/13 155/15 155/18 156/3
THE COURT: [358]
THE WITNESS: [134] 12/5 15/3 15/5 21/22 24/16 24/25 26/2 41/17 41/22 42/11 46/16 47/16 47/22 48/2 48/4 74/7 74/13 74/23 76/13 81/7 82/21 83/18 83/24 84/1 84/3 93/11 96/2 96/5 96/7 97/16 100/12 102/18 102/22 103/18 104/7 105/13 105/16 107/8 107/12 107/15 107/17 112/8 112/12 112/15 112/19 113/2 113/11 113/16 113/24 114/10 114/12 114/16 114/21 114/23 115/2 115/5 119/19 119/22 121/18 122/9 124/19 126/21 127/11 129/4 129/9 129/12 130/7 131/14 132/12 133/6 133/8 133/14 133/18 133/21 136/17 136/23 138/19 144/14 144/17 145/6 145/17 145/20 145/22 146/2

146/6 150/13 153/20 155/17 155/19 155/24 156/8 156/11 156/15 156/18 162/13 162/19 162/22 166/2 166/5 166/12 166/18 166/24 167/5 167/7 167/12 172/12 172/18 172/22 177/5 183/10 183/12 183/20 201/12 201/22 204/10 206/1 215/11 215/15 216/10 217/8 228/22 229/19 234/13 234/16 234/20 235/13 236/18 236/22 237/1 237/3 258/4 261/25 270/10 276/7

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| $' 20$ [2] 41/5 41/12 |
| '21 [6] 66/12 66/13 66/15 107/12 |
| $107 / 13273 / 15$ |
| '22 [6] 41/12 46/7 46/13 51/22 67/9 |
| $67 / 10$ |
| '22 voted [1] 41/12 |
| '23 [3] 46/11 46/13 46/15 |
| '23 and [1] 46/15 |
| '70s [1] 106/1 |
| - |
| - from [1] 37/2 |
| - or [1] 6/3 |
| -- physically [1] 114/23 |

...CONT'D [2] 2/25 3/1
. 05 [1] 257/11
0
00130421 [1] 158/17
07 [1] 136/16
1
1,000 [1] 83/14
1,420,303 [1] 37/18
1.0 [3] 205/10 207/3 207/11
1.1 [2] 207/3 207/11

10 [3] 141/11 143/13 206/14
10,000 [1] 218/2
10-4 [1] 232/7
100 [1] 230/2
100130421 [1] 158/19
104 [1] 227/11
104-page [1] 240/18
108 [5] 126/4 126/6 126/7 131/23
132/24
109 [1] 131/25
10:00 [1] 278/5
10:00 tomorrow [2] 278/2 279/11
10th [1] 207/25
11 [1] 1/10
11:30 [1] 65/21
1224 [2] 237/10 237/12
123 [1] 183/16
1230 [1] 35/19
1232 [2] 36/17 38/10
1233 [2] 36/23 38/10
1234 [3] 31/14 32/18 38/19
1235 [2] 37/21 38/14
1236 [3] 37/15 37/16 38/13
1237 [4] 37/4 37/9 38/11 38/15
1238 [2] 38/3 38/16
1242 [2] 158/15 240/6
1245 [1] 53/10
125 [1] 183/17

| 1 | 254/12 261/8 263/20 264/5 265/11 | 4th [1] 207/21 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 127 [2] 141/13 142/17 | 271/3 272/19 273/21 <br> 2022 [45] 18/16 34/8 37/12 37/17 37/24 | 5 |
| 1270 [1] 53/10 | 28/5 38/12 38/13 38/15 38/17 40/12 | 5.13 [5] 76/3 76/6 76/12 202/23 203/7 |
| 12th [1] 265/11 | 40/13 41/2 41/3 43/21 44/6 44/12 45/8 | 5.17 [20] 57/10 57/23 65/3 76/21 76/21 |
| 13 [2] 259/22 259/24 | 46/18 47/1 47/6 47/9 47/14 54/12 61/25 | 77/8 77/10 77/20 78/25 203/15 204/1 |
| 1383 [1] 1/25 | 62/8 63/5 63/11 63/20 64/13 67/4 67/13 | 204/10 204/17 205/8 205/13 207/18 |
| 14 [4] $261 / 5$ 261/14 261/19 261/20 | 75/13 76/2 76/7 76/15 125/18 128/2 | 208/5 208/12 250/9 267/20 |
| 15 [5] 79/24 261/18 261/24 261/25 | 132/4 203/13 206/16 207/21 219/25 | 5.5 [1] 212/8 |
| 262/5 | 222/24 268/2 | 5.5-A [2] 203/8 208/13 |
| 15 minutes [1] 65/17 | 2023 [9] 33/11 45/11 45/13 47/10 76/22 | 5.5.10.32 [1] 208/21 |
| 15-minute [2] 65/11 65/14 | 77/10 223/19 250/16 251/5 | 53 [1] 57/2 |
| 159 [4] 20/19 137/9 169/6 195/16 | 2024 [4] 1/13 5/2 75/23 280/13 | 54 [1] 53/4 |
|  | 21 [1] 154/17 | 55 [1] 53/5 |
| $\begin{gathered} 16[5] \\ 263 / 22 \end{gathered}$ | 21-2-267 [1] 242/8 | 56.9 percent [1] 38/7 |
| 165-bed [1] 106/9 | 215-1383 [1] 1/25 | 5665 [1] 262/25 |
| 17 [2] 131/23 265/7 | 22 [1] 159/16 | 58 [4] 248/6 248/7 248/8 248/9 |
| 18 [2] 254/7 257/6 | 220 [2] 217/23 218/1 | 59 [4] 248/7 248/7 248/8 248/11 |
| 184811 [1] 265/20 | 22nd [2] 259/25 260/10 | 5:00 [1] 170/25 |
| 18th [1] 254/11 | 23 [2] 163/13 244/19 | 5:30 [2] 182/19 235/2 |
| 19 [3] 121/21 159/8 159/11 | 2394 [1] 1/24 | 5:36 [1] 259/9 5th [2] 230/11 264/5 |
| 194 [7] 254/5 254/5 256/5 258/9 258/16 | 23rd [1] 33/10 | 5th [2] 230/11 264/5 |
| 258/19 259/17 |  | 6 |
| 1:00 [2] 97/18 97/23 | 24th [1] 280 | 605 [4] 211/22 212/22 276/15 277/7 |
| 1:00 now [1] 104/9 | 25 [5] 121/21 121/22 164/6 245/9 | 606 [3] 259/10 259/13 260/25 |
| 1:15 [2] 74/13 97/12 | 245/11 | 607 [3] 262/15 262/18 262/18 |
| 1:17-CV-2989-AT [1] 1/6 | 25 minutes [1] 277/21 | 608 [3] 263/17 264/23 265/4 |
| 1:20 [1] 74/7 | 26 [6] 51/24 55/23 56/3 57/15 67/23 | 609 [3] 265/17 265/20 267/16 |
| 1:40 [3] 65/13 74/5 74/7 | 146/1 | 61 [2] 248/14 248/18 |
| 1:40 I [1] 11/5 | 267 [1] 242/8 | 610 [1] 269/2 |
| 1st [3] 51/3 66/10 249/25 | 26th [1] 149/8 | 611 [1] 271/15 |
| 2 | 27 [8] 56/24 66/16 165/4 212/18 212/22 | 69 [1] 168/3 |
| 2,289,951 [1] 37/13 | 212/25 213/5 268/22 | 6:00 [3] 98/25 159/13 164/12 6:00 A.M [4] 98/8 98/20 159/10 159/12 |
| 2,400 [1] 195/19 | 279 [1] 280/9 <br> 27th [1] 268/5 | 6:00 A.M [4] 98/8 98/20 159/10 159/12 $6: 12[1] 279 / 21$ |
| 2,500 [1] 195/19 $\mathbf{2 . 0}$ [7] 205/20 205/25 206/3 206/15 | 27th [1] 268/5 <br> 28th [2] 66/13 66/15 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { :12[1] } 279 / 21 \\ & \text { 6th [3] } 45 / 1146 / 1147 / 10 \end{aligned}$ |
| 206/16 207/16 207/24 | 294 [2] 138/5 138/17 | 7 |
| 2.2 [1] 223/23 | $\begin{array}{lll} \mathbf{2 9 9}[1] & 136 / 16 \\ \mathbf{2 : 1 5} & \text { [37/16 104/7 } & 104 / 8 \end{array}$ | 701 [2] 53/8 85/7 |
| 2.2.1 [1] 223/25 20 |  | 71 [2] 53/10 159/23 |
| 20 [3] 32/11 38/16 132/4 | 3 | 74 percent [1] 43/22 |
| 20 hours [1] 113/15 20 minutes [4] 79/25 | 3,000 [1] 80/13 | 75 [1] 1/24 |
| $\begin{array}{r} 20 \text { minu } \\ 277 / 20 \end{array}$ | 3,962,030 [1] 38/6 | 77 [1] 53/5 |
| 20 years [1] 107/22 | 30 [5] 58/3 67/8 68/6 174/25 271/3 | 7:00 [3] 98/19 159/13 |
| 20.4 percent [1] 37/19 | 30 minutes [1] 73/8 | A.M [4] 98/5 98/20 |
| 2005 [1] 205/11 | 30,000 [6] 186/25 187/1 187/3 187/3 | 7:00 P.M [3] |
| 2015 [1] 14/16 | 187/13 $187 / 14$ | 8 |
| 2017 [5] 112/11 112/14 113/23 115/4 | 31 [1] 177/19 | 89 [3] 49/19 80/17 223/15 |
| 122/8 $1217121 / 24122 / 7$ | 33 [2] 178/17 178/24 | 8th [3] 37/17 37/24 38/5 |
| 2018 [3] 121/7 121/24 122/7 <br> 2019 [9] 6/25 7/3 14/16 17/6 17/7 17/22 | 36 [2] 136/13 136/20 | 9 |
| 33/11 225/15 225/21 | 3:41 [1] 182/14 |  |
| 2020 [45] 17/23 17/25 18/15 32/2 32/11 | 3rd [6] 54/12 63/11 67/4 75/13 268/2 | $90[2] 1 / 4171 / 5$ |
| 33/5 34/4 34/5 34/6 37/2 38/11 40/12 | 268/22 |  |
| 40/15 41/2 42/2 43/15 53/11 54/13 | 4 | 901 [1] 146/8 |
| 84/11 84/15 91/25 92/15 92/17 92/18 | 4.7 [2] 212/14 212/23 | 91 [1] 171/11 |
| 92/19 92/24 93/3 93/11 93/14 94/6 94/9 | 4.7.2 [1] 212/17 | 92 [1] 171/11 |
| 115/11 137/11 193/6 208/17 227/14 | 40 hours [1] 113/14 | 93 [2] 173/1 173/4 |
| 229/2 230/11 231/2 233/14 234/11 | 40 years [2] 106/5 107/21 | 94 [1] 173/10 |
| 234/14 259/25 260/10 269/8 | 40,000 [1] 186/22 | 94 percent [1] 44/13 |
| 2020's [1] 42/6 | 40-hour [1] 113/16 | 96614 [1] 262/19 |
| 2021 [35] 18/8 18/9 45/6 51/3 51/4 | 403 [2] 143/6 143/9 | 96615 [1] 262/19 |
| 66/10 72/22 72/22 94/24 115/11 121/24 | 404 [1] 1/25 | 969 [1] 53/10 |
| 134/5 134/5 137/22 146/1 149/8 149/12 | 45 minutes [2] 5/19 104/23 | 97 [1] 154/15 |
| 157/20 158/9 194/11 206/14 207/25 | 4578 [1] 263/2 | 98 [1] 154/17 |
| 219/1 219/14 222/24 253/16 254/7 | $\text { 4:00 [1] } 182 / 18$ | 99 [1] 53/5 |


absolute [1] 64/4
Absolutely [1] 139/21
absorb [1] 9/2
accept [4] 28/11 33/14 116/14 152/20 acceptable [2] 229/20 249/2
accepted [5] 28/13 37/11 37/13 38/2 277/7
access [32] 11/11 22/7 23/3 81/3 81/8 96/20 158/1 160/9 190/14 190/17
190/19 194/20 196/11 196/14 216/24 219/10 219/15 250/22 251/1 251/7
251/25 252/13 252/18 252/21 252/22
252/22 253/4 253/6 253/8 253/11
255/22 255/25
accessed [2] 255/21 255/24
accessible [2] 118/21 218/21
accessing [1] 273/13
according [1] 275/7
accordingly [2] 51/18 278/13
accreditation [1] 206/17
accuracy [5] 28/11 166/8 228/24 229/6 229/22
accurate [11] 20/4 32/10 36/20 36/25
57/22 102/1 158/8 161/17 164/8 248/24 250/20
aches [1] 279/10
acknowledge [1] 274/23
acquire [1] 149/3
acquired [2] 123/19 123/19
acronym [2] 127/18 206/10
across [14] 94/3 96/25 129/19 169/6
186/23 198/22 199/2 199/12 202/7
208/24 209/22 210/8 217/10 218/4
act [2] 140/18 278/13
action [2] 78/16 196/18
actions [2] 54/3 255/19
activation [1] 160/20
activities [2] 84/11 239/13
actual [10] 35/8 42/24 57/4 89/9
108/22 111/3 116/16 121/1 133/8
191/13
actually [28] 16/6 40/25 57/17 63/16
70/18 98/4 106/21 108/5 109/12 120/9 120/11 122/7 133/11 161/5 163/20
166/21 169/5 188/10 189/20 195/20
232/12 244/11 246/23 257/9 264/20
268/21 268/23 274/12
ADAM [1] 2/9
add [7] 55/22 61/8 80/1 146/7 213/23 217/9 236/10
added [1] 116/17
addition [2] 63/4 142/23
additional [12] 9/19 10/7 10/11 67/15 67/20 90/23 110/25 164/19 181/24 220/1 246/7 268/11
address [13] 35/15 47/18 51/7 52/6
54/5 66/18 75/10 104/19 114/4 116/5 117/8 118/3 230/23
addressed [2] 50/14 54/5
addressing [3] 69/16 148/13 173/7
adequate [2] 216/12 216/20
Adida [3] 6/18 220/25 221/2
adjourned [1] 279/21
adjust [1] 181/23
adjusting [1] 186/5
adjustments [1] 253/5
administer [2] 186/8 264/1
administered [1] 181/12
administering [1] 91/13
administration [8] 12/25 13/2 13/3
13/6 13/21 14/10 94/5 181/16
administrative [3] 161/13 161/13
268/12
administrator [1] 70/2
admiring [1] 279/4
admissibility [1] 71/11
admission [3] 138/16 138/22 266/15
admit [3] 142/16 148/16 277/12
admitted [12] 38/21 138/23 159/4
228/19 238/21 261/3 262/22 265/3
265/24 267/9 267/11 269/5
adopted [4] 53/9 135/1 206/15 207/24
advance [2] 75/5 198/15
advanced [34] 17/17 22/21 25/1 25/7 34/12 34/18 34/21 37/10 37/11 40/14 40/16 41/4 41/9 41/10 41/12 41/14 41/19 42/4 42/5 44/8 74/19 74/19 75/1 75/6 90/8 93/17 168/18 170/9 170/22
170/24 239/6 239/10 239/23 272/13
adverse [2] 60/15 60/18
advice [1] 168/4
advised [2] 78/17 213/24
adviser [2] 21/13 21/17
advisers [2] 21/10 21/11
advises [2] 213/18 214/2
advisories [2] 56/7 67/18
advisory [27] 51/11 51/25 53/13 55/7
62/9 62/11 63/21 63/24 66/24 66/24
67/1 67/3 67/5 67/9 68/10 203/13
221/13 221/23 223/18 268/1 268/6
268/10 268/19 268/22 268/24 270/12 274/11
affect [3] 152/13 152/15 198/7
affected [2] 33/4 123/20
affidavit [1] 30/2
affiliation [2] 16/16 16/19
affirmative [3] 133/25 137/2 137/11
affirmatively [1] 78/23
afield [1] 153/4
after [48] $1 / 6$ 8/17 $9 / 3$ 10/15 12/9 14/5 17/4 17/5 17/25 29/13 35/6 46/15 51/25 58/23 59/2 62/9 62/10 63/20 67/9 68/6
76/1 77/11 87/15 96/3 103/25 104/1 105/19 112/8 113/17 122/17 129/16 130/25 157/4 157/15 168/20 171/19 172/9 228/24 231/2 231/4 233/25 234/1 234/11 251/8 251/8 252/15 252/15 253/1
after-hours [1] 113/17
afternoon [8] 7/7 20/22 105/22 119/25
183/25 184/1 236/6 236/16
again [63] 21/8 32/6 32/22 33/1 34/7 42/10 43/18 44/22 48/8 56/9 64/14 74/3 79/14 81/19 86/20 92/18 102/2 103/3 104/5 118/17 126/12 132/16 143/22 148/3 153/13 169/25 170/2 172/16 173/9 173/15 178/14 183/4 187/19 191/20 193/6 195/1 198/13 198/17 200/3 202/6 207/6 207/23 208/9 213/3 214/8 218/3 227/3 229/22 230/4 243/17 250/16 253/4 255/12 256/24 257/16 258/18 264/12 266/12 266/13 267/11 269/12 275/11 278/9
against [5] 48/24 77/2 166/13 207/16 214/2
agencies [1] 59/23

## A

agency [9] 20/10 20/16 20/19 49/11
60/7 67/2 68/9 69/19 151/14
agent [2] 215/14 266/14
agents [1] 139/9
aggregates [1] 149/24
ago [5] 30/15 91/12 134/7 159/17 162/25
agree [13] 30/16 30/21 73/11 88/3
134/1 143/19 152/3 152/6 190/25 214/9
214/24 216/2 252/18
agreed [6] 71/4 187/24 191/20 199/17 232/11 245/23
agreement [1] 113/3
ahead [13] 14/11 26/12 43/7 48/6
65/25 76/10 104/14 111/4 111/15
120/15 157/11 163/14 174/20
AIDED [1] $1 / 21$
AL [2] $1 / 41 / 6$
Alabama [2] 14/9 33/11
alert [2] 222/13 272/18
alerted [2] 222/19 276/3
Alex [5] 51/9 66/20 250/14 250/14 253/4
all [227] 6/14 9/1 9/9 10/10 11/1 $12 / 20$ 17/24 18/10 19/4 19/10 20/6 20/9 20/19 21/13 21/20 22/14 24/22 25/8 25/9 26/8 26/17 27/14 33/1 33/13 34/7 34/19 35/5 $35 / 17$ 35/23 37/20 38/3 38/8 39/13 39/16 40/17 41/23 42/16 42/18 42/23 43/1 44/22 45/4 45/25 48/5 48/8 48/19 49/8 50/7 51/5 52/6 52/13 54/6 56/12 58/9 60/11 64/15 64/21 65/14 65/16 65/22 66/2 66/17 66/22 70/3 70/12 70/19 71/4 73/6 73/24 74/17 75/2 77/14 78/9 78/18 79/16 79/18 80/1 80/15 83/14 85/21 86/18 87/14 88/2 89/13 90/17 94/11 98/3 99/22 100/4 100/20 100/22 101/4 101/20 102/18 102/20 102/23 103/4 103/6 104/9 104/15 106/12 107/16 107/21 109/21 113/13 113/25 114/1 114/2 114/9 115/13 119/14 120/25 125/11 127/12 128/8 129/6 129/24 130/21 132/22 135/3 135/23 143/21 144/9 144/11 146/18 148/5 151/1 152/6 153/19 153/20 153/23 154/5 154/21 154/25 156/5 156/10 157/8 159/7 159/18 159/22 161/1 162/5 162/17 162/23 163/16 164/6 164/11 165/19 165/24 166/20 169/11 170/1 170/16 173/25 176/8 176/15 177/19 182/13 182/22 182/24 183/11 183/15 188/21 189/19 189/21 190/13 190/16 190/21 191/7 194/20 194/24 196/14 196/23 199/6 200/11
200/19 200/23 202/2 202/3 203/23
203/23 213/10 214/8 216/1 218/5 218/8 219/6 221/24 223/3 230/1 231/13 231/16 231/22 235/11 235/22 236/24 237/12 239/4 241/23 244/19 248/6 249/4 249/11 253/1 253/15 255/3 258/22 259/6 259/8 260/15 263/3 263/6 266/23 269/21 270/8 270/20 271/2 273/5 274/16 275/21 277/6 277/22 278/2 279/3 279/11 279/19 279/20
allegation [1] 223/4
allegations [2] 86/9 86/21
alleging [1] 33/3
allow [10] 5/12 11/14 30/2 30/3 69/13 196/21 202/16 246/6 247/23 276/5
allowed [6] 5/18 16/1 53/16 69/12 196/1 256/20
allowing [2] 97/11 216/24
allows [2] 129/18 257/23
ALLOY [1] 3/6
almost [4] 53/20 73/12 207/24 267/18
along [5] 36/3 84/18 120/13 178/7 273/9
Alpha [2] 33/10 33/10
already [16] 5/22 38/20 49/18 54/1
95/5 95/6 96/3 96/4 100/24 115/12 136/21 163/16 231/9 238/12 238/22 243/13
also [89] 6/18 7/5 9/18 13/1 13/15
15/11 18/19 20/1 20/18 20/22 22/21
24/18 25/11 28/9 33/12 34/17 36/20
37/16 47/2 48/16 53/8 56/16 56/25 57/3 58/15 59/9 60/14 61/2 64/25 67/5 67/6 70/1 82/10 85/5 89/24 90/8 90/25 100/23 101/1 110/14 111/20 115/4 128/19 141/4 142/25 147/15 158/3 158/15 161/24 165/4 167/13 170/12 172/19 172/20 172/21 175/14 176/13 176/25 177/3 187/9 196/6 196/25 197/13 204/1 204/20 217/4 221/1 221/20 224/5 225/3 225/25 231/13 231/20 232/24 237/6 238/25 240/25 241/5 243/2 245/7 245/18 245/25 246/8 247/6 247/14 249/3 253/4 256/13 273/13
alter [1] 188/6
alternative [3] 160/14 160/16 160/18
Although [2] 65/5 238/18
altogether [1] 99/16
always [5] 82/19 124/15 165/6 183/18 183/19
am [16] 12/16 13/11 19/9 20/8 53/20
58/20 59/25 60/3 64/12 65/21 73/20
144/22 147/21 188/13 190/21 255/8
amazing [1] 75/8
AMERICA [1] 280/3
among [1] 67/12
amount [3] 79/22 189/25 202/16
ample [1] 266/13
AMY [1] 1/11
analysis [4] 19/25 117/22 117/23 142/10
analyst [2] 14/18 14/24
analysts [1] 150/7
ANDREU [1] $2 / 10$
ANDREU-VON [1] 2/10
Android [1] 190/19
annual [1] 192/23
another [16] 9/3 19/6 75/7 78/21 86/13 92/10 96/20 97/17 116/8 165/2 170/2 191/24 204/8 215/12 274/7 278/11
answer [30] 40/25 41/6 42/10 42/24
43/2 51/13 60/17 70/13 82/13 87/11 92/5 121/12 122/3 126/11 126/13 126/16 131/9 132/7 138/18 151/24 153/11 153/13 153/18 154/5 154/21 214/14 214/16 214/18 255/17 270/16 answered [8] 23/21 30/5 95/5 153/10 153/10 154/25 163/17 199/25
answers [4] 54/16 56/16 64/22 111/24
anticipate [6] 6/4 6/10 6/18 7/5 7/22 156/3
anticipated [3] 7/15 8/8 57/5
anticipating [4] 6/1 7/24 8/24 169/18 antithesis [1] 116/8
any [115] 1/8 9/11 13/17 16/4 20/6 22/12 23/10 26/7 28/23 33/4 34/24 35/9 35/14 35/20 38/18 41/20 49/8 51/23 52/4 52/4 52/4 52/25 57/4 57/8 57/8 57/11 60/10 61/17 61/19 61/22 63/21 67/24 68/10 68/25 74/9 75/13 84/10 84/14 85/16 86/5 89/17 91/15 91/22 95/3 95/9 95/12 98/15 102/2 102/15 102/15 108/1 118/1 118/1 118/19 119/10 123/1 130/5 130/24 130/24 134/9 134/21 139/22 140/2 140/19 144/8 147/6 152/17 155/16 165/8 169/5 170/6 175/12 180/18 180/19 184/9 184/10 184/13 184/16 184/18 185/19 188/13 189/19 190/23 191/15 194/14 194/14 195/22 201/9 201/19 205/17 215/22 222/18 223/4 223/4 225/3 225/8 232/20 232/21 232/24 233/23 239/17 240/1 240/3 250/22 252/1 253/8 255/13 258/19 260/16 262/12 270/4 272/21 277/9 277/11 279/4
anybody [7] 9/16 25/10 50/21 124/13 145/6 153/1 250/21
anyone [18] 52/20 103/13 150/3 156/10 185/10 198/6 211/5 211/9 221/8 221/9 221/12 221/13 222/3 222/4 270/2 272/17 276/2 279/7
anyone's [1] 279/9
anything [38] 25/25 33/4 50/9 52/2 52/3 54/7 56/11 64/2 69/5 71/15 73/7 75/15 81/12 82/14 83/22 88/7 91/10 92/23 95/9 104/19 104/21 106/13 118/1 125/8 145/1 148/3 150/18 156/7 194/22 200/20 201/1 216/18 241/14 241/15
264/18 270/8 274/13 278/11
anyway [2] 70/14 72/6
anywhere [2] 113/14 170/25
apart [1] 67/14
apex [1] 123/14
apologies [2] 136/19 153/5
apologize [1] 5/17
apparently [1] 9/7
appear [3] 32/10 146/11 158/7
appeared [1] 42/25
appears [3] 5/7 32/13 69/21
appendices [1] 237/13
apples [2] 199/23 218/2
application [5] 47/3 64/16 77/14
131/16 207/20
applications [5] 15/7 47/8 47/12 155/8 271/12
applied [3] 50/13 50/18 75/21 apply [1] 108/4
applying [1] 93/23
appointment [4] 6/11 7/10 7/17 278/10 appreciate [4] 119/18 119/19 121/18 156/15
approach [11] 30/18 31/9 32/19 36/8 40/18 49/14 53/9 94/12 136/7 158/21 270/23
approached [1] 218/18
approaching [1] 71/17
appropriate [12] 31/5 52/9 59/13 71/12

## A

appropriate... [8] 72/17 73/1 100/20
112/5 152/9 153/6 154/2 154/19
approval [2] 76/12 220/20
approved [1] 76/18
approximately [4] 120/22 121/24 122/10 236/21
April [7] 14/16 45/8 46/7 46/25 271/3 273/15 273/21
April 30 [1] 271/3
APT [2] 239/10 239/12
architecture [2] 272/4 272/12
archives [1] 45/20
archiving [1] 115/13
are [323]
area [5] 133/12 139/4 178/19 244/6 246/8
aren't [3] 39/14 216/24 279/1
arguably [1] 274/6
argue [2] 39/11 274/13
argument [5] 52/9 57/15 57/15 57/23 200/19
arguments [1] 201/4
arise [1] 144/1
arises [1] 143/10
around [25] 13/14 14/16 47/6 60/16 80/13 82/8 90/2 93/19 112/11 112/14 115/4 115/15 116/7 137/1 166/17 171/1 192/24 193/2 193/6 193/9 193/10
195/19 236/22 248/19 253/16
arranged [1] 243/20
arrangement [2] 123/9 123/10
arrangements [1] 116/25
arrival [2] 112/10 112/11
arrive [2] 29/14 159/13
articulate [1] 241/14
articulated [1] 241/16
articulating [1] 241/21
artifact [1] 234/21
as [298]
as-needed [1] 113/4
Ashburn [1] 127/16
aside [2] 187/21 264/12
ask [56] 24/21 30/13 30/18 37/7 39/24
50/8 62/22 74/20 75/14 81/12 83/12
86/20 87/2 87/3 91/22 94/19 94/19 94/25 95/3 121/17 126/15 126/20 127/21 131/6 131/9 132/16 134/21 135/4 135/6 141/10 146/18 153/15 159/22 162/7 163/10 164/23 164/24 172/9 183/4 185/19 189/17 193/18 197/8 209/14 211/5 234/3 251/10 252/11 264/13 270/3 271/23 275/9 275/16 275/22 276/19 276/24
asked [51] 24/9 41/1 53/25 57/4 57/18
62/23 67/10 73/19 82/16 85/2 85/25
86/6 114/16 120/4 121/6 121/23 126/9 126/17 126/19 127/20 128/13 128/23 130/18 130/19 131/4 132/16 134/23 137/25 151/21 153/9 153/25 154/18 157/4 159/9 161/2 165/4 189/20 189/24 193/19 196/17 196/20 199/25 200/12 210/4 223/3 223/9 228/2 233/5 244/21 250/7 274/4
asking [18] 54/15 54/18 82/18 82/20 85/11 86/15 87/12 92/2 93/7 95/9 110/23 125/21 128/6 132/19 189/9

202/16 202/20 213/24
asks [1] 66/16
aspects [2] 181/22 238/23
asserted [3] 143/5 228/19 265/25
assess [5] 20/20 63/15 69/14 69/14 70/16
assessed [1] 70/4
assessing [2] 77/12 106/14
assessment [13] 108/21 108/22 110/1
111/20 111/21 112/7 112/14 112/17
114/18 118/14 152/12 152/18 152/19
assessments [1] 129/16
assessor [1] 152/22
assets [1] 150/23
assigned [2] 162/11 213/16
assistance [5] 48/9 48/11 48/13
149/11 149/16
assisting [1] 148/13
associated [1] 82/9
Association [9] 13/13 18/24 19/1 19/2
19/8 19/11 19/15 89/25 181/3
assume [6] 97/24 147/13 159/1 200/6 232/7 232/17
assumed [1] 127/25
assuming [3] 135/4 142/21 164/16
ATLANTA [11] $1 / 2$ 1/25 5/2 106/8 117/3 123/5 127/14 127/16 133/5 280/8 280/10
attached [4] 1/4 79/1 229/9 272/3
attaching [2] 1/7 257/10
attachment [2] 261/10 262/16
attacker [1] 224/4
attempt [1] 232/24
attempting [1] 121/9
attempts [1] 170/6
attend [3] 19/12 19/17 74/4
attended [1] 13/20
attention [3] 59/18 103/16 110/13
attorney [4] 131/8 154/4 270/7 270/9
attorney-client [1] 270/7
attorneys' [3] 51/15 276/21 277/10
Auburn [5] 12/25 13/1 13/10 13/16 14/5
audit [4] 9/20 10/5 56/7 67/19
audits [4] 9/20 10/7 10/11 64/18
August [10] 14/16 18/9 33/10 66/12
193/2 193/6 253/16 254/7 254/11 257/6
August 18 [2] 254/7 257/6
August 18th [1] 254/11
August 23rd [1] 33/10
authenticate [3] 143/11 143/25 146/8
authentication [6] 142/19 143/7
143/10 143/17 143/22 144/8
authority [1] 33/16
authorization [2] 256/22 257/13
authorized [2] 51/17 98/16
AutoMARK [2] 15/21 185/8
availability [2] 6/17 7/8
available [37] 24/14 24/17 24/20 25/10
25/12 25/15 25/17 25/17 26/4 26/7 26/8
26/25 39/14 46/24 62/23 75/19 76/21
80/7 80/10 81/2 92/1 100/21 129/23
148/12 158/3 158/16 160/25 185/18
195/12 198/6 198/8 198/16 201/24
218/21 236/6 236/16 247/8
average [1] 140/17
avid [1] 25/22
avoid [4] 87/15 197/13 197/17 239/20
aware [72] 21/5 66/22 84/10 85/10 86/9 86/21 86/23 109/16 111/17 170/6 170/12 180/23 188/9 188/13 188/13 190/9 190/21 191/15 191/18 193/23 194/14 194/16 196/10 198/22 199/1 199/4 199/20 200/1 201/9 201/11 201/12 202/2 202/10 202/20 202/21 208/5 211/9 214/13 218/12 218/14 219/7 219/8 223/4 225/3 225/8 225/21 225/24 225/25 226/4 232/24 233/6 237/17 238/5 238/9 239/21 239/22 239/25 240/5 247/6 247/9 247/13 247/21 248/1 248/2 248/5 250/21 251/5 251/17 251/19 251/25 252/8 268/5
away [2] 116/19 173/7
awesome [1] 120/3

## B

B-L-A-K-E [1] 12/6
bachelor's [2] 12/23 13/1
back [68] 6/25 7/14 24/9 27/24 27/24
28/12 28/13 39/24 46/4 55/15 59/23
70/10 73/25 76/1 85/21 92/17 96/9
101/2 110/17 113/7 113/8 117/24
117/25 121/1 135/13 141/4 141/7 149/7
149/19 150/9 152/18 156/20 168/1
168/12 168/25 168/25 169/22 169/25 170/3 173/23 174/2 175/12 182/17 182/21 183/4 186/16 189/14 191/2 191/17 207/17 207/23 210/2 225/12 226/17 228/3 229/15 229/21 236/16 236/19 248/19 250/4 254/2 255/17 256/14 263/3 266/8 277/13 278/19
backaches [1] 279/9
backed [1] 76/9
background [4] 53/6 64/15 105/25 146/24
backup [7] 101/17 168/1 168/5 186/11 224/13 225/1 256/21
bad [2] 118/19 141/5
badge [1] 98/17
balance [1] 152/17
balancing [1] 140/18
ball [1] 110/16
ballot [194] 15/7 15/19 16/11 22/8 22/9 22/10 23/3 23/4 23/4 23/5 24/7 24/15 25/4 25/13 26/10 26/12 26/14 26/24 27/3 27/7 27/10 27/11 27/14 27/15 27/17 27/20 27/24 27/25 28/4 28/6 28/9 28/11 28/17 29/3 29/9 29/12 29/13 29/16 29/20 29/21 29/22 29/23 29/23 29/24 30/1 30/3 30/4 30/7 30/9 42/7 42/8 42/12 42/13 42/13 42/17 42/24 43/19 43/20 44/10 44/11 44/14 44/15 47/2 47/3 77/14 79/24 80/10 80/14 82/7 84/19 84/21 86/25 87/8 91/3 91/6 92/2 92/6 92/7 92/9 92/10 92/11 92/12 92/15 92/16 93/23 93/24 94/5 95/10 95/20 96/6 96/7 96/9 96/10 96/13 96/16 96/19 96/21 96/22 96/25 97/2 97/3 97/5 101/18 101/25 102/4 102/6 102/7 109/2 109/5 109/23 110/2 110/20 111/7 111/18 114/21 114/22 115/11 119/8 125/14 128/7 128/7 129/4 133/8 135/11 160/10 160/15 160/21 160/21 160/21 160/22 168/8 168/15 168/21 168/23 171/20 171/24 172/1 173/21 174/11 174/12 174/14 174/24 176/8 176/11
ballot... [50] 176/16 176/17 177/12 177/22 179/23 180/2 180/6 180/10 180/10 180/15 180/20 181/5 181/14 182/3 182/3 182/5 182/6 182/6 184/19 184/22 185/2 186/5 186/11 186/23 187/7 187/10 187/21 187/22 187/25 188/4 188/7 188/21 191/7 195/25 196/2 196/6 196/25 197/18 198/12 224/19 231/15 242/3 242/21 243/9 243/19 244/7 244/12 246/7 253/6 264/8 ballot-building [7] 109/2 109/5 109/23 110/2 110/20 111/7 111/18 ballot-marking [45] 22/8 23/3 42/7 42/12 43/20 44/10 44/14 77/14 79/24 80/10 80/14 84/19 84/21 86/25 87/8 91/3 91/6 101/18 101/25 102/4 102/7 115/11 119/8 125/14 128/7 133/8 160/21 171/20 171/24 172/1 174/11 174/12 174/14 174/24 180/6 180/20 181/5 181/14 186/5 186/11 186/23 187/7 191/7 246/7 253/6
balloting [1] 244/6
ballots [91] 16/5 16/5 23/8 23/12 23/15 24/10 24/12 24/14 24/17 24/20 24/21 25/5 25/9 25/9 25/15 26/3 26/9 26/25 27/4 28/14 28/17 28/20 28/22 28/24 37/11 37/13 37/25 38/1 38/1 38/2 42/1
42/21 43/15 44/7 80/2 80/4 81/16 81/18 89/4 89/9 89/14 91/13 91/16 91/21 92/1 92/16 95/11 95/14 95/19 97/5 129/6 137/8 160/24 163/20 165/8 168/5 172/1 172/14 173/22 174/23 176/12 176/14 176/15 178/6 178/8 179/14 179/14 179/15 179/23 179/24 180/1 180/25 181/7 181/13 184/6 184/10 187/14 187/16 195/12 195/21 197/21 202/4 224/14 224/18 224/25 224/25 225/4 225/9 225/22 231/14 242/14
ballpark [1] 81/23
ballpoint [4] 190/6 190/7 190/9 191/2 barcodes [1] 57/7
Barnes [39] 6/9 6/10 6/12 6/13 8/24
77/23 78/4 78/4 78/8 78/17 126/24
131/6 131/18 131/20 182/16 182/21
183/12 183/20 204/23 209/5 211/19
220/16 221/1 221/18 227/19 228/2
228/6 228/10 228/13 229/7 229/24
243/12 246/8 254/11 254/11 255/10
255/16 256/25 278/6
Barnes' [1] 129/5
Barneses [1] 211/20
Barron [1] 17/20
Bartow [1] 6/24
based [24] 24/2 39/2 39/22 58/7 62/22
68/11 81/14 86/3 86/25 93/5 131/1
131/1 135/19 140/13 141/9 152/12
160/7 181/2 191/9 201/20 215/23
232/17 262/10 268/6
basic [2] 108/13 208/13
basically [5] 34/19 59/22 59/23 106/13 142/7
basis [14] 47/19 52/25 60/2 67/23
72/21 79/2 108/15 113/5 142/19 144/1 151/19 153/21 246/19 273/4
batch [5] 28/13 28/18 28/19 149/24 150/4

Bates [2] 158/16 262/19
Bates-labeled [2] 158/16 262/19 battery [2] 101/17 186/11
Bay [1] 53/17
be [291]
bear [1] 139/24
bearings [1] 67/1
bears [2] 272/23 274/4
Beaver [6] 60/24 110/13 113/9 113/10 124/2 124/4
became [2] 18/8 218/20
because [78] 9/11 10/17 16/12 24/10
25/3 25/9 30/23 35/6 37/6 39/7 46/21
51/14 55/2 59/15 60/3 62/17 64/5 65/1
66/22 71/13 72/17 73/3 73/20 74/24
76/25 77/11 78/23 82/7 82/14 94/16
96/10 97/18 112/21 113/23 116/9
116/20 120/19 126/18 128/13 128/14
128/17 129/13 131/2 131/7 135/23
146/11 147/13 147/22 148/8 148/19
152/15 152/21 153/22 156/9 158/12
165/6 166/15 182/4 191/21 197/18
202/17 216/5 217/11 217/23 218/18
235/17 244/10 244/14 247/4 250/23
256/7 258/7 262/3 267/5 274/4 274/8 274/11 275/11
becomes [1] 274/1
bed [1] 106/9
BEDARD [1] 3/5
been [106] 6/15 10/17 10/22 12/9 18/12 18/17 18/17 18/19 19/14 30/14 31/13 34/7 36/16 37/3 40/22 45/11 46/10 48/12 49/6 49/19 50/9 50/14 51/1 53/24 53/25 54/3 54/6 58/24 58/25 59/1 60/17 63/16 66/25 67/22 68/21 69/4 69/15 69/15 70/4 71/23 73/16 86/21 105/19 108/18 115/6 115/12 115/15 122/24 123/12 125/19 126/23 126/23 126/24 127/23 134/8 137/22 141/25 142/3 144/22 146/22 150/6 150/11 150/17 152/20 157/15 169/23 172/1 172/2 172/20 174/12 181/13 182/6 186/2 188/14 193/3 193/5 193/11 201/21 203/8 217/10 221/15 221/17 221/24 222/14 222/19 223/1 223/5 226/2 238/12 238/21 239/17 239/22 239/22 243/10 244/20 248/5 255/8 255/21 255/21 269/21 269/22 271/18
273/13 276/3 276/23 277/25
before [54] 1/11 5/6 8/19 10/3 11/3 12/19 22/16 27/5 43/10 44/4 44/4 46/15 49/20 65/1 65/18 67/24 71/21 73/19 88/16 92/5 95/14 96/8 97/12 98/19 105/4 108/20 153/18 155/3 157/21 158/6 161/1 162/6 174/6 183/3 184/3 188/12 191/18 198/2 198/3 198/4 198/5 210/22 211/12 225/13 226/3 237/16 238/21 244/13 244/16 255/16 255/23 268/16 279/16 280/10
began [7] 45/6 47/11 77/23 80/2 93/17 110/2 204/4
begin [9] 28/16 45/4 80/4 99/15 99/17 101/21 167/8 171/18 204/15
beginning [10] 10/23 99/19 146/22
161/15 163/7 165/7 168/11 174/16 193/1 266/24
begins [3] 164/22 183/3 264/4
behalf [6] 2/22 61/18 64/8 68/9 145/24

146/18
behest [1] 113/8
being [27] 21/16 39/17 73/18 82/5 83/10 86/2 98/15 108/15 109/13 121/2 121/6 125/16 128/17 153/25 156/14 180/19 186/10 187/23 190/7 192/2 192/5 220/5 266/19 273/2 274/10 274/12 278/1
belabor [1] 78/21
belief [2] 234/4 246/19
believe [53] 7/2 11/5 34/2 46/18 54/17 55/21 60/21 76/3 94/3 104/21 108/17 112/4 118/3 118/16 120/4 120/22 123/14 130/24 133/23 134/12 135/11 143/6 146/2 146/9 149/7 152/9 153/6 155/5 158/24 159/18 185/1 185/17 194/7 196/16 199/5 211/8 217/17 217/19 217/22 220/24 222/15 223/18 224/21 225/6 226/17 226/18 228/17 233/15 234/16 246/14 249/24 262/12 266/13
believed [1] 117/18 believes [1] 144/7
BELINFANTE [14] 3/4 3/6 4/6 4/12 52/1 56/9 61/11 63/17 69/8 194/7
200/15 210/4 240/19 244/21
Belinfante's [2] 61/15 230/5
Bellew [1] 255/9
below [2] 239/13 260/8
BEN [4] 2/6 220/25 221/2 256/9
BENCH [1] 1/10
benefit [4] 20/25 71/3 237/3 237/5
benefits [2] 123/20 123/22
beside [1] 16/13
besides [4] 15/23 29/3 146/11 201/19
best [12] 19/5 20/23 60/3 88/22 90/4
112/23 135/22 142/15 144/20 151/2 214/5 218/8
bet [3] 155/19 155/24 156/15
better [15] 8/1 11/18 31/1 52/15 71/23
73/9 74/10 110/18 117/2 118/16 120/21 123/12 145/14 150/9 251/22
between [16] 10/20 28/21 42/1 44/9
44/9 46/13 59/5 60/14 91/6 98/20 98/25
164/12 198/8 208/2 221/22 222/3
beyond [2] 143/1 264/17
big [1] 116/7
bigger [1] 57/16
bin [3] 168/8 168/9 168/16
binder [15] 25/1 25/12 136/10 141/11 143/14 154/15 204/19 204/25 205/2
206/24 253/23 254/5 257/5 261/23
267/20
binding [1] 90/20
birth [1] 27/1
bit [18] 6/16 11/11 27/4 37/6 40/25
71/18 72/1 103/24 120/13 122/10 184/5
184/21 186/24 216/6 218/3 226/5
248/14 278/15
BLAKE [12] 4/5 4/11 11/24 12/5 12/8 61/16 157/14 202/20 266/5 266/5 266/6 273/9
blank [1] 26/15
blends [1] 256/8
block [2] 41/19 263/13
blue [1] 150/23
BMD [65] 42/17 75/16 87/19 88/5 95/10 96/4 96/14 96/20 101/16 102/16 128/3

## B

BMD... [54] 130/1 131/1 132/3 133/2 160/10 161/2 161/6 161/15 163/17 163/18 163/20 163/24 170/3 170/6
172/5 181/22 181/24 182/2 182/3 182/6 186/1 188/10 190/5 190/8 190/10 190/20 197/19 199/6 201/15 202/8 204/17 208/24 209/1 209/7 226/14 226/21 232/25 232/25 234/5 244/11 244/15 244/23 245/6 245/14 245/18 248/12 248/18 248/20 248/24 252/4 252/13 253/8 253/11 264/8
BMD-based [1] 131/1 BMDs [35] 57/7 75/22 101/4 101/7 101/11 102/13 102/18 157/4 162/13 162/16 172/4 172/5 181/18 186/19 187/1 187/3 187/13 197/14 197/18 197/21 200/15 208/20 220/2 220/17 226/2 233/11 233/20 233/23 233/25 245/21 247/7 247/22 249/13 264/14 269/8
BMDs' [1] 227/22
board [14] 89/10 90/1 95/17 114/1
178/22 197/7 197/8 197/11 197/12
217/1 224/24 240/16 250/24 257/10
boilerplate [2] 142/1 $145 / 8$
book [1] 146/6
bookmakers [1] 53/17
boot [2] 99/17 164/22
booth [11] 24/15 25/19 26/16 188/20
196/2 243/8 243/13 244/1 244/2 248/9 248/11
booths [3] 187/16 242/13 243/10 both [14] 55/23 58/10 71/22 102/13
150/10 150/12 168/17 181/17 181/21
181/21 206/17 221/15 265/10 277/8
bottom [20] 33/23 34/20 132/24 149/1
175/1 178/19 178/23 206/21 207/2
207/7 212/15 223/21 228/17 230/9
239/9 245/11 262/25 263/2 264/3 266/6
bound [4] 61/16 64/10 64/11 64/13
box [8] 27/12 29/7 117/21 150/10
168/8 213/5 213/9 213/15
BOYLE [1] $3 / 9$
BRAD [1] $1 / 6$
brain [3] 106/8 123/24 151/11
branched [1] 108/12
breach [4] 56/6 67/18 194/14 275/4
breaches [2] 194/10 218/25
break [20] 7/15 9/3 11/2 11/11 58/4
65/11 65/14 65/21 72/18 101/20 103/25
104/20 104/25 182/14 195/9 235/16
236/25 258/1 258/7 259/9
breakdown [1] 37/14
breaking [1] 191/15
breaks [1] 275/3
bridge [1] 147/22
brief [18] 5/11 11/13 36/7 36/13 65/1 65/21 65/23 103/22 104/18 105/6 119/16 155/14 156/25 157/12 182/14 236/14 259/9 276/12
briefly [8] $12 / 20$ 20/12 101/4 105/24 119/13 218/25 246/5 253/15
bring [12] 11/14 23/8 25/19 61/14 160/10 160/21 196/6 236/11 253/17 253/19 279/6 279/8
bringing [1] 110/17
broad [1] 58/10
broader [4] 35/7 65/5 70/25 273/12 broadest [1] 59/17
broke [1] 161/1
broken [6] 164/17 191/21 226/14
226/18 226/22 231/9
brought [6] 11/6 63/21 110/13 142/13
161/13 188/25
BROWN [2] 2/15 2/15
BRUCE [2] 2/15 2/15
BRYAN [2] 3/7 3/7
bubble [1] 16/18
bubbled [1] 16/19
Buc [1] 236/10
Buc-ee's [1] 236/10
bucket [1] 113/3
budget [1] 124/15
bug [1] 108/14
build [1] 216/15
building [10] 45/6 80/2 91/21 109/2
109/5 109/23 110/2 110/20 111/7 111/18
built [2] 26/11 83/6
bunch [3] 140/6 140/8 258/7
business [13] 2/11 53/15 85/7 109/21
113/19 114/1 114/9 114/13 128/15
128/19 129/15 152/24 153/2
button [11] 101/21 161/10 162/8 163/4
163/5 163/6 166/13 191/12 255/1 255/4 255/5
buzzPost [1] 241/16
C
cabinets [2] 231/6 231/21
cable [1] 102/7
calendar [1] 193/2
California [1] 218/12
call [14] 11/21 11/24 34/4 34/6 73/25
77/20 105/4 117/15 127/4 127/6 156/20
192/3 241/13 241/13
called [15] 5/6 14/8 29/11 48/12 61/4 85/25 106/22 127/17 129/16 133/17
136/4 156/14 202/3 209/17 261/25
calling [7] 6/18 6/19 7/5 7/22 50/20 60/14 211/19
calls [4] 84/25 87/9 221/24 249/7
came [14] 74/18 106/2 122/7 124/12
128/10 141/6 143/23 144/19 145/23
147/4 147/18 150/19 266/21 267/3
cameras [1] 129/22
campaign [2] 198/10 198/11
CAMPBELL [1] 2/6
can [220] 7/17 7/18 9/2 9/14 10/21
13/25 14/2 14/4 16/12 22/3 22/14 22/19 23/6 24/21 25/18 26/9 26/10 26/11 26/13 26/14 26/15 26/25 27/12 27/12 27/12 27/19 28/1 29/12 29/21 29/22 29/25 30/1 30/17 30/17 30/19 31/5 33/23 34/16 35/5 35/15 39/11 42/16 42/18 42/21 44/17 46/3 47/3 47/5 48/17 50/21 51/4 52/22 53/11 53/13 53/23 54/12 55/23 58/4 60/13 61/17 61/20 62/25 64/23 64/24 65/5 65/6 65/18 65/19 67/25 70/15 70/17 71/1 71/2 73/22 73/25 78/15 78/16 78/19 80/25 81/3 81/8 86/10 87/3 87/20 88/16 93/7 96/8 96/9 96/15 96/17 96/20 97/13
97/25 99/18 100/24 101/1 101/2 101/20

101/23 101/24 101/25 102/1 104/14 104/17 105/14 109/5 110/24 114/4 114/4 117/13 120/21 121/10 121/16 125/22 126/13 126/14 133/3 133/3 134/10 135/6 140/11 144/10 146/8 151/4 153/12 154/15 158/1 159/13 160/5 160/10 161/8 161/11 161/14 161/16 161/17 161/18 162/5 164/21 165/11 165/11 167/15 168/1 168/9 168/13 169/2 170/2 170/15 170/24 171/12 172/3 172/4 173/13 173/22 179/2 179/19 180/4 182/21 188/6 188/11 189/4 190/6 190/9 191/15 192/7 194/19 194/22 195/8 197/3 198/25 199/15 200/2 200/8 204/19 209/24 210/18 211/14 212/7 214/14 218/8 226/12 227/5 227/10 229/15 230/23 234/1 234/24 235/5 235/20 237/9 237/19 241/6 246/4 247/7 247/14 247/22 247/24 248/9 248/11 248/14 248/18 249/15 250/4 250/10 253/23 254/14 257/1 258/3 258/8 259/22 263/12 263/13 267/14 267/23 268/12 271/24 273/6 273/11 274/23 277/13 279/8
can't [23] 7/19 33/1 39/11 39/12 39/15 42/16 63/15 72/8 117/15 129/1 150/6 152/13 154/6 156/6 169/5 225/13 234/7 239/23 242/20 251/1 253/4 253/6 270/16
cancel [2] 7/17 30/1
candidate [1] 140/15
candidate's [3] 16/14 16/15 16/17
candidly [4] 72/8 73/4 82/14 276/22
cannot [4] 16/9 134/9 198/12 257/12
capability [1] 139/19
capable [1] 234/4
capacities [1] 91/14
capacity [1] 85/19
card [36] 22/7 23/3 96/20 101/23
159/25 160/9 160/12 160/13 161/11 161/12 161/20 161/22 162/14 166/11 168/19 168/20 168/20 168/21 168/24 168/25 169/22 169/23 172/10 172/11 172/12 172/16 246/1 246/4 246/6 246/11 246/15 246/16 246/24 247/16 247/17 247/24
cards [12] 167/10 167/12 167/14
167/20 172/3 178/5 178/7 204/16 247/6 247/13 247/13 247/21
care [3] 11/17 106/7 108/23
cared [1] 130/20
career [2] 106/4 120/19
Carolina [4] 181/19 199/6 201/16 201/20
carriers [2] 101/11 102/13
carry [1] 239/13
carve [1] 29/10
carve-out [1] 29/10
CARY [1] 2/20
case [42] $4 / 26 / 36 / 259 / 1211 / 2316 / 17$ 48/12 51/15 52/10 52/15 53/11 53/19 54/1 55/11 60/21 64/6 69/7 69/9 71/22 99/11 99/15 101/14 102/14 108/18 146/19 146/22 153/21 153/21 156/2 164/15 164/17 172/6 172/6 184/3 188/10 188/17 196/15 211/20 233/10 243/18 256/15 275/3

## C

cases [9] 16/14 16/15 85/8 98/17
101/13 102/17 102/18 102/20 180/23
casings [1] 101/10
cast [28] 23/5 27/6 41/9 41/18 42/9
42/13 42/17 42/24 43/15 43/19 44/7
173/22 176/14 176/17 179/23 179/24
180/1 180/6 180/10 180/19 180/21
182/6 184/18 187/18 198/12 231/14
231/15 244/16
casting [2] 42/24 242/3
castle [2] 141/3 141/4
casts [1] 27/10
catastrophic [2] 106/7 106/9
categories [1] 34/13
causing [2] 82/5 266/16
CC [1] 266/6
center [27] 13/9 13/12 13/13 13/17 14/8 19/20 106/7 106/10 109/2 109/17 125/19 126/2 126/10 127/3 127/6 127/7 127/9 127/21 130/11 130/14 134/16 135/9 137/7 140/7 151/8 151/10 151/22 centers [2] 127/10 127/13
central [5] 27/18 49/12 69/7 84/18 217/24
certain [4] 30/25 60/25 67/16 94/19
certainly [15] 25/23 33/2 58/4 60/20
65/4 66/22 71/14 85/3 109/14 117/9
144/14 222/7 242/23 242/24 275/2
certificate [2] 13/2 13/4
certification [20] 13/15 32/13 48/25
76/5 76/9 76/25 77/5 77/9 108/4 108/5
203/5 203/11 204/4 204/4 204/14
204/15 205/8 206/3 207/17 208/5
certifications [1] 107/25
certified [12] 48/24 49/2 76/21 76/24
204/6 204/9 204/9 204/10 205/18
205/21 207/15 268/8
certify [5] 49/3 204/13 207/4 207/12 280/8
CES [5] 109/6 109/24 111/7 111/19 227/19
cetera [2] 67/19 144/16
chain [11] 55/6 148/8 150/21 178/1
178/4 178/5 178/11 178/18 178/24
226/11 256/4
chair [1] 20/8
chairman [1] 197/11
chairs [1] 279/3
challenge [2] 6/16 62/12
challenges [9] 8/9 203/22 203/23
203/25 204/1 261/11 261/16 262/1

## 262/6

change [9] 82/22 84/5 90/10 96/8 96/16 115/15 116/8 161/17 188/11
changed [7] 37/6 84/17 84/18 96/18
120/13 123/20 257/12
changes [8] 62/14 69/5 84/1 113/18
129/10 130/1 134/2 135/12
changing [2] 58/6 117/6
charge [2] 88/14 215/8
Charlene [1] 250/1
chart [4] 44/4 139/1 200/5 202/7
charts [3] 198/18 198/20 199/25
chased [1] 123/23
check [15] 22/7 23/2 28/10 99/9 99/19 101/2 148/20 160/8 160/19 161/16

161/24 163/3 177/6 213/9 213/15 check-in [1] 99/19 checked [7] 160/9 164/20 168/10 171/17 176/12 176/13 177/4
checkmarks [1] 16/20
checks [1] 160/4
cheer [1] 278/1
chief [4] 17/12 17/13 17/15 225/19
choice [1] 95/21
choices [1] 96/14
choose [2] 13/7 15/17
choosing [1] 44/9
chose [1] 132/7
Chris [7] 12/19 18/6 230/11 255/9
261/7 265/10 266/5
CHRISTIAN [1] 2/10
CIO [2] 124/2 124/20
circle [2] 16/15 183/4
circuit [4] 36/15 53/9 53/16 85/5
Circuits [1] 33/15
circumstances [4] 16/23 69/25 147/24 278/12
circumstantial [1] 146/9
CISA [65] 20/10 20/13 20/21 21/1 21/2
21/3 21/5 21/10 21/17 49/8 49/22 50/13
51/11 51/25 54/11 55/5 55/7 55/14 56/7
57/11 58/11 58/16 58/16 59/5 61/5 62/9
63/10 63/21 63/24 64/6 66/24 66/24
66/25 67/3 67/9 67/18 68/10 70/5 72/5
73/18 80/18 189/4 189/8 192/9 192/13
194/1 194/3 194/4 194/7 194/9 195/8
203/12 221/13 221/23 223/18 224/11
239/18 239/23 240/1 268/5 268/9
268/19 268/24 270/5 270/11
CISA's [3] 50/9 58/3 193/8
CISO [12] 120/5 122/14 123/2 123/9
123/13 134/24 137/3 140/1 141/20
142/12 152/18 152/25
CISOs [1] 122/23
cite [3] 1/4 58/4 202/13
cited [1] 72/12
citing [1] 33/11
citizens [1] 152/16
city [2] 15/2 280/10
civic [2] $12 / 2414 / 8$
clarification [4] 100/9 127/22 132/16 189/19
clarified [1] 56/13
clarify [8] 41/25 59/1 114/3 124/23
130/10 132/22 200/24 229/20
clarity [1] 45/2
clarity's [4] 17/24 26/19 30/6 262/17
class [1] 196/18
classes [2] 13/15 13/15
clear [14] 8/11 9/12 56/8 60/19 71/8
73/21 87/23 134/4 165/20 167/18
243/17 261/18 273/16 278/5
clearance [1] 108/10
clearly [1] 50/24
clerks [1] 217/20
click [1] 26/10
client [2] 35/7 270/7
client's [1] 7/8
clients [2] 56/2 67/19
Clinch [3] 227/14 228/18 229/17
clip [3] 167/19 249/15 250/10
Clip 4 [1] 249/15
close [18] 25/4 56/1 64/15 67/25

170/18 170/19 170/24 172/4 173/7 173/17 173/17 177/15 177/17 182/18 194/23 195/19 258/1 278/17
closed [1] 168/12
closer [2] 74/12 186/24
closing [5] 39/12 171/8 171/13 173/14 175/15
CM [2] 1/2 1/3
CM/ECF [2] $1 / 21 / 3$
co [1] 235/25
co-counsel [1] 235/25
coach [2] 106/23 142/14
coaching [1] 129/14
COALITION [2] 2/13 33/3
Cobb [2] 225/22 226/1
code [11] 70/7 74/23 75/6 118/13
160/20 224/5 239/18 239/20 240/1

## 264/9 264/15

Coffee [25] 56/6 67/17 84/9 84/11
84/15 84/17 84/22 194/11 194/17
218/25 220/1 222/14 251/8 252/18
252/25 253/7 253/13 253/14 253/18
272/19 273/24 274/3 275/4 275/20
275/24
colleague [1] $8 / 22$
colleagues [2] 155/4 181/18 collecting [2] 149/11 149/16
collective [3] 214/25 220/9 220/11
college [1] 12/21
Colorado [2] 217/19 217/21
Columbia [1] 19/24
column [1] 16/19
combination [1] 222/1
combinations [1] 92/8
Combs [2] 260/2 260/8
Combs' [1] 260/4
come [37] 16/12 25/8 57/19 72/15 83/2
90/4 104/16 111/17 117/24 117/25
140/9 152/14 163/21 173/23 174/2
179/15 182/21 186/16 206/13 206/21
212/11 215/18 223/21 224/3 236/16
238/15 239/9 242/6 243/16 254/9 254/9
256/3 257/3 257/4 263/3 266/15 270/2
comes [11] 16/20 62/15 108/25 124/6
152/18 161/11 164/8 169/22 214/6
230/13 248/19
comfort [1] 122/19
comfortable [1] 193/20
coming [11] 33/18 65/2 67/18 87/23
99/9 143/2 145/9 156/13 182/18 254/17

## 255/17

commences [1] 65/13
commission [12] 48/9 48/11 48/13
92/10 92/11 237/14 238/3 238/10
238/13 238/14 238/24 239/12
commissioners [1] 206/14
committee [4] 20/8 53/13 249/24 250/7
commodity [2] 135/19 135/23
commodity-based [1] 135/19
common [2] 134/16 217/10
communicate [1] 241/2
communicated [1] 270/9
communicating [1] 82/8
communication [4] 12/23 66/25
147/13 222/3
communications [3] 57/8 221/22
270/7
community [2] 12/24 19/5

## C

company [4] 106/21 123/19 123/19 271/12
comparable [1] 194/14
compare [2] 77/2 77/4
compared [4] 24/2 41/20 204/11 231/23
comparing [3] 179/13 194/17 195/2
compartment [2] 168/1 168/10
compartmented [1] 108/10
compartments [1] 242/12
compatibility [1] 76/7
compatible [3] 77/6 204/1 204/5
complaint [1] 266/24
complete [7] 12/4 105/11 163/23
173/21 177/15 177/17 220/16
completed [1] 57/5
completely [6] 47/10 152/15 153/18
167/20 168/11 172/6
completing [1] 176/3
complicated [1] 217/15
complied [1] 147/12
comply [2] 56/2 242/24
component [4] 45/7 46/6 268/1 268/8
components [2] 45/7 46/19
compromise [3] 118/2 269/15 278/17 computer [9] 1/21 11/14 53/6 104/17 108/7 108/13 130/2 187/23 188/6
COMPUTER-AIDED [1] 1/21
computers [1] 11/6
concept [3] 179/17 238/17 239/3
concern [8] 58/14 58/14 66/5 79/14
83/1 193/23 239/18 266/17
concerned [3] 53/20 53/24 141/1 concerning [4] 83/7 205/8 221/23 222/4
concerns [9] 35/7 69/17 78/22 119/10 186/12 253/10 254/15 273/6 273/7 conclude [1] 110/5
concluded [3] 116/19 156/12 156/21
concludes [1] 96/13
conclusion [1] 249/7
conditional [3] 60/2 189/13 189/16
conditionally [2] 70/22 73/12
conduct [7] 10/7 20/19 64/17 89/23
110/1 180/24 181/9
conducted [3] 77/9 194/5 217/19
conducting [2] 66/24 77/13
conducts [2] 9/19 19/25
conference [8] 10/24 13/23 72/23
157/5 194/4 195/8 252/8 252/13
conferences [7] 13/14 13/20 13/21
19/4 19/10 19/12 19/15
confess [3] 35/1 143/20 147/23
confident [1] 255/17
confidentiality [1] 143/9
configuration [1] 183/19
confirm [9] 28/11 76/7 175/14 183/21
222/6 222/9 222/12 245/16 264/20
confirming [1] 245/2
confused [2] 86/13 244/15
confusing [5] 40/25 41/6 46/17 167/6 216/6
confusion [1] 46/8
connect [2] 74/14 216/21
connected [6] 102/6 127/11 128/19
129/7 168/8 216/17
connecting [1] 161/3
connection [2] 58/17 74/10
cons [1] 181/21
consider [3] 140/23 150/22 278/11
consideration [3] 31/6 186/13 194/2
considered [9] 114/13 152/4 196/25
247/3 247/10 248/3 269/18 273/23
275/19
considering [2] 10/1 80/2
consistent [4] 78/25 229/12 229/13
232/12
constitute [1] 280/9
constraint [1] 124/16
construct [1] 90/23
construction [1] 108/3
constructs [1] 129/6
consult [4] 119/13 155/4 255/16 256/24
consultant [4] 106/21 112/25 120/10 122/19
consulted [4] 217/6 220/15 221/2 221/4
consumer [2] 137/7 137/14
consumer-grade [2] 137/7 137/14
contact [8] 50/11 50/16 52/20 75/14
76/16 162/2 226/19 263/11
contain [3] 99/8 174/23 272/7
contained [2] 150/17 243/8
containing [1] 231/6
contemplated [2] 202/23 202/23
contend [1] 273/11
contending [1] 274/17
contention [1] 273/5
contents [2] 212/12 237/17
contest [3] 16/25 31/25 32/14
contests [1] 92/8
context [10] 76/1 132/14 144/11 213/23 217/8 243/6 251/12 251/22 256/7 259/4
continue [4] 79/20 103/10 104/1 160/19
continued [8] 4/2 4/12 11/23 47/9 76/9
76/16 108/11 157/17
continuing [1] 245/5
contract [3] 110/10 120/9 120/10
contracted [1] 138/13
contractor [1] 110/14
control [2] 117/21 147/11
controls [2] 129/21 129/23
conveniently [1] 242/14
conversation [3] 64/1 124/10 256/16
conversations [6] 140/22 222/11
222/16 222/17 239/22 270/11
conversed [1] 144/19
convey [1] 241/9
conveyed [2] 197/22 241/19
conveying [2] 78/4 201/1
coordinated [2] 49/12 268/6
coordinator [3] 14/19 14/21 14/23
copied [3] 194/24 232/15 273/23
copies [7] 26/5 36/5 158/16 173/18 196/4 257/1 257/2
copy [19] 25/18 32/10 32/20 36/20 36/25 51/4 64/21 64/25 65/7 121/14 121/16 139/18 158/8 200/4 211/18 254/17 256/22 256/23 263/18 copying [4] 253/20 257/7 260/13 265/10
cord [1] 151/11
core [1] 64/5
corner [2] 149/1 245/11
corporate [4] 61/13 61/17 63/22 64/8
corporation [1] 116/23
corporations [1] 114/1
corral [1] 145/23
correct [102] 34/23 47/14 47/23 62/2
76/13 96/2 102/22 108/21 122/1 122/14 122/15 123/11 123/13 124/25 125/1 125/4 125/6 125/9 125/10 125/13 133/9 133/14 134/19 135/15 135/17 135/21 135/25 136/2 136/3 136/6 137/20
137/23 138/13 139/7 139/11 139/13 145/20 150/13 151/8 159/20 160/7 166/24 177/5 177/24 178/16 185/4 185/25 186/20 188/8 189/14 192/8 192/15 194/6 195/17 196/3 197/2 197/5 198/21 201/18 204/7 205/15 206/12 207/10 207/14 208/11 208/18 208/22 209/12 209/20 210/7 210/11 211/10 219/3 223/2 224/15 224/20 225/11 225/11 231/4 232/14 232/23 233/8 234/10 240/11 240/22 243/15 243/23 244/3 245/4 245/8 245/12 245/24 247/5 247/12 247/20 250/3 250/15 251/4 252/3 257/22 262/14 278/6
corrected [1] 48/1
correction [2] 225/7 225/12
correctly [15] 24/11 76/22 122/5
140/11 192/25 197/6 209/13 227/1
229/4 230/22 253/25 260/18 261/15 265/20 268/18
correspond [1] 25/22
correspondence [1] 256/4
could [110] 6/10 8/2 9/7 9/10 11/12 11/13 12/20 13/7 15/16 16/8 16/14 21/21 24/8 25/11 35/25 43/7 44/2 46/3 50/25 57/12 61/8 61/15 62/17 70/17 71/23 74/14 76/19 79/20 84/23 85/12 85/18 87/19 88/5 88/6 92/17 97/12 97/13 97/18 97/22 100/8 102/9 105/24 106/23 116/10 119/13 122/22 123/17 124/9 126/4 128/3 128/11 131/23 132/2 133/11 135/23 136/10 138/4 138/8 138/25 141/10 143/12 150/11 150/16 159/8 159/16 160/20 163/10 164/6 169/12 171/5 171/11 171/23 172/9 173/3 173/10 174/25 177/19 178/17 179/15 180/1 180/5 180/9 180/15 188/20 196/6 204/16 205/1 223/1 223/10 223/11 223/15 224/4 224/5 224/9 224/18 226/23 227/3 235/15 239/19 239/20 240/2 240/2 243/25 244/1 244/2 244/4 247/15 274/7 274/18 277/3
couldn't [2] 14/20 185/2
counsel [26] 8/19 9/2 30/15 30/21
35/20 55/16 64/25 65/7 65/22 66/22
67/11 67/11 82/18 83/12 104/2 114/4
157/5 158/25 202/18 235/25 243/2
250/2 251/9 251/21 270/14 270/17
count [8] 16/23 82/7 99/19 101/24
161/14 163/7 175/14 175/15
counted [4] 16/6 27/17 180/21 184/20 counter [5] 161/24 162/1 162/2 163/1 163/3
counterfeit [2] 247/16 247/16

## C

counterfeited [3] 247/7 247/14 247/22 counties [76] 10/7 20/19 23/14 23/25
24/12 25/1 25/6 25/8 25/11 28/21 28/22
45/10 46/9 47/9 47/17 77/11 84/5 84/8 89/3 89/14 89/15 90/4 90/20 91/7 91/12 101/10 101/11 101/13 102/14 125/5 134/17 134/22 135/10 135/12 137/9 137/13 165/15 166/21 169/6 186/18 192/19 192/19 193/3 193/20 193/25 195/16 195/23 196/3 197/20 198/22 199/1 203/17 203/18 203/19 203/23 216/23 226/3 233/14 233/15 233/20 233/25 234/12 234/13 234/15 240/13 240/16 241/2 241/10 242/24 249/1 249/2 256/20 260/8 260/15 260/22 269/9
counting [1] 28/23
country [2] 13/14 94/3
counts [4] 17/1 177/2 177/4 177/5 county [156] 5/2 6/24 9/15 9/18 14/13 14/14 14/17 15/1 15/2 15/16 16/4 17/4 17/5 17/5 17/8 17/9 17/10 17/14 17/19 17/21 17/22 18/10 21/19 23/11 25/10 26/5 27/2 27/20 27/23 28/4 29/9 37/14 37/14 40/5 40/6 47/5 56/6 67/17 79/22 80/9 80/9 80/11 81/16 81/18 81/19 82/1 82/22 82/23 83/2 83/13 83/18 84/9 84/11 84/15 84/17 84/22 84/23 85/12 88/8 89/1 89/2 91/8 91/16 91/22 91/24 92/10 92/11 92/13 92/20 94/2 98/6 99/22 100/9 100/12 100/13 100/16 117/11 117/17 138/1 150/19 158/1 161/23 162/3 162/3 162/12 162/15 164/1 166/6 167/7 172/17 174/4 174/5 178/15 178/16 183/5 183/7 183/8 183/16 183/18 183/18 192/22 193/12 193/16 193/17 193/23 194/11 194/17
194/21 209/22 215/1 215/18 217/11
217/13 218/22 218/25 220/2 220/6 222/14 224/25 225/4 225/8 225/18 225/19 225/22 226/1 226/23 227/3 227/14 228/11 228/14 228/18 230/17 230/23 240/19 241/5 248/23 250/25 251/8 252/15 252/18 252/25 253/7 253/13 253/14 253/17 253/18 254/7
255/11 256/13 267/14 272/19 273/24
274/3 275/4 275/20 275/25
county's [4] 162/9 162/21 166/4 172/21
county-level [1] 193/12
county-specific [1] 192/22
countywide [2] 183/10 183/14
couple [18] 5/21 18/8 30/15 33/7 37/7
50/20 53/2 71/17 91/14 160/18 174/6
209/8 233/14 233/15 233/25 236/9 237/23 271/23
course [23] 8/12 8/15 25/20 51/25 54/1 55/3 65/24 66/3 66/6 68/18 69/9 69/11 70/24 78/16 102/11 108/18 123/24
144/4 151/18 152/8 181/18 215/3 270/2 court [73] 1/3 1/6 1/9 1/1 1/23 5/25 8/1 8/11 9/17 11/4 12/20 20/13 27/19 30/13 31/5 31/7 32/19 33/9 41/25 42/20 44/18 55/24 58/11 59/9 60/23 62/13 62/20 62/24 63/1 64/25 65/17 66/25 71/14 71/15 71/21 72/8 72/19 72/19 72/23

73/5 74/1 85/9 85/22 89/20 104/1 104/3 105/24 109/5 117/13 144/5 157/10 164/11 171/13 171/23 173/13 179/17 190/23 191/25 199/10 199/15 200/16 202/7 232/21 235/16 236/4 246/4 253/11 267/11 280/6 280/7 280/10 280/17 280/17
courtesy [1] 65/7
COURTHOUSE [1] 1/24
courtroom [2] 52/18 61/18
courts [1] 62/13
cover [2] 212/7 212/9
covered [1] 189/10
covers [1] 56/19
COVID [5] 93/2 93/3 93/14 93/16 94/9
crazy [3] 5/15 5/18 9/6
create [3] 137/16 166/21 167/10
created [4] 67/23 129/16 149/23 166/3
creates [1] 165/14
creative [1] 25/8
crew [1] 113/9
criminal [1] $84 / 10$
crisp [2] 110/7 129/10
critical [7] 152/4 152/7 152/11 153/8
154/3 154/23 256/14
cross [26] $2 / 44 / 94 / 134 / 138 / 1620 / 1$ 54/17 56/13 59/12 63/12 67/10 79/5 112/5 114/5 119/23 182/18 183/3 183/23 184/2 190/1 199/24 235/18 236/2 251/15 258/25 263/8
cross-examination [8] 4/9 4/13 8/16 114/5 119/23 183/23 236/2 251/15 CRR [3] 1/23 280/6 280/16
cumulative [1] 238/25
CURLING [5] 1/4 2/2 49/19 66/15 223/16
current [14] 12/15 45/1 51/8 51/20
57/5 66/19 106/6 106/10 106/24 186/9 186/21 203/8 205/16 205/22
currently [5] 12/13 19/7 75/18 133/2 151/7
curtain [5] 242/14 242/19 243/7 243/13 244/1
custody [9] 147/11 150/21 178/1 178/4
178/5 178/11 178/18 178/24 226/11
customer [1] 145/9
customers [2] 120/17 218/5
cut [6] 153/10 153/12 153/18 153/19
258/7 258/8
CV [1] 1/6
cybersecurity [21] 19/14 20/9 20/15 20/16 49/11 50/25 67/3 72/13 106/13 107/5 107/20 107/21 107/23 107/25 118/15 215/13 215/22 216/1 233/10 237/22 238/9

## D

Dallas [1] 127/14
dancing [2] 55/2 60/16
DANIEL [1] 3/8
DANIELLE [1] $3 / 5$
dashboard [1] 47/4
data [26] 14/25 15/6 19/25 39/22 41/11
46/1 47/13 47/14 47/14 47/25 127/9
127/10 127/13 134/17 134/21 135/10
137/8 137/13 194/24 199/19 200/1
200/25 201/2 201/11 227/23 272/7
database [5] 15/12 45/10 46/10 231/7

231/17
DataLocker [3] 136/4 136/6 137/1 date [8] 27/1 54/11 54/12 54/13 101/25 161/16 207/20 268/21
dated [3] 149/8 158/8 268/2
dates [3] 46/4 46/14 115/6
DAVID [11] 2/4 2/23 2/24 4/7 14/8 21/15 105/4 105/13 105/18 184/2 271/3 David Hamilton [1] 105/13
DAVIS [4] 2/19 2/21 $2 / 22$ 7/6 day [98] 7/16 7/16 7/24 7/25 8/2 8/6 8/25 9/7 15/10 15/15 17/17 22/5 22/6 22/16 22/20 23/1 23/7 23/18 25/2 29/10 29/13 29/18 30/7 31/16 34/8 34/12 34/16 34/21 37/17 38/13 39/14 42/2 53/4 74/25 79/23 88/24 89/4 90/7 90/7 90/9 90/10 90/11 95/1 95/4 95/7 98/4 99/4 99/9 99/19 101/7 108/25 113/19 134/2 146/25 157/4 161/15 163/7 164/12 165/7 168/11 168/18 170/7 170/13 170/17 170/20 170/24 171/1 171/17 171/21 173/7 173/14 176/6 176/7 177/9 177/16 177/17 198/2 198/3 198/4 198/6 198/15 200/14 226/22 229/4 231/2 233/1 251/8 251/8 251/8 252/15 252/15 252/16 253/1 253/1 256/10 271/7 278/15 280/13
days [9] 1/4 26/8 29/13 30/15 129/13
194/22 198/4 198/5 231/4
dead [2] 74/3 226/2
deadline [2] 29/8 198/1
deal [4] 9/16 106/8 114/8 148/9
dealing [8] 8/9 123/24 148/19 152/10
153/7 154/3 154/20 184/6
dealt [4] 5/10 57/13 114/9 232/17 deceit [1] 88/23
December [2] 80/3 206/16 decide [5] 69/9 95/21 152/25 226/23 241/7
decided [9] 76/8 76/11 76/12 120/14 122/18 184/16 189/16 203/6 203/10 decides [4] 29/17 29/20 206/2 224/24 decision [22] 116/16 219/4 219/5 219/18 219/22 220/5 220/8 220/9 220/11 220/13 220/13 220/14 220/15 220/16 220/19 220/23 221/4 221/6 228/11 228/14 241/12 241/18
declarations [2] 51/9 66/20
decline [1] 152/20
dedicated [1] 118/25
deem [2] 73/12 100/20
deeply [1] 189/24
default [1] 211/21
DEFENDANT'S [2] 4/2 11/23
defendants [12] $1 / 73 / 251 / 1451 / 17$ 51/18 68/16 68/21 69/1 105/4 143/5 143/17 146/19
Defendants' [15] 31/14 32/17 35/19 36/17 37/3 37/20 38/9 38/11 38/12 38/14 40/23 158/15 158/17 237/9 262/18
defense [6] 57/20 61/15 67/11 106/3 202/18 240/6
defer [1] 183/20
deficiencies [3] 110/11 116/5 193/25 definitely [5] 85/14 116/4 125/25
125/25 129/25
degree [3] 60/9 252/20 252/25

## D

degrees [1] 14/5
DeKalb [1] 83/22
delayed [2] 93/20 93/21
delays [1] 82/6
delete [1] 240/2
delivery [1] 94/5
demand [1] 122/23
Democracy [1] 205/8
demonstrate [2] 179/12 185/21
demonstration [4] 188/13 188/14
188/14 191/13
demonstrative [8] 40/23 43/6 43/18
94/17 158/13 198/18 199/21 210/25
demonstratives [1] 211/1
Department [2] 106/3 193/21
depend [3] 16/24 214/25 214/25
depending [2] 113/17 241/11
depends [2] 74/20 214/22
depictions [1] 248/24
deployed [3] 174/12 175/9 175/10
deploying [1] 83/2
deployment [1] 228/24
deposed [6] 6/24 61/25 63/20 121/2
125/18 128/2
depositing [1] 168/14
deposition [21] 61/21 62/3 63/5 67/8
72/11 111/25 121/10 125/22 126/5
126/18 127/21 128/9 128/10 128/23
130/18 131/4 131/21 132/8 147/8 154/1
154/16
deputy [13] 17/15 18/6 77/22 170/5
183/12 195/4 208/16 220/16 221/1
225/14 246/8 255/16 256/25
Deputy Director [6] 183/12 220/16
221/1 246/8 255/16 256/25
derogatory [1] 69/21
describe [3] 20/12 51/5 66/17
described [4] 22/23 41/14 173/1
261/16
describing [3] 177/23 178/25 272/3
description [6] 139/8 230/20 231/1
266/3 266/11 266/20
deserve [1] 108/5
design [1] 272/4
designated [5] 28/15 51/15 51/16
61/13 61/22
designation [1] 276/20
designed [3] 239/13 243/10 243/14
designer [1] 211/24
despite [2] 226/21 278/1
destructive [1] 139/22
detached [1] 252/4
detail [4] 66/3 77/23 183/13 233/21
details [4] 103/3 209/6 233/21 234/1
detect [2] 20/5 226/12
detecting [1] 234/5
detection [3] 139/9 239/13 239/20
determine [9] 16/25 17/2 50/12 50/17
74/18 75/15 186/7 226/20 233/11
determines [1] 240/12
develop [1] 216/12
developed [1] 133/18
developer [2] 116/22 215/15
development [2] 128/8 129/5
developments [1] 67/17
develops [1] 129/5
device [36] 22/8 23/3 42/8 42/12 43/20 44/10 44/14 79/25 80/8 82/5 84/21 86/25 87/8 99/15 101/19 101/25 102/1 102/4 102/6 102/7 102/19 160/22 167/19 171/24 172/1 180/6 180/20 185/6 186/5 186/11 187/7 187/7 191/8 243/21 246/7 253/6
devices [22] 75/16 77/15 79/24 80/10 80/14 84/19 91/3 91/6 115/11 119/8 125/14 171/20 174/11 174/12 174/14 174/24 181/5 181/14 186/23 223/12 224/6 243/20
DIANE [1] $3 / 8$
dictate [1] 49/6
did [149] 8/18 12/18 13/16 13/18 14/6 14/17 16/4 16/7 17/4 17/25 19/17 21/2 29/17 35/20 38/20 42/5 44/6 45/4 45/21 45/22 45/23 46/16 48/19 49/3 49/11 50/16 52/20 57/11 57/12 61/12 61/22
69/2 69/8 69/22 75/13 75/14 78/19 86/1
93/3 93/8 93/9 93/14 95/24 100/2 100/4 103/8 106/2 106/17 107/10 110/1 110/4 110/5 111/17 111/25 112/7 112/13 114/7 115/9 115/19 116/3 116/11 116/13 116/14 117/24 117/25 118/3 118/21 119/3 120/8 122/5 122/6 122/16 124/3 124/5 125/5 125/8 127/21 129/11 130/14 132/16 133/14 135/18 138/19
139/18 140/1 140/5 140/19 140/23
142/14 143/18 144/7 146/17 149/10 149/15 150/3 153/16 165/7 180/12 181/20 183/3 184/19 186/4 188/15 190/12 196/17 197/15 197/16 200/4 200/6 203/3 203/7 220/24 222/13 224/10 224/12 231/15 231/15 231/16 231/20 231/24 233/14 233/17 233/19 233/19 233/23 234/2 234/4 234/12 234/18 234/19 246/13 252/8 252/9 252/10 253/12 262/11 262/13 269/8 269/14 270/2 270/14 272/17 274/2 274/22 275/4 275/19 276/15 276/15 276/16
didn't [35] 24/11 33/17 33/17 57/17 63/21 64/3 64/9 82/15 110/11 114/8 118/1 118/23 127/8 130/17 130/21 132/18 134/21 136/15 138/18 140/16 140/17 147/5 148/8 148/9 150/18 165/24 185/10 185/19 185/21 189/19 189/24 224/9 247/4 252/10 276/16
Diebold [1] 22/11
differ [1] 89/21
difference [4] 46/12 46/13 60/14 102/3
differences [2] 208/2 217/21
different [42] 41/10 57/6 59/6 70/3
70/18 72/5 72/6 83/15 86/16 92/12 95/3 97/9 101/10 109/16 117/4 120/12
127/15 127/16 127/17 129/24 140/6 140/8 152/23 162/9 185/12 201/7 209/14 214/13 215/20 215/24 216/5 216/6 217/24 218/5 243/2 247/1 256/16 257/1 261/23 262/4 263/1 274/18
differently [2] 71/18 249/1
difficult [1] 116/24
difficulty [3] 7/13 73/16 111/24
DIGGES [4] $2 / 132 / 132 / 182 / 18$
digital [3] 149/3 149/11 149/16
dilution [9] 179/5 179/7 179/16 179/21
179/22 179/25 180/5 180/9 180/16
dimensional [1] 167/3
dire [1] 112/2
direct [22] $4 / 64 / 84 / 1212 / 1059 / 10$ 63/2 87/2 105/20 120/9 134/21 135/2 142/24 143/1 151/20 157/17 188/24 202/9 202/18 223/3 243/18 246/10 251/6
directed [5] 85/22 109/11 147/9 147/19 193/16
direction [3] 144/4 255/9 259/7 directly [7] 78/6 127/11 141/18 196/19 202/8 220/24 270/9
director [65] 6/24 9/16 9/19 12/16
17/15 17/16 17/18 18/6 18/7 18/8 20/14 21/25 26/19 31/13 31/21 39/2 39/22
40/22 43/5 44/24 45/12 49/18 49/20
52/21 54/10 61/4 66/11 73/25 77/22
78/14 86/10 89/16 106/11 157/19 162/4
163/2 170/4 170/5 179/4 179/21 181/13
182/10 183/12 190/22 191/14 195/4
197/9 208/16 217/22 220/16 221/1
225/14 232/20 234/3 239/16 242/24
243/24 246/8 247/4 252/24 253/10
255/16 256/20 256/25 269/19
director's [1] 79/6
directors [4] 18/24 19/2 19/3 19/4
disabilities [4] 15/20 15/25 185/1 185/12
disability [2] 123/23 185/21
disabled [1] 15/23
disabling [1] 218/12
disagree [2] 252/12 252/17
disappear [1] 65/19
disassembling [1] 171/18
disasters [1] 104/24
disbelieve [1] 135/5
disc [1] 145/21
disclose [4] 52/2 64/3 130/17 130/20
disclosed [3] 10/18 128/25 268/10
disclosure [2] 49/13 268/6
disclosures [1] 51/24
discourage [1] 25/25
discovered [3] 227/22 228/23 231/7
discovery [17] 10/18 51/24 56/1 56/3
56/17 56/23 57/14 61/23 62/16 67/12
67/14 67/25 68/1 68/7 71/22 72/23
158/17
discrepancy [1] 176/18
discretion [2] 100/19 227/4
discuss [13] $9 / 2$ 10/14 11/1 68/9 68/23
90/4 103/7 103/12 103/14 124/22 156/9
214/4 270/14
discussed [8] 7/7 71/5 71/5 71/9 221/9
221/13 245/18 270/17
discussing [1] 222/10
discussion [5] 36/2 105/3 240/3
254/18 267/4
discussions [6] 66/23 142/24 221/15
221/17 239/17 240/1
disheartening [1] 232/3
display [2] 47/23 196/5
dispute [1] 71/22
disputing [1] 33/3
disregard [1] 43/1
disseminated [2] 272/13 273/25
distance [1] 236/7
distinction [2] 59/5 88/11
distinguish [2] 98/15 179/25

## D

distribute [1] 48/17
DISTRICT [12] $1 / 11 / 11 / 1219 / 24$ 33/11 33/12 33/12 33/13 280/4 280/7 280/7 280/17
districts [1] 92/13 division [4] 1/2 17/16 260/5 280/8 do [414]
docket [2] $1 / 5$ 1/5
document [73] 1/8 31/21 32/3 34/25
37/8 37/15 37/20 37/23 38/3 43/10 44/4 49/20 49/22 56/4 56/25 57/3 65/9 67/14 94/21 129/17 138/7 138/10 141/17 141/22 141/23 142/20 142/21 143/5 143/12 143/18 143/24 144/2 144/6 144/10 144/17 144/24 146/3 148/2 148/11 149/2 149/8 151/4 154/8 157/19 157/21 157/25 159/11 159/16 163/21 165/7 178/23 205/7 206/7 206/22 207/17 212/2 214/15 228/17 228/18 229/8 240/9 240/18 245/16 245/17 248/23 261/15 261/25 262/6 262/18 267/25 270/22 275/2 277/1
Document 607 [1] 262/18
documents [20] 30/14 39/2 57/4 57/11 67/15 67/20 143/18 144/4 147/1 147/2 147/6 147/8 147/10 147/11 147/14 148/15 158/2 163/24 177/21 272/3
DOD [2] 106/2 108/11
does [69] 9/23 10/10 10/10 11/4 21/10 22/24 23/10 24/13 28/23 29/2 30/8 32/9 32/9 33/8 35/15 37/8 37/15 37/23 38/3 43/13 43/17 45/2 46/14 48/22 72/3 72/5 72/19 77/2 77/2 81/12 81/24 82/16 83/12 90/17 91/1 95/16 95/21 96/14 100/9 106/14 107/6 132/2 144/17 152/22 158/7 158/10 159/24 161/5 168/4 168/6 171/8 175/16 177/11 180/2 184/20 186/17 192/13 193/18 198/24 204/12 214/2 214/11 214/15 245/15 245/21 254/25 259/10 262/10 274/6 doesn't [19] 9/8 29/1 61/12 70/2 73/23 78/18 139/23 142/20 142/21 143/23 152/13 153/23 163/21 179/25 200/20 201/1 228/13 236/7 273/15
doing [11] 9/23 10/11 15/5 31/4 62/18 72/6 103/17 188/7 215/16 216/22 253/12
Dominion [77] 48/20 49/1 49/3 49/10 50/11 50/13 50/16 50/22 52/21 75/14 75/19 76/2 76/12 76/16 76/21 77/8 115/11 118/4 118/8 119/8 125/11 165/18 166/1 199/3 202/4 203/2 203/4 203/15 211/14 211/24 212/3 213/9 213/18 213/25 214/2 214/11 214/22 215/1 215/5 215/7 215/9 215/13 216/1 216/11 216/17 217/4 217/7 218/13 219/22 220/23 220/24 221/4 221/10 221/13 221/16 221/18 221/23 222/4 222/8 222/13 222/17 222/19 246/16 247/6 247/22 250/9 263/25 264/14 265/10 265/16 266/14 267/4 268/1 268/8 274/4 274/21 276/16
Dominion's [2] 203/10 218/4 don't [176] 7/2 7/4 7/18 8/12 8/15 9/1 10/15 10/23 11/2 12/21 22/14 29/24 30/20 33/1 35/1 35/3 35/3 38/23 39/16

52/8 52/12 52/23 52/24 53/21 54/19 54/19 55/7 55/14 58/3 60/21 63/3 64/21 65/24 66/3 66/6 68/2 68/18 69/10 69/20 70/11 71/18 72/25 86/5 88/6 92/5 103/4 103/7 103/12 104/2 104/21 115/12 120/19 121/11 122/17 122/21 122/25 123/5 124/12 125/24 126/12 127/8 131/11 131/17 132/5 135/3 138/9 139/17 140/21 141/21 141/23 143/20 143/21 144/1 144/8 144/23 146/4 148/18 149/14 150/21 151/25 153/3 153/19 155/15 156/3 156/9 156/24 158/23 182/4 182/19 184/3 190/7 191/21 192/6 192/22 194/18 195/3 195/20 195/24 196/10 196/13 197/9 197/12 199/8 199/8 199/21 200/1 200/6 201/24 202/9 202/12 202/12 208/8 208/10 210/14 211/8 211/19 212/1 212/1 215/21 216/21 217/17 217/25 219/12 219/21 219/22 219/24 220/21 222/16 222/21 222/23 222/25 223/11 224/10 227/8 227/8 229/24 232/20 233/21 234/5 234/9 234/17 234/20 234/22 235/6 237/8 237/16 238/24 241/14 243/12 246/22 247/18 252/17 252/20 255/18 255/19 257/2 258/23 260/16 261/22 262/9 262/12 264/18 264/21 269/1 269/17 270/1 270/8 272/25 274/16 274/21 276/8 276/10 276/22 277/10 278/11 279/9
DONALD [1] 3/9
done [35] 8/2 8/6 35/13 47/8 50/9 57/25 62/20 63/13 63/16 71/16 72/9 73/7 103/11 104/7 112/17 116/10 128/8 165/10 172/3 172/10 182/1 186/2 192/24 192/25 193/5 198/1 202/13 209/7 211/6 211/8 217/18 233/18 235/23 260/9 267/18
DONNA [3] $1 / 42 / 22 / 2$
door [11] 86/2 123/16 174/1 189/6 231/10 231/17 242/15 242/19 243/7 243/13 244/2
doors [5] 101/12 129/21 191/7 231/8 231/23
doubt [2] 54/19 273/14
doubts [1] 260/17
down [28] 44/17 50/1 52/23 65/25 79/8 91/9 93/17 117/19 119/18 152/14
156/23 172/5 173/22 177/21 179/2 195/9 206/21 217/16 218/15 223/21 227/13 231/24 239/9 243/16 254/1 263/12 263/15 264/3
downloaded [2] 142/1 150/18
downloading [1] 142/2
dozen [2] 130/16 194/19
Dr. [46] 6/18 7/9 7/10 7/13 13/23 51/8 51/12 51/14 51/17 54/13 54/25 55/1 55/3 57/14 57/17 59/5 59/6 66/10 66/20 68/11 72/4 72/13 86/1 86/3 188/10 188/16 188/24 189/7 191/9 221/7 221/9 221/23 237/22 237/24 238/13 238/23 239/1 239/12 239/20 240/3 250/14 251/25 252/12 269/12 269/13 270/5
Dr. Adida [1] 6/18
Dr. Alex [1] 250/14
Dr. Gilbert [3] 7/9 7/10 7/13
Dr. Halderman [16] 13/23 54/13 54/25
55/1 55/3 57/14 57/17 72/4 72/13

188/10 189/7 221/9 251/25 252/12 269/13 270/5
Dr. Halderman's [15] 51/12 51/14 51/17 59/5 59/6 66/10 68/11 86/1 86/3 188/16 188/24 191/9 221/7 221/23 269/12
Dr. J [2] 51/8 66/20
Dr. Lee [6] 237/24 238/13 238/23 239/12 239/20 240/3
Dr. Lee's [1] 239/1
Dr. Wenke [1] 237/22
draft [2] 193/10 268/24
drafted [2] 261/15 268/5
draw [5] 10/4 39/12 199/10 199/16 200/16
drawing [2] 88/10 218/3
DRE [5] 9/12 113/22 131/1 225/13 238/6
DRE-based [1] 131/1
DREs [2] 22/11 243/9
drive [3] 1/24 135/10 139/17
driver's [3] 28/10 160/5 160/6
drives [7] 115/14 135/17 135/20 137/7 137/14 137/17 144/15
drop [2] 27/12 29/7
dropped [1] 218/19
due [1] 239/4
duly [3] 12/9 105/19 157/15
DUMA [1] 3/9
duplicate [1] 197/20
duplicated [1] 197/18
duplicative [3] 128/20 236/2 277/18
during [28] 37/11 72/16 89/4 108/17
109/17 110/20 111/7 118/4 120/24 122/19 125/21 126/2 127/21 128/9 128/10 128/23 129/12 129/13 130/17 131/4 132/7 142/24 170/9 170/17 176/6 228/23 270/2 272/13
duties [5] 14/23 15/5 17/13 88/17 256/15
duty [3] 56/15 56/16 90/23
dynamic [1] 186/12

## E

E-V-A-N-S [1] 12/6
EAC [29] 48/11 48/19 48/22 49/2 49/3 76/8 76/18 77/3 203/5 203/11 204/3 204/6 204/10 205/7 205/22 206/7 206/13 206/14 206/18 207/2 207/4 207/11 207/23 267/25 268/1 268/5 268/8 268/19 268/23
EAC-approved [1] 76/18
EAC-certified [2] 204/6 268/8 each [30] 34/11 41/20 41/20 51/7 59/13 66/18 67/6 70/6 80/8 80/25 82/4 82/25 83/22 88/13 90/5 152/24 162/11 171/24 172/1 174/12 183/10 183/13 183/16 187/2 187/6 192/20 195/21 209/18 213/15 246/17
earlier [12] 18/7 46/21 118/3 159/9 168/17 174/22 182/5 191/1 191/4 200/12 207/24 269/7
earliest [2] 45/7 46/6
early [29] 14/16 15/10 22/22 22/24 23/1 23/7 23/17 23/22 23/23 28/16 29/18 34/8 37/9 38/11 42/1 46/25 75/1 89/6 95/4 168/18 170/9 170/22 183/1 198/1 198/3 198/7 226/23 233/6 249/25

## E

easier [3] 25/2 25/5 70/18
easy [3] 211/7 255/4 255/4
eat [3] 97/12 97/21 97/25
ECF [2] $1 / 21 / 3$
education [4] 12/21 13/5 13/20 148/13
educational [1] 105/25
EDWARD [1] $3 / 5$
ee's [1] 236/10
effect [1] 113/23
efficient [1] 71/10
effort [2] 214/25 253/17
efforts [2] 89/17 95/13
eight [1] 194/22
eight days [1] 194/22
Eighth [1] 33/15
either [18] 8/13 13/19 23/6 25/4 29/18 55/23 66/8 130/24 152/20 163/21 178/7 200/14 202/9 222/4 223/1 233/7 247/11 253/8
election [297]
election-specific [2] 167/14 246/12 ElectioNet [3] 45/16 47/19 47/22 elections [83] 6/24 9/16 9/19 12/16 14/13 14/18 17/6 17/11 17/12 17/15 18/8 18/12 18/12 18/15 18/16 18/17 18/19 18/20 18/20 18/21 20/13 21/18 23/24 27/13 29/7 29/14 29/14 30/11 34/3 39/23 40/1 40/1 40/3 40/5 40/5 40/9 40/12 41/2 41/22 43/16 45/12 54/10 56/7 61/4 67/19 77/10 77/12 88/8 92/17 92/22 92/24 93/3 93/4 93/14 94/9 126/2 128/11 128/24 130/19 162/4 167/8 173/24 174/3 174/5 178/10 178/16 178/22 180/18 180/23 181/12 190/24 194/21 197/8 201/21 203/24 217/22 218/5 240/14 240/20 256/15 260/5 265/14 268/11
elector [5] 242/3 242/20 242/20 243/11 243/21
electors [2] 101/1 242/13
electrical [1] 186/9
electronic [15] 15/24 19/19 99/7 169/1
170/13 179/14 180/19 180/20 181/5
194/15 201/10 201/13 243/9 243/19
243/19
electronically [1] 180/2
elements [2] 80/1 179/11
Eleventh [3] 53/9 53/16 85/5
elicit [1] 60/15
eliminate [1] 190/24
eliminating [1] 197/7
else [16] 9/7 57/24 84/22 88/7 103/13 104/19 118/1 146/12 148/3 153/22
156/10 194/22 211/6 216/7 258/8 279/7
elsewhere [1] 127/13
email [41] 51/22 54/18 54/19 55/23 67/11 67/13 136/23 136/25 150/16 227/14 228/18 228/23 229/15 229/25
230/5 230/10 230/22 232/15 254/6 254/10 254/15 254/19 256/7 256/9 257/6 257/10 257/17 259/24 261/7 261/20 262/11 263/19 264/4 265/9
266/2 266/12 271/3 271/6 271/19 272/2 273/2
emailing [3] 227/18 228/14 260/2
emails [4] 65/10 221/24 222/7 222/10
embargoed [1] 268/24
emergency [11] 20/18 89/3 101/1
160/24 167/25 168/1 168/7 168/9
168/16 224/13 241/8
emphasize [1] 245/15
emphasized [1] 196/25
emphasizes [1] 95/17
emphasizing [1] 200/13
employed [5] 12/13 14/14 14/15 17/21 17/22
employee [1] 120/9
employees [1] 123/7
employment [3] 12/15 17/25 106/6
empty [1] 168/12
EMS [9] 84/24 85/13 211/24 219/1
219/11 219/15 219/19 220/5 252/14
enacting [1] 62/14
encode [3] 159/25 160/9 204/16
encoded [4] 160/14 170/2 209/18
209/21
encoder [1] 160/12
encourage [1] 64/16
encourages [1] 10/7
encrypted [3] 137/17 166/22 167/2
encryption [2] 137/8 137/15
encyclopedic [1] 143/21
end [18] 6/1 6/3 51/22 62/16 64/3
107/3 142/8 152/24 171/1 171/15
171/21 173/14 174/17 176/17 186/1
186/7 189/20 278/15
ended [5] 76/20 93/20 93/21 110/16 123/25
ends [4] 108/24 198/3 232/3 262/25
eNet [9] 45/15 45/16 45/18 45/21 46/14 47/9 47/9 47/17 47/21
enforced [1] 63/18
engage [2] 120/17 145/10
engaged [6] 112/15 123/3 123/6 140/3 233/10 239/17
engagement [7] 12/24 60/11 111/22
130/15 145/6 145/14 145/14
engineers [3] 123/4 123/4 150/8
ENGLISH [1] $3 / 9$
enjoin [1] 58/12
enough [10] 74/8 97/20 104/23 110/12
123/15 136/15 187/9 187/14 192/6
224/18
ENR [1] 259/25
ensure [3] 20/24 243/10 243/20
enter [7] 30/19 32/17 35/18 38/9 157/5
158/14 162/7
entered [1] 49/19
entering [1] 31/6
enterprise [1] 129/19
entire [10] 61/21 77/6 197/12 198/23
199/2 209/22 217/11 217/23 218/21
251/11
entirely [1] 115/23
entirety [1] 276/25
entities [3] 19/24 181/2 274/20
entitled [2] 157/20 268/1
entity [1] 118/7
entry [3] $1 / 5$ 14/25 15/6
entry-type [1] 15/6
envelope [3] 27/24 28/1 97/3
environment [8] 117/2 213/11 216/15 216/16 218/7 251/8 252/1 252/15

49/4 49/10 57/6 57/7 58/6 75/19 80/6 84/15 84/17 86/10 86/22 90/25 98/22 98/23 100/1 118/4 118/8 124/24 125/2 166/5 167/9 167/15 170/13 170/14 175/10 176/4 181/24 185/3 185/8 185/12 186/10 191/5 194/21 205/17 205/21 207/15 212/4 215/2 215/6 216/25 217/1 217/14 219/11 219/16 220/1 220/17 226/6 226/6 226/9 226/12 226/13 229/8 229/21 250/22 252/21 254/17 255/11 255/15 255/21 255/23 256/1 256/21 257/1 257/2 257/12
ERIC [7] 19/20 19/22 19/23 19/25 20/7 20/8 181/2
ES [7] 15/21 15/21 185/3 185/17 187/5 187/21 201/17
Escambia [10] 14/13 14/14 14/17 15/1 15/2 15/15 16/3 17/4 17/5 21/18 essentially [11] 16/24 17/15 20/3 81/1 88/12 88/21 90/2 92/7 179/22 203/9 215/13
established [2] 205/11 238/12
estimate [3] 80/11 92/14 277/20
Estrada [1] 53/10
et [4] 1/4 1/6 67/19 144/16
et cetera [1] 144/16
Ethics [2] 249/24 250/7
EUW [1] 2/10
evaluate [3] 51/6 66/18 272/12
EVANS [57] 4/5 4/11 5/7 5/9 6/5 8/24
11/4 11/24 12/5 12/8 12/12 21/25 26/19
31/13 36/15 39/2 39/22 40/22 43/5
44/24 49/18 61/16 66/7 66/7 66/11 68/8 68/18 69/12 70/1 70/25 72/1 73/25
74/17 78/14 86/10 104/1 156/20 157/14 157/19 179/4 179/21 183/25 204/24
211/22 227/13 235/5 237/12 239/6
249/19 259/22 266/5 267/5 269/7 271/2 271/20 273/18 273/20
Evans' [1] 258/21
even [12] 57/17 63/15 64/12 83/5
113/17 146/4 182/25 194/22 195/25 252/9 265/24 274/20
evening [3] 175/13 176/6 177/1
event [6] 7/11 67/24 100/23 168/13 211/24 254/15
events [3] 66/10 148/8 255/14 ever [20] 13/23 57/20 124/12 140/19
149/15 150/4 211/6 211/8 212/2 221/9 221/13 223/5 233/10 237/14 237/16 239/17 270/2 270/14 272/18 276/3 every [21] 10/6 24/13 24/16 66/3 68/13 82/22 82/23 84/1 85/24 108/25 113/7 130/2 134/2 134/3 169/13 176/18 187/10 195/24 208/24 209/7 209/21
everybody [3] 25/3 104/24 118/19
everyone [6] 68/11 70/18 162/10
172/17 178/20 279/19
everything [9] 35/15 57/12 66/6 83/21
146/12 153/21 172/7 217/24 222/1
evidence [29] 32/17 35/19 38/9 49/19
52/4 53/8 65/3 68/14 136/21 142/8
146/9 149/3 149/11 149/16 149/25
157/6 158/14 202/9 230/4 237/13
238/13 261/1 264/24 265/18 266/13
269/3 271/16 271/20 275/13
evolved [1] 141/8
equipment [69] 15/9 20/25 48/20 48/24 exact [9] 25/13 126/16 183/19 201/13

## E

exact... [5] 212/2 227/8 227/8 252/10 255/19
exactly [12] 10/16 32/5 117/16 121/13
135/4 145/5 188/15 200/22 214/2
214/11 218/13 222/21
exam [1] 108/4
examination [15] 4/6 4/8 4/9 4/12 4/13
8/16 12/10 105/20 114/5 119/23 135/2
157/17 183/23 236/2 251/15
examine [2] 233/16 233/23
examined [6] 60/18 125/14 233/11
233/25 252/4 269/8
example [11] 15/13 16/10 16/12 16/14 46/20 178/25 185/21 194/19 195/8
218/19 226/14
examples [1] 177/23
excellent [1] 58/24
exception [1] 72/12
excerpt [1] 211/23
exchange [1] 254/6
excited [4] 116/6 279/12 279/12 279/18
exclude [1] 65/3
excluded [1] 109/19
excuse [13] 21/17 27/8 34/2 34/18
38/16 38/17 52/14 52/16 80/20 84/20
103/7 153/14 197/1
excused [2] 155/25 156/5
executive [3] 20/8 192/21 193/10
exercise [2] 15/17 22/3
exercising [1] 39/4
exhibit [55] 31/6 31/14 32/18 35/19
36/17 37/3 37/4 37/21 38/3 38/11 38/13
38/14 40/23 43/6 49/19 72/12 80/17
136/13 136/17 136/20 138/5 138/17
138/22 141/13 142/17 143/22 158/15
211/22 212/22 223/15 223/16 227/11
230/2 237/10 237/12 240/6 254/5 254/5
256/5 258/12 258/15 258/19 259/10
259/13 259/15 260/25 262/15 262/18
263/17 264/23 265/17 269/2 271/15
276/15 277/7
Exhibit 1 [2] 40/23 43/6
Exhibit 100 [1] 230/2
Exhibit 104 [1] 227/11
Exhibit 1224 [2] 237/10 237/12
Exhibit 1230 [1] 35/19
Exhibit 1232 [1] 36/17
Exhibit 1234 [2] 31/14 32/18
Exhibit 1235 [2] 37/21 38/14
Exhibit 1236 [1] 38/13
Exhibit 1237 [2] 37/4 38/11
Exhibit 1238 [1] 38/3
Exhibit 1242 [2] 158/15 240/6
Exhibit 127 [1] 142/17
Exhibit 194 [4] 254/5 254/5 256/5 258/19
Exhibit 294 [2] 138/5 138/17
Exhibit 36 [2] 136/13 136/20
Exhibit 605 [4] 211/22 212/22 276/15 277/7
Exhibit 606 [3] 259/10 259/13 260/25
Exhibit 607 [2] 262/15 262/18
Exhibit 608 [2] 263/17 264/23
Exhibit 609 [1] 265/17
Exhibit 610 [1] 269/2

Exhibit 611 [1] 271/15
Exhibit 7 [1] 136/17
Exhibit 89 [3] 49/19 80/17 223/15
exhibits [3] 38/10 65/8 79/1
Exhibits 1232 [1] 38/10
exist [1] 234/21
existed [1] 128/15
exists [1] 141/18
exited [1] 52/18
$\begin{array}{lll}\text { expect [7] } 67 / 25 & 145 / 11 & 182 / 19 \\ 236 / 18\end{array}$ 241/19 242/23 242/24
expectation [4] 169/7 175/20 175/23 176/4
expected [2] 171/8 240/13
expecting [2] 73/4 74/15
expects [1] 248/24
experience [25] 10/11 16/3 18/10
20/23 24/2 25/20 53/12 87/1 91/13 91/15 93/5 102/12 108/8 118/10 124/4 168/17 180/23 181/2 182/2 184/5 185/23 195/11 201/20 217/9 217/17 expert [20] 30/23 50/24 50/25 51/15 51/18 52/24 52/25 55/10 78/18 85/1 87/10 87/23 88/1 108/3 220/15 220/25 221/2 233/11 238/9 253/11 expertise [5] 60/9 60/9 85/16 85/19 124/6
experts [2] 150/22 151/1
experts' [1] 6/16
explain [17] 16/8 59/11 71/19 72/2
78/16 86/3 87/4 92/5 103/10 109/5
168/9 176/19 179/16 186/17 240/15
240/15 271/24
explained [6] 51/12 79/1 137/12
242/18 243/17 271/18
explaining [2] 199/16 269/13
explanation [1] 79/20
explore [1] 112/5
exposed [1] 273/13
exposing [1] 273/18
exposures [1] 60/10
expressed [1] 273/8
expressly [1] 217/4
ExpressVote [2] 15/22 185/9
extended [2] 128/13 250/23
extensive [1] 66/23
extent [12] 10/14 55/11 58/7 179/14
189/18 220/21 220/22 228/17 233/17
249/6 265/23 270/6
extra [3] 25/18 25/24 186/12
extracting [1] 101/15
extracts [1] 149/24
eyes [4] 51/15 112/23 276/21 277/10

## F

F.3d [1] 53/10
face [1] 96/25
facilitate [1] 48/16
facilities [3] 114/2 117/4 128/16
facility [6] 112/21 125/20 126/1 126/23 127/16 128/18
fact [16] 25/25 53/24 60/16 64/14 69/8
71/3 71/10 123/16 152/12 196/13
197/17 205/13 215/8 217/4 257/3 274/10
factions [1] 116/23
factual [1] 61/8
failings [1] 151/16
fair [19] 62/15 63/12 68/14 68/15 69/3
185/23 195/7 195/25 199/11 209/7
226/16 233/23 247/2 248/22 249/8
250/19 269/18 269/21 275/16
fairness [1] 63/17
faith [1] 181/10
fall [3] 101/2 225/14 225/21
fall-back [1] 101/2
familiar [32] 13/9 18/23 19/19 20/9
22/2 44/24 48/8 48/9 53/19 53/20 80/15 80/21 89/17 109/12 144/11 174/7 175/5 176/8 176/20 178/1 179/5 194/10 212/3 224/10 237/24 238/3 238/17 238/18
238/23 239/2 264/13 269/21
familiarity [5] 54/1 111/25 113/22 115/9 192/7
far [12] 5/23 15/5 47/7 47/7 122/22
124/7 136/15 153/4 192/2 194/17 195/2 255/19
farms [1] 117/1
fashion [3] 68/20 77/24 82/9
fashioned [1] 30/18
fast [1] 110/12
faster [1] 209/2
favor [1] 258/24
FBI [1] 140/7
feature [1] 26/11
February [11] 45/11 45/12 46/11 46/15 47/10 61/25 146/1 149/8 149/12 206/14 207/25
February 10 [1] 206/14
February 10th [1] 207/25
February 2021 [1] 149/12
February 26 [1] 146/1
February 26th [1] 149/8
February 6 [1] 45/12
federal [10] 11/5 18/15 29/14 48/14
53/8 67/2 77/1 108/9 146/8 151/14
FedEx[1] 135/9
Feehan [2] 221/20 265/10
Feehan's [1] 265/13
feel [8] 68/13 73/19 110/12 158/7
159/22 159/23 193/20 247/15
feeling [1] 9/9
fell [2] 124/24 125/2
few [7] 26/8 62/10 177/25 185/23
234/12 236/8 237/6
Fight [1] 62/15
fights [1] 104/24
figure [9] 11/19 75/10 123/17 150/24
211/7 214/5 235/21 259/15 278/12
figured [2] 278/22 278/22
file [5] 65/5 149/20 149/22 150/17
166/22
filed [3] 1/2 1/6 1/8
files [3] 79/23 135/12 272/7
filibustering [1] 5/14
fill [1] 27/11
filling [1] 16/5
final [2] 243/17 268/25
finalized [2] 192/21 193/11
finally [1] $38 / 15$
find [15] 11/18 16/4 24/19 25/13 26/24 30/21 34/10 56/18 58/4 100/4 118/1
122/24 156/21 169/13 275/6
finding [4] 123/7 139/12 224/11 226/21
findings [5] 71/3 71/10 193/8 221/9
270/4
finds [1] 100/1
fine [23] 32/23 36/1 39/20 42/20 61/14 62/25 70/2 73/6 73/13 78/8 79/11 85/17 88/2 100/11 104/4 130/7 189/19 259/6
266/11 277/2 277/6 277/15 278/7
finished [1] 193/3
fire [1] 116/17
Firefly [3] 157/25 240/25 241/9
firewalls [1] 129/23
firm [6] 2/17 123/3 123/3 140/3 234/8 252/9
firmware [2] 50/12 50/17
first [43] 12/9 15/20 27/1 28/8 32/13
50/11 52/7 52/19 64/7 68/6 68/20 70/21
73/3 73/9 74/17 92/19 93/16 99/10
99/20 105/19 107/4 109/1 110/2 112/15
127/14 129/13 148/25 159/25 167/9
172/13 176/3 185/7 193/9 211/1 223/21
242/7 242/16 256/7 256/8 257/19
258/14 266/2 266/17
fish [1] 120/17
FISHER [1] $2 / 5$
five [10] 5/19 77/11 182/11 182/12
198/4 203/17 203/18 203/23 258/1
274/18
five days [1] 198/4
five miles [1] $5 / 19$
five minutes [3] 182/11 182/12 258/1
fix [2] 262/4 $267 / 5$
fixed [1] 267/6
flag [2] 11/16 236/1
flap [1] 168/14
flash [1] 137/7
flexed [1] 113/8
flexibility [3] 9/5 119/19 156/16
flexible [1] 53/9
flip [16] 158/7 204/24 206/6 207/17
207/23 212/21 241/23 254/4 257/5
259/22 261/5 261/20 261/22 265/7
266/17 267/23
flipped [1] 6/10
floor [1] 90/21
Florida [17] 7/14 14/12 15/15 33/12
33/13 33/13 181/12 181/20 184/5
184/10 184/19 185/1 185/24 187/4
187/13 187/20 188/4
flow [1] 53/21
flows [1] 201/6
fob [3] 172/19 172/19 183/8
focus [3] 95/16 133/14 139/4
focused [8] 34/20 56/19 72/13 93/4
103/17 129/14 133/12 133/19
FOERSTER [1] $2 / 7$
fog [1] 5/22
folder [1] 25/12
folks [8] 5/4 108/5 118/22 142/8 195/7
221/19 246/6 253/18
follow [9] 60/5 62/23 83/12 231/20
235/3 240/14 248/23 259/7 277/18
follow-up [4] 60/5 83/12 235/3 277/18
follow-ups [1] 62/23
followed [2] 51/22 232/4
following [14] 1/1 9/25 12/24 14/7 14/9
76/23 115/10 121/6 192/20 207/3 207/8
216/25 233/14 234/13
follows [3] 12/9 105/19 157/16
foregoing [1] 280/8
forensic [8] 117/22 138/14 139/8 139/16 139/18 142/9 233/10 253/20 form [14] 124/5 163/23 175/11 176/5 178/2 178/4 178/5 178/11 178/25 199/6 201/15 225/9 225/22 231/24
formal [2] 55/25 56/23
format [1] 37/6
forms [3] 16/12 177/15 177/18
Fortalice [35] 115/25 117/22 138/12 139/14 139/19 140/4 140/5 140/19 141/24 142/4 142/6 142/12 142/14 142/23 143/2 143/24 143/25 144/3 144/6 144/7 144/19 146/5 146/14 146/15 147/1 147/4 147/8 147/10 147/13 147/13 147/18 149/23 150/4 150/12 150/25
Fortalice's [2] 149/11 149/16
forth [7] 7/10 9/23 10/12 55/15 150/10 240/15 254/2
forthcoming [1] 193/25
forward [4] 138/8 203/5 207/15 233/17 forwards [1] 230/10
found [9] 11/10 74/9 86/24 110/11
115/25 117/25 118/16 169/14 227/24
foundation [10] 79/11 85/15 85/20
86/16 109/8 109/9 110/22 110/25 111/4 131/9
four [9] 101/18 107/8 107/9 120/12
120/12 191/7 198/4 198/5 242/16
Four days [1] 198/5
four-year [1] 107/9
fractional [1] 123/10
fragment [1] 108/10
frame [6] 5/24 66/5 66/13 66/14 109/12 209/9
framework [1] 109/22
Frances [2] 230/10 232/17
franchise [3] 15/17 22/3 39/4
frankly [8] 52/8 54/14 54/19 59/6 69/10 72/22 118/22 124/11
fraud [3] 20/5 33/4 88/22
fraudulent [1] 179/23
freaked [1] 117/19
free [3] 158/7 159/22 159/23
Friday [11] 5/24 7/9 7/20 7/25 8/2 8/5 8/6 198/3 198/8 268/5 278/12
front [18] 37/4 37/21 39/22 43/5 43/11
94/21 121/14 121/16 149/7 154/9
157/19 171/12 186/3 186/7 199/22
200/2 223/22 271/2
fuel [1] 116/17
full [17] $1 / 87 / 248 / 2565 / 2468 / 1371 / 3$ 76/1 112/25 113/2 120/4 122/14 123/2 123/13 123/18 148/25 153/13 168/7
full-time [4] 122/14 123/2 123/13 123/18
fully [3] 137/17 190/21 206/16
Fulton [32] 5/2 17/5 17/8 17/9 17/10
17/13 17/18 17/21 17/22 18/10 18/14
80/9 80/11 81/20 82/24 83/1 83/4 83/4 83/21 91/24 92/13 92/19 93/6 93/8 94/1 117/11 117/17 138/1 142/25 150/19 225/18 225/19
function [4] 81/10 81/25 82/3 217/20
functionality [2] 46/23 160/13
functioning [1] 163/25
functions [1] 148/20
fundamentally [1] 110/8
funding [1] 48/17
further [8] 12/22 16/25 143/1 151/25
155/16 155/20 155/21 276/13
future [3] 190/24 192/1 267/6
G
G-A [1] 228/18
G-A-R-V-i-S [1] 45/3
Gabe [5] 55/21 59/15 61/2 61/19 72/10 Gabriel [5] 62/24 110/14 220/14
221/17 222/15
gain [3] 251/1 253/4 253/6
gained [1] 53/12
Gainesville [1] 7/14
game [1] 69/3
gap [1] 58/19
GARViS [17] 44/23 44/24 44/25 45/2 45/5 45/6 45/7 45/21 46/5 46/19 46/21 46/22 47/4 47/11 47/12 47/15 47/22
gather [7] 142/8 142/9 146/12 224/9
225/21 225/25 246/23
gauge [1] 140/11
gave [3] 67/8 111/24 136/6
gears [1] 21/25
GEMA [1] 193/21
general [47] 10/6 18/11 18/15 18/16 18/20 23/24 34/5 34/6 37/12 37/17
37/25 38/5 38/12 38/13 38/15 38/17 39/23 39/25 40/1 40/3 40/4 40/4 40/6 40/7 40/8 40/12 41/2 42/6 44/6 44/7 44/12 56/14 56/15 76/7 80/4 84/11 84/15 90/2 91/17 91/24 152/18 212/17 225/4 225/10 231/2 231/3 250/2
generalist [2] 124/8 124/20
generalized [1] 109/13
generally [18] 16/1 25/2 29/10 40/3 43/23 88/9 93/16 98/17 163/19 170/16 181/1 196/3 196/4 237/17 240/15 254/2 254/3 254/18
generate [1] 57/7
generic [3] 147/5 148/1 246/24
GEORGIA [85] 1/1 1/25 3/2 5/2 17/8
17/9 18/1 20/18 21/14 22/1 22/3 22/5
22/17 22/20 22/25 23/22 24/23 27/6
28/20 30/11 33/23 41/12 44/7 44/25
48/21 49/5 49/10 50/16 74/18 75/16
75/19 75/22 76/25 77/16 80/6 81/12
84/12 88/8 89/17 89/24 91/15 91/16
119/6 119/11 120/23 121/25 134/17
137/9 170/4 170/5 170/19 181/13 187/9
188/9 190/6 192/14 195/16 196/10
196/13 197/3 198/20 198/24 199/13
200/13 201/19 202/3 202/8 212/5 214/2
214/5 214/9 222/20 223/5 225/3 225/8
229/13 246/16 247/7 247/22 260/22
264/14 265/13 280/4 280/8 280/10
Georgia's [7] 57/5 124/24 125/2
125/14 134/10 152/3 194/11
Georgians [5] 34/9 34/11 39/3 40/11 42/20
Germany [5] 220/13 220/25 221/18 230/11 $257 / 7$
get [91] 5/8 6/1 7/14 9/10 11/3 11/8
11/13 11/15 11/17 12/21 22/7 23/2
25/22 26/8 27/24 33/16 42/22 56/13
57/11 58/1 63/3 64/3 65/18 67/1 72/25
74/11 74/12 79/4 82/5 83/3 95/13 96/9

## G

get... [59] 99/18 100/8 103/2 108/5 109/11 116/7 126/16 140/17 141/4 141/7 142/12 150/22 151/4 162/4 162/6 162/15 164/23 165/17 167/2 167/14 169/12 169/25 172/6 173/15 174/1 177/2 184/20 186/4 190/14 190/16 191/12 191/21 192/20 192/22 193/24 194/20 195/24 200/4 201/8 205/2 217/12 234/1 234/25 235/23 236/8 236/19 241/5 241/19 244/15 245/9 246/6 247/16 259/16 262/3 270/1 274/7 274/23 277/13 278/19
gets [16] 28/19 47/19 72/1 95/20 96/7 167/7 168/10 168/19 172/15 173/16 177/8 178/9 184/21 187/25 193/8 264/15
getting [16] 25/4 93/20 93/21 98/21 98/23 158/12 160/13 167/4 179/8 192/21 195/2 202/10 208/5 241/21 258/1 278/16
Gilbert [3] 7/9 7/10 7/13
give [19] 5/11 13/23 36/11 60/17 64/21 65/11 69/1 70/14 74/6 74/8 75/9 141/15 155/13 160/15 216/20 234/8 234/18 253/23 266/18
given [22] 7/23 35/9 52/22 60/5 60/17 67/13 67/16 68/7 79/5 91/22 100/20
103/23 144/23 152/23 169/6 170/2
171/12 214/17 227/9 238/25 274/1
278/11
gives [1] 145/15
giving [1] 7/11
glad [2] 73/9 124/1
glitch [1] 264/13
globally [1] 58/9
go [97] 5/19 7/25 8/7 9/6 11/12 14/11 17/25 22/7 23/3 24/9 26/9 26/12 26/25 29/25 43/7 43/20 44/2 46/4 46/24 47/3 47/4 48/6 49/25 50/7 59/23 65/25 66/4 70/10 70/10 72/22 76/24 77/18 82/11 85/8 92/17 93/10 96/9 96/20 97/16 104/14 111/4 111/15 116/22 120/15 120/16 123/7 123/21 123/25 126/2 126/14 128/16 129/20 129/24 130/14 136/15 140/9 151/25 157/11 159/8 159/16 159/23 163/14 168/3 171/24 172/12 173/10 174/20 182/19 183/13 189/14 189/24 191/6 191/7 195/8 195/23 207/16 207/18 210/2 228/8 229/15 229/21 232/2 233/14 233/23 237/19 240/2 244/19 245/5 245/9 248/14 250/4 256/7 256/8 260/16 262/24 279/7 279/19
go-to [1] 123/7
goes [15] 22/6 55/5 64/5 96/10 176/25 179/19 191/11 191/17 213/15 231/13 231/20 232/2 267/17 268/9 272/7
going [116] 5/6 7/18 7/22 7/25 8/15 8/16 9/13 9/16 10/16 10/17 21/25 27/24 27/25 28/1 30/3 30/13 30/14 32/25 33/6 34/1 36/11 39/9 40/22 49/18 50/7 50/19 51/23 52/10 56/1 56/8 57/9 57/10 57/22 57/24 57/24 60/21 62/4 63/24 66/4 66/9 68/8 68/18 70/11 70/14 71/25 72/2 72/7 76/14 76/17 78/5 78/13 78/20 79/4 79/10 80/13 82/24 83/12 86/17 87/15

92/12 94/17 94/25 97/13 97/22 98/24 103/2 103/6 103/13 104/4 120/15 124/14 126/15 141/10 154/17 156/6 157/5 164/19 164/23 164/23 164/24 174/21 179/16 186/9 186/10 189/7 189/17 190/2 191/20 200/17 203/4 203/9 204/13 211/2 211/22 217/14 225/12 233/17 235/16 235/16 235/18 235/23 235/24 236/11 236/24 251/10 258/11 259/4 259/6 262/3 262/24 263/3 263/17 266/18 276/24 279/14 279/16 gone [1] 71/20
good [21] 2/13 6/7 12/12 41/25 46/16 105/22 115/5 119/25 123/24 156/17 181/9 181/17 181/21 183/25 184/1 200/19 225/7 226/11 258/7 277/25 278/15
Google [2] 211/6 211/8 got [44] 6/4 6/7 14/9 15/20 43/5 43/11 51/3 51/13 55/6 75/2 97/8 97/12 108/13 116/9 117/17 120/19 121/22 127/14 133/6 139/1 141/14 147/1 152/21 158/5 181/18 193/9 204/3 209/7 210/20 210/25 212/21 241/17 246/22 251/25 252/20 253/7 253/11 257/11 259/20 263/10 263/18 266/7 266/9 275/8
gotten [8] 52/3 73/21 146/9 170/16
193/10 250/21 250/22 251/6
GOVERNANCE [1] 2/13
government [9] 48/14 58/25 62/14 62/14 62/18 62/19 64/12 98/1 228/18 grab [1] 204/24
grade [2] 137/7 137/14
graduate [2] 13/2 13/4
graduating [1] 13/19
grand [1] 39/19
grant [1] 48/16
granular [2] 77/24 193/24
great [6] 118/21 121/18 124/8 156/18 279/4 279/14
greater [2] 252/13 252/19
greatly [1] $36 / 4$
Greenwalt [5] 271/3 271/7 271/9 273/8 274/12
Greenwalt's [3] 271/19 271/22 272/2 grounds [4] 50/20 238/20 271/17 276/23
group [5] 2/11 33/2 129/5 137/6 142/15 guess [16] 25/17 34/10 34/13 56/12 107/9 112/9 122/9 132/18 132/23 133/11 134/11 136/15 201/6 201/23 215/21 277/8
guessing [1] 262/24
guide [5] 211/25 212/3 218/4 276/17 276/18
guideline [1] 83/16
guidelines [8] 48/25 67/6 77/3 90/2 204/11 204/13 206/8 206/11
guys [4] 202/22 218/18 221/2 262/3

## H

H-A-M-I-L-T-O-N [1] 105/16
hack [3] 191/25 192/3 211/7
hacked [1] 86/10
had [88] 5/5 6/10 9/11 36/2 38/20 47/2 47/13 52/2 56/25 57/3 58/23 59/9 59/10 60/6 61/22 64/2 66/25 68/13 70/10
72/23 85/2 85/18 85/25 86/13 92/14

93/17 111/21 113/17 115/12 116/18 116/22 116/25 118/25 119/18 123/21 123/22 123/23 125/18 126/23 130/5 137/22 139/19 140/21 141/7 142/24 144/9 147/7 147/17 149/18 150/14 158/24 159/9 161/2 185/9 187/14 189/9 189/11 189/12 196/22 203/8 203/22 204/18 208/19 208/23 219/9 222/7 222/10 222/14 222/15 222/19 226/2 231/17 233/16 247/10 251/6 253/5 253/9 254/6 255/21 255/21 260/22 268/5 270/10 270/10 274/20 276/3 279/7 280/9
Halderman [17] 13/23 54/13 54/25 55/1 55/3 57/14 57/17 72/4 72/13 188/10 189/7 221/9 250/14 251/25 252/12 269/13 270/5
Halderman's [17] 51/9 51/12 51/14 51/17 59/5 59/6 66/10 66/20 68/11 86/1 86/3 188/16 188/24 191/9 221/7 221/23 269/12
half [12] 7/16 7/16 14/15 120/22 120/25 121/24 122/10 130/16 134/7 176/3 182/25 236/10
HALSEY [1] 2/8
HAMILTON [49] $4 / 7$ 6/8 8/23 8/24 61/1 103/24 104/12 105/4 105/13 105/15 105/18 105/22 107/19 109/16 111/6 111/17 111/24 115/9 118/3 118/14 119/6 119/17 119/25 121/2 121/21 122/25 124/23 130/10 133/23 134/23 135/9 136/11 137/25 138/25 139/24 141/10 142/19 148/1 148/25 151/4 152/3 153/3 153/10 153/25 155/3 155/15 155/22 155/23 156/4
Hamilton's [1] 121/9
Hampton [1] 253/2
hand [46] 11/25 15/19 16/5 16/10 27/14 42/1 44/11 44/15 55/23 56/14 64/25 65/6 89/3 89/13 91/13 91/16 105/8 149/1 179/13 180/2 180/10 180/15 180/25 181/7 181/12 181/19 184/6 184/10 184/19 184/22 185/2 187/10 187/15 202/4 204/19 211/18 224/14 224/17 224/25 225/1 225/4 225/9 225/22 241/8 270/22 280/12
hand-marked [31] 15/19 16/5 16/10 27/14 42/1 44/11 44/15 89/3 89/13 91/13 91/16 179/13 180/2 180/10 180/15 180/25 181/7 181/12 181/19 184/6 184/10 184/19 184/22 185/2 202/4 224/14 224/25 225/4 225/9 225/22 241/8
handed [2] 36/16 204/25
handful [2] 233/20 269/8
handle [1] 240/20
handled [2] 73/18 125/11
hands [3] 63/2 216/23 253/25
hands-on [1] 63/2
hang [3] 205/1 211/16 263/8
happen [15] 45/23 87/19 88/5 96/15 96/15 159/24 169/3 180/1 180/5 180/9 223/9 223/10 224/10 256/16 264/16 happened [9] 54/20 66/4 122/17
194/16 195/1 232/12 244/13 254/3 264/20
happening [6] 63/25 95/1 98/19 170/12 192/1 193/14

## H

happens [17] 8/17 95/22 99/25 102/3 141/5 162/1 163/9 163/17 167/24 168/20 169/5 169/5 169/13 170/17 170/18 173/25 264/14
happy [16] 5/8 32/19 33/16 52/14 59/25 78/24 85/8 103/25 104/2 109/9 112/2 121/14 154/11 157/9 179/12 179/17
hard [9] 115/13 123/21 139/17 158/16 186/2 208/14 211/18 212/7 263/18
harden [1] 110/7
hardened [2] 127/13 129/9
harder [1] 181/22
hardware [7] 117/5 131/12 131/14 166/6 167/21 172/5 215/10
Harry [1] 103/20
Harvey [10] 12/19 18/6 230/11 232/7 261/8 261/16 262/13 265/10 266/5 266/5
has [154] 1/6 5/7 6/15 9/11 10/17 10/22 11/7 26/5 29/13 31/13 35/7 35/9 35/14
36/16 37/3 40/22 45/11 46/10 48/12 49/18 50/9 50/22 53/9 53/14 53/16 53/24 57/20 57/25 58/11 58/16 58/25 58/25 59/1 59/2 60/23 61/19 62/13 62/16 62/20 63/15 65/8 66/4 69/15 69/15 71/14 71/16 72/20 73/16 74/10 75/18 76/24 77/23 78/4 78/17 79/5 80/18 82/4 84/14 84/17 84/18 85/11 85/24 87/12 90/17 91/15 92/9 92/11 96/4 97/13 108/18 111/12 111/12 115/6 123/22 127/23 132/13 134/8 139/1 141/3 142/3 142/20 143/23 144/5 148/10 148/14 148/21 148/22 149/23 152/20 153/21 153/23 156/21 162/10 168/13 169/23 172/2 172/17 172/20 172/20 172/21 182/5 182/16 186/2 186/20 188/10 193/5 193/11 197/7 197/11 198/1 199/5 201/21 201/22
202/3 202/13 205/20 206/3 211/6 211/9 214/17 215/5 215/7 216/11 221/8 221/12 221/15 222/3 223/5 225/1 226/14 228/17 233/10 233/11 235/5 235/7 238/12 238/21 243/25 244/13 248/19 250/21 250/22 252/13 252/24 253/2 263/10 265/23 268/9 269/22
270/17 271/18 273/11 276/23 277/25
hash [2] 19/25 233/19
haul [1] 119/2
HAVA [1] 48/16
have [444]
haven't [11] 30/7 68/25 71/5 85/15 85/19 94/16 96/10 169/14 183/5 239/25 240/3
having [27] $7 / 12$ 12/9 15/8 42/25 52/10 68/21 78/17 85/15 105/19 116/10 123/15 148/8 157/15 163/24 181/23 181/24 187/13 197/4 218/1 222/16 225/8 231/15 252/22 261/11 261/17 262/1 275/1
he [143] $5 / 85 / 136 / 66 / 236 / 247 / 27 / 10$ 9/11 9/12 9/15 9/23 9/23 10/10 10/10 11/4 11/5 11/6 11/8 11/9 11/12 18/7 21/18 21/19 35/8 35/9 35/15 39/9 39/11 39/12 42/16 42/16 42/18 52/11 52/21 57/17 57/17 57/24 59/20 61/16 63/20

64/9 68/9 68/12 70/3 70/11 72/7 78/7 78/15 78/16 78/18 78/19 78/23 80/18 82/19 85/2 85/11 86/5 87/12 93/6 93/7 97/12 97/13 97/20 97/25 100/9 104/13 104/14 104/17 109/12 110/23 110/24 110/24 111/12 111/12 111/25 121/17 124/5 124/9 124/10 124/17 124/19 124/19 126/13 131/7 134/24 134/25 138/8 142/20 142/20 142/21 142/22 143/23 144/5 144/6 144/7 153/12 153/12 153/17 153/18 155/25 156/22 169/2 169/4 169/4 169/5 169/18 179/10 182/16 188/15 188/19 189/2 189/7 189/7 191/12 196/17 196/20 199/25 200/1 200/8 200/20 202/9 202/10 214/17 215/13 220/21 235/7 236/5 236/11 236/16 238/14 238/23 250/22 251/14 252/4 252/8 252/10 265/15 270/16 270/17 272/2 272/7 273/18 273/20
he's [7] 78/4 79/1 126/13 238/22 239/2 239/3 259/5
head [2] 55/2 79/8
heading [5] 149/19 212/23 213/6 223/23 242/6
health [1] 123/20
hear [13] 6/4 11/10 24/11 33/17 35/6 57/9 60/2 61/1 78/5 124/1 138/18 153/16 246/13
heard [20] 5/21 50/21 51/11 59/8 61/2 70/8 108/17 135/4 162/10 188/12 191/19 197/10 214/21 218/17 226/3 238/1 239/23 240/3 244/16 264/17
hearing [7] 7/3 53/4 58/24 64/7 68/5 251/11 251/11
hearsay [14] 50/20 52/7 52/19 52/21
52/23 63/3 143/2 143/6 144/2 202/5
254/23 255/4 266/1 271/20
heavily [2] 193/1 197/11
heavy [1] 113/6
held [1] 280/10
help [14] 20/4 61/12 106/22 106/23
108/3 110/6 130/8 142/13 161/9 226/12
254/25 257/3 258/18 263/25
helped [3] 59/1 117/9 265/15
helpful [4] 5/25 70/9 112/3 125/23
helping [1] 15/9
helps [2] 200/8 254/24
her [8] 53/5 53/15 121/11 123/22 228/6 260/13 266/18 266/19
here [88] 5/13 6/6 6/7 8/23 9/22 10/4 11/2 22/12 52/9 53/21 56/20 57/16 61/12 66/4 68/13 71/18 72/8 76/25 78/11 103/24 106/8 111/24 117/3 119/18 121/8 123/5 127/16 133/5 142/19 143/25 144/8 144/25 145/10 145/10 145/11 147/24 156/7 156/24 159/11 163/3 177/21 181/18 182/16 189/14 191/14 192/6 195/20 200/6 206/7 208/8 208/10 210/1 210/20 211/16 213/9 213/18 215/23 216/5 217/4 218/2 227/13 227/18 228/10 228/13 231/5 232/11 232/19 232/21 239/3 239/12 241/24 242/2 242/8 242/11 242/18 243/17 243/18 244/5 245/7 249/19 259/24 261/7 262/12 264/7 265/9 267/18 267/25 276/22 hereby [1] 280/8
hereunto [1] 280/12
HERNANDEZ [1] 3/5
hey [3] 96/18 117/17 241/12
high [8] 28/19 60/8 60/8 67/2 82/9
186/24 201/10 217/13
high-level [1] 67/2
high-speed [1] 28/19
higher [8] 40/2 40/3 40/5 40/6 40/7 40/9 93/24 94/1
highest [1] 205/17
highly [1] 62/21
him [50] $7 / 4$ 8/23 11/14 21/16 52/14 61/12 70/22 74/10 74/12 74/12 74/15 78/5 78/17 85/11 85/13 87/2 87/3 87/4 103/20 103/25 104/16 121/12 121/14 121/16 121/17 126/15 126/18 126/20 135/4 151/21 153/19 154/7 154/8 154/9 154/9 154/11 154/13 156/21 157/4 179/16 182/17 188/25 196/2 204/19 236/4 236/5 238/1 251/10 253/23 278/19
himself [2] 10/11 11/6
hire [2] 120/16 123/2
hired [2] 55/10 120/10
his [46] 7/8 7/15 9/25 10/1 10/11 11/7 11/14 21/21 35/9 51/12 53/15 55/4 58/2 66/11 67/8 70/12 70/15 74/4 74/11 78/16 85/6 85/6 85/15 93/5 97/24 103/23 104/1 111/25 121/15 121/17 124/18 126/13 126/14 135/2 135/4 142/22 151/21 151/24 153/11 154/7 156/21 188/19 228/7 249/7 251/14 253/5
historically [1] 39/25
history [1] 194/15
hit [2] 122/22 161/10
hold [3] 13/14 19/7 20/6
hole [1] 191/17
home [2] 101/22 279/19
Homeland [3] 20/18 140/7 193/21
homes [1] 39/15
honestly [1] 158/12
Honor [174] 5/5 7/21 8/20 9/10 9/15 10/19 11/3 21/22 30/12 30/23 31/3 31/10 32/16 32/22 32/23 33/8 33/19 33/22 34/14 34/23 35/2 35/12 35/16 35/22 36/9 38/8 38/24 40/18 42/15 42/19 49/15 50/19 51/2 52/19 54/9 55/9 55/20 57/13 57/21 59/4 60/20 61/8 61/24 62/8 63/15 64/5 64/11 64/24 64/24 65/6 70/17 71/2 71/10 73/24 75/9 76/13 78/3 78/21 80/16 84/25 94/12 97/7 100/8 102/24 103/9 103/10 103/18 103/23 104/13 104/22 105/3 109/7 109/10 110/23 111/2 111/12 111/23 112/4 113/11 119/13 121/8 121/14 126/12 126/17 126/19 132/9 134/20 134/23 136/7 136/21 138/16 138/21 142/16 142/18 143/4 143/8 143/13 143/14 143/16 143/20 144/3 146/7 146/16 146/20 146/23 146/25 147/23 148/17 148/23 151/19 151/22 152/1 153/9 154/6 154/11 155/20 155/21 156/2 156/4 156/11 156/19 158/11 158/21 159/2 169/2 169/9 179/8 188/23 189/3 189/21 200/4 200/24 202/6 204/19 204/20 206/24 210/24 211/1 215/11 228/16 234/24 235/4 236/1

## H

Honor... [31] 237/3 237/6 238/20 251/9 251/23 258/4 258/9 260/25 262/15
263/9 264/23 265/2 265/17 265/22
266/15 267/10 269/2 270/23 271/15
272/24 272/25 273/16 273/19 274/25
276/14 276/19 277/16 278/4 278/14
278/20 278/24
HONORABLE [1] 1/11
hope [1] 60/15
hoped [2] 69/23 69/23
hopeful [1] 73/22
hopefully [2] 262/4 278/19
HORST [1] $2 / 9$
hospital [6] 106/8 106/9 119/20 151/10

## 151/14 155/9

hosted [6] 19/10 115/22 128/4 130/19 132/4 133/2
hour [5] 113/16 134/3 182/25 236/10 236/13
hours [8] 79/22 113/3 113/14 113/15 113/17 236/8 236/9 236/19
house [5] 109/21 110/17 116/9 123/7 133/4
housed [1] 133/5
housekeeping [2] 5/6 182/15
how [125] 7/15 7/18 8/12 8/16 14/1
14/3 14/14 17/21 18/11 18/21 20/13
20/23 22/5 22/24 23/22 26/23 27/17
27/19 32/3 33/23 34/9 34/10 34/11
36/23 40/4 42/5 43/14 44/6 45/2 45/23
53/7 68/22 70/16 72/13 73/10 73/18
77/2 80/10 81/20 88/6 90/7 90/8 91/19 91/25 92/7 93/3 93/8 93/14 97/15 99/3 101/6 102/6 103/14 104/12 105/23 107/5 107/19 111/12 111/17 120/17 120/18 121/13 124/11 129/20 140/9 140/13 142/8 144/15 144/25 145/2 145/10 145/16 147/1 148/6 148/19 148/19 157/23 160/16 161/5 170/9 171/20 173/6 173/21 175/20 175/25 176/1 176/5 176/20 181/7 186/9 187/1 187/6 188/15 188/20 189/16 192/9 192/23 195/8 195/18 197/11 199/11 200/18 209/3 209/3 211/7 212/4 216/14 223/11 224/9 224/13 226/6 227/2 232/17 235/1 235/17 235/21 240/1 240/19 241/18 244/2 244/16 248/24 258/5 275/6 277/19
however [3] 1/7 243/8 245/9
huge [2] 189/1 215/16
huh [3] 133/25 137/2 137/11
human [2] 64/16 264/9
hundreds [1] 217/12
hurry [1] 116/7
I
I'Il [29] 10/22 20/23 31/4 52/6 57/13 60/19 74/11 78/3 94/16 94/19 103/10 121/8 132/9 134/20 141/15 151/19 151/24 153/9 157/11 196/21 199/17 202/16 211/18 225/12 246/8 273/9 276/5 278/12 278/19
I'm [186] $5 / 8$ 6/6 6/12 6/21 8/15 9/8 9/8 10/4 14/20 15/1 20/22 24/19 24/23 25/20 25/21 25/22 30/13 30/17 30/23 31/13 32/19 33/5 33/16 34/10 35/12

36/11 40/22 40/24 42/19 49/18 50/7 52/14 53/19 53/19 53/23 54/20 55/15 56/13 56/18 57/22 58/13 58/20 59/17 59/18 60/1 63/8 66/4 68/3 68/25 69/21 70/1 70/14 73/9 73/13 73/22 75/10 78/13 78/24 82/13 85/8 85/10 85/10 85/13 86/13 86/16 86/17 86/23 87/14 88/10 88/25 88/25 93/4 93/7 93/9 94/16 94/25 95/24 97/8 97/8 102/11 103/9 106/11 109/9 110/23 112/2 113/11 114/5 114/6 114/6 115/5 115/5 115/23 116/16 116/16 119/25 121/8 121/14 121/15 121/21 123/6 124/1 125/21 128/5 128/6 130/5 130/7 132/9 132/20 133/17 136/19 138/19 141/10 143/8 147/3 154/11 157/9 163/13 163/14 166/15 167/1 178/20 179/12 179/17 180/13 183/2 184/2 188/2 188/13 189/5 189/9 190/2 190/18 192/2 193/9 194/16 199/14 202/20 202/21 204/23 205/1 206/23 207/5 211/20 213/24 214/13 215/21 216/4 216/6 216/8 218/14 225/24 233/4 234/1 235/21 235/23 237/1 237/16 237/25 240/5 247/9 247/17 250/21 255/17 257/4 257/10 257/15 258/1 259/6 259/23 262/24 263/3 265/8 265/19 266/4 266/5 266/18 271/18 272/21 273/19 275/10 276/20 278/25 279/4 279/12 279/16 279/17 I've [10] 97/8 120/19 127/25 210/20 239/22 239/23 258/7 264/16 269/20 270/10
iButton [12] 166/18 166/19 166/21 167/13 173/15 209/16 209/18 210/12 210/13 210/16 211/7 213/10
ICC [3] 219/1 219/20 220/5
ICHTER [2] 2/20 2/21
ICP [4] 164/4 164/5 166/16 210/5
ICPs [1] 220/18
ICX [2] 198/24 199/3
ID [2] 23/2 160/4
idea [4] 91/25 110/18 150/14 199/10
identifiable [1] 266/9
identification [1] 54/7
identified [12] 51/8 51/20 54/2 55/4 59/20 64/20 66/20 69/17 118/22 169/19 203/8 233/20
identify [9] 20/1 51/5 66/16 70/6 98/9
98/18 100/5 104/17 269/14
identifying [2] 59/19 267/12
III [3] 2/13 2/16 2/18
illegal [7] 179/15 180/1 180/5 180/9
180/12 180/13 180/24
illegally [1] 180/15
image [1] 139/8
ImageCast [4] 164/5 224/6 268/1 268/8
images [2] 145/19 145/21
imbue [1] 120/20
immediately [1] 150/20
impact [6] 49/5 93/3 93/8 93/14 113/20 140/12
impacted [2] 92/23 274/24
impeach [2] 126/15 154/8
impeaching [1] 154/7
impeachment [3] 121/11 121/13 154/10
implement [2] 136/2 151/16
implementation [2] 186/13 215/10
implemented [2] 75/21 137/22
implementing [3] 69/4 78/25 267/5
import [1] 54/13
importance [1] 95/17
important [7] 62/21 74/17 74/21
140/23 193/13 193/15 226/9
imprinted [1] 172/20
improving [1] 15/11
inability [1] 82/6
inaccurate [1] 232/21
inappropriate [3] 184/11 185/11 185/15
incident [6] 117/10 141/6 149/4 149/12
149/17 194/17
include [3] 99/17 106/14 262/18
included [3] 261/10 268/11 275/25
includes [1] 262/16
including [4] 89/24 144/2 220/2 274/21
inclusion [1] 271/20
increase [1] 95/13
indeed [1] 256/15
independent [1] 13/4
indicate [3] 51/21 97/1 171/16
indicated [1] 183/7
indicates [4] 206/14 227/23 268/4 272/2
Indicators [1] 118/2
indicia [1] 148/10
indictments [1] 84/10
individual [8] 9/18 59/13 131/16
140/12 152/24 196/17 248/15 266/9
individual's [1] 263/10
individuals [12] 28/15 180/24 194/20
196/16 222/8 251/6 252/14 252/25
253/12 257/9 260/13 264/7
industry [2] 45/25 107/20
infect [2] 84/23 85/12
infected [3] 84/21 86/24 88/5
infection [2] 86/22 223/6
inference [4] 39/12 199/10 199/15 200/15
inferences [1] 218/4
infiltrating [1] 150/24
inform [1] 274/3
informal [3] 54/18 55/17 55/22 information [83] 10/10 19/20 20/15 28/2 28/5 28/6 28/6 34/20 36/21 44/25 45/21 46/22 46/24 46/25 47/17 47/20
47/23 49/12 52/10 56/4 56/15 58/18 63/22 67/20 71/20 72/9 72/20 73/17 90/6 99/8 100/18 100/20 100/21 106/11 107/1 112/21 120/14 124/6 124/8 129/18 137/8 141/2 142/11 145/7 145/16 145/18 145/24 146/18 151/7 153/1 159/19 160/7 162/10 166/22 167/15 173/20 173/20 174/11 174/23 176/5 176/16 178/9 178/12 198/7 198/10 198/11 198/15 199/24 202/17 241/20 246/12 247/8 247/18 247/19 252/21 263/11 266/9 267/12 273/3 273/8 273/10 273/12 274/21
informed [1] 252/24
informing [1] 95/11
infrastructure [10] 20/10 49/11 106/4
106/12 131/15 152/4 152/11 153/8 154/3 154/23
initial [5] 27/1 70/21 110/1 181/23 222/16
initially [6] 14/18 18/6 106/22 113/6
185/7 204/3
initials [2] 115/23 266/19
injuries [1] 151/11
injury [3] 106/8 106/9 123/24
input [1] 117/19
inputs [2] 140/6 140/8
ins [1] 31/1
insert [4] 161/12 161/12 166/16 172/3
inside [3] 125/19 248/11 248/19
insight [1] 195/7
insights [1] 195/10
inspect [1] 195/24
inspecting [1] 245/2
inspection [2] 111/20 192/20
inspections [2] 192/13 192/16
install [3] 77/19 208/13 224/4
installation [2] 208/12 208/23
installed [1] 208/23
installing [1] 202/23
instance [4] 81/7 126/24 183/16
253/14
instances [3] 24/25 25/7 28/10
instead [6] 16/17 117/2 145/8 187/13
218/1 261/24
instinct [1] 70/21
instructed [1] 231/22
instruction [5] 142/7 144/12 229/13
229/24 245/13
instructional [1] 144/25
instructions [1] 16/18
insurance [1] 123/25
integrity [1] 88/22
intelligence [1] 106/2
intelligent [1] 124/9
intend [1] 34/3
intended [1] 242/19
intent [4] 17/2 60/20 182/7 186/14
intentionally [1] 242/2
interact [1] 20/13
interchangeable [1] 81/6
interest [2] 69/16 108/15
interested [1] 118/20
internal [2] 152/21 222/10
internals [1] 131/11
internet [6] 129/7 158/4 194/25 196/14 216/18 216/22
interrogatories [6] 54/16 55/19 56/22 60/4 66/14 69/6
interrogatory [10] 51/2 54/21 54/24
55/12 55/16 56/19 56/21 56/24 65/9 66/16
Interrogatory Number [1] 56/21
Interrogatory Number 27 [1] 56/24
interrupt [2] 53/21 153/3
intimate [1] 209/5
intimately [1] 219/5
introduce [3] 258/11 276/25 276/25
introduced [1] 192/4
introducing [1] 275/12
introduction [2] 57/10 268/4
inverse [2] 79/3 79/14
investigate [3] 51/6 66/17 226/20
investigated [1] 232/16
investigating [1] 232/8
investigation [5] 219/10 219/12 219/13

219/19 264/19
investigations [1] 67/16
investigative [1] 150/25
investigative-type [1] 150/25
investigators [2] 117/15 195/23
invite [1] 21/2
invited [3] 21/3 21/7 194/7
invoked [1] 241/8
involved [16] 18/12 18/18 61/3 142/24
193/1 201/21 208/13 218/8 219/4 219/5
219/6 220/12 220/21 220/22 220/23 227/7
involvement [1] 15/8
involving [7] 55/11 84/10 107/23
117/11 180/24 181/5 254/16
irrelevant [3] 54/14 54/15 69/24
is [1186]
ISAC [1] 140/6
isn't [3] 196/18 216/17 279/17
ISO [1] 106/24
issue [16] 52/22 54/5 64/19 65/5 67/3
70/13 78/21 100/25 102/21 116/5 144/8 147/16 150/19 163/24 163/25 279/13
issued [7] 28/9 38/1 62/9 66/10 67/4
96/20 268/23
issues [27] 16/4 55/6 57/14 59/1 59/24
60/11 61/4 63/3 63/14 67/3 71/21 71/25
73/18 74/21 75/10 107/23 114/5 117/25
120/23 121/25 147/17 148/13 171/14
241/2 268/1 278/17 278/17

## it [880]

it's [2] 25/21 106/9
item [3] 137/6 145/3 166/15
Item 1 [1] 137/6
Item 2 [1] 166/15
items [1] 152/24
its [11] 27/20 62/9 81/1 81/9 82/4 168/25 202/3 222/14 222/19 251/7 268/10
itself [11] 53/13 102/16 102/19 118/4 167/22 192/3 199/19 200/25 201/2 240/2 243/13

## J

JACOUTOT [1] 3/7
James [2] 129/14 142/14
JANUARY [13] 1/13 5/2 125/18 128/2
132/4 193/4 194/11 253/19 263/19
264/5 265/11 272/19 280/13
January 12th [1] 265/11
January 20 [1] $132 / 4$
January 5th [1] 264/5
January 9 [1] 263/19
JAVIER [1] 3/4
JEFFREY [1] 2/2
Jenna [3] 146/21 253/23 276/15
Jerry [1] 221/20
job [6] 14/9 118/21 120/20 123/23
216/19 250/25
Johnson [1] 256/9
joining [1] 18/3
Jones [5] 33/10 62/15 230/5 230/13

## 230/16

Joseph [1] 6/19
JOSH [3] 3/4 35/23 62/2
journey [3] 108/19 108/24 133/24
JR [1] 3/9
JS [1] 266/19
judge [6] 1/12 33/10 62/15 120/4 258/18 279/15
Judge Jones [2] 33/10 62/15
judgment [3] 62/21 64/4 216/4
judicial [3] 30/13 33/13 179/17
July [14] 17/22 17/25 33/11 66/10 66/13 66/15 92/19 92/21 93/11 137/1
193/2 193/6 227/14 229/2
July 1st [1] 66/10
July 1st 2020 [1] 137/1
July 28th [2] 66/13 66/15
July 9th [1] 229/2
July of [1] 92/19
jump [4] 147/21 244/4 244/19 248/6
jumping [1] 55/15
juncture [1] 70/16
June [14] 54/12 63/5 63/11 67/4 75/13 76/1 93/21 121/24 134/5 203/13 223/19 229/5 268/2 268/22
June 3rd [6] 54/12 63/11 67/4 75/13 268/2 268/22
June 9th [1] 229/5
jurisdictions [5] 20/17 201/13 201/23 217/9 268/12
just [232] 5/23 8/22 10/16 11/4 11/13 11/16 17/24 18/13 24/8 24/9 24/10 24/19 24/22 25/20 25/22 26/15 26/19 27/19 30/6 33/20 35/3 35/11 35/23 36/2 36/11 37/6 43/20 45/2 45/19 46/3 46/4 49/22 50/7 50/21 52/16 52/17 53/3 55/7 55/15 55/17 55/22 56/18 56/22 58/20 59/25 62/2 65/8 65/25 66/4 66/9 68/3 69/21 69/22 71/13 71/20 73/1 73/2 73/4 73/8 73/12 74/13 74/14 78/3 79/4 79/8 80/1 80/7 81/19 82/15 82/19 83/12 85/2 86/15 87/15 87/22 93/7 93/8 93/9 93/17 94/19 97/7 97/14 101/4 102/9 103/16 104/10 105/24 108/11 108/13 108/15 109/11 109/13 110/6 110/8 110/11 113/17 113/24 114/3 114/6 116/17 116/21 121/17 122/24 124/13 124/22 124/23 126/13 126/17 126/20 126/22 127/4 130/7 130/10 132/9 132/22 134/4 137/12 139/24 141/8 141/21 141/25 142/18 143/16 144/10 144/23 145/2 145/10 145/13 145/22 146/7 147/5 147/23 148/3 148/21 150/18 150/21 152/18 153/20 153/21 155/3 155/13 156/20 157/3 158/23 158/25 163/10 165/19 166/18 167/18 171/11 171/12 172/9 173/13 177/25 178/20 179/16 182/12 182/25 183/3 187/5 187/14 188/11 188/22 189/18 191/25 192/6 199/21 199/22 200/1 200/24 201/11 201/20 202/20 204/25 205/1 207/23 208/8 210/1 210/20 210/25 211/11 211/18 211/21 213/24 216/4 216/8 219/22 223/1 226/23 229/7 229/18 230/6 234/5 235/1 235/20 235/21 237/23 238/17 239/2 240/3 243/5 243/17 246/4 249/10 249/18 252/11 254/16 255/1 255/2 255/8 255/18 257/3 257/19 258/11 259/1 261/18 262/17 264/13 264/15 264/17 265/19 267/10 270/1 270/14 270/15 273/16 275/6 277/12 277/17 278/4 278/10 278/14

| K |
| :--- |
| Kansas [1] 7/11 |
| Kip |

274/9 274/21 274/23 276/2 276/7 276/10 276/22 277/10 279/8 279/14
KNOWiNK [13] 204/2 271/10 271/12 272/18 272/20 273/9 273/12 273/22 274/3 275/7 275/19 276/3 276/7
knowledge [35] 21/5 23/6 23/14 23/20 48/19 51/19 53/12 53/14 54/6 70/12 75/13 78/12 79/12 85/6 85/14 91/1 91/9 91/15 94/21 111/13 120/20 123/1 124/18 131/17 132/23 137/21 149/10 149/15 149/18 150/3 180/19 222/18 232/20 233/9 272/17
known [4] 18/23 19/19 178/1 181/4 knows [4] 70/3 110/23 110/24 178/20 KREVOLIN [1] $2 / 9$

## L

lab [1] 204/12
label [1] 259/18
labeled [2] 158/16 262/19
laboratories [4] 48/23 76/18 76/20 77/1
laboratory [1] 252/9
labs [1] 206/17
lack [6] 54/6 69/16 78/11 109/7 145/14 150/9
lacked [1] 131/8
Lacks [1] 110/22
laid [2] 85/15 85/20
landscape [1] 134/2
landscapes [1] 134/1
laptop [7] 74/11 117/11 117/17 138/1
138/11 139/15 150/19
laptops [1] 142/25
large [8] 80/9 81/19 91/24 102/13
172/17 215/18 231/6 231/21
larger [5] 79/13 79/22 79/23 101/11 101/11
largest [2] 41/19 216/11
LAROSS [1] 3/8
last [26] 20/17 21/21 27/1 38/3 57/13 67/14 71/15 106/5 107/13 107/13
107/15 118/23 132/21 170/24 193/2
193/6 207/7 236/20 243/16 248/6 249/25 249/25 257/5 257/8 257/17 270/22
late [9] 14/16 29/2 45/6 46/18 46/25
106/1 118/25 219/25 269/8
later [10] 10/20 11/2 18/8 42/22 66/12 71/11 98/8 114/4 235/5 251/22
latest [1] 94/24
launched [1] 106/4
LAURA [5] 2/13 2/18 230/5 230/13 230/16
law [12] 2/15 2/17 2/24 24/1 29/11 49/6 53/19 91/9 216/25 249/4 252/9 257/23
lawful [1] 179/24
laws [7] 89/25 90/1 90/2 90/22 90/24 240/15 250/24
lawyer [1] 277/24
lay [6] 53/3 85/14 85/19 109/9 111/4 152/25
laying [2] 86/16 112/23
layouts [1] 186/20
lays [1] 110/24
leader [1] 131/7
leadership [2] 20/6 144/12
leading [5] 87/3 87/9 87/12 87/14

87/21
learn [3] 19/5 222/2 246/23
learned [6] 203/4 203/20 203/25
253/16 274/2 275/5
learning [1] 5/10
least [25] 6/3 39/23 64/23 68/23 69/14 69/18 72/11 132/24 146/4 177/23
178/25 182/18 189/13 196/16 197/10 202/14 225/12 231/5 235/2 236/15 251/12 263/13 263/24 271/9 274/6 leave [10] 26/15 39/15 152/9 153/6 154/2 154/19 220/5 229/18 236/22 244/6
led [1] 275/15
Lee [7] 237/22 237/24 238/13 238/23 239/12 239/20 240/3
Lee's [1] 239/1
left [20] 14/19 15/21 16/17 18/7 37/11 60/25 118/15 118/16 122/17 123/8 123/18 134/4 137/21 137/24 146/2 185/8 218/19 249/21 267/14 267/21
legacy [2] 45/16 45/19
legal [4] 179/9 180/12 201/4 249/7
Leigh [2] 260/2 260/4
length [2] 188/25 213/4
lengthy [1] 108/18
less [4] 39/19 40/2 46/11 193/25
let [45] 9/1 31/3 35/11 35/14 39/23 52/2 52/16 59/25 64/2 67/25 70/22 70/25
75/14 81/12 85/13 85/21 85/22 86/20 87/22 95/3 107/10 117/22 151/1 151/24 154/9 154/11 154/13 159/22 162/6 184/3 189/15 209/14 211/5 234/3
238/17 243/5 249/18 252/11 258/7
264/12 270/22 271/23 275/11 275/16 275/22
let's [40] 11/1 22/22 24/7 27/4 30/7
30/11 42/23 42/23 43/20 44/22 49/25
58/1 64/1 65/14 80/9 81/19 84/8 88/8
91/22 91/25 95/5 98/3 99/2 101/4
115/17 159/7 163/16 163/22 168/3
170/17 182/11 214/8 230/2 230/19
236/24 244/4 244/19 255/8 263/6
279/19
lets [1] 25/14
letter [2] 55/17 274/19
level [14] 67/2 77/1 77/5 81/16 81/17
81/18 89/23 102/12 124/5 124/18
193/12 193/17 250/22 253/6
leverage [1] 224/4
liaison [1] 260/5
license [3] 28/11 160/5 160/6
licensing [1] 114/1
lid [1] 164/17
lies [1] 59/4
life [2] 14/8 74/21
light [4] 66/24 67/18 219/19 255/14
like [77] 15/11 23/1 30/24 30/25 31/1
32/5 32/19 35/7 65/4 70/20 71/21 72/19
73/2 73/4 73/19 78/4 80/2 80/9 81/19 91/10 91/24 101/22 102/24 108/21 108/24 110/12 $127 / 4$ 129/21 129/21 137/16 142/1 142/4 142/5 144/14 144/17 144/20 145/3 150/18 151/5 156/6 166/13 166/13 166/17 166/18 167/19 169/4 178/24 181/24 182/4 182/12 186/8 193/5 193/7 198/10
202/14 210/25 212/1 213/23 214/6

| L | $59 / 2463 / 1765 / 19$ | $70 / 10$ | $76 / 10$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

## M

marked... [20] 179/13 180/2 180/10 180/15 180/25 181/7 181/12 181/19 184/6 184/10 184/19 184/22 185/2 202/4 224/14 224/25 225/4 225/9 225/22 241/8
markers [2] 243/9 243/19
market [2] 120/16 122/21
marking [48] 22/8 23/3 42/7 42/12 43/20 44/10 44/14 77/14 79/24 80/10 80/14 84/19 84/21 86/25 87/8 91/3 91/6 101/18 101/25 102/4 102/7 115/11 119/8 125/14 128/7 133/8 160/21 163/20 171/20 171/24 172/1 174/11 174/12 174/14 174/24 180/6 180/19
180/20 181/5 181/14 186/5 186/11
186/23 187/7 191/7 242/21 246/7 253/6 marks [3] 7/23 16/9 188/1
Martin [4] 5/11 5/23 11/13 259/11 MARTINO [1] 2/6
MARTINO-WEINHARDT [1] 2/6 MARY [2] 2/5 119/25
master's [4] 12/25 13/1 13/5 13/7 match [4] 99/12 99/13 101/20 164/16
matches [2] 28/6 101/15
material [1] 156/24
materials [4] 56/4 65/18 97/24 178/9
Mathews [1] 14/8
matter [13] 51/10 62/20 66/21 108/2
121/2 156/12 156/21 209/8 228/19
235/10 265/25 279/5 280/11
matters [2] 35/4 59/11
MATTHAEUS [1] 2/6
mature [2] 106/23 123/15
maturing [1] 108/23
may [65] 1/2 1/4 7/6 7/25 8/22 8/25
16/21 16/21 24/10 30/5 31/9 36/8 40/18 41/11 41/11 46/7 49/14 52/7 57/25 59/18 63/4 66/7 66/7 69/11 71/13 72/4 72/5 73/1 73/11 73/12 80/4 83/5 85/3 89/21 93/20 94/12 94/19 94/24 97/7 100/24 107/12 107/13 115/15 134/5 136/7 146/2 148/18 150/6 157/20 158/9
158/21 182/18 182/25 188/13 193/3
193/14 196/3 215/24 216/8 236/10
242/13 244/20 268/5 268/22 270/23
May 2021 [3] 94/24 157/20 158/9
May 27 [1] 268/22
May 27th [1] 268/5
maybe [20] 7/16 24/10 55/17 63/13
68/3 68/4 74/13 75/6 83/11 114/5 114/6
127/23 127/25 193/6 234/17 253/3
274/14 276/16 277/20 278/14
McGowan [1] 250/1
McGUIRE [2] 2/16 2/17
me [83] 6/20 6/22 12/19 21/3 21/17
30/23 31/3 34/2 34/18 35/11 35/14 38/16 38/17 39/24 42/10 52/16 54/18 58/4 59/25 60/3 64/21 65/11 69/13 74/3 74/8 75/9 75/14 76/22 79/9 80/20 81/12 84/20 85/21 85/22 86/20 87/22 92/17 95/3 102/24 107/10 114/16 122/18 124/13 126/19 128/13 132/24 139/24 145/3 148/7 153/14 153/15 155/13 157/2 159/22 162/6 166/20 167/4 167/6 184/3 185/6 199/22 200/2 205/2 209/14 211/5 211/23 216/6 218/3 228/14 234/3

236/18 238/17 243/5 249/18 252/11 258/8 264/12 270/22 271/23 275/11 275/16 275/22 276/15
mean [67] 9/5 9/8 16/8 23/23 24/13 24/21 25/20 26/20 32/6 34/13 38/19 39/11 39/13 42/19 46/14 55/2 55/13 55/25 59/25 65/12 69/7 69/20 70/3 71/13 73/16 76/11 78/18 83/13 85/10 85/13 85/18 92/6 96/22 100/9 107/6 115/23 118/19 124/9 125/16 128/7 130/21 132/5 142/14 145/5 150/7 153/3 153/17 160/3 167/19 178/15 198/10 200/20 202/11 203/12 207/14 212/1 217/6 235/20 235/21 235/22 237/8 241/11 250/14 273/11 273/14 274/8 274/17
meaning [4] 24/20 132/13 150/12 200/14
means [12] 25/20 39/4 98/9 118/19 160/1 160/12 189/5 189/6 190/21 197/3 201/5 277/23
meant [11] 59/23 71/6 71/7 84/2
184/24 190/24 203/7 250/23 273/21 273/25 275/6
measure [5] 5/6 182/15 190/23 191/1 191/24
measures [19] 51/6 51/21 54/8 59/14 61/22 64/6 66/17 68/9 68/21 68/24
110/19 111/3 111/6 111/18 151/15
151/16 152/6 195/9 232/3
MECHANICAL [1] 1/21
media [1] 224/6
medical [1] 6/10
medium [1] 158/1
meeting [2] 236/20 249/24
meets [1] 204/12
MEGAN [2] 2/13 2/18
member [1] 197/11
memory [6] 76/22 145/18 146/25 147/2
178/5 178/7
mention [7] 56/6 65/1 174/21 245/2
245/7 245/22 250/9
mentioned [14] 5/23 18/7 27/5 46/20
168/19 194/3 196/6 197/11 199/5
203/16 218/25 240/25 245/20 245/25
mentions [1] 245/10
merely [1] 273/21
merits [1] 69/10
Merritt [5] 110/13 113/8 118/23 124/2 124/8
mess [1] 139/23
messages [1] 241/5
messing [1] 274/19
met [2] 120/2 184/3
metal [4] 101/12 102/13 166/14 166/14
method [10] 27/9 40/11 41/1 42/3
43/14 79/5 91/17 160/14 160/16 225/6
methodology [2] 45/25 247/16
methods [8] 15/16 22/2 22/19 34/14
34/15 39/3 53/6 160/18
Michael [12] 6/13 77/22 126/24 129/5 131/6 131/18 136/25 182/16 221/18 227/18 254/11 254/11
microphone [2] 12/3 105/11
middle [10] 9/6 33/11 $33 / 12$ 149/1
178/19 210/8 212/9 213/4 231/13 266/6
might [33] 5/24 16/15 16/16 16/25
47/15 60/15 64/9 68/22 70/18 73/22

79/4 99/8 104/10 104/10 122/23 141/25 144/22 150/8 150/17 155/25 158/5
158/13 193/25 198/7 234/21 236/5
241/9 247/18 249/11 258/18 273/12
274/24 277/16
migrate [2] 45/21 45/25
miles [1] $5 / 19$
military [1] 29/11
Miller [2] 5/7 5/12
millions [1] 25/21
mind [3] 96/8 96/17 96/18
mine [1] 261/18
$\operatorname{mini}[1]$ 114/17
minimum [4] 9/20 23/25 89/8 224/24 minor [1] 12/23
minute [7] 11/10 21/25 65/11 65/14 115/6 127/23 142/3
minutes [12] $5 / 1965 / 17$ 73/8 79/25
79/25 104/23 182/11 182/12 209/1
258/1 277/20 277/21
mirrors [1] 126/21
mismark [2] 16/10 184/24
mismarks [6] 16/7 16/8 182/4 184/20
184/21 184/22
misremembering [1] 147/21
missed [3] 6/6 8/23 132/21
MISSETT [2] 2/13 2/19
missing [4] 30/25 226/15 226/22 227/23
mission [1] 20/3
mistake [1] 96/18
mistakes [2] 94/4 94/9
Misty [1] 253/2
misunderstood [2] 55/18 183/6 mitigate [9] 51/6 66/18 151/15 181/4 191/21 203/7 214/6 218/7 268/12
mitigated [1] 51/1
mitigates [1] 57/11
mitigating [1] 49/9
mitigation [9] 49/22 50/9 64/6 108/23
124/10 190/23 191/1 191/24 192/4
mitigations [4] 50/1 52/4 239/23
270/11
MLK [1] 7/12
mode [1] 213/11
modeling [4] 140/2 140/3 140/9 140/20
modified [1] 257/12
modify [1] $7 / 19$
moment [16] 9/8 52/16 74/3 75/9 84/8 91/12 97/8 139/24 141/15 155/13
156/14 159/17 162/25 169/6 211/2 254/14
Monday [4] 7/24 8/2 8/5 8/7
monitoring [3] 233/16 233/18 233/18 month [2] 63/20 66/12
months [5] 14/7 18/8 62/10 67/9 112/9
more [55] 11/10 14/25 15/8 22/12 32/23 35/24 36/5 53/20 56/16 56/17 63/1 71/10 73/13 79/24 86/6 87/15 91/22 93/8 93/23 103/2 104/10 110/7 111/3 113/17 120/18 120/25 124/7 124/20 129/10 135/16 136/2 150/24 150/25 152/21 155/3 177/25 178/14 182/8 183/13 193/1 193/13 193/24 202/9 235/1 235/21 246/9 248/14 251/12 251/22 253/10 255/7 256/2 258/5 277/19 278/14
Morgan [1] 234/17
morning [14] 5/3 5/11 5/15 5/18 6/11 8/21 12/12 174/16 175/12 217/15 226/18 226/22 235/6 235/7
MORRISON [1] $2 / 7$
most [18] 25/6 28/10 40/13 40/15 41/3 41/8 41/10 41/11 42/3 53/3 53/23 64/12 64/14 70/24 74/17 81/22 140/25 231/7
mostly [3] 106/8 113/16 128/12
motion [4] 65/3 71/1 71/2 72/12
mouse [1] 117/18
move [23] 22/14 30/19 32/17 35/18
38/9 42/15 117/1 137/8 138/16 142/16 157/5 158/14 203/4 239/3 239/4 257/4 260/25 262/15 264/23 265/17 269/2 276/15 278/10
moved [7] 47/13 115/12 117/4 127/15 127/16 141/3 185/9
movements [1] 117/7
movers [1] 20/1
moves [3] 47/8 47/18 62/14
moving [3] 86/15 97/8 117/18
Mr [8] 4/6 4/9 4/12 4/13 68/23 70/1 78/17 273/17
Mr. [175] 5/7 5/7 5/9 5/11 5/12 5/23 6/5 6/8 6/9 6/10 6/22 6/23 7/6 7/8 7/23 8/23 9/11 9/17 9/18 9/22 10/9 10/22 11/4 11/13 12/12 14/1 14/3 17/20 21/16 31/18 35/7 35/14 36/15 52/1 54/17 56/9 56/13 58/2 59/12 60/24 61/1 61/11 61/11 61/13 61/14 61/15 61/25 62/22
63/4 63/17 63/20 66/7 66/7 66/11 67/8
67/10 68/8 68/18 69/8 69/12 70/1 70/25 72/1 74/17 78/4 78/4 78/8 78/17 79/5 103/24 104/1 104/12 105/15 105/22 107/19 109/16 111/6 111/17 111/24 113/10 115/9 118/3 118/14 119/6 119/17 119/25 121/2 121/9 121/21 122/25 124/4 124/23 130/10 131/20 133/23 134/23 135/9 136/11 137/25 137/25 138/25 139/24 141/10 142/19 148/1 148/25 151/4 152/3 153/3 153/10 153/25 155/3 155/15 155/22 155/23 156/4 156/20 182/18 182/21 183/3 183/20 183/25 190/1 194/7 199/24 200/15 202/20 204/23 204/24 209/5 210/4 211/19 211/22 227/13 228/2 228/6 228/10 228/13 229/7 229/24 230/5 232/7 235/5 235/18 237/12 239/6 240/19 243/12 244/21 249/19 255/10 258/21 259/11 259/22 261/16 262/13 263/8 265/13 267/5 269/7 271/2 271/7 271/9 271/19 271/20 271/22 272/2 273/8 273/9 273/18 273/20 274/12 278/6 278/18 278/18
Mr. Barnes [21] 6/9 6/10 78/4 78/4 78/8 78/17 131/20 182/21 183/20 204/23 209/5 211/19 228/2 228/6 228/10 228/13 229/7 229/24 243/12 255/10 278/6
Mr. Beaver [3] 60/24 113/10 124/4 Mr. Belinfante [10] 52/1 56/9 61/11 63/17 69/8 194/7 200/15 210/4 240/19 244/21
Mr. Belinfante's [2] 61/15 230/5
Mr. Blake [2] 202/20 273/9
Mr. Cross [11] 54/17 56/13 59/12

67/10 79/5 182/18 183/3 190/1 199/24 235/18 263/8
Mr. Davis [1] 7/6
Mr. Evans [33] 5/7 5/9 6/5 11/4 12/12
36/15 66/7 66/7 66/11 68/8 68/18 69/12
70/1 70/25 72/1 74/17 104/1 156/20
183/25 204/24 211/22 227/13 235/5
237/12 239/6 249/19 259/22 267/5
269/7 271/2 271/20 273/18 273/20
Mr. Evans' [1] 258/21
Mr. Feehan's [1] 265/13
Mr. Greenwalt [4] 271/7 271/9 273/8 274/12
Mr. Greenwalt's [3] 271/19 271/22 272/2
Mr. Hamilton [44] 6/8 8/23 61/1 103/24
104/12 105/15 105/22 107/19 109/16
111/6 111/17 111/24 115/9 118/3 118/14 119/6 119/17 119/25 121/2 121/21 122/25 124/23 130/10 133/23 134/23 135/9 136/11 137/25 138/25 139/24 141/10 142/19 148/1 148/25
151/4 152/3 153/3 153/10 153/25 155/3
155/15 155/22 155/23 156/4
Mr. Hamilton's [1] 121/9
Mr. Harvey [3] 232/7 261/16 262/13
Mr. Kirk [8] 6/22 6/23 9/11 9/17 9/18 9/22 10/9 10/22
Mr. Martin [4] 5/11 5/23 11/13 259/11
Mr. Miller [2] 5/7 5/12
Mr. Oles [3] 7/8 31/18 35/14
Mr. Oles' [1] 35/7
Mr. Persinger [1] 278/18
Mr. Richard [1] 17/20
Mr. Skoglund [1] 14/3
Mr. Stafford [1] 21/16
Mr. Stark [1] 14/1
Mr. Sterling [10] 7/23 58/2 61/11 61/13 61/14 61/25 62/22 63/4 63/20 67/8
Mr. Tyson [2] 137/25 278/18
Ms [1] 4/10
Ms. [10] 7/23 53/4 85/5 112/5 121/9
219/8 232/7 254/19 254/23 260/8
Ms. Combs [1] 260/8
Ms. Kaiser [2] 112/5 121/9
Ms. Marks [1] 7/23
Ms. Nakamura [2] 53/4 85/5
Ms. Slaughter [1] 254/19
Ms. Slaughter's [1] 254/23
Ms. Watson [2] 219/8 232/7
much [22] 12/21 23/1 57/16 83/8 93/24 94/1 104/15 119/22 123/20 124/7
131/17 142/4 150/25 156/13 209/2 209/5 235/1 235/21 239/24 252/18 258/5 277/19
multiple [8] 20/2 48/14 56/7 67/18
130/13 139/9 173/18 215/24
multitude [1] 61/3
municipal [4] 18/19 18/20 40/9 77/10
must [2] 67/19 92/1
mvp.sos.ga.gov [1] 27/1
my [67] 8/22 12/5 15/8 20/23 24/22
25/20 26/10 26/22 26/23 34/24 46/20
46/23 47/14 47/14 47/14 47/24 47/25
73/9 73/10 76/22 77/22 79/1 80/25 83/8 88/6 96/18 102/11 108/15 109/19 109/22 111/21 112/9 114/13 119/19
120/16 123/16 123/20 129/12 130/15

146/25 147/2 153/5 155/4 156/16
159/24 186/14 191/12 200/24 203/9
203/14 205/19 206/1 207/14 210/17
213/23 215/15 217/9 217/17 235/17
236/8 246/20 247/1 255/12 256/19
256/23 278/10 280/12
My Voter [2] 26/10 26/22
myself [1] 150/23

## N

Nakamura [2] 53/4 85/5
name [17] 12/3 12/4 12/5 16/14 16/15 16/17 21/21 27/1 28/10 105/11 105/12 105/14 123/5 211/21 230/18 266/18 266/18
narrow [1] 79/11
narrowing [1] 72/23
nation [1] 24/5
National [8] 13/13 18/24 19/1 19/2 19/7 19/11 19/15 181/3
Naturally [1] 237/8
nature [3] 10/8 70/10 273/8
Navy [1] 106/1
near [1] 269/14
nearing [1] 56/1
necessarily [9] 26/4 69/20 78/18 85/15 194/18 195/1 195/3 197/17 262/9
necessary [1] 149/3
need [50] 7/13 11/5 11/8 11/14 11/18 12/21 27/6 36/5 50/12 50/17 51/4 60/4 63/24 67/24 72/25 74/5 90/22 96/9 96/18 100/23 103/8 103/17 104/16 104/19 108/4 126/15 141/4 142/9 145/12 156/20 161/17 162/2 164/2 165/20 189/14 200/2 216/22 226/25
226/25 227/4 228/2 234/25 236/25
243/13 245/15 255/4 257/2 259/4 260/15 278/10
needed [17] 54/8 108/14 110/8 113/4
113/19 116/5 128/16 135/16 145/23
176/6 190/13 190/16 236/5 241/8
247/18 252/21 253/1
needing [1] 258/1
needs [11] 130/2 154/7 154/8 160/14
189/18 196/4 256/16 267/13 277/9
277/9 277/11
negate [2] 179/23 179/24
negative [1] 69/20
negatively [1] 152/15
neighborhood [1] 186/22
nerve [1] 126/1
net [7] 114/24 115/9 127/12 128/17
128/18 129/2 129/4
network [2] 123/4 128/20
networking [1] 106/12
never [20] 24/22 25/23 30/9 52/3 53/24
58/17 59/2 59/3 69/4 69/4 73/21 108/24
125/14 125/19 126/23 150/18 211/11
226/3 238/1 264/16
new [20] 47/8 57/20 63/25 77/14 77/19
78/2 96/10 100/25 103/1 120/16 128/3
131/1 133/1 171/19 174/18 203/15
206/18 229/20 238/6 259/18
newer [1] 205/20
newest [1] 206/15
news [2] 5/11 278/15
next [22] 7/19 14/6 37/3 44/2 58/23
59/2 100/6 105/2 118/17 154/17 156/19
next... [11] 157/6 162/4 162/6 172/13 224/3 243/3 243/5 243/12 248/12 250/1 261/14
nice [1] 120/1
Nicole [1] 221/20
night [7] 31/24 32/4 32/5 171/15
174/17 176/17 260/16
nightly [1] 47/19
nights [1] 118/25
nine [1] 268/9
Ninth [1] 33/15
no [105] 27/8 28/25 33/3 33/3 35/2
38/22 38/23 39/8 51/21 53/22 53/22
53/22 55/1 57/20 69/5 71/23 75/24
77/13 78/7 79/10 80/18 87/25 91/18
91/20 94/10 98/8 102/5 104/24 117/25
118/6 119/12 124/7 124/13 125/7
125/16 130/13 130/21 132/18 135/5
138/21 139/12 139/25 141/25 142/3
143/25 149/13 149/18 149/18 155/20
155/21 169/3 169/8 170/8 170/11
170/24 180/22 182/8 182/22 184/12
184/15 184/17 185/13 185/16 185/22
187/22 188/6 197/1 197/22 197/24
205/20 207/3 207/11 208/6 209/2
211/13 216/4 228/15 233/9 234/8 238/2
243/25 245/2 245/7 252/17 252/24
253/2 253/7 253/9 261/2 262/21 264/9
265/1 269/4 270/1 270/14 270/15
273/14 273/19 273/19 273/19 273/20
276/11 276/13 277/1 277/4
no-excuse [1] 197/1
Nollette [1] 221/20
non [3] 236/2 272/22 277/18
non-duplicative [2] 236/2 277/18
non-notification [1] 272/22
none [3] 10/17 58/6 60/10
nonparty [1] 6/23
nonprofit [1] 14/8
noon [1] 236/22
normal [3] 111/20 118/10 139/21
normally [1] 221/19
NORTHERN [5] 1/1 33/9 33/12 280/4 280/7
not [362]
note [5] 10/22 35/9 157/11 218/20
228/22
notebook [1] 117/19
noted [1] 268/9
notes [2] 218/16 261/8
nothing [9] 9/7 25/21 73/12 110/7
159/3 206/3 228/10 228/13 274/10
notice [8] 30/13 33/14 179/17 238/22
268/18 273/22 274/1 275/7
notification [2] 272/21 272/22
notified [1] 276/8
notify [4] 100/5 100/13 163/1 164/1
November [33] 10/6 18/12 32/11 32/11
34/5 37/12 37/16 37/17 37/24 38/5
38/15 38/16 38/17 42/2 42/6 63/19
67/10 67/13 75/23 76/7 76/14 77/10
91/25 92/15 206/15 230/11 231/2 231/3
234/14 249/25 249/25 250/16 251/5
November 15th [1] 67/13
November 1st [1] 249/25
November 20 [2] 32/11 38/16

November 2020 [7] 32/11 34/5 42/2
91/25 92/15 231/2 234/14
November 2022 [1] 76/7
November 2023 [2] 77/10 251/5
November 2024 [1] 75/23
November 4 [1] 231/3
November 5th [1] 230/11
November 8 [3] 37/12 38/15 38/17
November 8th [3] 37/17 37/24 38/5 now [40] 6/5 10/3 10/5 26/7 35/24 36/11 36/15 39/5 58/9 63/2 67/24 69/11 72/25 86/13 93/4 97/13 104/9 104/20
104/20 141/4 146/5 163/9 179/4 186/21
191/18 197/3 199/22 200/7 204/3 204/9 207/3 207/11 224/16 245/25 258/3
259/12 264/18 275/21 277/12 277/17
nowhere [1] 269/14
number [63] $1 / 5$ 1/6 1/5 28/11 34/12 34/21 37/11 37/13 37/25 38/1 43/19 53/1 53/2 56/21 56/24 57/22 59/17 59/19 66/16 67/6 70/7 79/21 83/14 83/25 84/2 89/8 93/24 97/4 97/5 149/1 161/14 161/16 161/18 162/11 162/11 162/18 162/21 162/21 162/25 171/17 171/25 172/14 172/14 172/16 172/17
172/21 176/11 176/12 176/13 176/14
176/15 183/18 183/19 193/3 199/12
213/5 224/25 229/8 231/9 242/12
259/15 262/25 263/2
Number 27 [1] 66/16
Number 3 [1] 213/5
Number 5 [1] 162/25
number one [3] 57/22 59/17 59/19
Number three [1] 161/18
Number two [2] 53/2 161/16
numbered [1] 89/12
numbers [15] 43/13 44/11 171/16 171/19 172/7 174/14 174/16 174/18 175/11 176/24 177/1 178/6 178/11 231/22 231/23
numerous [2] 214/21 253/12

## 0

oath [4] 55/20 88/16 88/19 121/4 object [16] 33/20 35/22 50/19 78/3 104/2 121/8 132/9 134/20 142/18 151/19 153/9 185/10 189/19 265/22 270/6 271/19
objected [2] 131/8 143/9
objecting [1] 33/18
objection [70] 10/4 10/17 10/24 32/24
35/2 35/6 35/9 35/14 35/16 38/22 38/24 39/5 39/7 42/15 52/20 52/23 53/5 58/7 58/9 59/12 70/21 71/1 73/4 78/7 78/10 79/2 79/11 84/25 85/3 85/23 109/7 110/22 126/12 138/21 143/4 143/6 143/10 143/22 147/9 153/17 154/4 154/6 154/24 158/24 169/4 169/8 188/23 196/15 199/14 200/25 202/5 228/16 238/20 238/21 249/6 251/9 254/22 258/13 258/17 258/23 261/2 262/21 265/1 269/4 270/16 271/17 272/20 275/15 276/4 277/4
objections [8] 34/24 35/21 38/18 86/14 143/7 143/17 148/4 277/1
obligated [1] 55/10
obligations [4] 56/2 62/16 181/9 182/16
observance [1] 7/12
observation [1] 242/20
observe [1] 244/1
observed [1] 139/12
observing [1] 242/3
obtaining [1] 73/17
obvious [1] 182/7
obviously [12] 10/5 59/19 59/23 68/10 68/24 70/2 70/25 73/7 108/9 123/24 132/5 273/6
occurred [3] 130/25 184/13 194/10
occurs [1] 164/18
OCGA [1] 242/8
October [16] 51/3 54/13 62/3 62/5 62/6 62/7 62/8 63/5 64/13 67/9 72/22 72/22 207/21 208/17 259/25 260/10
October 1 [1] 54/13
October 1st [1] 51/3
October 22nd [2] 259/25 260/10
October 4th [1] 207/21
October 7 [1] 72/22
odd [1] 274/11
off [24] 8/2 8/6 76/9 106/1 107/8 114/24 115/9 116/23 122/9 127/12 127/13 127/15 128/17 128/18 129/2 129/4 130/4 153/11 153/12 153/18 153/19 159/25 164/17 171/16 off-net [7] 114/24 115/9 127/12 128/17 128/18 129/2 129/4
offense [1] 242/2
offenses [2] 241/24 241/25
offer [10] 13/15 25/12 26/21 35/23 53/2 70/17 195/7 258/19 258/21 271/15
offered [4] 264/25 266/12 267/8 274/13 offering [4] 258/25 266/21 267/2 271/23
offers [2] 21/1 144/2
office [116] $2 / 24$ 12/17 12/18 14/13 17/6 17/10 17/16 18/1 18/3 18/11 18/13 18/14 23/10 27/13 29/7 29/9 29/15 45/4 45/18 54/11 61/18 66/11 67/15 92/22 94/24 106/18 106/20 107/2 109/18 110/3 110/21 113/1 115/20 116/14 116/18 117/11 118/5 118/15 119/4 120/24 122/1 122/13 123/2 123/9 123/13 124/25 134/5 134/13 135/14 137/3 140/1 140/24 148/12 150/4 157/25 173/24 174/3 174/4 174/5 175/16 177/12 178/10 178/15 178/15 178/16 193/8 193/12 193/24 194/21 208/15 208/19 211/6 213/18 214/11 214/22 215/3 219/2 219/9 219/14 219/19 220/1 221/5 221/8 221/12 221/22 222/2 222/4 222/13 222/19 227/6 230/7 230/24 233/9 239/18 240/10 240/12 241/1 241/7 245/13 245/15 248/22 250/2 252/1 252/15 254/1 255/14 255/22 258/20 260/14 263/25 267/4 272/14 272/17 274/2 275/4 276/3
officer [3] 106/11 120/15 151/8 offices [1] 112/20
official [13] 1/1 1/2 1/3 1/7 1/23 27/23
30/24 31/2 32/22 33/8 230/17 280/6 280/17
officials [24] 13/14 23/11 48/16 48/18 69/18 82/10 89/2 89/25 90/22 91/8 98/6 158/1 161/23 193/16 193/17 193/23

## 0

officials... [8] 214/5 215/1 215/18 218/6 230/23 240/20 241/5 250/25 offline [1] 152/15
often [1] 192/23
oftentimes [1] 197/18
Oh [10] 6/6 80/16 128/7 163/13 206/23 225/7 258/9 259/20 261/23 275/10
okay [222] 6/2 10/13 13/4 13/9 13/19 14/1 14/5 14/14 15/4 15/15 15/23 16/3 16/8 17/13 17/21 18/2 18/5 18/17 18/21 18/23 19/14 20/12 21/7 21/10 22/11 22/22 23/6 23/10 23/14 23/17 24/2 24/7 26/23 27/4 27/9 28/8 28/20 28/23 29/1 29/16 30/5 30/11 31/8 31/17 32/1 32/9 32/15 33/25 36/19 37/2 37/6 38/18 38/25 40/4 40/11 42/5 43/3 43/13 43/18 44/1 44/6 44/9 44/16 45/2 45/12 45/15 45/18 45/21 46/2 48/5 49/3 49/22 49/25 50/4 62/4 65/11 73/15 74/9 75/18 77/2
79/13 81/16 82/2 82/12 84/8 84/14 84/17 84/20 86/7 86/12 86/24 88/8 88/16 88/24 89/3 89/8 90/10 90/20 91/5 91/9 91/12 91/19 92/4 92/23 93/12 94/1 94/4 94/8 94/25 95/12 95/16 95/20 96/22 97/10 97/17 98/6 98/9 98/19 98/24 99/2 99/6 99/25 100/16 101/9 105/5 109/4 109/11 111/14 115/7 119/15 121/6 123/8 126/4 126/8 127/24 128/2 130/4 131/24 132/25 133/16 136/12 136/22 138/23 139/3 141/4 141/12 141/16 142/4 143/15 149/9 151/6 156/15 156/22 158/20 163/8 163/8 165/23 167/16 167/24 171/4 172/23 175/4 175/16 178/4 178/23 180/9 180/18 182/11 187/13 189/3 204/12 204/21 206/6 209/18 212/21 220/23 229/7 230/1 230/19 234/23 235/14 235/19 236/3 237/1 237/18 241/23 243/16 244/4 249/14 253/22 254/4 254/19 256/2 257/3 257/25 258/17 258/24 260/4 261/6 261/9 261/13 262/3 262/21 263/3 263/23 264/19 264/22 265/22 267/1 267/7 267/18 267/24 269/21 270/18 270/24 275/14 275/16 276/2 276/6 276/10 278/8 279/2
old [2] 30/18 130/25
old-fashioned [1] 30/18
older [3] 133/16 278/25 279/1
OLES [5] 2/23 2/24 7/8 31/18 35/14 Oles' [1] 35/7
omit [3] 38/19 51/16 130/21
once [30] 26/25 27/11 28/13 35/15 71/2 76/23 76/23 95/10 102/2 120/14 148/7 160/8 161/10 165/10 169/23 172/2 182/1 182/1 182/5 186/1 190/12 192/7 192/24 193/6 198/12 203/4 213/12 216/23 274/2 275/5 one [162] 5/8 7/13 7/18 7/19 10/1 10/22 13/6 16/12 16/14 16/17 19/5 25/16 25/21 25/24 26/3 26/7 33/3 33/3 34/3 38/21 41/8 43/11 45/2 46/1 46/3 48/22 50/11 50/20 52/7 52/7 53/1 53/2 56/14 56/22 56/25 57/20 57/22 58/23 59/2 59/17 59/17 59/19 60/17 61/8 66/12 75/6 76/18 76/20 79/12 81/19

82/19 83/13 83/15 83/19 83/23 84/9 87/20 92/9 92/10 93/22 96/10 100/25 102/12 109/23 114/12 117/15 120/16 129/6 130/1 130/22 130/22 136/6 139/24 141/12 143/25 150/7 150/7 150/7 153/13 155/3 155/13 158/18 160/18 161/5 161/14 162/11 162/15 163/5 165/17 167/9 172/17 174/1 174/2 175/4 176/17 178/25 180/3 181/15 181/22 182/15 183/3 186/17 187/2 187/5 187/7 187/7 191/25 192/13 196/4 196/17 201/16 204/1 205/2 205/3 205/24 208/2 209/2 209/13 210/2 211/16 215/24 217/21 219/22 225/12 228/22 229/19 230/4 231/14 231/15 233/9 234/5 234/16 238/9 238/21 239/19 242/2 243/25 244/18 246/10 249/1 250/8 252/24 253/2 253/7 253/15 256/2 256/16 259/19 263/6 263/8 264/17 265/24 266/4 266/6 266/16 266/17 267/21 268/25 273/22 276/20 278/14 279/17
ones [6] 59/18 120/12 146/22 176/2 189/20 221/21
ongoing [1] 110/10
only [50] $1 / 21 / 6$ 11/3 30/22 34/19 40/6 50/21 50/24 51/16 60/2 61/17 74/22 102/17 123/18 128/11 131/11 131/13 133/3 133/3 133/10 142/21 142/23 143/4 143/10 144/1 146/22 169/3 174/21 190/7 196/16 196/22 198/20 198/22 199/1 199/5 199/9 200/17 209/13 211/2 219/19 228/16 234/25 245/14 247/7 247/19 263/9 264/8 276/19 276/22 277/10
open [23] 28/1 87/20 93/8 98/4 98/4 98/5 98/19 98/23 99/14 102/1 158/5 159/14 159/15 161/6 161/18 165/11 165/11 189/6 217/14 219/9 231/8 231/17 245/5
opened [4] 86/2 159/10 219/12 231/6 opening [15] 28/16 80/5 99/3 101/15 101/24 159/17 164/13 164/14 166/16 175/14 210/5 231/14 231/21 244/22 244/23
opens [1] 170/16
operability [1] 77/7
operates [1] 266/14
operating [5] 77/19 77/19 190/20 218/7 227/1
operation [1] 215/9
operational [3] 251/7 252/1 252/14
operations [4] 90/9 90/11 95/1 246/7 opinion [6] 53/3 87/10 87/24 88/1 179/9 238/22
opponent [1] 266/15
opportunities [1] 62/22
opportunity [6] 5/16 35/9 59/10 68/14 69/1 70/14
opposed [4] 102/4 236/6 249/7 271/20
opposing [6] 30/15 64/25 65/6 104/2 157/5 158/24
option [5] 27/2 101/2 160/24 168/14 173/17
options [4] 29/3 29/19 136/6 212/17 oranges [2] 199/23 218/2
order [9] 6/9 6/9 8/8 11/14 27/6 90/13
103/14 143/9 253/11
ordered [3] 9/17 146/25 148/8 organization [5] 18/23 19/19 19/23 140/13 152/25
original [8] 54/12 139/18 139/22
139/23 228/23 229/15 230/5 232/15
other [74] 7/21 15/8 18/5 24/3 24/4 29/3 31/15 33/19 35/20 41/20 46/1 59/18 62/13 63/14 64/7 67/12 69/5 69/17 70/13 74/9 82/10 89/1 90/5 90/25 102/14 104/24 120/14 125/16 127/8 127/12 142/5 146/25 148/6 152/13 156/1 163/21 170/12 174/21 177/8 180/3 181/2 181/19 194/16 195/2 199/5 201/1 201/9 201/12 201/19 214/4 218/11 219/11 219/15 219/23 223/12 224/5 226/3 231/16 234/6 238/25 249/2 252/21 258/19 260/13 264/18 267/20 267/21 274/13 274/17 274/18 274/20 276/23 276/24 279/9
others [13] 9/24 9/25 10/2 15/23 98/10 107/23 195/9 201/23 219/8 230/23 257/7 273/13 274/24
otherwise [6] 7/6 8/3 51/7 66/18 90/12 273/1
ought [3] 189/7 251/11 274/7
our [47] 6/3 6/16 6/16 8/8 8/21 10/17 10/23 15/12 21/19 26/19 31/24 32/5 32/6 33/2 45/1 45/24 45/24 55/19 59/10 60/20 67/20 70/25 77/6 103/21 105/3 126/3 138/13 142/8 142/14 143/21 148/3 150/6 152/15 156/2 156/19 204/14 216/13 220/25 231/15 255/11 256/14 256/15 258/13 273/10 275/3 278/4 278/5
ours [1] 217/24
ourselves [2] 57/12 72/18
out [83] 5/22 6/16 7/22 8/21 11/19
14/25 15/5 16/5 22/9 24/19 25/21 26/12 26/14 27/11 28/17 29/10 30/21 34/10 42/8 42/20 46/19 46/19 47/5 47/20 47/22 49/12 56/18 58/1 61/20 63/19 71/23 72/15 75/10 77/7 106/2 108/12 116/20 117/19 118/24 120/19 123/16 123/17 124/13 124/13 128/13 143/16 145/16 150/10 150/25 160/23 163/21 164/2 165/8 174/12 176/25 186/2 186/3 192/25 194/7 196/4 211/7 214/5 220/24 234/20 235/20 235/21 238/5 239/13 241/5 244/11 255/10 257/3 257/19 258/7 258/25 259/15 263/9 263/14 266/10 268/19 268/22 275/6 278/12 outcome [2] 33/5 184/16
outlines [1] 149/2
outside [19] 5/7 6/5 52/17 78/22 99/11 101/14 101/18 113/19 123/3 124/24 125/2 140/3 151/20 155/6 155/10 188/23 214/5 272/14 273/25
outstanding [2] 68/7 69/6
oval [4] 16/13 16/17 16/18 188/1
over [19] 22/7 23/3 47/11 53/5 66/9 80/13 81/22 92/14 106/4 107/9 115/12 120/2 130/15 134/7 141/8 147/9 194/21 256/8 260/22
overall [1] 183/15
overlaying [1] 128/21
overly [1] 58/10
overnights [1] 119/1
oversaw [1] 17/16

| O |
| :--- |
| Overseas [1] 29/11 |

oversee [1] 15/9
overview [2] 5/12 223/23
overvotes [1] 17/1
own [9] 11/7 11/14 57/15 81/1 81/9 82/4 83/22 102/11 229/8

## P

P.M [3] 29/10 170/21 170/25
packing [1] 171/18
pad [23] 99/7 99/14 99/15 100/24
102/4 159/24 160/9 160/19 171/14 171/14 171/16 176/20 176/24 176/25
177/2 177/3 177/6 177/6 177/13 177/22 204/18 272/3 279/6
pads [16] 99/2 99/4 100/2 100/25 159/17 159/23 169/1 171/2 171/9 204/2 204/16 271/13 273/24 275/20 275/25 279/3
page [91] 1/5 4/3 26/10 26/22 26/23 31/25 32/5 44/2 46/20 46/23 47/15 47/24 47/25 49/25 49/25 50/7 53/4 53/5
53/5 121/21 126/4 128/5 131/23 131/25 132/24 138/8 138/25 148/25 149/1 149/2 149/7 149/19 154/15 154/17 159/8 159/11 159/16 159/23 161/8 162/6 163/11 163/12 164/6 165/4 168/3 171/5 173/1 173/10 174/25 177/19 178/17 178/24 206/21 207/2 207/6 207/7 207/18 210/4 212/12 212/18 212/22 212/25 213/5 223/21 224/3 232/2 238/15 240/18 241/23 242/6 244/4 244/19 245/3 245/5 245/9 245/11 245/19 254/9 254/10 254/20 256/3
256/7 256/8 256/17 257/5 257/8 257/17 261/14 261/21 266/17 267/12
Page 1 [1] $207 / 7$
Page 108 [3] 126/4 131/23 132/24
Page 109 [1] 131/25
Page 19 [2] 159/8 159/11
Page 2 [1] 49/25
Page 22 [1] 159/16
Page 23 [1] 244/19
Page 24 [3] 161/8 163/12 245/5
Page 25 [4] 121/21 164/6 245/9 245/11
Page 27 [5] 165/4 212/18 212/22
212/25 213/5
Page 3 [1] 149/19
Page 30 [1] 174/25
Page 31 [1] 177/19
Page 33 [2] 178/17 178/24
Page 5 [1] 241/23
Page 54 [1] 53/4
Page 69 [1] 168/3
Page 7 [1] 242/6
Page 71 [1] 159/23
Page 77 [1] 53/5
Page 9 [1] 244/4
Page 90 [1] 171/5
Page 93 [1] 173/1
Page 94 [1] 173/10
Page 97 [1] 154/15
Page 99 [1] 53/5
Page Number 3 [1] 149/1
pages [6] 171/11 237/19 245/19 248/6 248/8 280/9

Pages 58 [2] 248/6 248/8
Pages 91 [1] 171/11
panel [5] 20/22 21/2 21/4 194/3 194/8 panels [1] 21/1
paper [41] 15/19 16/5 16/11 22/9 27/14 42/1 44/11 44/15 66/23 89/4 89/13 91/13 91/16 101/3 179/14 180/2 180/10 180/15 180/25 181/7 181/13 181/20 184/6 184/10 184/19 184/22 185/2 187/9 187/14 187/16 187/22 188/7 202/4 224/14 224/18 224/19 224/25 225/4 225/9 225/22 241/8
paragraph [7] 61/20 168/7 206/13 242/7 242/16 256/13 257/19
parallel [3] 233/16 233/17 233/18
Parameters [3] 212/14 212/23 212/25
pare [1] 52/22
parking [1] 102/6
parrot [2] 50/22 52/11
part [37] 19/24 48/13 48/20 57/10
58/19 65/4 69/7 76/6 77/9 92/19 107/4 112/19 112/21 116/5 117/5 117/7 129/15 134/9 139/16 144/18 144/22 147/15 159/20 166/5 167/3 171/15 173/18 202/3 204/14 215/18 220/13 220/14 220/14 239/22 254/18 263/14 277/10
partial [4] 1/8 7/25 8/5 8/7
participate [7] 11/15 13/16 20/25 21/2 21/3 74/10 108/2
participated [2] 15/11 239/25
particular [12] 53/6 63/18 64/19 65/5
84/9 92/8 118/11 132/13 163/24 224/12 229/25 245/18
particularized [3] 53/11 53/14 85/6 particularly [3] 58/10 62/22 89/21
parties [1] 265/23
partnered [1] 20/17
party [10] 16/16 16/19 68/13 144/2
202/2 202/13 264/24 266/15 266/21
272/20
pass [1] 273/9
passed [1] 178/22
password [24] 81/2 81/9 82/4 83/13
83/19 84/2 84/5 99/18 161/12 162/14 162/15 165/2 165/3 165/21 173/16 183/7 183/8 183/9 183/17 183/17 217/10 217/11 218/19 218/20
passwords [12] 81/25 82/8 82/22 82/25 83/3 83/3 183/5 217/16 218/1 218/15 252/20 253/1
past [2] 90/18 193/5
path [1] 70/18
patience [1] 156/13
patients [1] 151/11
pause [14] 36/7 36/13 65/23 103/22
104/18 105/6 119/16 155/14 156/25
157/12 210/1 236/14 249/18 276/12
paying [1] 59/18
pays [1] 89/13
PCC [6] 115/23 115/25 116/11 116/19 133/18 133/19
PDF [1] 1/1
pen [9] 188/11 188/22 190/6 190/7
190/9 191/2 191/10 191/13 192/5
pending [3] 56/10 269/22 270/3
penetration [2] 208/3 208/6
pens [2] 187/15 187/16

Pensacola [3] 14/12 15/3 15/4 people [36] 20/1 20/24 24/14 25/21 25/25 33/23 39/13 39/13 39/14 40/13 40/15 41/3 41/8 41/11 41/12 41/15 41/18 41/19 42/17 54/4 60/7 60/8 60/16 61/3 93/23 98/12 127/8 128/15 128/22 138/13 177/4 177/5 215/24 216/6 218/15 220/12
per [9] 79/25 82/1 82/22 83/15 110/10 162/15 187/2 187/7 209/1
percent [10] 37/19 38/7 43/22 44/13 44/14 89/10 89/11 89/12 224/16 224/18 percentage [5] 37/18 38/6 43/14 43/21 201/10
Perdue [4] 34/6 36/23 38/10 43/15
perfectly [2] 56/9 60/6
perforated [1] 27/25
perform [2] 88/17 256/20
performance [1] 152/13
performed [1] 111/21
performing [1] 256/14
perhaps [3] 59/13 95/13 235/15
period [8] 1/4 24/3 24/4 60/25 107/9
130/15 170/10 250/23
permit [1] 53/8
permitted [1] 52/4
Perry [7] 235/6 235/8 235/9 236/5
236/7 236/8 236/23
Persinger [1] 278/18
persistent [3] 239/7 239/10 239/24
person [63] 15/18 22/21 22/22 22/24
23/1 23/7 23/17 23/23 27/13 28/3 28/7
29/7 29/18 29/18 29/21 29/23 29/23
30/2 34/8 37/10 37/11 38/11 40/14
40/16 41/4 41/9 41/13 41/15 41/19 42/1
42/4 42/5 42/7 42/11 44/13 61/21 63/1
69/4 75/1 88/14 89/6 89/24 93/17 95/4
95/18 98/15 107/15 118/17 120/1 120/3
123/7 160/7 168/18 170/9 170/23
170/24 178/10 198/23 199/3 200/14 225/10 225/23 272/13
personal [7] 78/11 79/11 118/14 123/1 180/18 266/9 267/11
personally [1] 109/12
personnel [1] 216/14
perspective [9] 72/3 135/23 215/17 216/13 247/3 247/10 248/4 265/15 269/19
Phi [1] 33/10
phone [3] 140/22 221/24 222/11
photos [1] 248/8
physical [22] 20/20 20/24 21/9 91/2
91/5 111/20 112/17 127/4 128/14
129/19 129/21 161/4 166/2 166/6 166/6 166/10 166/12 192/13 195/9 209/15 215/17 252/22
physically [4] 114/17 114/23 128/21 161/2
pick [1] 87/21
picked [2] 16/21 16/22
PICO [1] 3/4
PICO-PRATS [1] 3/4
picture [2] 166/16 210/8
pie [5] 198/18 198/20 199/25 200/5
202/7
piece [5] 58/1 166/14 167/21 175/10 185/7
pieces [1] 181/24

## $\mathbf{P}$

pile [1] 24/21
pilot [6] 76/6 76/9 76/14 77/10 203/21
225/23
piloted [1] 203/17
piloting [1] 203/6
pilots [1] 203/16
pin [7] 55/2 162/7 162/9 162/9 162/20
172/4 172/13
pipe [1] 142/9
place [12] 11/12 23/8 123/21 123/25
153/13 156/18 159/10 191/5 201/19
242/7 250/24 252/10
places [2] 181/19 242/11
plaintiff [1] 55/10
plaintiffs [15] 1/5 2/2 2/13 2/18 9/2
33/2 66/15 68/16 69/14 71/9 79/4 85/25
120/1 179/11 184/2
plaintiffs' [15] 8/19 30/20 35/20 49/19
78/22 80/17 114/4 136/13 136/20 138/5
138/17 141/13 142/17 223/16 227/10
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 127 [1] 141/13
plan [3] 141/7 156/20 278/5
planning [1] 8/23
plans [3] 57/5 57/8 233/16
platform [3] 115/13 202/3 241/4
play [6] 209/24 210/18 215/16 215/19 249/15 250/10
playbook [3] 144/18 145/3 145/4
playbooks [3] 144/23 145/8 145/13
played [2] 39/10 251/11
players [1] 216/5
Playing [4] 209/25 211/3 249/16 250/12
pleasant [1] 278/21
please [32] 12/2 20/12 31/6 67/25 74/1 103/7 103/12 103/16 105/7 105/10
105/11 105/24 126/4 136/10 138/4
141/10 147/21 154/15 156/9 166/16
206/6 223/16 227/11 228/12 229/7
230/2 239/4 244/4 254/4 259/22 261/5 265/7
pleased [1] 236/4
plug [1] 164/21
plugged [1] 164/22
plugging [1] 101/16
plugs [1] 106/13
plus [1] 19/24
PM [3] 182/14 259/9 279/22
point [54] 7/22 11/8 11/15 30/12 32/16 32/20 33/2 38/9 41/25 54/9 57/13 60/20
61/8 61/25 62/12 62/16 69/15 78/20
79/13 86/1 96/15 97/8 99/20 101/24
107/14 108/17 110/5 110/9 116/15
143/16 158/11 164/21 165/3 165/12
167/14 172/5 172/7 172/13 173/22
188/3 190/13 194/19 194/22 200/17
202/6 202/12 206/2 207/15 216/20
222/13 230/5 263/9 266/24 273/15
pointed [2] 194/7 235/18
pointing [1] 199/24
points [3] 59/7 73/17 94/19
policies [1] 144/20
policy [3] 229/14 232/13 255/22
polite [1] 56/10
politely [1] 52/1
poll [151] 26/1 30/1 81/2 82/5 82/24

83/4 83/5 83/19 88/10 88/11 88/12 88/13 88/14 88/16 90/8 90/16 90/18 90/22 90/23 90/24 94/23 95/25 96/17 96/19 96/24 97/1 98/8 98/9 98/9 98/11 98/16 98/16 98/17 98/18 98/21 99/2 99/4 99/7 99/11 99/14 99/15 100/2 100/13 100/13 100/24 100/25 101/23 102/4 137/8 157/6 157/20 157/24 158/8 158/14 159/8 159/12 159/12 159/17 159/20 159/23 159/24 160/5 160/9 160/19 160/20 161/5 161/5 161/8 161/10 161/11 161/12 161/20 161/21 162/7 162/14 162/20 163/23 164/6 164/9 164/21 164/25 165/4 165/5 166/16 167/12 168/3 168/22 168/24 168/24 169/1 169/23 171/2 171/5 171/9 171/14 171/14 171/15 171/16 171/24 172/3 172/10 172/12 172/16 173/1 173/10 173/16 174/15 174/25 175/11 175/25 176/5 176/20 176/24 176/25 176/25 177/2 177/3 177/6 177/6 177/9 177/12 177/17 177/19 177/22 178/17 183/8 183/17 186/15 186/21 187/4 191/4 204/2 204/16 204/18 217/12 218/19 226/19 227/23 230/17 230/23 240/7 240/13 240/17 240/20 245/17 247/13 271/13 272/3 273/23 275/20 275/25
pollbook [1] 99/7
pollbooks [1] 169/1
polling [21] 23/8 23/15 46/25 89/1 90/15 98/7 98/10 159/9 170/16 170/17 170/18 170/19 187/6 190/10 195/13 195/18 195/21 196/1 228/24 242/6 242/11
polls [26] 22/6 26/13 29/22 29/22 98/3 98/5 98/19 98/23 102/1 159/15 159/17 161/18 164/13 165/11 165/12 171/9 171/13 172/4 173/17 173/17 178/9 210/5 244/22 244/23 245/6 245/14 poor [1] 146/21
poorly [2] 203/19 203/20
portal [2] 47/2 150/6
portion [6] 1/4 27/25 72/11 79/6
228/17 276/25
ports [1] 145/18
posing [1] 255/8
position [11] 18/2 19/7 53/15 68/12
72/10 85/6 123/9 147/10 181/3 188/1 275/3
positions [3] 18/5 20/6 54/5
possession [1] 147/11
possibility [1] $8 / 6$
possible [5] 24/1 150/22 151/15 151/17 279/12
possibly [2] 79/23 251/12
post [7] 25/2 25/5 25/8 64/17 218/20 241/6 241/12
Post-it [1] 218/20
posted [3] 25/23 174/1 244/6
posters [1] 23/11
posting [2] 24/13 241/20
postmarked [1] 29/12
potential [2] 49/9 272/12
potentially [3] 20/2 50/22 82/6
power [5] 101/21 161/10 173/22
191/12 279/4
PPO [2] 143/5 143/17
practice [8] 52/15 134/16 135/22
137/12 144/21 155/5 217/18 274/5 practices [8] 19/5 20/23 90/5 142/15 214/6 240/13 272/23 273/1
pragmatically [1] 24/24
PRATS [1] 3/4
precautions [1] 181/4
precinct [5] 24/13 164/5 210/6 217/25 245/10
precise [1] 251/3
predecessor [1] 66/12
prefer [5] 29/21 39/13 182/2 182/3
202/8
preference [6] 26/9 80/3 93/18 93/20
181/15 199/11
preferred [3] 15/24 39/3 39/17
prefers [1] 104/3
preformatted [1] 145/7
prejudicial [1] 62/21
premature [2] 58/10 85/4
premise [2] 126/3 152/20
prepare [8] 11/6 74/6 100/24 100/25 173/23 192/16 262/11 262/13
prepared [12] 5/8 60/1 99/20 165/12
172/7 186/8 237/14 240/9 240/23
248/22 262/8 262/9
preparing [5] 15/9 76/6 159/14 159/14 262/10
prepped [1] 61/21
preprinted [1] 187/16
present [9] 23/2 31/5 68/14 69/2 69/3 83/8 114/2 160/4 251/21
presentation [8] 11/9 13/24 103/23
104/1 237/22 238/14 238/18 241/22
presentations [1] 19/14
presented [4] 68/20 160/7 173/16
215/23
presenter [1] 11/9
presently [1] 255/9
preserve [3] 115/14 139/22 182/6
president [3] 31/25 32/11 34/4
presidential [6] 26/9 43/15 43/20 80/3 93/18 93/19
press [5] 162/7 163/4 163/5 163/6
255/1
presses [1] 166/13
presumably [1] 42/17
presume [1] 266/1
pretrial [2] 10/24 143/8
pretty [8] 58/19 77/23 77/23 113/6
118/24 118/25 153/4 195/7
prevalent [1] 140/25
prevent [4] 62/19 88/22 191/25 226/12
previous [2] 93/25 111/22
previously [4] 56/17 106/17 157/15
236/15
PRICE [1] $2 / 2$
pricing [1] 53/17
primaries [3] 40/2 92/24 94/6
primarily [2] 118/12 133/14
primary [18] 18/17 18/19 80/3 80/4
91/16 92/17 93/3 93/14 93/18 93/20
199/6 201/15 221/21 225/6 225/9
225/22 229/4 229/5
print [9] 23/4 26/12 26/14 160/22 165/5
165/8 173/18 187/10 196/3
printed [11] 42/8 42/12 95/10 96/6 96/7
96/13 97/6 172/1 172/14 174/23 244/6

## P

printer [14] 101/17 102/6 102/8 161/3 181/25 186/11 187/2 196/17 244/24
245/6 248/12 248/18 248/20 248/25
printers [4] 187/1 187/3 187/14 196/11 printing [1] 277/2
printout [2] 31/24 64/17
printouts [1] 33/14
prints [3] 22/9 96/16 165/6
prior [4] 21/16 22/19 75/22 170/5
prioritize [1] 140/11
privacy [10] 242/18 243/10 243/14
243/21 243/25 248/9 249/4 249/12 249/13 273/7
privilege [1] 147/17
Pro [6] 233/15 233/19 233/23 234/4 269/7 269/13
probably [24] 7/16 31/1 52/15 65/25 70/23 71/10 71/22 73/9 112/9 120/25 122/21 129/12 130/16 131/2 131/3
140/25 146/6 186/24 222/1 229/5 235/2 273/14 274/18 274/20
problem [7] 5/20 58/15 86/5 122/24 139/25 148/1 152/21
problems [3] 51/8 51/19 66/19
procedure [7] 164/14 167/25 169/15
169/18 171/9 171/13 171/14
procedures [8] 99/3 99/6 168/5 171/1
171/2 208/12 244/22 244/23
proceed [8] 60/3 70/16 73/10 100/19 101/15 102/25 103/14 157/9
proceeding [1] 79/6
proceedings [16] $1 / 101 / 21$ 36/7 36/13 65/23 103/22 104/18 105/6 119/16
155/14 156/25 157/12 236/14 276/12 279/21 280/9
process [29] 9/23 9/25 10/1 23/22
27/19 30/1 30/8 47/17 48/21 49/4 76/25
77/18 79/19 82/6 108/22 117/7 139/21
145/2 165/19 171/18 171/20 171/23
172/25 172/25 173/6 173/6 173/13
204/9 206/4
processes [1] 240/12
processing [10] 15/6 15/7 15/7 28/3
28/14 28/16 47/7 47/8 47/12 260/17
procure [1] 49/7
procured [2] 49/1 49/2
procurement [2] 48/20 49/4
produce [3] 147/1 147/5 147/10
produced [18] 1/22 56/5 67/22 67/24
94/23 143/24 144/4 146/12 146/13
146/13 146/15 146/18 147/14 148/11
157/24 158/17 188/16 222/3
product [1] 216/19
production [2] 45/8 46/7
productions [2] 56/4 67/14
profess [2] 54/6 70/12
professed [1] 60/11
professional [3] 13/20 181/9 182/16
proffer [7] 57/25 69/12 70/15 70/25
72/2 73/13 134/25
profile [1] 140/14
profiles [1] 153/2
profound [1] 69/16
program [17] 11/5 13/6 74/4 97/15
104/5 106/24 106/24 108/3 108/23
123/15 129/25 137/16 140/13 165/15

165/16 166/7 166/24
programmed [4] 167/14 246/12 246/12 246/17
programming [3] 13/17 166/4 166/5
programs [2] 141/2 161/21
progress [1] 63/18
progressed [1] 120/13
prohibited [1] 1/7
project [8] 81/1 83/6 167/8 212/14
212/23 212/25 256/25 265/15
projects [2] 15/11 216/16
promise [1] 156/7
prompted [1] 165/1
promptly [2] 67/22 67/24
proper [3] 121/11 202/15 242/13
properly [2] 149/3 176/4
propose [1] 70/24
proposed [1] 9/17
proprietary [9] 222/14 222/19 272/7
272/18 273/2 273/7 273/24 274/14 274/21
pros [1] 181/21
prosecuted [1] 180/24
protect [6] 57/12 108/14 108/16 112/22
141/3 217/1
protected [1] 216/16
protection [3] 150/23 249/12 249/13
protocol [1] 231/20
protocols [1] 253/12
proud [1] 119/3
provide [25] 23/10 26/6 48/14 48/15 51/4 56/15 61/5 61/20 72/19 73/5 76/1 76/18 90/14 90/15 90/25 91/1 105/24 132/7 140/19 153/13 175/16 177/12 197/4 243/14 251/12
provided [23] 15/25 34/7 44/18 46/4
53/4 58/25 90/18 95/12 100/16 144/7 144/18 146/5 159/19 185/3 190/23 191/24 192/18 195/21 195/25 251/5 260/23 264/24 268/7
provider [3] 116/21 127/15 127/17
provides [6] 20/16 83/17 88/19 212/4 260/21 271/12
providing [5] 52/10 88/24 90/12 144/12 201/2
provisional [1] 34/22
provisionally [1] 277/13
prudent [1] 70/24
public [9] 12/25 13/2 13/5 47/6 98/14
98/24 159/14 161/24 247/19
publicly [3] 158/3 218/21 247/7
pull [16] 23/3 28/4 47/20 54/12 138/4
145/16 160/6 171/5 177/19 186/9 200/8
211/14 223/15 227/10 230/2 237/9
pulling [1] 118/22
purpose [7] 19/1 34/25 42/21 169/10
179/9 179/10 271/18
purposefully [1] 72/20
purposes [6] 45/19 81/21 97/4 148/12
182/3 226/10
pursuant [1] 105/3
pursue [3] 203/6 216/8 236/4
pursuing [1] 13/7
push [4] 76/8 76/12 76/17 203/10
put [47] 22/10 27/1 28/13 43/7 49/12 52/4 76/4 77/8 85/22 94/21 95/8 97/3 99/16 99/16 101/23 103/25 107/10 121/14 121/16 140/16 141/2 154/8

161/11 164/25 165/2 165/3 167/2 168/1
169/25 172/3 172/6 172/13 173/16
174/14 174/18 175/10 175/12 176/5
177/2 194/24 218/6 229/7 229/20 231/9 231/10 238/5 273/22
putting [8] 99/18 162/18 167/3 173/6 187/21 191/2 263/10 264/12

## Q

QR [2] 264/9 264/15
QTS [3] 117/2 127/17 132/1
qualification [1] 267/9
qualified [3] 54/4 60/7 63/1
qualitative [1] 140/10
Quality [1] 127/17
quantitative [1] 140/10
quantity [1] 80/6
question [76] 24/9 39/17 39/19 40/8 40/24 42/21 46/16 50/21 51/5 52/20 58/8 63/12 71/24 74/17 79/12 86/6 86/14 87/2 87/3 91/23 92/5 95/3 102/20 111/2 121/6 121/12 121/23 124/17 126/16 126/17 126/20 130/5 131/18 132/10 132/17 132/20 132/23 132/25 132/25 133/12 135/6 148/6 153/4 153/10 153/15 153/16 154/1 154/18 154/23 155/3 159/24 163/10 180/4 183/4 190/18 196/22 198/25 200/3 201/6 201/12 205/19 223/4 223/9 225/6 228/12 233/5 255/7 255/12 256/2
256/12 256/19 270/17 273/1 274/1 275/9 275/10
questioning [3] 78/11 78/23 97/9 questions [31] 37/7 53/25 62/23 73/19 94/25 108/3 110/25 119/14 131/9 137/25 155/16 155/20 155/21 159/9 182/8 185/20 189/13 189/16 189/17 189/24 189/25 196/20 200/12 235/17 237/7 237/23 244/20 244/21 271/23 274/3 276/13
quick [5] 146/24 250/10 253/15 257/4 263/21
quicker [1] 209/5
quite [2] 203/19 226/5
quote [1] 226/2
quoting [1] 273/2
R
race [2] 92/9 92/11
RAFFENSPERGER[2] 1/6 33/10
Raffensperger's [1] 107/4
raise [3] 7/25 11/25 105/7
raised [7] 30/22 41/25 70/21 79/5
143/17 147/16 278/18
ramifications [1] 273/12
ramp [1] 113/8
RAMSEY [2] $2 / 557 / 1$
ran [1] 28/19
randomly [1] 233/20
ransomware [1] 140/25
rate [2] 122/24 129/18
rather [3] 70/24 109/13 268/25
re [2] 17/1 54/2
re-counts [1] 17/1
reach [3] 71/3 71/10 220/24
reached [1] 63/19
reacted [2] 58/11 58/16
reaction [2] 73/9 73/10
read [18] 16/9 40/25 55/7 55/16 56/22 59/3 86/1 121/11 122/5 126/13 187/25 188/16 191/9 212/8 221/7 255/8 257/19 269/12
readable [2] 64/17 264/9
readily [1] 201/24
readiness [1] 20/20
reading [4] 55/7 190/5 190/12 254/22
reads [3] 224/4 244/6 256/13
ready [5] 98/23 161/6 161/19 167/8
206/16
real [8] 120/20 144/8 213/20 214/3 214/12 217/6 250/10 263/21
realize [4] 9/6 73/20 103/24 215/24
realized [2] 204/4 204/16
really [36] 34/20 52/8 53/20 63/21 64/9 68/10 68/17 69/2 69/24 86/13 102/21
104/10 112/23 116/8 129/14 129/14
131/17 132/24 133/12 141/1 142/7
144/7 144/10 166/12 210/20 225/13
250/20 255/7 260/14 260/14 260/14
260/14 260/15 260/15 260/15 274/10
realm [1] 108/11
rearrange [1] 117/1
reason [9] 29/2 29/17 123/18 130/24
135/5 193/19 197/4 244/14 262/12
reasonable [5] 68/14 68/15 72/21 152/6 181/4
reasons [7] 27/6 39/14 70/23 213/19 214/3 217/5 244/18
reboot [8] 188/22 190/9 190/13 191/10
191/15 192/2 192/3 192/5
rebooted [1] 192/7
rebooting [1] 191/3
rebuttal [1] 182/9
recall [83] 13/25 14/2 14/4 54/19 107/1 115/25 117/10 117/13 117/16 117/23
120/6 121/2 121/6 123/5 128/6 128/9
128/10 129/1 131/5 131/8 134/14
136/23 138/2 138/15 140/21 141/21
141/23 142/2 146/4 148/7 149/14
153/25 156/1 156/6 161/4 170/15 184/7
188/19 190/5 190/7 190/15 192/11
195/14 196/8 208/8 208/10 208/19
208/25 219/12 219/13 219/21 219/24
219/25 220/4 222/16 222/23 222/25
223/13 224/10 224/12 225/5 226/7
227/8 227/8 229/4 233/5 234/22 246/2
246/18 246/22 249/23 253/16 253/21
254/15 255/19 262/10 264/18 268/23
269/1 269/13 269/16 269/17 276/8
recalled [1] 103/13
recalling [1] 156/3
recap [28] 99/14 171/25 172/2 172/10
172/15 173/21 174/7 174/9 174/10
174/15 174/17 174/22 175/2 175/4
175/7 175/8 175/17 175/18 176/8
176/11 176/16 176/20 176/24 177/6
177/12 177/13 177/22 177/22
receipt [2] 94/5 100/17
receive [5] 27/23 29/17 99/23 148/15

## 192/19

received [12] 12/24 14/5 30/8 30/9 67/13 67/17 71/20 117/15 178/10 178/12 178/14 253/1
receives [2] 27/20 29/20
recent [1] 30/11
recently [1] 67/16
recertification [1] 255/23
recertify [2] 255/11 255/15
recess [1] 65/17
recognize [11] 31/21 32/3 138/7
141/17 157/23 158/2 205/7 211/23
230/16 230/18 237/12
recognizes [2] 69/8 144/6
recollection [10] 121/10 121/15 126/14
131/20 132/2 143/21 154/8 154/10 236/8 255/13
recommend [1] 116/11
recommendation [6] 58/16 80/18
116/14 137/22 216/2 217/7
recommendations [10] 49/8 50/4
50/10 58/3 106/15 134/12 134/24 135/5 153/1 238/6
recommended [7] 122/13 134/25
136/1 151/14 197/7 213/19 217/5
recommends [1] 218/13
reconcile [2] 176/11 176/17
reconciliation [1] 171/15
record [35] 12/4 17/8 17/24 28/9 52/3
65/6 71/1 71/3 73/23 79/5 80/16 80/20
105/12 126/13 151/24 160/6 167/18
171/16 171/25 173/21 174/18 175/13
176/14 176/14 176/24 177/1 177/9
178/6 178/12 178/14 178/21 189/13
189/18 202/14 254/23
recorded [2] 172/7 177/6
recording [2] 171/19 243/18
recordkeeping [1] 97/4
records [1] 158/5
red [2] 150/23 151/1
redact [1] 267/16
reduced [1] 116/21
reevaluate [1] 59/24
refer [3] 80/18 94/20 145/13
reference [3] 45/19 78/16 129/3
referenced [3] 67/5 69/4 70/4
references [1] 168/7
referencing [6] 1/5 55/8 59/20 65/8
68/3 132/10
referred [5] 54/17 118/2 125/24 126/18 164/3
referring [5] 50/5 63/9 137/12 175/2
239/10
refers [2] 239/6 268/22
reflect [5] 43/13 95/21 96/14 168/4 171/8
reflected [2] 159/11 173/2
reflecting [1] 57/4
reflection [1] 164/8
reflective [1] 145/1
reflects [1] 273/17
reframe [1] 39/16
refresh [4] 121/9 131/20 132/2 154/7
refreshes [1] 126/14
refreshing [2] 121/15 154/10
regarded [1] 215/13
regarding [15] 23/11 49/9 49/12 50/9
54/2 57/8 67/16 69/5 73/17 81/12 125/5
137/8 144/13 175/20 259/25
regardless [2] 7/24 101/13
region [3] 19/9 21/13 194/5
Region 4 [1] 194/5
regional [4] 21/10 21/11 21/13 21/17
register [1] 129/17
registered [3] 22/2 44/25 99/8
registration [30] 15/6 15/12 17/6 19/20 19/25 28/5 28/7 45/1 45/9 45/10 45/17 46/9 46/10 47/12 89/25 109/21 114/14
114/15 114/20 115/1 115/17 115/22
116/1 116/12 117/8 128/11 133/5 133/9 133/15 142/25
regular [3] 26/14 29/23 30/4
regulations [1] 70/5
reinstall [1] 77/14
reiterate [1] 277/17
relate [1] 35/8
related [10] 64/15 149/3 149/11 149/16
149/17 149/18 268/7 272/8 273/1 273/7
relates [5] 24/4 39/23 44/12 52/24
89/21
relating [2] 54/7 73/18
relation [1] 188/1
relatively [3] 24/3 24/6 104/13
release [2] 54/12 120/14
releasing [1] 110/16
relevance [19] 9/11 32/24 33/19 33/20
33/22 35/2 38/23 39/5 142/19 143/5
143/9 147/25 202/5 238/24 267/2
271/18 271/24 272/21 276/4
relevancy [1] 265/25
relevant [10] 39/7 56/15 63/13 67/7
102/16 102/21 130/17 148/5 148/18 276/21
reliability [1] 148/11
reliance [1] 78/17
relied [1] 263/25
rely [6] 56/8 57/17 118/10 155/6 155/9 241/9
relying [2] 57/19 64/22
remain [1] 150/22
remediating [1] 106/15
remedy [2] 51/6 66/18
remember [26] 7/4 93/9 115/13 120/12
124/12 132/1 135/3 142/20 142/21
144/24 147/15 149/13 192/25 202/24
218/16 220/3 220/7 220/11 222/21
223/7 234/17 234/21 254/2 254/3
254/18 269/10
remembering [1] 147/24
remind [10] 6/20 6/22 11/4 74/3 92/17
96/1 168/23 185/6 246/4 276/15
reminded [2] 58/2 148/7
reminder [1] 207/23
reminding [1] 95/19
remnants [1] 118/1
removable [1] 224/6
remove [4] 78/24 99/12 99/14 156/24
removed [1] 80/17
renew [1] 35/5
rep [4] 61/13 61/17 63/22 64/8
repeat [3] 180/4 198/25 228/12
replace [4] 57/5 219/19 238/6 255/25
replaced [4] 84/14 219/2 220/1 276/23
replacement [1] 220/17
replacing [4] 66/11 116/11 202/3 220/17
report [48] 51/12 51/15 51/18 51/20
55/4 55/5 58/17 59/3 59/3 59/5 59/6 63/11 66/10 68/11 73/18 86/1 86/3
125/5 138/15 142/4 142/7 165/5 172/10
174/10 176/3 188/16 188/19 188/24

## R

report... [20] 190/5 190/12 191/9 192/21 193/7 193/10 193/24 221/7 221/24 234/18 234/19 234/24 237/13 237/15 238/5 239/1 253/5 264/7 267/3 269/12
reported [8] 110/14 113/10 124/2 230/19 231/5 232/11 232/21 234/20
Reporter [5] 1/3 1/6 1/23 280/6 280/17 reporting [2] 32/4 260/17 reports [15] 50/13 51/9 66/21 140/19 142/5 192/16 192/18 192/19 192/22
193/12 193/15 227/22 230/24 260/8
264/17
represent [2] 120/1 184/2
representations [1] 273/20
representative [3] 19/9 21/3 194/9
representatives [1] 60/7
Republican [2] 202/2 202/13
request [17] 27/11 47/2 55/22 55/25
56/12 56/19 56/23 56/25 57/3 64/22
145/11 146/17 146/18 149/10 149/15
150/4 158/5
requested [9] 16/1 29/16 30/6 38/1
97/13 141/23 185/18 185/19 185/24
requesting [2] 67/1 142/21
requests [7] 15/7 56/10 65/9 65/9
67/21 68/7 93/24
require [9] 81/24 81/25 82/17 180/3
198/23 199/2 249/4 255/23 270/7
required [21] 9/21 23/14 23/25 24/12
27/8 53/1 69/24 89/3 89/6 89/9 89/10
188/21 195/23 224/16 224/17 242/12
243/7 244/5 244/10 249/11 251/15
requirement [4] 26/3 122/22 208/6
242/25
requirements [2] 90/11 242/19
requires [7] 10/5 67/23 88/20 95/18
208/3 218/12 257/23
requiring [1] 10/1
reraise [1] 85/4
resealed [1] 228/3
resealing [1] 171/19
research [1] 217/19
researcher [2] 268/7 268/10
reservation [1] 148/16
reserve [1] 10/17
reserving [1] 182/9
reset [3] 163/4 163/5 163/6
resilient [1] 120/18
resolution [2] 148/10 279/12
resources [1] 48/15
respect [5] 7/14 128/24 143/18 214/10 265/13
respective [1] 255/3
respond [9] 9/14 51/14 55/10 63/23
68/10 68/15 71/1 260/13 270/4
responded [2] 52/1 53/24
responding [3] 86/14 110/12 271/6
responds [3] 228/6 229/7 232/7
response [19] 51/3 56/9 64/6 68/2 68/3
72/4 72/5 73/21 85/23 86/3 132/25
141/7 147/19 147/19 203/10 203/12
228/7 268/19 268/24
responses [6] 56/3 60/5 67/12 67/14 72/21 72/24
responsibilities [3] 124/23 128/24

151/22
responsibility [6] 110/17 110/17 130/5 216/21 216/23 260/4
roughly [6] 18/11 121/7 121/23 187/1
195/18 198/4
responsible [13] 67/2 88/24 90/12 91/5
round [1] 194/5
110/9 118/7 118/12 215/14 215/22
215/24 216/1 216/7 216/7
responsive [6] 56/4 67/20 135/1
196/19 202/8 214/8
rest [2] 43/1 236/11
restricted [1] $1 / 3$
restroom [2] 5/17 236/25
result [3] 90/11 117/23 180/16
resulting [1] 31/24
results [20] 30/24 31/2 31/25 32/5
32/10 32/13 32/23 33/8 33/14 34/2 35/8
36/18 36/23 119/10 173/19 173/19
173/20 173/25 174/1 260/17
retrieve [1] 47/5
return [2] 29/3 53/23
returned [4] 28/3 29/9 29/25 38/2
returning [1] 29/7
reveal [3] 28/1 270/7 270/8
reveals [1] 164/18
review [26] 22/9 23/4 26/4 34/25 42/20
48/19 48/23 48/24 51/17 55/6 95/11
95/14 95/19 115/3 138/11 138/12 139/5 139/16 139/18 139/19 141/15 144/10 145/16 168/23 208/4 261/8
reviewed [6] 42/8 42/13 42/16 141/19 142/5 147/16
reviewing [2] 35/3 138/15
reviews [1] 128/14
RICARDO [2] 2/19 2/22
Richard [1] 17/20
rid [1] 151/4
right [348]
right-hand [1] 149/1
rigor [1] 108/4
rigorous [1] 64/17
rise [4] 65/16 182/13 259/8 279/20
risk [26] 9/19 9/20 10/5 82/3 82/4 82/9 83/8 108/23 111/20 111/21 112/7 112/14 124/10 124/11 129/17 140/14 140/15 140/16 152/12 152/23 153/2
187/22 190/24 217/11 217/13 239/21
risk-limiting [3] 9/19 9/20 10/5
risks [11] 49/9 106/14 106/15 129/18
140/10 181/5 193/14 214/4 214/6 218/8 218/8
RMR [3] 1/23 280/6 280/16
ROBBINS [1] 3/6
ROBERT [2] 2/16 2/17
role [18] 9/11 13/19 28/23 89/16 89/20 89/22 106/10 106/14 106/20 107/25 125/8 155/9 215/4 215/5 215/7 215/16 216/11 265/13
roles [1] 88/8
roll [1] 77/7
rolled [5] 46/19 46/19 47/5 186/2
192/25
rolling [3] 67/23 110/16 186/3 rollout [3] 181/23 208/15 265/16 rolls [1] 20/4
room [6] 11/11 74/9 126/22 178/20
252/8 252/13
ROSS [1] 3/6
roster [1] 98/11
Roswell [1] 47/18
roundabout [2] 274/8 274/19
routinely [1] 142/12
row [2] 34/20 139/4
rows [1] 139/1
rule [19] 51/24 53/8 55/23 56/3 57/15 67/23 71/2 71/11 85/7 89/10 95/18
146/8 178/19 178/21 178/22 217/1
224/21 257/11 257/11
Rule 183-1-12-. 05 [1] 257/11
Rule 26 [4] 51/24 56/3 57/15 67/23
Rule 701 [1] 85/7
Rule 901 [1] 146/8
ruled [2] 62/15 62/20
rules [8] 63/18 90/1 90/3 145/14 226/14 226/17 240/16 250/24
run [10] $5 / 165 / 25$ 90/8 165/8 181/18 181/18 181/19 203/24 218/5 227/3
running [2] 11/15 256/15
runoff [4] 18/21 24/1 91/19 229/6 runoffs [1] 23/25
runs [3] 102/7 131/12 131/16
RUSSO [1] 3/3
Ryan [5] 220/13 220/25 221/18 230/10 257/7

## S

S-T-A-F-F-O-R-D [1] 21/23
safe [6] 74/13 237/14 238/3 238/14 238/24 239/12
said [60] 19/10 26/19 41/3 41/5 46/6 50/23 51/23 57/17 59/2 61/19 64/2 67/12 71/14 71/25 72/4 78/4 80/8 81/14 99/25 108/20 114/8 115/17 117/17 117/18 117/21 118/3 128/9 133/3 133/10 143/2 148/1 148/14 159/10 161/24 166/3 172/9 174/22 185/1 196/17 199/20 204/12 210/12 212/25 215/25 221/2 221/4 221/7 223/11 223/18 224/9 224/21 225/8 226/1 233/6 246/10 250/16 250/19 251/1 253/4 280/10
sake [4] 17/24 26/19 30/6 262/17 salary [1] 122/22
same [44] 18/2 25/4 30/8 40/8 43/11 43/23 47/6 61/1 66/12 66/14 69/2 69/22 82/25 97/25 117/6 118/17 123/3 128/21 140/16 142/13 142/14 162/11 162/11 172/17 172/20 172/21 183/4 183/7 183/15 183/18 183/19 189/24 198/14 208/13 209/21 217/10 233/5 247/24 248/14 253/18 256/10 271/7 274/12 274/16
sample [20] 23/8 23/11 23/15 24/10
24/12 24/17 24/20 24/21 25/15 26/2
26/10 26/14 26/24 26/25 27/3 195/12
195/21 195/25 196/2 196/6
Sandy [1] 47/18
save [1] 135/13
saw [7] 16/14 16/15 16/17 93/22
240/18 249/5 264/8
say [72] 10/16 30/7 32/6 32/9 33/7 33/8
39/3 41/8 42/18 46/16 54/10 57/10
58/11 58/15 59/25 62/4 63/23 68/5
68/19 69/12 74/7 74/13 76/11 76/22
78/5 78/19 82/23 87/22 94/1 95/24 96/9

## S

say... [41] 96/22 108/17 110/24 111/12 115/19 118/17 132/25 145/4 145/10 147/5 152/14 153/20 178/14 180/12 181/17 185/23 190/22 195/7 195/25 197/16 199/11 203/12 203/20 208/9 209/7 214/4 216/6 217/4 228/13 233/23 239/23 241/12 245/17 245/19 246/8 247/2 248/22 250/19 265/24 269/18 269/21
saying [22] 9/25 24/20 30/2 41/8 41/10 48/1 58/20 69/18 69/21 79/18 93/5 113/21 126/22 131/5 153/17 167/6 204/8 228/10 228/23 243/12 274/14 277/9
says [22] 32/4 34/21 53/13 58/15 75/6 77/3 136/16 139/4 139/8 149/2 149/19 153/22 163/3 178/19 207/3 214/11
217/5 243/2 243/7 255/8 267/20 273/9
scaled [1] 113/7
scan [4] 96/8 160/5 160/5 217/24
scanned [6] 28/18 81/16 81/18 97/2 139/8 187/25
scanner [50] 16/9 16/21 16/22 22/10
23/5 27/18 28/19 81/3 81/5 81/9 81/14 82/4 82/7 82/23 82/25 83/15 83/25 84/2 84/18 84/20 95/18 95/25 96/11 164/3 164/8 164/18 164/18 164/22 165/1 167/22 167/24 168/1 168/5 168/22 168/23 173/23 175/4 175/7 175/8 175/15 175/18 181/25 183/9 183/17 209/11 210/6 210/9 245/10 245/14 245/15
scanners [17] 77/15 79/25 81/20 83/2 83/14 83/19 84/19 164/3 164/14 164/15 173/7 173/14 175/8 217/23 217/25 218/1 218/2
scanning [3] 168/5 188/2 244/11
schedule [5] 8/18 119/20 156/16 278/9
278/12
scheduled [2] 97/16 104/7
scheduling [1] 5/10
SCHEINMAN [1] 2/7
SCHOENBERG [1] 2/3
science [1] 53/6
scope [19] 59/1 70/12 70/22 114/13 115/18 115/19 120/13 124/22 124/24 125/3 128/24 132/23 134/20 135/1
142/22 143/1 151/20 151/23 188/24
score [1] 22/14
Scott [5] 263/19 263/24 265/9 266/4 266/13
screen [36] 43/8 99/18 101/23 160/11 161/10 161/13 161/14 162/15 163/11 163/12 164/23 165/11 171/25 172/2
172/13 172/15 174/7 174/9 174/10
174/15 174/17 174/22 175/2 175/17
190/14 190/16 223/22 242/14 242/19
243/7 243/13 244/2 244/24 245/6
248/19 263/10
screens [1] 188/22
scribble [1] 16/16
script [2] 149/24 150/5
scripts [1] 148/20
seal [26] 100/3 100/4 101/12 101/14 101/20 102/3 164/16 171/19 172/6
173/23 174/13 174/16 174/18 175/11

176/3 176/24 177/1 178/6 178/11 178/12 226/15 226/18 226/22 229/8 229/8 229/21
sealed [6] 164/15 172/6 172/6 172/8 277/9 277/13
seals [37] 98/22 99/10 99/12 99/13 99/13 99/14 99/25 101/17 101/18 102/2 102/15 102/16 102/17 102/18 164/16 164/19 164/20 175/9 175/12 175/13 191/4 191/6 191/7 191/16 191/20 191/21 226/5 226/9 226/11 227/23 231/9 245/2 245/7 245/10 245/16 245/18 245/22
search [6] 158/4 211/6 211/8 222/6 222/9 222/12
seat [6] $5 / 3$ 12/2 105/1 105/10 157/1 279/4
seated [1] 250/1
seats [2] 34/11 43/24
SEB [3] 178/19 178/21 224/22
second [33] 24/8 35/11 49/25 50/24
52/24 66/1 73/10 85/21 93/19 96/21
102/9 129/12 138/25 160/24 168/7
193/1 205/2 206/13 207/18 210/1 210/2 212/12 232/2 249/18 254/20 256/3 256/13 256/17 257/5 257/8 257/17 263/8 267/12
seconds [1] 179/12
secrecy [2] 188/21 188/21
secret [3] 108/11 147/16 273/3
Secretary [74] 12/16 18/1 18/3 18/11 18/13 18/14 23/10 26/21 32/6 33/9 36/20 45/4 54/11 90/17 90/17 94/23 95/12 106/17 107/3 107/4 109/1 112/20 113/1 113/4 113/25 117/16 118/20 120/5 120/23 121/25 122/13 123/1 123/8 123/13 124/25 128/19 130/15 130/21 134/4 134/13 135/13 135/16 135/19 136/1 137/3 137/13 137/21 140/1 140/15 140/23 143/24 144/5 145/2 146/1 148/12 149/10 149/15 150/3 157/24 175/16 177/11 177/11 193/13 193/18 198/11 202/23 203/1 208/15 220/4 220/10 241/18 257/13 272/11 272/14
Secretary's [64] 26/20 45/18 61/18 67/15 106/20 107/2 109/18 110/3 110/20 115/20 116/14 116/18 117/11 118/5 118/15 119/3 168/4 193/8 193/12 193/24 208/19 211/6 213/18 214/11 214/22 215/3 219/2 219/9 219/14 219/18 220/1 220/20 221/5 221/8 221/12 221/16 221/22 222/2 222/13 222/18 227/6 230/7 230/24 233/9 239/17 240/10 240/12 241/1 241/7 245/13 245/15 248/22 250/2 254/1 255/13 255/22 258/20 260/14 263/25 267/4 272/17 274/2 275/4 276/2
section [3] 212/21 223/23 223/25
Section 2.2 [1] 223/23
Section 2.2.1 [1] 223/25
sections [1] 67/6
sections of [1] 67/6
secure [8] 82/9 100/20 108/7 118/21
135/17 152/7 202/4 226/6
secured [2] 210/13 231/8
securely [2] 150/9 150/16
Securities [1] 134/17
security [122] 20/10 20/19 20/20 20/24 21/9 21/11 49/9 49/11 51/7 51/19 66/19 80/21 81/3 81/24 82/17 82/19 83/19 91/2 91/6 106/2 106/4 106/11 106/24 108/13 108/19 108/23 110/19 111/3 111/6 111/17 112/22 118/4 118/7 118/11 118/12 120/15 120/23 121/25 123/15 124/6 124/8 125/2 125/6 129/18 129/24 133/24 134/9 134/14 135/23 140/7 141/2 145/7 148/13 149/12 149/17 151/8 151/16 153/1 155/6 155/6 155/10 164/24 164/25 165/14 165/15 165/17 165/19 165/21 166/22 167/13 167/18 189/1 192/10 193/21 195/9 209/10 209/14 209/15 209/17 209/21 210/9 210/14 213/3 213/6 213/10 213/19 213/20 214/3 214/10 214/23 215/1 215/5 215/9 215/17 216/13 216/14 217/5 217/6 218/13 218/23 220/15 226/10 229/13 232/3 235/10 247/3 247/10 248/4 250/8 253/12 268/7 269/19 272/4 272/8 272/12 272/23 273/1 273/6 273/10 273/25 274/4 279/6 see [162] $7 / 18$ 13/8 14/22 16/7 32/20 33/23 34/16 35/14 38/23 39/5 39/9 40/9 46/24 46/24 50/2 52/25 56/10 60/4 72/11 76/16 77/1 95/5 97/14 98/24 106/23 120/1 126/14 128/16 129/20 136/14 137/10 137/19 139/2 139/6 139/10 143/12 143/21 149/5 149/21 150/1 154/9 159/7 163/8 173/3 178/19 179/19 202/24 205/10 206/7 206/8 206/13 206/19 207/2 207/9 207/13 207/18 212/7 212/9 212/10 212/11 212/14 212/19 212/23 213/5 213/7 213/13 213/21 223/22 224/1 224/7 227/13 227/16 227/20 227/25 228/4 228/7 229/10 229/24 230/9 230/12 230/14 230/20 231/11 231/12 231/18 231/19 231/25 232/3 232/5 232/9 232/10 233/2 233/24 235/17 238/17 238/19 238/24 239/2 239/6 239/9 239/12 239/14 241/24 242/4 242/7 242/9 242/11 242/16 243/22 244/8 244/25 248/8 248/9 248/11 248/13 248/14 248/16 248/18 249/19 254/6 254/10 254/13 256/9 256/17 256/18 257/6 257/9 257/14 257/19 258/8 259/3 259/24 260/11 260/12 260/19 261/7 261/10 261/11 261/20 261/21 261/25 262/6 263/7 263/18 264/3 264/6 264/7 264/10 264/11 265/9 267/25 268/3 268/14 271/4 271/6 271/24 272/5 272/9 272/15 273/6 278/3 279/11
seeing [3] 73/3 142/20 234/21
seeking [2] 52/21 66/7
seem [1] 200/13
seemed [2] 70/20 200/15
seeming [1] 69/16
seems [9] 31/1 35/7 145/3 186/24
194/22 202/14 238/25 277/1 278/10
seen [28] 13/23 24/22 24/25 25/6 25/7 25/23 43/10 44/4 49/20 57/20 60/23 62/13 62/13 68/25 94/8 142/22 150/8 157/21 188/14 191/13 210/23 211/11 223/18 237/14 237/16 264/16 268/16 277/23
select [1] $27 / 2$

## S

selected [4] 48/20 49/4 213/10 213/15 selections [13] 22/8 23/4 23/5 26/12
26/13 42/7 42/8 42/12 42/13 96/17
187/20 187/23 188/3
self [1] 243/8
self-contained [1] 243/8
senate [6] 38/10 43/23 43/24 249/24
250/7 251/10
send [8] 28/22 117/22 145/11 150/15
157/11 228/2 257/7 262/13
sending [1] 137/13
sends [2] 28/20 254/19
SENIOR [1] $1 / 12$
sense [2] 9/10 32/23
sensitive [8] 73/20 182/17 272/8
272/18 273/7 273/24 274/15 275/7
sensitivity [1] 274/2
sent [16] 54/18 136/25 138/11 150/16
150/20 182/17 257/6 259/25 261/7
261/16 263/19 264/4 265/9 268/19 271/3 271/7
sentence [7] 207/7 224/12 243/3 243/5 243/12 243/18 254/20
separate [10] 74/25 111/11 114/25 128/21 154/11 167/19 167/20 167/20 167/22 168/10
separating [1] 28/17
September [2] 208/16 219/25
sequence [2] 66/5 66/9
serial [4] 174/18 231/9 231/22 231/23
series [3] 36/12 60/6 94/25
serious [2] 151/15 275/5
seriously [1] 71/14
seriousness [1] 69/22
served [6] 17/18 51/2 56/17 66/15

## 147/7 238/13

server [18] 77/25 78/1 79/21 84/18
117/1 117/7 127/9 127/10 128/3 133/1
219/1 219/11 219/15 219/20 220/5
251/2 251/7 252/14
servers [5] 114/24 117/1 127/11
130/19 132/3
serves [1] 76/22
service [4] 108/9 116/21 164/2 168/2
services [6] 20/16 106/2 106/12 127/6
127/18 135/9
serving [1] 117/10
set [22] 48/25 55/19 56/22 80/25 81/4 81/8 82/19 98/21 98/23 99/15 101/6
186/18 186/22 187/5 187/13 224/21
240/15 244/2 248/9 248/25 278/22
280/12
sets [1] 90/21
setting [6] 99/3 101/16 157/4 161/2
187/5 245/14
settle [1] 22/14
setup [5] 161/4 245/21 248/9 249/5
262/4
setups [1] 249/11
seven [2] 198/22 199/1
seventh [1] 238/15
several [6] 67/9 79/22 111/21 119/18
124/4 251/6
shall [3] 243/7 243/20 272/13
SHANNON [4] 1/23 74/22 280/6 280/16
shapes [1] 16/20
share [4] 8/18 134/17 150/9 213/10
shared [3] 8/21 30/15 124/5
SharePoint [2] 150/8 241/4
sharing [1] 20/23
she [14] 121/10 123/22 154/7 154/8
227/22 227/23 228/2 228/23 230/19
253/25 254/20 255/8 260/7 260/21
she's [1] 255/7
sheet [25] 99/14 171/25 172/2 172/15
173/21 174/7 174/9 174/10 174/15
174/18 174/22 175/2 175/4 175/7 175/8
175/13 176/8 176/11 176/16 176/19
176/20 176/24 177/7 177/22 177/22
sheets [7] 97/5 121/1 174/6 175/18
175/18 177/12 177/13
Shepherd [8] 106/7 106/10 123/24
151/8 151/10 151/22 155/9 156/17
shift [2] 141/1 141/8
ship [1] 186/10
Shipping [1] 53/18
shocked [1] 241/15
shook [1] 79/8
short [10] 24/4 36/15 45/16 104/13
104/14 112/2 147/18 164/5 210/20 250/10
shortly [4] 14/7 76/1 112/8 112/19 should [35] 24/17 24/20 60/17 65/25 67/22 70/16 71/23 73/10 78/5 104/20 122/14 124/20 131/6 132/18 144/20 151/25 152/6 153/18 163/1 176/12 176/13 176/14 176/16 176/19 178/10 236/1 236/22 255/2 256/23 258/9 262/25 267/6 270/22 271/2 277/8 shouldn't [1] 26/2
show [21] 25/3 30/14 30/20 34/9 37/8 37/15 37/23 38/4 40/22 41/8 41/11 44/11 47/14 47/15 49/18 94/16 165/6 172/14 231/14 231/15 273/21
showed [11] 15/18 40/13 40/14 40/15 41/4 41/4 41/15 42/11 42/17 176/18 211/11
showing [3] 31/13 38/6 248/8
shown [4] 46/22 165/4 188/10 210/22
shows [11] 23/2 24/17 25/10 37/9 37/9
37/10 37/13 37/13 37/17 37/24 37/25
shrink [1] 115/14
shrink-wrapping [1] 115/14
shut [4] 93/17 117/19 172/5 254/1
sic [3] 131/20 134/17 158/17
side [8] 71/6 103/21 128/11 133/4 133/5 221/16 221/19 265/16
sides [4] 71/22 150/10 150/12 248/19
sideways [1] 195/9
sign [4] 30/2 178/13 244/5 244/10
signage [1] 25/14
signed [1] 55/20
significant [8] 148/6 152/10 153/7 154/2 154/19 203/22 215/5 215/7
signs [6] 23/11 95/8 95/9 95/11 139/9 160/8
similar [6] 33/14 41/5 94/8 181/19 252/23 274/3
similarly [1] 162/25
simple [3] 129/21 149/24 191/25
simply [4] 51/11 55/17 58/20 166/21
since [15] 9/12 13/19 18/3 25/21 45/11 46/10 46/25 67/17 75/13 84/15 94/9 144/12 187/18 208/14 248/22
singing [1] 279/16
single [9] 82/23 113/7 130/11 144/24 187/10 195/24 213/10 218/20 222/3 sir [41] 39/10 70/19 106/16 106/19 109/19 111/9 115/21 118/6 119/5 119/7 120/8 124/1 125/15 125/22 126/5 127/3 127/22 128/10 128/23 130/18 132/2 132/8 132/19 134/10 138/7 140/2 141/17 154/16 155/2 190/24 194/15 197/19 203/18 205/16 214/3 244/17 245/3 247/11 248/20 250/20 251/18 sit [10] 52/17 65/25 191/14 192/6 194/18 195/20 208/8 208/10 232/19 262/12
site [8] 89/4 130/22 131/7 150/8 150/17 187/6 190/10 196/1
sites [6] 127/5 129/19 192/14 195/13
195/18 195/21
sits [1] 248/12
sitting [3] 248/11 248/18 252/14
situation [8] 23/7 30/5 117/14 145/23
169/13 226/20 227/7 274/11
situations [1] 60/24
six [2] $34 / 244 / 14$
six percent [1] 44/14
Skoglund [1] 14/3
Slaughter [3] 254/10 254/19 257/8
Slaughter's [1] 254/23
sleep [1] 279/14
slight [1] 5/5
slightly [1] 7/16
slot [1] 168/15
small [3] 150/22 193/3 199/12
smaller [1] 118/24
Smith [1] 136/25
snapshot [3] 108/22 139/16 150/15 so [413]
soft [2] 102/14 102/14
softer [1] 101/13
software [44] 50/12 50/15 50/17 57/6 57/6 57/23 60/10 63/25 64/15 64/19 65/4 75/15 76/2 76/17 76/23 77/2 77/19 77/20 78/2 137/7 170/6 202/22 203/5 203/6 203/15 204/2 204/11 208/20
208/23 215/10 216/12 222/14 222/19
232/25 250/9 253/8 272/18 273/2
273/23 275/7 275/19 275/24 275/25 276/3
software-related [1] 64/15
solution [2] 135/17 136/2
solutions [4] 106/22 113/2 149/23 216/12
some [86] 9/5 10/9 11/6 24/25 28/2
30/11 30/14 35/7 46/8 46/19 50/8 58/24 60/9 64/8 67/1 67/15 69/16 69/18 69/18 70/22 72/8 74/6 75/10 84/9 89/24 95/6 101/11 101/12 102/13 102/14 106/2 108/17 109/19 110/6 110/11 111/10 111/24 116/4 116/4 129/9 134/12 137/25 140/3 144/1 147/12 147/17 147/17 148/22 156/1 159/9 162/10 179/11 183/2 187/23 189/13 189/25 193/7 196/3 196/13 197/20 199/24 202/13 213/4 217/18 221/17 222/13 222/15 226/12 233/17 233/19 236/1 241/15 244/20 246/7 247/15 249/1 249/2 249/11 249/13 253/19 269/8 269/15 276/23 277/10 277/17 278/17

## S

somebody [15] 15/25 60/14 74/15 85/18 103/20 123/5 147/21 152/13 153/22 185/19 192/2 192/5 201/20 216/7 254/17
somehow [2] 166/22 185/11 someone [8] 98/15 161/6 170/13 187/21 191/2 198/14 210/9 263/24
someplace [1] 123/22
something [44] 9/3 62/17 64/9 73/1
79/9 83/9 103/8 108/14 108/20 116/10 116/22 128/25 130/20 131/6 134/25
141/5 141/19 141/25 150/11 150/15
150/15 194/4 199/25 201/7 202/13
204/17 206/2 214/6 214/13 239/16
241/11 241/12 243/2 247/2 248/3 248/5
256/24 262/9 263/1 267/6 269/18
269/20 278/19 279/7
sometime [1] 164/12
sometimes [10] 11/12 16/20 25/11
164/4 209/16 218/15 241/12 244/10 244/15 264/14
somewhere [2] 81/22 186/22
song [1] 279/17
songs [1] 279/17
soon [3] 24/1 151/15 151/17
sorry [50] 5/14 6/6 6/12 6/21 14/11
14/20 15/1 35/12 40/24 63/8 79/18
95/24 100/8 103/9 112/12 113/12 115/5
115/6 121/8 128/5 130/5 130/7 132/20
133/17 136/17 136/19 138/19 158/19
158/23 163/13 163/14 167/1 174/20
180/13 185/5 197/25 204/23 205/1
206/23 207/5 209/14 210/2 211/16
211/20 233/4 234/25 257/4 257/15 266/5 275/10
sort [10] 67/1 186/2 202/14 244/21 249/4 249/13 253/19 269/15 274/8 274/19
sos.ga.gov [1] 264/5
sought [1] 202/17
sound [1] 259/10
sounding [1] 278/25
sounds [8] 65/4 78/3 135/15 156/6
169/4 193/5 208/4 219/17
source [1] 279/9
south [5] 19/9 181/19 199/6 201/16 201/20
South Carolina [4] 181/19 199/6 201/16 201/20
Southern [1] 33/13
SOUTHWEST [1] 1/24
space [2] 73/7 106/3
Spalding [7] 234/16 253/17 254/7
255/11 255/14 256/9 257/10
span [1] 194/21
sparked [1] 267/4
SPARKS [1] 2/9
speak [20] 21/7 33/1 42/16 42/16 50/21
95/2 128/3 128/11 132/3 133/3 133/11
134/9 150/6 169/5 194/8 208/14 221/19 225/13 233/21 246/9
speaking [3] 49/23 74/5 193/20
speaks [4] 179/10 179/15 199/19 200/25
special [2] 15/11 18/20
specialist [2] 124/7 124/19
specialize [1] 13/7
specializes [1] 151/10
specialty [1] 98/1
specific [21] 50/25 56/16 56/17 56/18
58/8 58/17 61/5 69/17 91/23 120/10
141/21 145/1 147/24 151/15 167/14
192/22 193/13 244/23 246/12 268/9 270/4
specifically [16] 56/6 61/5 92/2 107/21
109/19 136/4 142/3 144/23 145/9 146/5 193/15 220/12 246/11 246/17 250/8
251/1
specificity [2] 51/5 66/17
specifics [3] 255/19 270/1 278/16
specs [1] 210/14
speculate [3] 39/11 39/13 122/25
speculation [3] 39/6 64/8 151/20
speech [1] $7 / 11$
speed [3] 28/19 36/3 239/4
spell [5] 12/4 21/21 45/2 105/11 105/14
spelling [1] 75/3
spend [2] 87/15 190/2
spending [1] 189/25
spent [4] 72/17 84/9 120/22 121/24
spinal [2] 106/9 151/11
split [1] 116/23
spoil [5] 29/24 96/9 96/19 96/22 96/24
spoiled [4] 96/25 97/2 97/3 176/15
spoke [4] 194/3 213/4 220/24 269/7
spot [4] 11/18 165/1 174/13 177/3
spotty [1] 11/11
spouse [1] 123/20
spread [3] 88/6 223/11 224/5
Springs [1] 47/18
SR [1] 2/23
stack [3] 26/5 28/17 169/25
staff [10] 90/7 90/15 116/25 124/13
144/12 148/14 176/1 176/2 216/13 272/11
Stafford [3] 21/15 21/16 21/22
stamina [1] 279/5
stand [5] 65/17 71/18 99/16 148/3 182/12
standalone [3] 252/4 252/13 253/11
standard [12] 45/25 129/17 155/5
205/10 205/13 205/14 205/16 205/17
205/22 206/15 206/18 207/16
standards [5] 70/4 70/5 208/4 208/7 216/14
standing [6] 11/2 147/24 168/22
196/16 248/15 276/22
standpoint [1] 125/17
stands [1] 51/13
Stark [1] 14/1
start [12] 6/5 6/18 24/1 31/4 93/16
163/22 180/7 184/4 202/10 273/13 278/2 278/5
started [14] 5/9 11/4 14/25 15/5 45/7
46/6 46/14 77/8 93/18 106/1 110/15
112/8 127/13 266/25
starting [6] 12/21 121/21 126/9 154/17 179/4 231/21
starts [1] 11/5
state [167] 3/2 7/11 10/1 10/3 10/5
10/6 12/3 18/24 19/2 20/1 28/21 28/23 32/7 48/15 48/17 48/21 49/1 49/6 50/16 51/14 51/17 51/18 52/20 55/9 55/11 57/4 57/25 58/11 58/12 58/15 60/8

66/16 69/1 69/8 71/16 72/3 72/6 72/10 72/13 72/20 73/17 76/24 77/5 77/9 77/16 81/17 81/24 82/16 83/16 84/14 85/24 85/25 86/2 86/9 86/22 89/10 89/14 89/16 89/17 89/21 89/23 90/1 91/1 91/6 93/10 93/11 94/3 95/17 100/9 105/11 107/3 112/20 113/1 113/4 117/16 118/20 120/5 130/15 130/22 134/22 135/16 135/19 136/1 137/13 137/22 140/15 144/5 145/2 146/1 146/12 146/13 146/25 147/9 147/12 147/12 147/16 147/20 148/9 149/10 149/15 158/17 167/7 170/4 170/5 178/22 181/4 185/11 186/23 190/22 191/14 192/10 192/18 195/4 195/10 197/6 197/8 197/9 198/11 199/5 201/9 204/4 204/14 204/15 208/16 208/24 209/7 214/9 215/6 216/25 216/25 217/22 217/23 224/14 224/24 225/14 225/23 229/13 232/13 232/19 233/24 234/3 238/22 239/16 240/16 240/23 241/2 242/23 243/24 247/3 248/24 250/24 252/2 252/24 253/10 255/10 256/19 256/21 257/10 257/13 257/23 262/18 266/14 269/19 270/3 272/11 273/22 277/13
State's [42] 12/16 18/1 18/3 18/11 18/13 18/14 23/10 26/21 33/9 36/21 45/4 54/11 72/3 94/24 106/17 113/1 113/25 120/23 121/25 122/13 123/2 123/9 123/13 124/25 128/20 134/4 134/13 135/14 137/3 140/1 140/24 148/12 150/4 157/25 169/7 175/16 177/11 177/12 199/24 208/15 215/9 272/14
State's perspective [1] 72/3
stated [1] 280/11
statement [13] 109/20 113/4 120/11 120/11 128/12 129/13 143/19 230/6 250/20 251/10 251/17 256/12 257/22
statements [5] 258/19 258/20 264/24 265/23 271/22
states [30] $1 / 1$ 1/12 $1 / 24$ 19/4 19/23 20/2 20/4 20/16 24/3 24/4 29/1 31/25 32/12 43/24 53/10 149/23 170/12 194/16 195/2 198/23 199/2 199/12 213/9 218/11 224/16 257/11 268/11 280/3 280/7 280/17
statewide [11] 9/20 40/1 40/4 40/5 40/7 40/8 89/23 241/13 241/13 241/20 241/21
stating [1] 78/23
statistics [1] 37/24
status [4] 54/18 59/6 159/2 165/5
statute [2] 9/21 242/7
stay [2] 76/16 123/17
STENOGRAPHY [1] 1/21
step [5] 99/10 240/19 240/19 245/21 245/21
stepped [2] 5/7 254/1
steps [12] 77/24 100/6 149/2 162/4 165/20 167/9 186/17 188/20 208/13 245/5 268/11 270/4
Sterling [19] 7/23 55/21 58/2 59/15 61/2 61/11 61/13 61/14 61/19 61/25 62/22 62/24 63/4 63/20 67/8 110/14 220/14 221/18 222/15
Sterling's [1] 72/11

## S

stick [2] 100/2 235/20
stickers [1] 158/12
sticky [1] 218/15
still [26] 8/2 31/15 35/1 45/18 51/13 62/14 77/12 87/22 96/8 97/20 123/9
145/25 147/25 164/1 164/11 215/21
226/25 228/20 230/7 236/17 240/7
256/5 256/10 259/1 267/20 276/21
stock [1] 97/5
stolen [3] 222/14 222/20 272/19
stop [8] 24/8 46/3 97/13 97/18 97/23
102/9 107/10 236/9
stopping [2] 277/17 277/22
straying [1] 153/4
streets [1] 15/12
strike [2] 42/16 187/18
struggling [1] 68/25
student [1] 13/16
stuff [10] 15/6 30/23 72/9 72/15 133/4
150/9 150/25 150/25 196/4 258/7
styles [6] 92/2 92/6 92/7 92/12 92/15 92/16
subject [13] 36/1 38/21 69/13 78/10
86/22 97/17 103/1 103/3 108/2 112/1
112/5 223/5 261/8
subjected [1] 223/5
subjects [1] 48/8
submit [4] 47/3 73/1 206/2 258/25
submitted [4] 47/4 180/15 207/15
207/20
subpoena [3] 146/17 147/7 147/19
subsequent [1] 50/14
subset [3] 41/14 41/15 41/18
substantively [1] 82/15
succeed [1] 12/18
successfully [1] 203/24
such [12] 16/23 57/7 57/8 57/11 67/17 82/3 100/18 109/20 201/10 243/9
243/20 243/21
suddenly [1] 68/8
Suffice [1] 190/22
sufficient [3] 214/18 242/12 269/14
sufficiently [1] 275/5
suggest [3] 57/21 63/1 202/7
suggested [2] 111/25 186/20
suggesting [12] 54/20 87/5 87/11
154/1 154/18 184/9 184/13 184/16
184/18 185/14 220/19 273/20
suggestions [1] 110/6
suggests [2] 19/3 267/5
Suite [1] 205/8
Suite 5.17 [1] 205/8
SullivanStrickler [2] 253/18 254/16
summaries [1] 30/24
summarize [3] 171/12 171/23 173/13 summary [5] 62/21 64/4 192/21 193/7 193/10
summer [6] 51/3 92/18 121/7 121/23 219/1 219/13
superintendent [11] 28/16 100/5 100/10 100/12 100/14 100/17 162/3 164/1 226/1 226/19 227/4
superintendents [11] 89/18 89/22 90/5 90/14 91/2 95/13 99/22 101/6 160/17 175/17 175/25
superuser [3] 190/14 190/16 190/19
supervisor [5] 14/13 21/18 21/19 227/15 227/18
supplement [6] 51/23 54/16 56/1 56/3 56/11 63/24
supplementary [1] 68/1
supplies [2] 88/25 242/13
supply [2] 101/17 186/11
supported [1] 123/22
supportive [3] 124/12 124/16 124/18
suppose [1] 192/4
supposed [15] 24/13 95/8 95/25 96/14 98/7 99/13 100/17 118/18 129/8 169/3 186/18 199/15 226/15 231/14 240/20
supposedly [2] 54/4 60/9
sure [87] 12/23 16/9 20/15 24/25 28/8
30/17 33/5 35/8 35/10 39/18 56/2 61/15 70/1 74/2 75/11 77/5 79/21 82/13 93/15 94/17 98/12 99/19 102/10 103/16 108/5 109/11 115/23 116/16 116/16 123/6 131/7 131/22 134/15 144/22 146/6 147/3 157/3 160/6 161/14 161/16 161/24 167/5 167/5 167/5 168/11 171/15 173/15 178/20 180/5 183/2 183/4 183/5 186/7 188/5 189/5 190/18 191/5 192/2 193/9 196/12 199/1 199/14 199/23 200/9 201/18 201/22 216/11 216/15 216/19 216/21 216/24 217/20 223/1 226/11 226/25 227/5 229/16 234/1 234/17 243/5 247/17 258/2 265/19 267/15 271/18 272/21 276/20
surprise [5] 58/5 64/5 222/2 246/23 246/25
surprises [1] 104/24
surprising [1] 59/1
surrender [1] 29/22
surrounding [1] 147/25
survey [1] 193/22
surveys [1] 20/19
suspect [1] 57/9
Sustained [1] 270/19
switch [2] 21/25 44/22
switching [1] 48/8
sworn [5] 12/1 12/9 105/9 105/19 157/15
system [114] 9/12 15/12 28/5 28/7 45/1 45/1 45/9 45/17 45/19 46/1 46/9 48/23 48/25 49/1 51/8 51/20 66/20 77/3 77/6 81/9 84/24 85/13 109/2 109/6 109/22
109/23 110/2 110/20 111/7 111/18 113/22 113/25 114/8 114/12 114/13 114/14 114/15 114/20 114/21 114/22 115/1 115/10 115/17 115/22 116/1 116/12 117/8 118/11 123/4 127/12 128/4 128/17 128/18 128/19 129/2 129/4 130/1 131/1 131/1 131/5 131/10 132/3 132/11 133/1 133/2 133/13 133/15 133/16 133/19 134/10 142/25 148/2 148/3 149/17 152/3 181/22 182/2 186/2 186/6 186/21 189/1 190/20 191/10 191/15 192/24 194/11 194/15 206/2 206/8 206/10 206/17 214/23 215/14 215/16 215/23 216/17 217/24 222/20 224/13 225/13 238/6 238/6 241/1 241/8 246/11 246/16 252/5 253/20 261/11 261/17 262/1 264/1 272/3 273/13
system's [1] 272/12
systems [36] 50/11 50/13 50/16 75/15

77/15 77/22 106/3 108/7 108/9 109/3 109/16 109/17 109/20 109/21 109/23 113/18 113/19 114/2 114/9 114/11 127/13 128/15 128/21 131/12 149/25 152/7 152/22 155/7 155/10 165/18 181/17 181/21 202/4 207/4 207/12 256/14

## T

tab [35] 136/10 136/17 136/19 141/11
143/13 204/24 205/4 205/5 205/7 206/6
206/23 206/24 207/7 207/17 207/23
254/4 254/5 259/22 259/24 261/5
261/14 261/18 261/19 261/20 261/22
261/24 261/25 262/5 262/24 263/4
263/7 263/21 263/22 265/7 267/23
Tab 1 [5] 204/24 205/4 205/5 205/7 207/17
Tab 10 [2] 141/11 143/13
Tab 13 [2] 259/22 259/24
Tab 14 [4] 261/5 261/14 261/19 261/20
Tab 15 [4] 261/18 261/24 261/25 262/5
Tab 16 [5] 262/24 263/4 263/7 263/21
263/22
Tab 17 [1] 265/7
Tab 3 [1] 136/19
Tab 4 [5] 206/6 206/23 206/24 207/7 207/23
Tab 5 [5] 136/10 136/17 254/4 254/5 267/23
table [4] 101/16 168/25 194/5 212/11 tables [1] 255/3
tabulated [1] 27/17
tabulation [6] 27/21 57/8 64/18 81/20 125/9 212/17
tabulator [14] 80/21 80/25 81/3 81/5 81/24 82/17 82/17 187/25 209/10 213/3 213/6 213/16 214/10 218/13
tabulators [2] 213/10 213/12
tail [1] 107/3
tailor [1] 140/13
take [80] 5/6 8/2 8/6 8/13 8/13 8/16 8/25 10/18 10/20 11/9 22/9 24/14 25/18 26/13 26/15 27/12 29/21 30/13 32/23 36/16 42/20 44/17 52/1 65/14 69/22 71/14 72/10 73/11 74/12 76/19 77/21 77/24 78/13 79/19 80/9 81/19 87/21 88/16 90/6 91/25 103/20 104/10 104/20 113/21 117/21 125/22 151/14 152/14 156/23 164/25 166/6 168/21 168/24 179/2 179/12 179/17 182/11 182/12 186/13 186/18 196/1 204/14 204/15 211/2 211/22 218/6 235/5 235/16 236/7 236/18 238/12 240/16 254/14 258/3 262/5 263/6 263/12 263/15 268/12 275/4
taken [24] 11/17 26/16 33/13 51/6 51/21 54/3 54/8 61/22 65/21 66/17 68/24 104/25 153/21 160/10 164/2 164/17 165/10 170/3 182/14 259/9 266/10 275/20 275/24 276/3
takes [6] 5/19 5/19 79/22 101/22 181/4 274/16
taking [4] 25/25 108/23 116/9 193/21 talk [22] 9/4 9/22 22/1 22/22 24/7 27/4 30/11 44/22 50/25 72/1 84/8 88/8 98/3 99/2 101/4 115/17 170/17 188/25 189/4 199/21 218/11 278/9

## T

talked [27] 70/20 91/21 95/5 102/2 102/12 130/23 146/24 158/24 161/20 163/18 168/17 169/22 174/6 181/3
182/4 182/17 184/5 192/9 195/12
197/13 202/22 203/15 209/10 224/13
245/25 247/14 278/18
talking [26] 39/17 57/16 75/3 82/10
88/25 89/1 100/2 112/24 126/22 127/25
130/11 164/3 166/10 166/11 179/13
188/2 194/1 199/23 217/22 217/25
234/11 254/16 266/2 266/4 273/3
275/21
Tampa [1] 53/17
tampered [1] 191/5
tampering [1] 226/13
tape [6] 165/5 165/6 165/9 173/19 173/21 174/1
tapes [2] 173/19 173/25
target [1] 278/1
targeted [1] 193/16
TAYLOR [1] 3/9
teach [2] 120/17 120/17
team [7] 45/24 45/24 88/14 88/15
118/23 151/1 273/10
teamer [2] 150/23 150/24
teams [1] 118/24
technical [6] 45/24 86/6 125/17 127/18
129/23 210/14
technically [1] 66/13
technician [8] 167/10 245/25 246/4
246/6 246/11 246/15 246/24 247/6
TED [1] $1 / 24$
tell [11] 12/20 18/5 72/8 89/20 96/17
117/13 153/2 157/2 182/7 211/23
232/20
telling [3] 124/13 128/10 166/20 tells [1] 217/19
ten [6] 89/10 89/11 89/12 224/16 224/18 237/19
ten percent [5] 89/10 89/11 89/12
224/16 224/18
tend [1] 184/22
Tenth [1] 33/15
tenure [1] 120/24
term [8] 75/22 80/15 80/21 145/14
150/9 152/19 161/21 179/5
terminology [2] 127/2 239/24
terms [26] 20/20 39/3 39/25 43/14 52/8 53/5 61/3 63/2 66/5 66/9 78/15 82/21
82/21 89/9 89/20 92/16 94/4 97/11
103/21 134/14 134/20 160/16 161/3
168/4 171/8 188/24
test [1] 206/18
tested [1] 139/14
testified [28] 7/2 12/9 58/2 59/15 91/12
95/7 105/19 133/23 134/12 142/20
143/23 144/5 151/7 155/5 157/15
159/17 159/18 162/25 185/17 186/1
191/1 191/4 219/9 223/3 225/3 226/5 232/24 238/23
testify [26] 9/13 10/4 53/6 53/11 53/13 53/17 57/25 59/11 61/12 61/14 61/16 61/17 62/25 66/7 68/22 69/13 70/22 70/25 71/19 78/5 85/13 169/12 189/7 189/8 199/15 250/6
testifying [4] 62/19 78/8 169/3 169/4
testimony [39] 7/15 10/9 35/6 50/24 51/9 52/24 52/25 53/3 58/3 58/25 61/2 61/5 61/16 66/21 70/8 70/15 72/16 79/7 85/1 85/4 103/7 103/12 121/17 125/21 131/21 154/12 154/13 156/10 165/25 169/10 186/1 196/20 215/23 223/13 227/6 238/22 238/25 251/6 280/12 testing [20] 48/23 76/18 76/20 77/1 139/23 166/8 167/8 204/12 205/10 205/13 206/17 207/20 207/21 208/3 208/6 213/11 227/3 228/24 229/22 233/19
Texas [1] 127/14
text [3] 138/25 148/25 264/9
than [33] 7/16 12/22 33/19 40/2 40/9 41/10 46/11 57/16 64/7 69/17 70/24 73/9 73/13 93/8 93/24 98/8 109/13 118/16 120/25 125/16 152/22 162/9 201/1 214/15 217/24 247/1 252/13 257/1 258/20 264/18 268/25 274/13 274/17
thank [40] 11/20 31/17 35/17 41/23 44/17 44/20 73/24 102/23 104/15 119/17 119/21 120/3 121/19 122/11 135/7 148/17 148/23 151/4 152/1 155/2 155/12 155/15 155/18 155/23 156/11 156/12 159/5 172/23 182/10 182/23 183/22 189/22 217/3 218/9 237/3 251/23 258/4 267/15 276/14 279/2
Thanks [1] 119/22
that [1687]
that's [36] 9/18 34/23 36/1 85/17 88/2 100/11 103/4 106/12 113/13 119/14 120/3 122/10 130/7 150/13 169/17 169/20 182/24 185/4 189/3 200/10 200/19 200/23 203/14 214/17 215/17 231/4 234/25 236/13 237/5 249/8 250/15 259/6 266/11 275/16 277/2 278/7
their [138] 20/3 20/20 22/8 22/9 23/2 23/4 23/4 23/4 23/5 23/5 25/13 26/9 26/12 26/12 26/13 26/24 27/13 29/9 29/12 30/3 39/15 42/7 42/8 42/8 42/12 42/12 42/13 42/13 42/21 43/19 44/7 46/10 46/24 46/24 54/5 55/6 56/2 56/3 57/15 57/15 61/13 64/8 67/6 67/11 68/14 79/14 83/2 83/4 83/5 83/14 83/22 86/3 86/3 88/12 88/17 88/22 89/12 90/7 90/8 90/15 90/22 90/23 90/24 92/10 92/11 95/10 95/11 95/14 95/19 95/20 95/21 96/4 96/6 96/7 96/8 96/13 96/14 96/16 96/16 96/17 100/19 106/23 110/10 116/6 116/20 116/22 117/18 118/13 118/23 123/6 143/6 145/24 152/16 160/4 161/11 162/3 163/1 164/1 164/15 164/25 167/8 168/14 168/21 168/23 172/3 172/3 172/10 172/10 173/21 175/25 176/1 184/19 187/18 187/20 187/23 188/3 198/7 216/19 216/23 217/20 217/22 217/23 217/23 218/5 227/4 240/17 242/14 242/21 244/11 244/16 255/15 256/21 257/2 272/18 272/23 273/23 274/9 276/3 them [90] 10/18 20/17 20/17 20/22 24/14 24/15 25/2 25/5 25/11 25/23 26/14 26/15 27/5 29/24 30/3 35/24 36/5 36/6 43/14 51/16 51/22 59/11 60/10 63/19 65/19 68/23 74/14 85/10 90/6

95/14 95/18 96/1 98/13 98/13 98/18 109/19 110/16 114/6 115/14 115/15 116/7 117/4 117/22 120/17 120/18 120/20 123/19 127/16 128/22 129/20 135/13 136/6 137/14 137/16 147/17 150/15 150/20 153/2 160/8 162/14 165/16 168/23 168/24 169/13 171/21 176/1 176/1 176/6 177/1 177/23 189/20 192/10 193/18 196/7 198/8 198/16 201/24 218/6 218/6 218/16 226/19 226/20 233/24 244/1 245/2 245/3 249/11 253/19 268/7 276/8
themselves [5] 101/5 109/20 125/9 159/23 171/2
then [171] 5/12 6/8 6/15 7/9 7/22 10/21 11/13 13/1 14/18 15/19 15/21 16/1 18/7 18/19 20/22 22/10 22/15 25/14 26/12 28/9 28/11 28/14 28/19 29/13 29/20 29/21 29/25 30/1 30/3 30/19 31/5 32/16 35/18 38/2 38/8 42/13 46/19 47/7 47/19 47/23 52/11 55/5 56/15 58/7 58/12 60/25 65/15 67/8 67/10 69/13 70/15 73/13 76/24 83/4 90/4 90/5 90/6 90/23 93/21 95/22 96/7 96/17 96/19 97/2 97/18 97/22 98/22 99/12 99/17 100/5 100/24 101/1 101/20 101/20 103/25 106/3 107/3 107/4 108/11 108/13 111/4 112/9 112/24 113/7 113/7 114/3 114/16 116/22 118/16 127/15 135/5 139/17 147/13 152/19 153/10 153/12 159/13 160/8 160/8 160/19 160/24 161/12 161/18 162/2 162/7 163/25 164/16 165/1 165/10 165/25 166/3 166/7 166/8 167/12 168/12 168/12 168/14 168/18 168/24 171/17 172/2 172/4 174/2 174/13 174/16 175/12 178/8 178/9 182/5 185/8 187/1 189/3 189/7 189/16 192/20 193/6 203/6 203/10 212/17 213/18 216/13 216/22 218/6 218/7 220/25 221/18 223/25 224/3 225/17 226/18 228/2 229/7 231/13 236/5 240/16 241/21 242/6 245/19 251/11 255/25 256/2 260/13 261/20 262/3 263/3 273/9 274/1 275/22 277/13 277/22 278/3
then-Secretary [1] 107/3
theoretically [1] 62/17
theory [1] 179/25
there [302]
there's [10] 46/8 75/6 160/18 176/18 187/22 193/7 209/13 212/17 226/12 237/22
thereby [1] 279/21
therein [2] 59/4 280/11
these [42] 7/19 10/11 30/24 30/24 32/9 34/7 34/11 34/13 36/12 39/2 41/22 50/8 50/25 52/25 54/2 54/7 59/11 59/24 60/11 61/3 63/13 67/2 67/22 70/6 74/21 77/2 80/1 95/6 127/10 130/25 144/1 147/1 175/20 177/21 177/21 183/5 195/21 228/2 242/18 255/14 268/12 272/7
they [415]
they'Il [1] 28/8
thing [39] 7/21 9/6 10/22 11/3 26/7 28/8 30/22 33/17 41/5 41/6 41/8 57/16 61/17 71/13 71/15 75/6 77/20 115/14 118/17 126/22 129/16 133/11 142/14
thing... [16] 144/25 157/7 167/19 174/21 177/8 186/20 192/23 202/11 228/22 229/18 229/19 248/14 263/9 264/8 276/24 278/14
things [58] 7/19 10/7 26/3 30/25 33/7 36/3 48/15 48/22 53/2 53/7 63/13 63/17 63/25 67/12 71/17 71/23 80/2 85/5 89/1 90/25 93/17 93/22 98/21 110/7 116/4 116/24 117/6 118/20 124/10 124/12 129/21 129/24 135/24 140/11 144/1 144/20 148/20 152/16 152/25 154/11 186/6 186/8 186/17 192/13 194/16 195/1 195/3 195/8 203/20 203/24 232/17 235/11 241/14 246/10 250/8 273/21 274/14 276/20
think [151] 8/5 23/20 32/22 33/3 40/24 41/7 41/25 42/19 45/9 46/8 52/8 52/12 52/22 52/23 55/2 59/4 59/7 59/9 59/11 59/16 60/23 61/20 63/12 65/25 66/13
70/7 70/9 70/23 71/9 71/12 71/17 71/25 72/9 72/10 72/15 72/20 73/8 73/20 74/25 75/6 78/15 78/22 79/3 79/14 79/14 82/21 85/3 90/21 93/7 97/8 97/19 97/20 104/10 104/24 108/14 110/18 110/24 111/23 112/6 112/6 112/12 116/7 116/24 119/14 120/2 120/4 121/10 121/11 122/19 122/21 124/8 124/17 126/13 127/18 128/13 130/4 130/17 131/2 132/22 133/7 135/1 135/11 138/9 140/11 141/19 141/21 142/25 144/1 144/8 147/8 147/16 147/25 148/5 148/10 151/22 151/25 153/3 153/17 161/1 163/16 169/9 181/22 182/1 182/1 182/2 182/5 182/6 184/3 189/15 189/23 192/24 199/25 200/10 201/7 201/12 201/22 214/17 215/17 215/20 216/10 218/3 229/19 229/20 234/7 235/5 235/10 235/25 236/3 236/5 236/15 236/20 237/16 241/14 244/15 244/18 248/6 255/7 261/24 266/1 267/10 267/13 267/21 272/25 273/17 274/7 274/7 274/16 275/12 277/25 278/16 279/6
thinks [1] 169/4
third [14] 50/7 51/2 55/19 56/22 139/4 210/8 242/2 254/9 254/10 254/20
260/22 264/24 265/23 266/21
this [363]
those [81] 6/9 6/11 7/23 13/23 16/5 19/12 19/17 19/24 28/14 29/6 44/18 52/6 67/17 67/22 75/21 80/24 82/8 83/3 89/13 90/2 90/3 90/24 92/11 94/8 99/6 101/20 106/15 109/23 111/10 114/1 114/2 115/23 117/7 118/24 128/15 129/6 133/5 145/13 147/10 147/10 147/14 151/16 162/16 164/15 164/19 167/13 167/13 175/5 176/21 176/23 177/15 177/24 178/8 180/1 183/10 183/13 183/13 183/16 186/12 189/15 192/16 192/18 193/15 193/19 195/2 203/19 204/12 221/15 221/17 221/24 222/4 222/15 222/16 233/22 234/15 248/24 249/11 258/21 269/15 279/3 279/8
though [10] 41/7 59/25 78/15 78/16 113/22 148/1 163/18 165/25 249/5

## 266/24

thought [21] 5/24 35/13 38/20 71/7 75/3 79/4 111/2 117/1 120/15 123/12 135/16 141/8 158/12 163/13 189/9 189/11 189/12 269/20 275/11 275/11 276/16
thousand [2] 81/22 92/14
thread [3] 229/25 264/4 266/25
threat [6] 134/1 134/1 140/2 140/3 140/9 140/20
threats [5] 140/23 141/9 239/7 239/10 239/24
three [20] 14/7 14/15 23/24 29/13 34/3 92/11 112/9 117/24 139/1 161/18 167/3 177/8 184/2 203/19 203/23 221/20 239/9 243/16 248/19 272/3
three days [1] 29/13
three months [2] 14/7 112/9
three weeks [2] 23/24 117/24
three-dimensional [1] 167/3
threshold [1] 239/14
through [59] 5/12 5/25 6/1 22/10 23/5 27/19 28/19 31/4 42/14 47/9 49/2 50/8 55/5 56/10 58/5 64/13 66/4 71/20 72/7 72/18 76/4 76/8 76/17 76/24 77/9 85/8 96/4 96/11 104/6 104/10 107/4 108/2 113/22 117/2 127/17 158/1 158/3 158/7 164/11 165/8 168/15 168/15 170/16 186/15 188/19 189/2 191/17 193/2 203/11 204/3 204/8 204/15 204/18 206/4 227/3 229/21 231/10 239/19 279/7
throughout [1] 59/7
tie [2] 231/8 231/9
ties [1] 231/22
time [128] 5/24 7/6 11/6 11/16 24/3 24/4 28/14 31/5 46/15 47/6 60/25 64/7 66/5 66/13 66/14 68/6 68/20 69/2 72/17 72/17 73/1 73/3 74/6 74/8 75/13 76/3 77/13 78/25 79/22 80/6 83/6 84/9 86/1 87/15 97/13 97/20 97/25 98/3 98/4 98/6 101/25 104/11 107/15 108/22 109/12 109/17 110/20 111/7 112/25 113/2 115/16 116/19 116/19 116/24 117/6 118/5 118/15 119/18 120/5 120/22 121/1 121/24 122/10 122/14 122/19 122/23 123/2 123/8 123/13 123/18 125/18 127/20 128/2 130/3 137/4 137/21 137/24 140/17 141/8 155/18 155/23 156/1 156/4 159/12 161/16 170/4 170/19 170/22 178/8 178/12 180/18 182/8 182/17 185/8 190/1 190/2 192/24 193/1 193/9 193/10 195/5 195/6 204/5 208/15 208/19 209/9 211/1 217/14 219/8 220/4 226/1 235/12 235/21 250/23 251/14 255/10 258/7 260/5 260/22 263/24 265/14 267/10 271/9 274/13 274/16 276/13 277/24 278/1
time-sensitive [1] 182/17
timeline [1] $72 / 18$
times [8] 16/7 111/21 113/18 130/13 130/16 177/9 177/9 247/24
timing [4] 124/15 130/2 188/1 278/4 tiny [1] 279/6
tired [2] 116/9 183/2
title [4] 14/17 17/10 19/3 50/1
TLC [1] 110/8
today [17] 6/4 7/6 8/21 8/23 45/18 51/13 62/18 134/10 155/18 185/14 187/9 191/25 194/4 211/1 235/23 276/22 278/19
together [3] 99/11 99/16 141/2
told [2] 8/22 253/2
Tom [2] 221/20 265/10
tomorrow [14] 6/15 6/17 7/7 8/13
158/15 182/20 235/6 235/7 236/6
236/16 278/2 278/10 278/13 279/11
tonight [1] 279/15
tons [1] 140/21
Tony [14] 138/4 209/24 211/14 223/15
227/10 228/8 229/18 230/2 237/9 237/19 238/15 249/15 250/4 250/11 too [6] 6/6 7/20 82/9 83/8 189/4 189/11 took [9] 5/16 66/11 68/9 68/22 110/15 117/24 209/1 209/4 255/20
top [22] 5/22 9/20 10/6 32/4 33/8 37/10 37/10 40/23 108/10 139/1 210/9 212/23 224/3 232/2 238/19 239/6 244/5 254/20 256/17 257/17 263/18 271/21
topic [7] 21/7 131/21 189/1 213/3
222/7 222/10 253/15
topics [3] 44/22 222/5 241/4
torture [1] 103/5
total [7] 34/8 34/8 38/6 38/16 107/8 107/21 120/25
totally [4] 75/4 113/8 128/21 156/8 TOTENBERG [1] 1/11
touch [15] 171/25 172/2 172/15 174/7 174/9 174/10 174/15 174/17 174/22 175/2 175/17 190/14 190/16 244/24 245/6
touching [1] 114/5
tough [1] 262/3
toured [1] 112/20
towards [3] 76/2 109/12 193/16
track [3] 13/6 97/4 144/15
tracked [1] 137/18
trade [1] 273/3
train [12] 89/18 90/6 90/6 90/8 90/22
90/24 107/23 175/25 176/1 216/13
216/20 240/17
trained [3] 101/6 101/9 160/17
training [19] 13/15 89/20 90/13 90/14
90/15 90/24 90/25 91/1 95/12 95/16
99/23 100/7 100/16 168/3 171/6 175/17
177/12 227/9 231/22
trainings [1] 89/24
transcript [9] $1 / 11 / 5$ 1/7 $1 / 8$ 1/10 $1 / 22$
46/8 126/18 280/9
transcripts [1] $1 / 2$
transfer [1] 48/3
transition [2] 115/10 130/25
transitioned [2] 47/11 116/18
translation [2] 83/9 217/12
transmission [1] 134/21
transporting [2] 178/7 178/8
travel [1] 6/17
traveling [1] 7/10
treatments [3] 124/11 151/11 152/23
Triage [2] 149/20 149/22
trial [8] 1/10 6/1 31/14 32/17 35/19
37/3 38/9 54/2
tried [3] 83/1 83/2 170/14
trigger [1] 59/23
trips [1] 119/18

## $T$

troubled [1] 71/15
troubling [4] 68/5 68/17 68/19 69/11
true [19] 32/10 36/20 36/25 64/13
107/17 135/11 153/23 158/8 216/8
232/11 255/12 264/12 266/1 267/3
273/14 273/22 274/15 274/15 280/9
truly [2] 69/10 108/24
trust [1] 29/1
trusting [1] 83/13
TrustPoint [4] 106/22 112/16 113/2 123/18
truth [13] 143/3 228/19 228/21 230/6 254/24 258/21 259/2 264/25 265/25 266/12 266/22 271/23 274/13
try [12] 17/1 30/3 36/15 76/8 81/3 81/8 87/15 134/11 214/8 235/17 235/23 275/11
trying [31] 10/4 24/19 24/23 25/22 34/10 56/13 56/18 58/20 69/1 72/18 74/18 75/10 93/9 114/6 122/24 123/2 123/17 130/7 132/22 150/24 153/20
201/7 205/2 215/21 216/4 216/8 217/12
235/21 257/4 259/15 278/24
Tucker [5] 263/19 263/24 265/10 266/5 266/13
Tuesday [3] 8/4 8/7 198/8
turn [11] 83/10 95/14 101/21 109/1
136/10 138/25 141/10 148/25 154/15
166/17 174/25
turned [3] 82/7 116/7 161/6
TURNER [1] 1/24
turnout [13] 34/2 34/9 37/9 37/16
37/18 37/18 37/24 38/6 38/6 38/13
38/16 39/25 40/1
turns [1] 101/22
two [29] 26/3 34/2 41/22 43/23 53/2
53/4 92/12 107/7 117/4 117/24 128/20
134/7 136/6 154/11 161/16 162/18
165/20 179/12 207/24 227/22 231/4
234/13 236/19 238/20 245/10 245/19
264/7 273/21 276/19
two days [1] 231/4
two hours [1] 236/19
two seconds [1] 179/12
two years [2] 107/7 207/24
type [10] 15/6 41/20 70/6 70/7 102/14 142/11 145/8 146/3 148/15 150/25
types [1] 108/7
typical [2] 74/25 148/14
typically [5] 40/1 40/9 113/14 168/22 170/21
TYSON [4] 3/7 4/9 137/25 278/18
U
U.S [4] 29/4 106/1 108/25 194/15

Uh [3] 133/25 137/2 137/11
Uh-huh [3] 133/25 137/2 137/11
ultimately [3] 67/4 73/13 203/1
unable [1] 54/6
unanimously [2] 206/15 207/24
unauthorized [5] 216/24 219/10
219/15 255/22 255/25
uncommon [2] 82/11 217/18
under [22] 51/24 53/16 55/20 56/3
57/14 69/24 85/7 120/10 121/4 136/17
137/6 139/4 139/8 146/8 147/22 207/7

212/14 226/14 242/6 253/11 261/24 278/12
undergo [1] 206/3
underlined [1] 116/4
underlying [1] 70/5
underpinning [1] 117/5
underpinnings [1] 131/14
understand [55] 24/23 25/23 35/1 35/3
41/7 41/7 43/14 54/25 58/13 58/14
58/21 60/13 68/12 82/15 83/11 103/19
114/6 144/10 152/5 156/8 165/20
165/24 190/12 190/18 191/22 191/23
193/14 197/6 197/15 200/2 201/3
202/11 203/3 203/7 209/13 213/24
214/1 214/9 214/20 214/21 215/21
216/4 230/16 230/22 244/14 251/20 252/6 252/11 253/25 261/15 262/8 268/18 273/11 275/19 275/24
understanding [35] 70/9 79/2 80/25
82/18 84/22 85/3 85/11 86/4 86/25 87/4
87/4 87/7 87/12 88/19 112/22 139/14
191/12 203/9 203/14 206/1 207/14
209/3 210/17 226/21 243/24 246/15
246/20 247/1 249/7 249/10 249/10
253/7 256/23 257/22 275/6
understood [12] 17/3 58/22 68/11
82/13 87/17 124/9 124/10 132/19
156/11 215/12 273/18 277/16
undertake [1] 140/2
undertaken [1] 84/14
undertaking [1] 270/4
undervotes [1] 17/1
undetected [1] 240/2
unequivocally [1] 215/25
Unfortunately [1] 146/21
unified [4] 213/19 214/10 217/5 218/12
uniform [2] 29/11 170/22
uniformed [3] 261/11 261/17 262/1
unify [8] 80/15 80/21 81/24 82/17
82/17 209/10 213/3 213/6
unique [11] 10/9 81/1 81/9 81/25 82/4 82/8 82/22 83/3 92/8 195/7 213/16
unit [1] 139/17
UNITED [14] 1/1 1/12 1/24 29/1 31/25
32/12 43/24 53/10 198/23 199/2 199/12 280/3 280/7 280/17
units [2] 243/8 243/19
universe [1] 278/11
University [4] 7/11 12/25 13/10 14/6
unlawful [2] 179/22 180/1
unlimited [1] 247/23
unlocked [1] 168/13
unmitigated [4] 152/10 153/7 154/2
154/20
unorthodox [1] 103/24
unreliable [1] 184/14
until [12] 29/13 47/10 92/19 92/21
93/20 93/21 96/10 97/16 121/24 156/12
168/1 235/2
unusual [2] 92/23 118/13
UOCAVA [1] 29/12
up [123] 5/6 6/4 8/25 10/18 10/20 15/8 15/18 16/21 16/22 23/2 23/3 24/17 25/3 25/8 25/10 26/9 28/1 28/4 39/24 40/13 40/14 40/15 41/4 41/4 41/9 41/15 42/11 42/17 43/7 46/23 47/14 47/15 51/22 54/12 55/24 59/10 60/5 63/21 76/1
76/20 79/8 80/1 83/3 83/12 85/21 92/19

93/20 93/21 95/8 98/21 98/23 99/3 99/14 99/15 99/17 101/6 101/15 103/25 106/23 110/16 113/8 117/21 117/21 123/25 124/12 129/15 135/12 138/4 140/9 140/16 141/6 145/9 147/21 152/24 156/20 156/24 157/4 160/6 160/10 160/21 161/2 161/11 164/22 166/16 167/18 168/12 171/5 171/18 172/6 173/14 173/23 176/3 176/18 177/19 179/4 182/12 182/18 186/2 186/18 186/22 187/5 187/5 187/13 200/8 211/14 223/15 224/3 227/10 228/8 229/18 230/2 231/21 235/3 235/5 237/9 244/2 245/14 248/9 248/25 256/14 263/10 277/18 278/22 upcoming [2] 56/7 67/19 update [14] 56/16 62/16 62/17 67/11 68/21 68/23 76/17 77/13 77/19 94/24 208/20 209/2 250/7 259/25
updated [3] 47/19 57/23 58/17
updates [3] 50/12 50/17 69/5
updating [1] 113/18
upgrade [4] 77/24 78/1 80/5 202/22
upgraded [1] 257/12
upgrades [3] 75/15 75/18 75/21
uphold [1] 88/21
uplift [1] 117/5
upload [2] 79/19 260/16
uploaded [1] 239/19
uploads [2] 260/9 260/23
upon [3] 5/10 100/17 231/14
ups [1] 62/23
us [28] 5/24 18/5 52/2 54/10 62/24 64/2
67/25 83/3 104/4 111/24 117/24 117/25 128/10 144/18 144/23 144/25 145/11 145/12 150/16 155/20 159/3 194/19 194/22 216/20 216/20 221/6 258/24 277/13
usage [1] 38/21
USB [10] 134/18 135/10 135/17 135/19 135/23 136/2 137/7 137/14 144/15 145/18
USBs [2] 135/13 135/13
use [66] 15/23 16/1 16/2 19/5 22/13 27/12 31/1 34/1 34/3 45/10 45/24 46/4 46/9 46/15 46/21 47/6 47/9 52/11 64/15 81/8 83/13 90/20 94/17 98/12 100/19 100/23 101/11 101/13 102/14 122/18 127/2 128/22 137/17 140/6 158/13 160/24 166/8 167/25 170/13 172/10 173/19 173/20 174/15 174/17 175/11 175/13 175/14 176/1 176/1 176/5 184/9 192/5 204/2 212/4 213/19 217/5 218/4 226/2 226/23 227/4 231/16 231/16 241/5 247/24 272/12 273/2
used [60] 15/20 42/3 45/8 45/11 45/18 45/19 46/6 46/10 46/15 49/5 49/10 83/21 83/22 91/16 101/1 109/17 123/4 126/1 128/17 129/17 141/2 162/14 167/15 168/13 169/24 169/25 173/15 174/10 175/21 175/24 176/11 176/24 178/5 178/6 178/7 181/14 183/7 190/7 190/9 190/20 205/13 206/16 207/4 207/11 212/4 220/6 225/9 225/22 226/6 226/15 227/5 243/8 246/11 246/16 247/21 255/23 271/13 272/11 273/2 275/20
useful [1] 213/11

## U

user [7] 28/4 117/17 211/24 212/3 218/4 276/17 276/18
users [1] 113/20
uses [6] 81/2 137/7 168/20 177/1 241/1 248/23
using [25] 33/16 41/12 44/10 44/14 45/5 47/11 53/5 57/23 60/1 81/5 81/10 83/4 101/3 135/19 160/20 181/12
186/18 188/11 197/21 205/22 210/9
213/11 225/4 228/20 230/7
usually [2] 120/16 145/7
utilize [3] 20/17 26/23 82/24
utilized [2] 111/7 111/18
utilizes [1] 27/9
utilizing [1] 82/3
V
vague [1] 64/8
validate [1] 129/25
validating [1] 245/3
validation [1] 51/12
value [2] 148/21 148/22
variety [4] 70/23 147/6 241/4 279/4
various [3] 59/7 148/20 149/2
vast [1] 200/13
veering [1] 130/4
vendor [11] 110/9 115/22 116/9 116/11
118/9 118/10 125/11 136/4 155/6
155/10 204/18
vendor's [1] 45/24
verification [1] 55/21
verified [3] 55/20 164/16 164/19
verify [10] 28/5 64/16 99/12 101/13
101/17 101/24 101/25 174/16 175/11 178/10
verifying [2] 98/22 99/10
version [10] 76/3 76/4 76/21 76/24
136/19 203/5 203/6 208/20 212/8
268/24
versions [1] 50/15
versus [1] 40/5
very [30] 6/7 25/4 34/20 60/19 64/8
68/19 68/19 70/2 70/9 71/14 73/21
104/15 118/20 119/22 124/11 124/16
144/24 156/13 182/7 185/23 193/15
199/12 202/16 202/18 213/11 235/18
251/3 256/8 278/16 279/4
via [2] 134/17 224/6
vice [1] 20/8
video [6] 209/24 210/18 210/20 210/22
210/23 211/11
videotape [4] 209/25 211/3 249/16 250/12
view [10] 27/2 83/8 124/5 133/23
135/22 215/15 216/10 217/2 229/12 252/12
viewed [1] 67/7
views [1] 72/14
VINCENT [1] 3/3
violation [5] 230/20 231/1 266/3
266/12 266/20
Virginia [1] 127/17
Virtually [1] 85/24
virtue [3] 53/14 54/4 85/6
visible [1] 248/15
visit [4] 130/10 130/12 130/14 255/10
visits [1] 130/25
voir [1] 112/2
volume [3] 1/10 66/23 94/8
voluntarily [1] 10/10
voluntary [4] 48/25 77/3 206/7 206/10
volunteer [1] 108/2
VON [1] 2/10
vote [67] 15/18 16/22 16/23 20/1 22/5
22/7 22/16 22/19 22/24 24/17 29/18
29/21 29/23 30/3 30/4 39/13 40/13
40/14 40/15 41/4 41/9 41/9 41/12 41/16
42/5 42/11 42/25 99/9 119/8 160/4
161/7 179/5 179/7 179/15 179/21
179/22 179/25 180/5 180/5 180/9
180/16 180/19 180/20 184/19 185/2
185/12 187/15 188/20 197/3 198/8
198/12 198/16 198/17 198/23 199/3
199/11 199/12 200/14 200/14 200/18
202/8 207/4 224/18 244/11 244/15 244/16 247/24
voted [9] 40/15 41/12 44/13 44/14 96/3 96/10 185/2 197/23 264/8
voter [122] 15/12 15/16 15/18 16/15 17/2 19/25 20/4 22/6 22/7 22/24 23/2 23/3 23/6 24/16 25/13 25/22 26/4 26/7 26/10 26/16 26/22 26/23 26/23 26/25 27/6 27/9 28/2 28/5 28/7 28/9 29/1 29/3 29/8 29/16 29/19 29/20 30/6 30/8 39/25 44/25 45/1 45/9 45/10 45/16 46/9 46/10 46/20 46/22 46/23 46/23 46/24 47/3 47/7 47/12 47/15 47/18 47/23 47/24 47/25 74/25 89/25 92/9 92/10 95/20 96/13 96/16 96/20 96/25 99/21 109/21 114/14 114/15 114/19 114/25 115/17 115/22 116/1 116/12 117/8 119/6 125/16 140/17 142/24 159/25 160/4 160/8 160/8 160/9 160/15 160/19 160/22 168/19 168/20 168/21 169/24 170/2 176/18 182/2 182/7 184/18 184/23 187/10 187/18 187/20 187/22 188/3 188/9 188/20 190/14 191/10 191/15 192/7 196/1 197/3 197/22 243/25 247/13 247/21 247/24 264/14 266/9 266/18
voter's [5] 28/4 28/10 160/21 168/17 180/20
voterfraudemailalerts [1] 264/5
voters [57] 15/19 15/23 15/25 16/4
22/2 22/5 22/16 22/16 22/19 25/14 28/20 28/22 29/11 42/5 43/15 43/19 43/21 44/7 44/9 44/9 44/10 44/13 46/1 47/8 64/16 80/11 89/12 95/9 95/11 95/14 95/19 99/8 101/2 168/14 171/17 176/12 176/13 185/1 185/11 185/18 185/23 187/15 196/6 196/10 196/13 198/23 199/2 199/11 199/12 200/13 200/18 201/10 202/7 224/17 224/18 244/10 244/15
votes [13] 34/12 34/13 34/21 34/22
34/22 41/19 64/17 125/9 137/9 187/10 188/11 198/7 198/14
voting [173] 15/10 15/16 17/17 22/1 22/21 22/22 22/24 23/1 23/6 23/7 23/17 23/18 23/22 23/23 24/16 24/22 25/1 25/3 25/7 26/16 29/19 33/24 34/8 34/9 34/11 34/12 34/14 34/15 34/17 34/18 37/9 37/10 37/12 37/25 38/12 38/14 39/3 40/12 40/14 40/16 41/2 41/5 41/9

41/13 41/15 41/19 41/20 41/21 42/2
42/2 42/3 42/4 44/8 44/10 48/23 48/24
48/25 50/11 50/13 50/16 57/6 57/6 58/6 74/19 74/19 74/24 75/1 75/1 75/15 75/19 77/3 77/6 77/22 82/6 84/14 86/10 86/22 88/13 88/25 89/4 89/6 90/9 91/17 93/17 95/4 100/1 100/25 109/20 114/8 114/11 114/12 118/4 124/24 125/2 125/9 131/1 131/1 148/2 149/17 152/3 161/19 165/13 165/18 168/18 168/19 170/6 170/9 170/10 170/13 170/14 170/22 174/2 187/7 187/16 187/21 187/22 188/9 188/20 188/22 189/1 194/11 194/15 194/20 196/2 197/1 197/13 197/17 198/1 198/3 198/7 199/2 199/6 201/10 201/11 201/13 201/13 201/15 202/4 206/1 206/7 206/10 206/17 207/4 207/12 211/24 212/4 219/15 222/20 223/4 224/13 225/6 225/9 225/23 226/5 226/9 226/23 231/6 231/7 232/25 233/6 242/12 243/8 243/19 243/21 244/1 247/23 254/17 256/21 261/11 261/17 262/1 264/1 272/13
vs [1] $1 / 5$
VSTL [1] 206/18
vulnerabilities [21] 50/14 51/1 51/7 51/19 54/2 54/7 59/20 63/10 66/19 70/3 70/6 115/25 117/8 152/10 153/7 154/2 154/19 203/8 239/19 268/10 268/13
vulnerability [12] 49/13 55/4 70/7
70/11 140/8 142/23 153/22 218/23
223/23 224/4 224/6 268/6
VVSG [11] 205/10 205/20 205/25
206/10 206/15 206/16 207/3 207/11
207/24 208/2 208/5
VVSG 1 [2] 208/2 208/5

## W

Wagoner [1] 221/20
wait [3] 35/11 55/12 177/9
waiting [2] 156/13 158/23
waived [1] 143/7
walk [7] 27/19 50/8 58/5 72/7 72/18
164/11 244/11
walked [2] 186/15 189/2
walking [1] 64/23
walks [2] 188/19 240/18
wall [1] 106/13
want [65] 10/14 11/21 24/9 25/13 29/2 29/17 35/6 35/8 35/23 37/7 39/12 53/21 56/2 61/14 63/3 68/13 69/9 69/11 71/13 71/15 71/18 71/19 72/2 76/22 79/4 79/9 87/20 103/4 103/14 109/1 120/19 120/20 122/25 130/10 140/16 140/17 145/22 148/8 148/9 152/14 153/15 156/23 165/5 183/4 183/20 192/3 193/20 194/18 195/3 199/21 199/22 202/10 229/19 229/21 239/2 241/13 247/25 255/16 256/24 260/16 266/10 270/1 277/12 277/17 279/9
wanted [14] 8/11 11/16 46/4 56/8 84/5 97/14 116/7 124/22 150/15 150/21
173/3 200/16 250/9 279/6
wanting [1] 217/8
wants [5] 42/20 59/12 62/24 85/9 196/20
war [1] 126/22

## W

warehouse [3] 15/9 176/1 176/2 warned [5] 239/12 239/18 239/20 240/1 240/3
warning [1] 274/9
warranted [1] 123/15
was [439]
wasn't [10] 63/21 71/8 118/19 126/2
126/3 128/14 129/13 201/1 205/19 208/14
water [2] 147/22 226/2
Watson [3] 219/8 230/10 232/7
way [61] 15/8 25/8 30/18 47/16 47/16 50/21 51/16 58/1 60/3 63/23 68/15 68/15 69/21 75/14 78/14 81/13 82/10 87/22 98/14 100/19 102/16 107/11 112/23 116/20 123/16 123/17 140/10 140/17 141/4 141/7 142/13 154/7 163/25 168/25 184/9 184/10 187/23 189/23 197/13 197/17 197/22 199/13 200/10 209/14 209/21 211/5 216/10 217/2 218/18 219/23 232/21 234/3 234/5 247/15 248/9 249/1 274/7 274/17 274/19 275/17 275/22
ways [8] 16/23 63/19 74/24 75/10 218/5 249/3 249/11 274/18

## we [473]

we'll [31] 6/5 6/8 6/17 6/18 9/3 10/18 11/17 11/18 11/19 36/15 43/1 50/7 100/2 103/6 104/9 117/22 180/7 186/16 201/4 239/3 240/15 241/12 255/1 259/16 262/4 263/15 267/16 278/3 278/5 278/9 278/19
we're [60] 6/11 7/18 8/6 8/9 10/16 21/25 32/25 33/5 33/16 33/18 34/1 50/19 56/1 57/9 63/23 64/7 64/23 68/8 71/17 71/25 73/3 77/11 77/12 78/22 79/10 80/3 94/17 103/2 103/6 103/13 103/25 104/2 118/18 124/13 158/12 164/11 173/1 179/8 179/13 187/24 191/20 199/17 199/23 200/17 204/13 205/2 216/16 216/22 228/20 245/23 254/22 258/10 263/9 266/21 267/2 271/22 276/24 277/22 278/16 278/23 we've [10] 55/6 60/6 84/9 97/11 117/17 152/21 158/5 170/16 227/9 266/8
webinar [2] 241/20 241/21
webinars [1] 89/23
website [6] 26/20 26/20 26/21 30/25 33/9 36/21
wedded [1] 9/8
weeded [1] 118/24
week [6] 5/10 23/25 93/19 113/7
113/15 113/16
weeks [3] 23/24 117/24 209/8
WEIGEL [1] $3 / 8$
weigh [1] 214/4
weighed [1] 153/23
weight [1] 118/23
WEINHARDT [1] 2/6
WELCH [3] 1/23 280/6 280/16
welcome [3] 155/17 251/14 251/21
well [90] 9/1 9/15 10/3 11/1 13/19
18/18 20/25 23/20 25/14 31/3 32/9 33/1 34/7 34/24 35/5 36/25 39/10 39/23 40/16 42/23 48/22 51/25 54/15 58/13 59/16 60/6 61/1 61/24 63/14 64/12

64/22 66/23 68/12 68/23 75/14 78/10 81/12 85/22 91/21 91/22 96/5 103/2 104/9 105/14 111/1 112/6 112/21 114/12 121/16 123/3 131/11 135/3 139/16 140/6 145/10 147/3 148/5 148/18 153/12 155/3 155/22 156/5 171/11 174/21 177/2 179/18 179/25 189/15 199/20 200/19 210/21 215/3 215/8 215/20 223/11 230/19 236/2 236/24 238/12 245/7 256/12 258/10 258/11 259/1 266/10 266/18 274/6 275/9 277/6 277/22
Well-played [1] 39/10
Wenke [1] 237/22
went [22] 17/5 29/2 93/11 106/22
112/20 115/15 116/16 120/13 122/21 125/25 125/25 127/15 129/25 130/13 130/22 193/2 203/19 204/8 234/12 252/25 253/18 268/21
were [200] 5/6 5/21 8/20 13/16 14/14 14/17 14/23 15/23 16/3 16/4 16/6 16/18 16/22 17/13 17/21 19/10 35/13 38/1 38/2 40/25 45/12 46/21 49/22 50/4 54/4 55/20 55/20 55/25 56/8 57/16 58/11 60/18 62/23 62/23 63/13 65/1 66/14 66/22 67/23 72/2 74/18 75/3 75/5 76/4 76/6 76/14 76/17 78/22 79/6 79/18 82/16 84/21 86/12 86/24 87/19 88/5 90/10 92/18 94/2 94/4 94/8 97/5 97/6 100/2 102/13 109/16 109/19 110/6 110/6 110/12 111/3 111/6 111/10 111/18 112/25 113/18 114/2 114/24 116/6 116/20 116/21 116/21 117/7 117/10 117/25 118/22 118/25 119/1 120/12 120/12 120/15 121/4 121/23 122/23 123/14 123/14 123/16 123/18 124/16 125/18 126/9 127/20 127/25 128/2 128/23 130/18 130/19 131/4 132/19 133/19 137/3 138/13 140/21 141/2 141/7 144/12 144/23 145/25 147/11 154/1 154/18 154/18 157/2 157/3 159/7 163/13 173/22 174/23 175/9 175/9 176/14 176/15 177/22 178/11 178/25 179/24 180/24 185/10 187/4 187/4 189/17 189/17 190/9 191/10 191/18 193/23 194/20 195/4 199/20 199/22 199/24 200/12 201/7 203/23 203/24 203/24 203/25 204/25 208/16 219/1 219/4 219/6 219/8 220/5 220/12 223/3 223/9 223/9 225/14 225/17 225/19 227/23 231/8 231/9 231/23 232/11 232/15 233/5 234/15 235/16 238/9 241/7 241/18 247/6 247/13 247/21 248/1 250/6 251/3 251/5 251/17 254/16 257/16 259/16 259/17 264/24 265/24 274/24 277/2 279/21
weren't [5] 116/6 118/22 224/10 225/8 233/6
what [366]
whatever [16] 29/2 29/17 32/24 56/8 57/23 60/5 68/23 71/3 73/23 75/21 83/14 101/10 104/2 116/23 196/21 198/7
when [131] 5/19 5/19 9/3 11/2 13/7 14/19 15/20 15/21 18/7 20/25 21/19 22/6 24/16 25/3 26/8 27/20 27/23 28/15 32/6 40/25 45/4 47/4 47/11 62/1 63/13 63/16 63/19 64/1 65/12 65/12 65/13

67/25 70/21 72/8 76/11 76/17 77/7 80/1 80/5 93/9 93/16 93/16 94/1 96/22 98/3 103/11 104/5 104/5 107/1 107/1 107/10 108/9 110/2 112/7 112/13 112/15 112/18 112/24 113/18 120/17 124/6 127/14 128/10 128/23 129/11 130/14 130/18 130/18 131/4 132/16 143/10 144/19 145/4 145/11 146/5 150/19 152/10 153/7 154/3 154/20 157/9 159/9 160/4 164/18 164/22 165/3 167/7 170/18 176/3 176/25 177/11 178/9 178/14 185/7 187/4 187/4 187/18 187/20 187/21 188/9 193/5 193/21 194/1 195/9 198/16 199/23 203/12 204/3 204/6 204/10 204/14 207/18 213/9 213/11 214/6 216/6 219/12 222/18 224/9 231/5 242/20 244/10 244/14 251/5 251/17 258/24 264/14 267/16 269/8 276/10 276/20
whenever [2] 152/17 275/5
where [85] 5/4 11/8 11/9 11/15 14/11 16/15 16/15 16/18 17/25 20/23 23/1 24/25 25/7 26/11 29/12 30/6 30/12 32/25 33/5 39/9 47/2 47/5 48/17 51/23 57/17 60/24 62/16 63/20 72/2 79/3 79/10 92/18 97/8 99/18 101/2 102/15 113/7 114/21 114/23 123/25 126/24 127/9 128/3 129/5 131/22 132/3 132/5 133/2 141/7 143/23 145/23 152/25 157/2 157/3 158/16 159/7 164/23 164/24 165/11 165/17 167/2 169/1 170/13 179/19 180/20 180/24 181/13 181/23 191/6 191/10 194/19 201/9 206/13 215/18 223/22 225/17 235/7 235/18 245/9 246/21 246/22 249/23 257/16 266/16 274/17
whereof [1] 280/12
Whereupon [3] 12/7 105/17 157/13 wherever [1] 84/22
whether [44] 16/5 16/25 30/21 42/20 50/25 55/25 68/16 75/5 84/23 85/11 85/12 91/6 102/16 110/24 121/17 124/5 124/17 144/11 175/20 195/20 208/12 219/10 219/14 221/8 221/12 222/24 232/16 233/11 247/19 255/12 255/13 256/20 264/12 264/19 264/20 267/3 269/14 270/3 270/17 273/22 276/2 277/8 277/10 277/14
which [76] 6/12 7/6 16/20 27/9 32/1 33/20 34/3 34/13 36/17 37/18 38/14 38/16 41/11 42/2 45/16 46/11 50/12 50/17 51/3 52/25 55/5 56/25 59/2 61/4 62/20 65/4 66/16 68/10 68/11 72/22 76/21 78/25 79/1 79/6 80/17 93/20 99/7 99/17 108/10 108/18 110/18 111/21 115/22 117/2 118/7 128/5 129/17 146/9 147/16 150/23 157/25 158/1 168/8 181/15 188/3 198/1 201/7 205/24 209/16 213/4 224/5 237/13 242/13 243/9 247/14 249/4 252/20 252/25 254/5 256/25 257/11 258/15 262/15 272/7 274/19 277/1
while [16] 13/16 14/17 17/18 60/17 68/6 94/2 117/10 122/18 134/8 185/10 189/14 242/3 243/21 249/11 253/25 269/22
who [75] 6/5 6/5 6/19 6/22 9/24 9/25 12/18 15/18 17/18 18/6 20/1 21/13 23/6

## W

who... [62] 28/3 28/20 30/9 41/12 41/15 41/18 41/20 54/4 60/7 60/7 60/8 68/22 69/3 74/20 83/5 85/18 85/19 88/14 88/24 89/13 90/12 91/5 95/25 98/10 98/15 99/8 105/2 110/13 117/16 123/6 146/22 161/5 161/21 165/14 168/23 168/23 177/4 177/15 178/7 184/18 185/2 185/18 187/10 197/23 198/6 198/14 201/10 201/20 211/9 215/22 219/18 220/8 221/15 221/15 233/11 235/25 250/21 252/25 253/11 253/18 276/7 279/3
whole [9] 57/20 70/13 78/11 148/6 148/7 202/6 229/18 245/17 256/16 wholly [1] 110/9
why [41] 7/4 7/18 9/1 9/23 10/10 10/10 10/15 24/23 30/20 35/3 39/16 58/14 59/16 59/17 59/18 61/4 61/12 61/23 61/23 63/18 64/21 75/25 77/18 78/19 79/1 79/18 82/2 92/5 111/1 141/6 145/15 150/20 156/24 163/5 176/19 211/19 226/9 228/13 250/6 261/23 267/8
wide [1] 231/8
wife [1] 124/1
WiFi [1] 74/12
wild [1] 5/22
will [140] 1/3 5/11 7/7 7/9 7/13 7/13 7/22 7/24 8/3 8/12 8/13 9/17 9/22 10/9 11/5 25/1 25/6 25/8 25/12 26/8 28/4 28/10 28/13 28/16 31/3 34/4 34/5 34/17 36/3 36/16 56/10 65/17 68/5 71/10 72/15 73/13 74/11 74/25 75/9 75/21 81/22 88/13 88/21 90/4 90/4 96/19 96/21 96/24 96/24 97/1 97/2 97/20 97/22 98/11 98/11 98/17 98/18 99/7 99/11 99/12 99/14 99/16 99/17 99/17 100/5 100/13 101/12 134/25 145/11 147/23 148/16 156/20 158/14 158/15 160/9 164/16 164/17 164/25 165/1 165/4 165/6 165/7 165/8 165/10 166/6 166/7 166/8 167/9 167/10 168/21 168/23 168/24 168/25 169/25 171/16 171/18 171/24 171/25 172/6 172/12 172/13 173/15 173/15 173/17 173/18 173/19 173/20 174/1 174/2 174/11 174/13 174/15 174/17 174/22 175/8 175/9 175/11 175/13 175/21 175/24 175/24 175/25 179/10 179/12 183/12 192/20 197/18 197/20 198/17 206/3 213/5 228/22 235/3 236/20 240/16 246/6 246/9 257/9 278/13 279/11
WILLIAM [2] 2/13 2/18
willing [1] $85 / 13$
window [1] 174/1
windows [4] 64/16 148/2 149/24
149/25
wireless [1] 11/11
withdraw [2] 196/20 199/18
withheld [1] 72/20
within [16] 20/6 67/5 70/22 85/6 112/9 114/13 115/18 115/19 116/22 124/11 129/17 135/1 147/11 151/23 215/22 267/4
without [18] 55/7 68/20 74/19 103/5 117/18 150/16 173/3 189/25 191/15

197/4 220/20 244/11 248/15 257/13 274/18 275/1 278/16 279/3
witness [56] $4 / 310 / 2311 / 211 / 2212 / 1$ 30/14 30/18 31/4 31/9 36/8 40/19 41/3 41/5 49/14 52/9 52/18 53/11 53/14 55/10 57/19 58/23 59/2 60/1 60/2 60/15 61/17 68/6 69/3 74/3 78/24 80/17 85/24 94/13 97/12 103/5 103/7 105/2 105/9 112/2 143/10 143/23 146/10 148/14 155/25 156/19 169/12 182/19 189/14 199/14 200/25 201/1 215/12 258/10 270/7 274/23 277/25
witness' [2] 65/12 259/7
witnesses [6] 7/23 8/8 8/21 59/10 214/22 215/25
won't [2] 94/18 173/9
Wonderful [1] 255/1
wondering [1] 158/25
words [5] 81/6 82/14 88/21 152/13 163/21
work [41] 5/12 7/15 8/1 30/8 31/4 73/22 90/7 98/24 99/11 106/3 106/7 106/17 109/1 109/20 110/2 113/4 113/16 115/18 115/19 119/3 120/11 124/11 124/25 125/3 128/12 129/13 138/14 139/17 139/17 142/22 151/16 156/17 156/18 186/2 192/9 204/17 204/18 235/15 235/17 269/7 269/13 worked [18] 14/7 15/8 20/21 45/24 47/17 53/7 71/23 106/1 106/21 107/1 107/5 107/19 108/7 109/18 120/4 192/9 255/14 271/9
worker [65] 81/2 83/19 88/13 90/18 90/24 94/23 95/25 96/17 96/19 97/1 98/16 98/18 100/1 100/13 101/23 157/6 157/20 157/24 158/8 158/14 159/8 159/20 160/5 160/20 161/5 161/8 161/10 161/11 161/12 161/20 161/21 162/7 162/14 162/20 163/23 164/6 164/21 164/25 165/4 165/5 167/12 168/3 168/22 168/24 168/25 171/6 172/3 172/11 172/12 172/16 173/1 173/11 173/16 174/25 177/19 178/17 183/8 183/17 186/15 218/19 226/19 230/17 240/7 245/17 247/13
workers [36] 30/1 82/5 82/24 83/4 83/5 88/11 90/8 90/16 90/22 90/24 98/8 98/9 98/17 98/21 99/11 159/13 169/23 171/16 171/24 174/15 175/11 175/25 176/5 177/1 177/9 177/17 186/21 187/4 191/4 217/12 227/23 230/23 240/13 240/17 240/20 248/23
working [25] 6/11 6/16 8/20 14/12 21/16 76/2 80/4 85/19 98/10 98/12 98/13 98/21 112/25 120/23 121/25 124/4 132/23 145/25 158/12 160/12 216/17 255/9 255/10 260/17 278/23
workload [1] 113/6
works [5] 27/20 120/11 121/13 126/24 189/21
world [1] 130/2
worried [1] 65/1
worry [1] 116/10
worst [2] 53/3 64/4
worth [2] 32/24 196/21
would [240] 7/21 8/1 11/8 12/3 15/18
16/1 16/10 16/24 16/25 18/15 23/17
26/23 27/6 29/19 29/21 32/17 32/19

33/7 35/18 36/6 38/9 39/2 39/6 42/15 43/18 47/4 47/14 47/14 47/17 47/20 47/23 47/25 49/4 49/6 49/6 50/22 52/1 52/11 52/17 52/25 53/2 53/3 53/8 54/10 55/13 57/21 58/7 58/10 58/15 59/12 59/22 62/21 62/25 63/13 64/1 64/2 64/11 64/12 65/4 69/12 69/13 69/23 69/23 69/24 70/15 72/10 72/19 73/2 73/4 74/7 74/8 77/18 77/20 77/24 78/5 79/19 80/8 83/1 83/8 85/4 87/7 87/19 90/12 90/14 90/15 92/7 92/14 92/14 102/24 105/7 112/3 113/8 118/17 121/18 123/12 125/22 127/2 131/17 131/20 133/23 134/1 135/9 135/12 137/16 138/16 140/12 141/19 141/21 142/11 142/16 142/18 142/22 143/1 143/1 143/16 144/6 144/9 144/18 145/22 146/3 146/4 146/7 146/11 148/15 150/14 151/5 151/16 152/15 157/6 157/7 159/12 159/24 160/1 160/3 160/18 161/9 162/17 163/5 163/6 164/1 164/2 164/15 165/17 167/25 169/13 181/17 182/12 183/20 190/25 191/12 191/25 192/4 193/19 193/24 197/8 198/15 201/23 204/16 204/24 204/24 206/6 207/14 207/15 208/4 208/7 208/14 209/5 213/23 214/4 218/21 218/23 218/23 221/19 221/19 222/2 222/6 222/9 222/11 226/1 226/17 226/19 226/25 227/2 227/4 229/19 229/20 229/21 232/12 232/17 234/7 234/7 235/17 236/4 236/18 237/6 238/25 241/14 241/15 241/18 241/23 244/19 245/17 245/19 246/23 246/25 247/1 248/7 249/2 252/22 254/4 255/16 255/25 256/24 258/13 258/19 258/21 258/24 261/5 262/18 263/9 264/21 265/7 265/22 265/24 265/25 266/10 266/14 269/2 270/6 271/19 273/3 276/19 276/24 276/25 277/20 278/2 278/5 278/21 279/5 279/7
wouldn't [7] 111/1 127/6 134/11 134/11 135/24 203/20 234/7
wrap [2] 117/21 179/4
wrapping [1] 115/14
wrecks [1] 5/22
write [6] 31/1 74/14 96/24 96/24
175/15 218/15
write-ins [1] 31/1
writes [1] 254/21
writing [4] 73/2 145/9 217/16 218/4
written [12] 91/9 140/19 140/21 144/24
172/15 177/8 178/11 192/18 192/19
222/3 231/24 234/18
wrong [2] 82/14 110/8
wrongly [1] 184/16
wrote [3] 137/6 137/16 257/9

## Y

y'all [2] 31/15 36/5
y'all's [1] 156/15
yeah [45] 26/21 30/22 34/16 36/1 48/13 69/18 77/22 92/7 108/21 115/5 122/9 122/9 122/10 123/11 123/16 124/16 124/19 126/21 128/12 129/9 129/25 131/2 131/3 132/12 133/3 134/11 138/9 139/21 141/18 144/14 145/17 146/2 150/13 163/6 199/19 209/16 210/17

| Y | 85/11 86/15 86/15 87/5 93/5 113/21 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| yeah... [8] 225/7 231/4 254/2 259/5 259/18 263/15 277/2 277/5 year [16] 20/18 32/1 46/12 67/14 77/13 107/6 107/9 107/13 193/2 193/3 193/7 222/22 223/1 249/25 249/25 253/19 years [10] 14/15 24/22 93/25 106/5 107/7 107/21 107/22 124/5 134/7 207/24 <br> yep [8] 117/9 134/3 136/23 138/9 142/15 213/2 257/18 263/23 yes [253] 12/14 17/9 18/22 18/25 19/21 20/11 21/6 21/12 21/22 22/4 23/16 23/19 27/16 27/22 29/5 30/10 31/11 31/19 31/22 32/8 32/21 35/12 36/10 36/22 36/22 36/24 37/1 37/5 40/10 40/20 41/17 41/22 43/12 43/25 44/5 44/19 44/25 45/14 48/2 48/4 48/10 48/22 49/6 49/16 49/24 50/6 54/23 56/21 61/10 62/11 63/23 65/20 75/17 75/20 80/23 81/7 81/15 83/24 84/3 84/13 84/16 86/11 88/18 89/5 89/7 89/19 91/4 91/11 92/3 92/25 94/7 94/14 95/15 98/11 98/13 99/1 99/5 99/24 100/11 101/8 103/18 106/16 106/19 109/19 109/25 111/9 113/11 113/11 115/2 115/21 116/4 116/20 117/24 118/13 119/5 119/7 120/7 121/5 122/2 122/3 122/4 133/10 134/6 135/11 136/8 138/3 138/20 141/21 143/13 146/20 149/6 149/23 151/9 151/13 152/5 154/16 155/8 158/22 159/21 160/2 162/19 162/22 164/5 164/10 165/22 166/2 167/23 168/6 168/10 171/3 171/10 171/22 172/18 172/22 173/8 174/5 174/8 175/3 175/6 175/19 175/22 176/9 176/22 177/14 177/24 178/3 179/1 179/6 180/8 180/11 180/17 181/1 181/6 181/8 181/11 184/25 187/17 190/11 194/9 194/13 195/6 196/9 196/12 198/5 203/14 203/18 205/12 207/22 208/1 208/25 209/23 212/6 212/13 212/16 212/20 212/24 213/1 213/8 214/12 214/16 215/7 218/24 219/7 221/3 221/6 221/11 221/14 223/20 223/24 224/2 224/8 224/23 225/2 225/20 227/17 229/3 230/15 230/25 231/4 232/1 232/6 233/3 234/8 235/4 237/5 238/4 238/8 239/11 239/15 $240 / 24$ 242/5 242/22 243/1 244/9 244/13 246/14 246/18 248/17 248/21 249/22 250/18 254/3 256/5 257/21 257/24 260/3 260/7 260/12 260/20 260/24 261/13 262/20 263/5 264/2 265/5 265/12 265/21 268/20 269/11 269/20 269/24 269/25 270/1 270/14 270/15 271/8 271/11 272/6 272/10 273/9 276/1 276/18 277/15 yesterday [1] 278/23 yet [12] 21/7 29/25 30/8 56/5 83/6 94/17 94/18 165/8 193/11 206/4 233/13 233/18 <br> you [1164] <br> you'll [7] 11/10 61/1 103/13 155/13 227/13 257/5 264/7 <br> you're [51] 5/18 27/24 34/20 52/10 60/1 64/22 74/5 79/23 79/24 83/13 | 130/4 144/11 155/17 156/5 166/20 <br> 175/1 181/23 184/9 184/18 185/14 |  |
|  | 186/7 194/10 194/14 202/20 205/4 |  |
|  | 208/5 212/3 220/19 223/1 225/3 225/21 |  |
|  | 232/8 234/11 238/3 238/5 238/17 |  |
|  | 238/18 239/25 258/25 259/4 260/2 |  |
|  | 271/6 275/21 277/9 279/14 |  |
|  | you've [18] 43/11 86/6 119/17 181/12 |  |
|  | 181/13 181/18 182/1 182/1 191/24 |  |
|  | 269/18 269/21 270/9 277/23 |  |
|  | you-all [1] 71/4 |  |
|  | your [340] |  |
|  | yourself [4] 230/10 232/19 249/19 |  |
|  | 257/6 [4] ${ }^{\text {c }}$ |  |
|  | yourselves [1] 10/20 |  |
|  | youth [2] 237/4 237/5 |  |
|  | Z |  |
|  | zColo [1] 117/2 |  |
|  | zero [15] 99/20 101/24 113/14 113/15 |  |
|  | 158/18 161/15 161/25 162/1 162/2 |  |
|  | zeros [1] 165/5 |  |
|  | zip [6] 149/20 149/22 150/17 231/8 |  |
|  | 231/9 231/22 |  |
|  | Zoom [2] 11/9 120/2 |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
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